JOE YARKPAWOLO and his wife, and RACHEL JOHNSON-MASSAQUOI, DANLETTE JOHNSON-TUCKER, CATHERINE JOHNSONWHISNATN, R. H. WRIGHT-BREWER, RAE BREWER-WILES, by and through her husband, LOUIS A. WILES, GABRIEL EL PHILIPS, VICTORIA JOHNSON-CURRIE, by and through her husband, HAROLD CURRIE, and CHARLES R. JOHNSON, heirs of G. M. JOHNSON and F. E. R. JOHNSON, deceased, Appellants, v. JOHN Y. ROBERTSON and GENEVA JOHNSON-DUFF, by and through her husband, ADOLF DUFF, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued November 4, 1968. Decided February 7, 1969. 1. A sale or conveyance of jointly held property may be made by the act of all of the co-tenants joining in such conveyance or ratifying, but one joint tenant acting alone cannot convey a portion of jointly owned property. 2. In ejectment, the plaintiff must recover upon proof of title, whose strength must be evidenced by a continuous and consistent chain. 3. In ejectment, the plantiff must show a legal and not merely an equitable title to the property in dispute, and mere showing of heritable blood does not sufficiently establish a legal title. An action of ejectment was brought by plaintiffs, who purchased the property from one of the heirs to an undivided estate, of which the land sold was a part. They sought to evict a prior purchaser who had paid the sale price in escrow, for the same parcel from the same grantor, pending division of the property among the heirs consenting to the transaction. The other heirs intervened. A jury verdict was returned for the plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the court. An appeal was taken from the judgment. Judgment reversed. 226 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 227 J. Dossen Richards and Philip J. L. Brumskine for appellants. The Simpson law firm, by G. P. CongerThompson and Samuel Perry Baker for appellees. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the court. John Y. Robertson brought an action of ejectment against Joe Yarkpawolo and his wife, to evict them from a piece of property located in Monrovia, and situated in the area known as “Buzzie Quarter.” Before the disposition of the issues of law involved, when pleadings had progressed to the surrejoinder, upon motion filed March 13, 1967, and granted by the court, intervenorsappellants entered the case. Pleadings advanced as far as the surrebutter, and on February 13, 1968, the issues of law having been resolved, the case was ruled to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on February 2 1, 1968. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence which was denied. Subsequently, defendants appealed from the final judgment. The case arose from the following facts. F. E. R. Johnson, of Monrovia, died seized of real property situated in Monrovia, Buzzie Quarters, consisting of a sevenacre lot, which after his death descended to his two sons, F. E. R. Johnson and G. M. Johnson. They died seized of the property without having provided properly for its disposition, though they had sought to partition it before their deaths. Despite this, Mrs. Geneva Johnson Duff, the oldest heir of F. E. R. Johnson, unilaterally and without the assent of the other heirs, bargained, sold and conveyed to John Y. Robertson, plaintiff in the ejectment suit, a half-lot portion of the undivided and unallotted sevenacre lot of land situated in Buzzie Quarters. In passing, we would like to mention that the instrument of convey- 228 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ance was put into evidence and forms part of the record certified to us. This document, as other warranty deeds, contained an authority-to-convey clause : “That at and until the ensealing of these presents, I/we was (were) lawfully seized in fee simple of the aforesaid granted premises, that they are free from encumbrances; that I/we have good right to sell and convey to the said John Y. Robertson, his/her/their heirs and assigns forever, as aforesaid ; and that I/we, will and my heirs, executors and administrators and assigns shall warrant and defend the same to the said John Y. Robertson, his/her/their heirs and assigns forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.” The record also disclosed that eight months prior to the sale, September 7, 1965, from Mrs. Duff to John Y. Robertson, Joe Yarkpawolo also dealt with Mrs. Duff for the purchase of a lot which included the same piece of property, subsequently sold to Robertson, upon which Yarkpawolo had settled prior to paying $750 to her on December 22, 1964. This was strongly denied when she took the witness stand and these questions were propounded to her : “Q. In your testimony you said that defendant Yarkpawolo was to buy this property from you for $75 0.00, but up to the time you sold it to the plaintiff you have not seen that money, even though Mr. Emmett Harmon had advanced it to Mr. Yarkpawolo. Is it not a fact that when Mr. Yarkpawolo came to know that the property you were selling him was joint property of the Johnson estate, and that you alone had no right to single-handedly dispose of any portion of that property, he declined to purchase the land from you? “A. Defendant Yarkpawolo approached me for the purchase of a piece of land to which I con- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 229 sented, but afterwards, considering that houses were built thereon, I told him I could not sell him the property. As a matter of fact, the amount is with Mr. Brewer. “Q. I suggest that you are making a mistake, your memory is failing you. What caused you to change your mind and sell the property to the plaintiff was the fact that Yarkpawolo, the defendant, having come to know that the property did not belong to you alone, but to the Johnson estate, you could not sell it, and he therefore gave the money to Mrs. Rachel Massaquoi and other members of the family in your presence to be held until such time that the property could have been partitioned, and each know his or her share. Is it not what happened? “A. I could not sell the land because houses were on the land. “Q. If what you say is true that you could not sell him that particular lot because houses were built on it, did you offer to sell him another lot on which there were no houses? [Objection: On the ground irrelevancy; the Court: objections sustained. To which defendant excepted.] “Q. We appreciate that you are not very well and that your memory could deceive you; but I therefore jog your memory by asking you, did you not on December 2, 1964, receive $750.00 from Yarkpawolo, the defendant, with the understanding that you would sell him one lot when the property is partitioned? “A. No, I did not receive the money from Yarkpawolo. The young man was working with Mr. Emmett Harmon, and Brewer told Mr. Harmon not to pay me the money. “Q. And so, do you tell this court and jury you did not, on December 22, 1964, sign a note of hand 230 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS in favor of Mr. Joe Yarkpawolo, your signature to which receipt was witnessed by two persons? “A. Yes. I made out a paper, and after discovering what I did, I told him that I could not sell him the property; but I did not receive one cent of the money.” We find it difficult to give honor to this testimony due to the following note of hand : “For and in consideration of the amount of $75o.00, I, Geneva Johnson-Duff, of the City of Monrovia, Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia, one of the heirs of the late F. E. R. Johnson, do, for myself, my heirs, assigns and administrators, promise to issue a deed for one lot of land belonging to the Johnsons’ heirs located at the Buzzie Quarters, to Mr. Joe Yarkpawolo, as soon as it is surveyed and my share assigned to me. “Done in Monrovia, Liberia, this 22nd day of December, 1964. “[Sgd.] GENEVA JOHNSON DUFF. “Witnesses : “[Sgd.] JOSEPH W. HOWARD “[Sgd.] DANIEL BOYMAH.” The record further shows that Joe Yarkpawolo, having learned of the joint ownership, and apprehensive of purchase without warranty, approached the other heirs. A family conference was held and a mutual understanding was reached to accommodate Mr. Yarkpawolo, in that an amount of $937.00 was paid through Mr. Herbert Brewer, this amount to be held pending the partitioning of the property according to the receipt marked exhibit This amount was paid on August 13, 1965 ; still, Mrs. Duff, who participated in the family conference and endorsed its conclusions, sold the half-lot on September 7, 1965 to Robertson. Thus, we have attempted to give a summary of the sur- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 231 rounding circumstances of the case. Though there are other issues of interest, we prefer to limit our determination to the following: ( ) Did Mrs. Duff have legal authority to sell? (2) Is appellee Robertson vested with title to justify an ejectment suit? The entire case is centered around these two issues which were raised by appellants throughout their pleadings, during the trial, and strenuously argued before us. This is a piece of property jointly owned by the heirs of the late F. E. R. Johnson and G. M. Johnson, in which they all share equally. As mentioned earlier in this opinion, no division of the property has been effected so as to sever this joint ownership, giving to each of the heirs individual title in fee simple which would authorize conveyance to third parties. Did Mrs. Duff hold a fee simple? “A title in fee or fee simple is a full and absolute estate, beyond and outside of which there is no other interest or right; a title to the whole of the thing absolutely; it is an indefeasible title or estate, in which is blended the right of possession and the right of property.” 31 C.J.S., Estates, � 8. During the trial, Mrs. Duff admitted that the property was not partitioned when, during direct examination, she said : “I have been asking the family over and over again to divide the property and give me my share or every place where the property is jointly owned, and they have refused to. So I sold half a lot to Mr. Robertson. “I am asking this court to please have the Buzzie Quarters surveyed and my portion turned over to me.” This is evidence given by Mrs. Duff herself which substantiates appellants’ contention that the property was not apportioned, hence there was no title to convey. The division which is made between several persons of lands is either voluntary or compulsory. Voluntary divi- 232 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS sion is that made by the owners by mutual consent. It is effected by mutual conveyances or releases to each person of the share which he is to hold executed by the owners. A compulsory partition is that which takes place without regard to the wishes of one or more of the owners. If it appeared to Mrs. Duff that the other heirs were reluctant to partition the property, she could have proceeded through the second means of partitioning. But strangely, Mrs. Duff bases her authority to sell on the unchallenged and uncontested acts of her sister, Victoria, and brother, Charles, which she testified to : “My sister, Victoria, was the first person to sell the land in Buzzie Quarters and no one said anything to her, so I sold the half-lot to the plaintiff with the understanding that when the property is partitioned, this will be deducted from my share.” On direct examination she also said : “I was not the first person who sold land to other people out of the family. My sister, Victoria, was the first person to sell land in Buzzie Quarters. They have not bothered her, it is I whom they have come to bother. When it comes to the Johnsons’ joint property, my late father was the oldest; his brother, Gabriel Johnson, was the next. Mr. Brewer is the end to the property, his mother was the youngest. When it comes to the division of the property I am the oldest and my father was the oldest. Mr. Brewer employed his surveyors whom he wants to survey the land in Buzzie Quarters. He ordered Mr. Scotland, the surveyor, to go to Buzzie Quarters and survey the lots that my sister, Victoria, had sold to the Buzzie people. Issued deeds to them. I told the surveyors that I defy him to put his foot on the Johnsons’ property.” To further expose the illegal acts of her sister and brother, she elected to put into evidence copies of two warranty deeds, marked by court exhibits “A” and “B,” issued by Charles R. Johnson and Victoria Johnson Bal- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 233 thazara. The doctrine of stare decisis, which is to “abide by former precedents” could not easily be confused with the acts of her brother and sister, since their doings have not been brought into litigation, and a judicial decision of approbation given. “A sale or conveyance of joint property before severance may be made by the act of all of the co-tenants joining therein; but one joint tenant acting alone cannot sell or convey the joint property so as to bind his co-tenants or divest them of the interest therein unless they have previously authorized or subsequently ratified such sale or conveyance, and in the absence of such authorization or ratification, a contract of sale is not binding on a joint tenant who does not sign it. . . .” Appellees stressed that the intervenors gave their consents to the sale of the property in question. Even though there is no direct showing that the heirs, the intervenors, gave approval, would such a consent as referred to by appellees legalize the transaction? “A sale or conveyance of joint property may be made by the act of all of the co-tenants joining therein; but one joint tenant acting alone cannot sell nor convey joint property.” Coming to the second issue, if Mrs. Duff lacked a title to convey, would anyone acquiring property from her be vested with legal title? Mrs. Duff had no title to the property; therefore, she could not convey to any person or persons. This court has held in Cooper-King v. Scott, [1963] LRSC 38; 15 L.L.R. 390 (1963), that a plaintiff in ejectment must recover upon proof of title, which must be evidenced by a continuous and consistent chain, and he must recover unaided by any defects or mistakes of the defendant. Proof of the plaintiff’s title must be beyond question, and not presumed, but must be established. In this case, appellee Robertson is without this chain of 234 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS title, nor has his grantor the right to convey to him. Appellee Duff seems to rely on her inheritance to be obtained. As to this, the Court has held that in ejectment the plaintiff must show a legal and not merely an equitable title to the property in dispute. Horace v. Harris, [1947] LRSC 14; 9 L.L.R. 372 (1947) Also see Cooper v. Cooper Scott, ii L.L.R. 7 (1951) where the Court said, in an action of ejectment, the mere showing of heritable blood does not sufficiently establish title, and title must be proved for the party to prevail. Because of the foregoing, we find ourselves compelled to reverse the judgment of the lower court, and the clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to that court and the judge, informing him of this judgment. And it is hereby so ordered. – Reversed.