SAMUEL WHITE, Petitioner, v. HON. NAPOLEON B. THORPE, Chairman, MICHAEL M. JOHNSON and J. HEZEKIAH GEORGE,

Members, Special Traffic Court, Montserrado County, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS. Decided September 1, 1971. 1. The Special Traffic Court established and maintained in Monrovia pursuant to Presidential proclamation in 1962 and 1963, under the Emergency Powers Act, even if its continuance can still be considered authoriied, cannot deny the right of appeal to persons convicted before it. The petitioner was convicted in the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia for failing to yield the right of way. He announced an appeal which the Court refused to grant, contending no right of appeal existed in that court, having been established by Presidential proclamation in 1962 and 1963, pursuant to the Emergency Powers Act. The appeal bond nonetheless tendered for approval by the petitioner was refused and mandamus was sought to compel .acceptance of the bond and to have his appeal granted. The Chief Justice granted the application. The Solicitor General for respondents. No other ap- pearances indicated. PIERRE, C. J., presiding in chambers. Petitioner herein prays for mandamus, and has complained against the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia, and has alleged in his petition that from a judgment against him for failing to yield the right of way, he announced an appeal which the Special Traffic Court . refused to grant. 644 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 645 The petition states that notwithstanding the judges’ refusal to record the exceptions to the judgment, and the announcement of an appeal therefrom, petitioner still prepared and submitted his appeal bond in keeping with law, but that the court refused to approve the appeal bond, and stated as grounds for such refusal that the court is a “Special Traffic Court” from which appeal is not granted, because they have “emergency power.” The petition prays for process to compel approval of his bond and granting of his appeal. The Solicitor General prepared and filed a return for the respondents, in which he contends that the petition should not be granted, in keeping with the law upon which he relied (The Emergency Powers Act passed by the Legislature in 1969/70) . Because of the importance of the issue which is raised, I think it is necessary to quote counts two and three of the respondents’ return. “2. That respondents Napoleon B. Thorpe, Chairman of the Traffic Board, Michael M. Johnson and Hezekiah George, Members, correctly and legally denied petitioner’s appeal and of approving an appeal bond, based on the provisions of law as recited in an Act restoring and enlarging powers granted the President of Liberia, passed during the Session 1969-197o. Under the provisions of said Act the Chief Executive has the power to establish Special Tribunals when in his opinion it was for public safety and the safety of the state to do so. In this case the rapidly increasing automobile accidents in Montserrado County endangered the public safety. And this Special Traffic Court has authority under the provisions of the Act to make regulations and rules of procedure for apprehension, conduct of trials and conviction. In addition, the Act provides for such Special Courts to arrest with warrant and detain without the benefit of bail any 646 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS person considered dangerous and a threat to the public safety and safety of the State. In order to curb the rapidly increasing automobile accidents resulting in death and property damage, this Special Traffic Court was established and is not governed by the strict judicial procedure rules. “3. That until now the Legislature has not reestablished regular Traffic Courts under the judicial department of Government. Under provisions of the Constitution of Liberia, Article IV, the judicial power of this Republic shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such subordinate courts as the Legislature may from time to time establish. The Special Traffic Court having been established under the Act providing for the Emergency Powers of the President does not comply with or conform to the strict judicial procedures rules of appeals because of the peculiar executive nature of its powers and functions.” During the argument, the Solicitor General contended that the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia was established by the President’s Proclamation in 1962; and that this was done on authority of an Emergency Powers Act passed by the Legislature. He argued that by the authority granted by the said Emergency Powers Act, this Special Traffic Court had a right to deny an appeal in traffic cases heard and determined by it, pursuant to the governing presidential, proclamation. “A Proclamation by the President “WHEREAS, on August Seventh, Nineteen Hundred and Sixty-two, a Proclamation was issued by me dissolving the Traffic Court, appointing Special Courts to determine all traffic matters and suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in all matters of accidents pertaining to traffic offenses occurring within the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 647 County of Montserrado and the Central Province for a period of six (6) months from August 15, 1962; and “WHEREAS, the situation in Montserrado County and the Central Province has not improved to warrant the termination of the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in all matters of accidents pertaining to traffic offenses and to dissolve the Special Courts ; “Now THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM V. S. TUBMAN, President of the Republic of Liberia, by virtue of the authority and power in me vested by provision of Section I (f) of THE ACT TO RESTORE AND ENLARGE EMERGENCY POWERS GRANTED THE PRESIDENT OF LIBERIA, October 9, 1962, the relevant portion of which reads as follows. “(f) To exercise the following administrative powers when deemed necessary; ( ) To take all administrative and political measures conducive to the safety of the State and the welfare and protection of the citizens thereof,’ . . . do hereby extend the provisions of the Proclamation of August 15, 1962, suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in all matters of accidents pertaining to traffic offenses occurring within the County of Montserrado and the Central Province and establishing the three Special Courts to handle all traffic matters for an additional period of six (6) months from February 15, 1963.” It does not seem to me that this Proclamation, or section I (f) of the Emergency Powers Act mentioned therein, makes any reference to the subject of the present litigation, that the Legislature has by passage of the Emergency Powers Act granted the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia the right to deny a party an appeal from its judgment. But could the Legislature by this Act give the Special Traffic Court or any other subordinate court in Liberia any such authority, in face of Article IV of the Constitution? “Judicial power of this Republic shall be vested in 64S LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS one Supreme Court, and such subordinate courts as the Legislature may from time to time establish. . . .” Section 1st. According to this provision of the Constitution, all judicial power was vested in the Supreme Court of Liberia, and such subordinate courts established after 1847. I understand by this provision of the Constitution, that all subordinate courts exercising judicial functions within this Republic, and established by the Legislature since the signing of the Constitution, come within Article IV, Section 1st. It could be argued (but this point was not raised), that the Special Traffic Court established in 1962 by Proclamation of the President was not established by the Legislature as provided by the Constitution. But this point would seem to prompt the following questions : Does the Special Traffic Court exercise judicial functions? If it does, could the judicial functions which it exercises fall outside Article IV, Section 1st? The Vehicle and Traffic Law, 1956 Code, 37:100 et seq., regulates the operation of motor vehicles, including the- “right of way.” Violations are chargeable in the traffic courts of the Country, and appeals from any judgments of these traffic courts are brought before the circuit courts. There is no exception made in the case of the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia unless respondents want to contend that they do not come within the Judicial Department of Government. Appellate procedure in these cases is clearly set forth. “Appeals from Commissioner and Inspectors of Traffic. An appeal from the Commissioner or any Inspector of Traffic shall be taken to the Circuit Court of the county in which the matter was heard or, in the case of Hinterland districts, to the Circuit Court of the county nearest to the district in which such violation allegedly occurred.” 1956 Code, 37:204. “Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts. The Circuit Courts sitting in Quarterly Session shall have exclu- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 649 sive jurisdiction to hear cases of alleged violations of the provisions of this Title which are subject to penalties of more than fifty dollars or of imprisonment and to try all violations herein specifically classified as crimes.” Id., � 205. The violation of any traffic law is considered and classified as a crime. According to the position taken by the respondents in their return, no appeals can be taken from any judgments in these particular criminal cases. The implication here is that the “Special Traffic Court” in Monrovia should be regarded as a court of last review in criminal matters growing out of traffic violations. .They have contended in their return, and they have argued here, that the Special Traffic Court established by the President’s Proclamation under the Emergency Powers Act has authority to deny an appeal, contrary to procedure obtaining Article i of the Constitution. The question which still remains unanswered is : Can criminal cases be fully determined by the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia? If the answer is in the affirmative, then there are other questions : ( ) Under which of the three branches of Government does this Special Traffic Court hear and determine criminal cases growing out of traffic violations? ( 2) If they do not function under the Judiciary, then where do they fit, under Article 1, Section i4th of the Constitution, which provides for division of the powers of Government into branches? These constitutional questions are not only implied, but they are partially raised as a result of the references to the Constitution made in the petition and in the return. The constitutionality of the Emergency Powers Act has not been affirmatively raised. I would like to go back for a moment and review the relevant portion of the Emergency Powers Act referred to in the President’s Proclamation, under which the respondents claim to have acted in denying the petitioner an appeal from conviction of a traffic violation. 650 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS “To exercise the following administrative powers when deemed necessary: (r) to take all administrative and political measures conducive to the safety of the State and the welfare and protection of the citizens thereof.” Section i (f ). It is difficult for me to see, nor have the respondents sought to show, in what manner a vehicle operator failing to yield the right of way, could by this traffic violation, endanger “the safety of the State and the welfare and protection of the citizens thereof.” This particular provision of the Emergency Powers Act upon which the President predicated his Proclamation, authorized the President to “take all administrative and political measures necessary to protect the safety of the State and the welfare and protection of the citizens, during the period for which these emergency powers were granted.” Nowhere in this quoted provision of the Emergency Powers Act, or in the Proclamation growing out of it, has any reference been made to appeals from convictions of traffic violations before the Special Traffic Court. On the contrary, the Proclamation merely suspended “the writ of habeas corpus in all matters of accidents pertaining to traffic offenses.” These two things are not the same ; the suspension of habeas corpus in matters pertaining to traffic offenses, is entirely separate and distinct from granting or denying appeals in traffic matters. There is no relevance between these two, as far as I am concerned. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not deny the power of any subordinate court to hear and determine criminal cases ; nor does the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus authorize any subordinate courts to deny appeals in criminal cases accorded in keeping with judicial procedure of the Country. The fact that the Special Traffic Court hears and determines criminal cases, is sufficient evidence of the fact that it belongs to the Judiciary Department of the Government. But, LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 651 more important is the fact that the Constitution has not clothed the Executive branch with the power of trial and determination of criminal cases. On the contrary, it has forbidden the Executive Department from interfering with Judicial matters, according to Article 1, Section i4.th of the Constitution. Therefore, the President could not have intended that his Proclamation establishing the Special Traffic Court gave authority for this court to unauthorizedly set itself up as a court of last review, in violation of the Constitution which he swore to protect and defend. The Proclamation has not said so, and it is error for anyone to try to interpret the Proclamation, or read into the text thereof, anything which the literal meaning of words which compose the text has not conveyed. We come now to consider the duration for which the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia was established. According to the Proclamation quoted hereinabove, the functions of the regular traffic court were first suspended on August 15, 1962, by Proclamation of the President, for a period of six months, and in its stead the Special Traffic Court was by the same Proclamation established. In February, 1963, the provisions of this Proclamation were further extended for another period of six months, beginning on February 15. This extension of time for the existence of the Special Traffic Court expired in August 1963. It has not been contended, nor has any further Proclamation been produced to show, that under the Emergency Powers Act, which is still in effect, the President intended that the Special Traffic Court in Monrovia should continue to perform the duties of the regular traffic court. According to precedent set in 1962, and 1963, implementation of section 1(f) of the Emergency Powers Act has always been by Proclamation. Where for reasons unknown and not stated, this provision of the Emergency Powers Act has not been ordered enforced by Proclama- 652 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS tion, as was done in 1962, when this Special Court was first established, and 1963, when its functions were extended for another six months, it must be concluded that it was not intended that this Special Court was to continue beyond August, 1963. In any case, the continuance or noncontinuance of this Special subordinate court does not give it authority to deny appeals from its judgments. In keeping with the Constitution no such authority could be given in criminal cases. The circuit court still retains appellate jurisdiction over traffic matters heard by all traffic courts, and will continue to have this jurisdiction till some statute is passed to change this. In view of the foregoing, we have no alternative but to order the petitioner’s appeal bond approved nunc pro tunc to enable him to complete his appeal, if he so desires. The Clerk is also ordered to send a mandate down giving effect to these orders. This being a criminal case, costs are disallowed. Petition granted.