ALIU TAYLOR, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Argued October 31, 1961. Decided December 15, 1961.
1. Malice aforethought, as an element of the crime of murder, may be inferred from a deliberate act, and need not be grounded on actual or malevolence.
2. The corpus delicti of a murder may be established without production of the weapon alleged to have been used to effect the killing, and without evidence of a post mortem examination of the victim.
3. Proof of guilt of a crime will be deemed sufficient where the evidence thereof, even if circumstantial, is of such
nature as to convince any rational mind of the criminal responsibility of the accused.
4. Where a criminal trial was regular in all respects, and the evidence of guilt clear, cogent and convincing, a judgment of conviction will be affirmed.
On appeal from a judgment of conviction of murder, judgment affirmed. Michael M. Johnson for appellant. Solicitor General J. Dossen Richards and Assistant Attorney General Nelson W. Broderick for appellee.
CHIEF JUSTICE -WILSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant in this case was indicted for the commission of the heinous crime of murder. After more than six years of continuances and postponements, the case eventually came on for trial before an empanelled jury at the November, 1958, term, of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, which, after hearing the testimony of witnesses for and against the accused, deliberated and, on December 10, 1958, returned a verdict of Guilty against the accused; whereupon he was, by final judgment of the court, sentenced to be hanged by the neck until dead on February 3, 1959, between the hours of 6 A.M. and 6 P.M., to which final judgment
the defendant excepted and took an appeal to this Court for review. Culled from the records certified to us, the prosecution alleged, and made an effort to prove by witnesses that appellant, a resident of the Firestone Plantations, went to Division Number 28 and made overtures for sexual relations with one Nuah, who it is alleged, rejected his approaches and told him that she had a husband.
He persisted, and on the day on which it is alleged he inflicted the fatal wounds on decedent, husband of the said female Nuah, the decedent visited her at the said Division Number 28. After taking his bath he sat to eat the food his wife had prepared. At his request, his wife closed the door and sat on the bed, as it was at night and bedtime in that area. The door not being latched, appellant forcibly entered the room, and started to row with her husband, slapped him, and then said to him : “You Mano man, what you come here to look for?” She then made an alarm for help. Even though her husband, the decedent, tried to get out of the reach of appellant, he pursued him. She, being naked, did not follow her husband and his assailant, the appellant. This is the statement the wife of decedent made as of her certain knowledge. Testifying to the death of the decedent a witness, Knobo Blatnah stated, in substance, that appellant told him of the fight which had taken place between himself and the decedent on this fatal night, and that the appellant confessed to having fought the decedent and also told him that, in the fight, he heard the decedent cry : “Oh Lord!” Appellant was thereafter taken to the magistrate’s compound in Bondiway. One Walker-Walker, a witness for the prosecution, testified as follows : “The defendant
in the dock is the one who killed decedent. Zorhn’s wife used to sell in Firestone, and Zorhn afterwards
went to meet her. He said to her: `I come now, so we will go home.’ Nuah said : ‘We will but wait until tomorrow, so we will go.’
The defendant came and said to the woman : ‘Why you say that you will be going with this man, Zorhn?
‘ She said to the defendant: ‘He is my husband.’ The defendant said : ‘Why you treat me like that?’ The woman said to defendant: ‘This is my husband whom I am living with in Monrovia; I did not come here to you; I came to my brother.’ The defendant referred the matter to Every Day and Every Day said to defendant: ‘I know this is my sister’s husband, and I do not know who you are.’ Every Day said to defendant: ‘I don’t know you to be my sister’s boy friend, and I don’t know any fuss to exist between you and her.’ Every Day said : ‘I will report the matter
to the overseer.’ Every Day said : `Borbor, come, I will report the matter to the overseer, so I will get this man out of my place.’
Zorhn and Nuah went to bed. While we were at the overseer’s house we heard an alarm, and the woman was crying, saying: ‘My people, you all come; my people, you all come.’ When we got there they all had left and gone down the road; when we got there we met defendant on top of decedent. While the defendant was sitting on top of the decedent, I caught the defendant by the arm and pulled him off; at the same time, Every Day also assisted me in pulling him off. The defendant had a knife, and that knife even cut Every Day when he was trying to take it away from defendant. Aliu took the knife and gave it to Borbor Helb. After this, Aliu Taylor ran to the soldiers and reported that the people had jumped on him, and began to say to the soldiers : ‘Look, the blood on me.’ Aliu then said to the decedent: ‘What did you come here to do?’ When they rang the bell in the morning for the people to come to work, they found decedent’s body behind the wash house. The overseer then sent word to Bondiway informing the people that a fight had occurred that night and that the defendant had killed the decedent. The soldier from the gate came and arrested the defendant, put him in a car, and carried him to Bondiway. The people that came from Bondiway went and looked at the spot where the body was found. The clerk from Bondiway said that the decedent was killed by a knife and asked : ‘Where is the knife?’
The clerk was informed that the defendant had given the knife to one Borbor Helb. All of us were arrested ; and on our way to Bondiway we left the dead body at his father’s place, and we proceeded to Bondiway, and we were locked up. We were there for three days, and afterwards they brought us down to Monrovia. That is all I know.” Walker-Walker also stated that, when he pulled the defendant off the decedent, the decedent ran behind the water fence and fell, and there he died with his hands crossed. Another witness for the prosecution, who testified to his certain knowledge of appellant’s commission of the crime, was Nuah’s brother, Every Day, who stated that appellant went to his home where his sister was living at Division Number 28, Firestone Plantations Company.
He testified to having heard his sister sound the alarm. When Walker-Walker went to the scene of the alarm, Nuah told him that her husband, the decedent, had run off, chased by appellant. He and Walker-Walker went in the direction of the pursuit; and on reaching the scene, they saw the decedent on the ground with appellant sitting on him. Appellant had a knife with which he was cut on the index finger of his right hand when he attempted to take it from him. Appellant gave the knife to one Borbor Helb and ran off to the Firestone gate and reported to the soldiers that Every Day and others had beaten him. He also stated that the decedent was found dead by a watchman. It is necessary to state that he said also that the incident took place at night, to o’clock, which was bedtime. There also was brought out on cross-examination of this witness the following: “At this time decedent got up and went. The people got lanterns and saw a lot of blood on the ground.” He stated also that decedent died on the same night of the fight. Appellant, testifying on his own behalf, said that he was attacked in his own home by decedent, who he believed to be the brother of Nuah; yet he studiously avoided stating what led to decedent attacking him, since he said Nuah told him that decedent was her brother, and not her husband as Nuah and other witnesses for the prosecution had said. His statement on the relationship of Nuah and decedent being that of brother, and not husband, was not corroborated by any witness. On the contrary, the woman, Nuah and her brother, together with other witnesses, stated that decedent was Nuah’s husband.
He testified to the death of decedent, and that there was a fight on this fatal night in which he, the decedent, Every Day and others were involved, but stated that he was the victim of cuts and dragging. He confessed, however, that at the investigation in Bondiway by the Magistrate and County Attorney, witnesses Nuah, Walker-Walker, and Every Day, the same witnesses who testified for the prosecution, stated that he was the one that killed the decedent by inflicting several chops on his body. He stated, also, that the fight took place on a dark night, and that they could not make out one another; but on seeing the dead body which was found on the dump pile, he observed a wound on the upper shoulder of his back. The only witness to corroborate his statement was one Fisabu Flomo who testified at the February, 1957, term, of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County. His testimony was read into the record by the clerk. This statement fell short of corroboration of defendant’s statement.
This states, in brief, the salient parts of the evidence produced and recorded on both sides in the case; and now our comment and conclusion on this evidence. Appellant having overpowered decedent, he made an effort to break off the fight, and ran away from appellant, who pursued after him and overtook him. By the testimony of witness Nuah, wife of the decedent, there being no evidence to the contrary save for that of the lone statement of appellant himself, appellant has been proven to be the aggressor, first and forcibly entering the room of decedent’s wife, where decedent had retired with his wife for the night, then and there precipitating and starting a
row by slapping decedent, from which a fight ensued ; and even after overpowering decedent who broke off the fight and ran, appellant still pursued him, overtook him, and resumed the fight. Confirmation of the resumption of this fight is supplied by the testimony of witnesses Walker-Walker and Every Day, decedent’s wife’s brother, who, each and both of them, stated that, on being informed by decedent’s wife of the attack appellant had made on her husband, he fought and pursued him, went in the direction where decedent and appellant in pursuing had gone, and found appellant on top of decedent with a knife in his hand, the weapon he is alleged to have stabbed decedent to death with. The effort to disarm him resulted into a cut on Every Day’s finger. After surrendering the knife to one Borbor Helb, appellant fled to the Firestone gate, where were stationed soldiers of the Liberian Frontier Force, and reported that he had been beaten by a gang of people, naming Walker Walker, Every Day and the decedent, who at this time had gone off in a direction unknown, but was subsequently discovered to be on a dump pile where he succumbed and died that very night. Appellant’s effort, by running ahead of the other persons who were on the scene, to report to the soldiers and give the impression that he had been assailed and beaten, fell short of its purpose when investigation of the incident at the magisterial court at Bondiway brought to light the true story as revealed in the testimony of prosecution witnesses at the trial, from which
this appeal was taken.
Establishment of the corpus delicti in this case is complete, since all of the witnesses, including appellant
himself, testified to the death of decedent and that same took place on the same night, and that the body had stabbing wounds on it when found. Therefore refreshing ourselves by citations of law on this point seems unnecessary; and we will pass on to the next element to be proven in a case of first degree homicide–the attaching of criminal responsibility for the crime. In an attempt to extricate himself from liability, the appellant,
through his counsel in argument before this Court, held that no malice had been established at the trial, claiming that, prior to this fatal night, there had been no misunderstanding or quarrel between himself and decedent. For the sake of argument, let us lay aside the statement of Nuah, decedent’s wife, who testified at the trial that she had been approached by appellant; that overtures had been made to her by him for relationship prior to this visit of her husband to the Firestone Plantations where she was ; that she had rejected them, warning appellant that she had a husband ; and that, on forcibly entering her room and meeting the decedent there, the appellant assaulted and slapped him, after which there followed a fight wherein the decedent was stabbed and died that
very night. Let us address ourselves exclusively to the acts of appellant which immediately followed, resulting in decedent’s death, as substantially and conclusively testified to by other witnesses. Without repeating the statements of these witnesses, let us examine our law as to malice. In Koh-Giddue v. Republic and Krahn-Gbo v. Republic, [1943] LRSC 7; 8 L.L.R. 141, 150 (1943), Mr. Chief Justice Grimes, speaking for this Court, quoted with approval the following:
“The term “malice” has already been defined. Malice in law does not necessarily mean hate, ill will or malevolence, but consists in any unlawful act, wilfully done, without just excuse or legal occasion, to the injury of another person. It may properly be said not to be a thing or entity, but rather a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification, from which act another suffers injury. Where the act is done with the deliberate intention of doing bodily harm to another, it is called express malice; otherwise the malice is inferred or presumed from the act. Evil intent is legal malice, so also is gross and
culpable negligence whereby another suffers injury. r Wharton, CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 146-47, at 191 (1 ith ed. 1912).” Syllabus 2 of the same cases reads as follows : “To constitute malice aforethought in murder there need not be an old quarrel, or a long period of resentment, envy, or spite.” This settles the question of malice aforethought as raised by appellant’s counsel in an effort to mitigate the offense committed by the appellant, his client, and brings us to the conclusion, from the facts stated at the trial, that malice has been sufficiently established as the motive which prompted appellant to commit the heinous crime of murder. The production of
the knife with which the crime was committed, if possible to be obtained, seems under ordinary circumstances to be the responsibility of the prosecution; and also the cause of death as established by a post mortem examination.
When this point was raised and advanced by appellant’s counsel, the prosecution was required to counter and show why and under what circumstances this was unnecessary in the instant case. Because of what had been disclosed by the evidence in the case, which tended to attach responsibility by the homicide to appellant, the Solicitor General, for appellee, called the Court’s attention to the following:
“The manner and means in and by which the crime was committed is not an element of the corpus delicti, and the exact manner of the killing need not be proved. It is sufficient to show the finding of a dead body, and the appearance thereof showing acts of violence. Where a cause sufficient to produce a complication resulting in death is shown, and no other cause is shown to have existed, a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the result arose from the known cause is afforded. A mere possibility that death resulted from some cause other than the act of accused will not overcome facts proved leaving no rational grounds for doubt, nor will an inference from
incompetent evidence. The cause of death and the criminal agency may be established by circumstantial evidence, especially when no question as to the cause of death is raised at the trial. . . . It is not necessary that the evidence that death was caused by criminal means should be obtained from the body of deceased. So an autopsy is not essential.” 3o C. J. 287-88 Homicide § 53 1 .
Again we quote, for the sake of this opinion, the following, from an opinion of this Court: “When a human being has been deliberately killed by another the law will presume ‘malice’ even though no particular enmity has been proven.” Darnenoh v. Republic, [1935] LRSC 12; 4 L.L.R. 308 (1935), Syllabus 3. This contention of the prosecution is fully upheld by the common law and the opinions of this Court, quoted, supra, and therefore is sustained. To what benefit and for what purpose the testimony of Fisabu Flomo was demanded by appellant to
be read into the record is hard to conceive, especially when it was intended to prove his innocence of the commission of the crime as against that of the prosecution’s witnesses who corroborated on the testimony as to the fight between appellant and decedent; that appellant was in possession of a knife during the fight; that blood was discovered on the ground where the fight took place; that the body of decedent, when found, had wounds by stabbing; and that Nuah, wife of the decedent, made an alarm, which drew them to the scene where they saw appellant with a knife sitting on decedent; and that one of them was wounded while trying to get hold of the knife.
I have made this lengthy review of the testimony of these witnesses because of the very important issue raised by appellant’s counsel as to the insufficiency of the evidence at the trial to convict. Counsel claimed that the prosecution failed to produce the knife said to have been used, and that the cause of death had not been established by a medical certificate after a postmortem examination. In a criminal prosecution, it is imperative that proof of defendant’s guilt be so conclusive as to leave no segment of doubt; but such a doubt must be apparent and not imaginary; so that where the evidence, even if circumstantial, is so connected as to convince any rational mind of its sufficiency to attach criminal responsibility for the crime committed, no doubt arises. In the summation of the evidence, recited, supra, the following salient points must be the controlling circumstances
by which a fair and just conclusion can be reached in this case: i. Witnesses for the prosecution, including Nuah, wife of the decedent, and three others, testified to a fight between appellant and decedent, and according to the testimony of Nuah, the fight was precipitated by appellant who, without provocation, assaulted and stabbed the decedent. 2. Appellant having overpowered decedent, the decedent made an effort to break off by running away from appellant, who pursued and overtook him.
Appellant then resumed the fight, and maintaining the upper hand over decedent, sat upon his body and gave him the fatal stab with the knife he had in his possession, from which he thereafter succumbed and died. The trial of the case being regular in all respects, and the evidence proving appellant’s guilt clear, cogent and convincing, the verdict of the empanelled jury and the judgment of the court thereupon should not be disturbed. And it is so ordered. Affirmed.