ROSA SIMONOVITCH, widow of SIMON SIMONOVITCH, for herself and her minor daughter, VERA, JEAN SIMONOVITCH, for himself and for HENRY SIMONOVITCH and MARIA SOLOMONVIKA, nee Simonovitch, heirs of the said SIMON SIMONOVITCH, Appellants, v. THE LIBERIAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, by and through its manager, S. STEINER, Appellee.

MOTION TO DENY REVIEW OF APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued May 5, 1969. Decided June 13, 1969. 1. The Supreme Court will not permit a mere technical violation of the exact wording of a statute to serve as a bar to having a review entertained, as in the instant case where appellants inadvertently announced intention to appeal to the March Term, rather than the October Term, of the Supreme Court, in which it was then sitting. The spirit of the law shall be observed to effect justice. 2. An appeal when taken is from the judicial determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the jury’s verdict as a matter of law, not from the facts, of which the jury is the sole judge. 3. But where all of the steps necessary to effect an appeal have been taken, and none of the grounds exist for dismissal, as provided by statute and the Rules of the Supreme Court, review will not be denied and the record will be considered by the Supreme Court in toto. 4. Nor can a lower court be ordered to resume jurisdiction in a case and enforce its judgment before review, unless there has been a failure to perfect the appeal as prescribed by statute. After a defendant’s verdict returned by a jury in an action of debt, plaintiff moved four days thereafter to have the verdict set aside and a new trial ordered. The motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that motions for a new trial are to be brought within two, not four, days in the case of trial by jury, as distinguished from nonjury trials, where four days are prescribed by statute. The appellee moved the appellate court to deny review of the appeal, contending that, under the circumstances, the appeal was not from the judgment of the 299 300 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS court, but from the verdict of the jury, hence, barred by law, since the jurors solely determine the facts, and appeals are properly brought from the judgment of the court which determines, as a matter of law, the sufficiency of evidence to support or reverse the jury’s verdict. Motion denied. Nete Sie Brownell and T. G. Collins for appellants. Lawrence A. Morgan and John W. Stewart, Sr., for ap- pellee. MR. JUSTICE court. This is the second time that this Court has been called upon to hear argument relating to the subject case not predicated upon the merits thereof. On this occasion, the appellees have filed a motion requesting this Court to deny the appeal and to order the lower court to resume jurisdiction and enforce its judgment. In count one of the motion the appellees contended that all of the appropriate steps which are preconditions to the perfection of an appeal had not been complied with, in that appellant, while still at the trial court, had stated in contravention of statute that he would appeal to the March 1967 Term of the Supreme Court, whereas the Circuit Court was in its June Term and the Supreme Court in its October 1967 Term. With regard to this point as raised in count one of the motion, it is the position of this Court that before this bar of justice, the rights of individuals are brought to a final determination. In the circumstances, where an error is committed in the lower court and this error prejudices no one, this Court will not permit the mere technical violation of the exact wording of the statute to serve as a bar to having a suit entertained by this Court. The spirit of the law should be properly viewed with the view to givSIMPSON delivered the opinion of the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 301 ing substantial justice, for a strict adherence at all times to the letter of the law does none other than to kill the law. Coming now to the second count of the motion, the appellee has contended that the motion for a new trial as filed by the appellants in the court below, was not for the purpose of setting aside the verdict and thereafter having a new trial ordered. Additionally, it was felt that no appeal may be taken from the verdict of the jury predicated upon mere questions of fact. The appellee has strenuously argued that the law provides two distinct categories of circumstances under which a motion for a new trial may be filed, with corresponding time limits prescribed by statute. These statutes are set forth : “New Trials: grounds. “1 An Jury actions. When an action has been tried by jury, a new trial may be granted to any or all of the parties, on all or part of the issues on any or all of the following grounds : “(a) Whenever it is proved that any juror ( ) has received a bribe; (2) or after being sworn or affirmed has conversed otherwise than openly in the presence of the court with any party to the action or with any agent of any party on the subject of the trial; or (3) was guilty of giving false answers to the material questions when examined as to his competency to serve as a juror in the action; or “(b) If the verdict is manifestly against the evidence, the law, or the instructions of the court; or “(c) If the debt or damages found by the jury is greatly too much or too little when compared with the evidence in the case; or “(d) On the basis of newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time for introduction at the trial.” Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6:82o (in part). “Time for motion for new trial. A motion for a 302 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS new trial shall be served not later than four days after the verdict is entered if it is based on grounds set forth in section 820 (a) or (d) and not later than two days after the verdict is entered if it is based on grounds set forth in section 820 (b) or (c). The motion shall be in writing and shall be filed with the clerk of the court. A copy shall be served on the opposing party not less than four hours before argument on the motion is to be heard. “Not later than four days after the entry of the verdict or the decision in a case tried without a jury, the court may on its own initiative order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on the motion of a party; the order shall specify the grounds therefor.” Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6 :82 r. Succinctly stated, what the appellee is here contending is that the law requires that there be a motion for a new trial filed in the lower court as a condition precedent to the right of review by this Court. This requirement is amplified by the constitutional provision to which our statutes conform, which, in effect, states that there may be no appeal from the verdict of the jury based upon a mere question of fact, since the jury is sole judge of the facts. Secondly, in accordance with section 821 cited supra, where the grounds stated for the granting of a new trial fall within the categories included in the subsections (b) and (c), then the time for filing the application for the new trial should be within two days from the date of entry of the verdict. In the case at bar, appellee contends that the ground included by appellants, then plaintiffs, in the lower court, in a request for a new trial, fell within the provisions of subsection (b) of section 82o and, therefore, the time for filing of the motion was limited to two days after the entry of the verdict. However, the motion was filed within four days of the entry of the verdict and, therefore, was denied by the lower court. Appellee con- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 303 tends that in the circumstances there was no legal motion for a new trial filed at the trial court, and since this was not done, review at this Court of the proceedings would of necessity be predicated solely upon a legal nullity, contravening the basic law of the land and statutes made in pursuance thereof. For the above-cited reasons, the appellee contended that this Court should deny the appeal and order the lower court to resume jurisdiction and enforce its judgment. At first blush this request seems both reasonable and logical. However, before making a final determination, let us carefully examine all of the legal implications attached thereto. It has been argued that we have not here been called upon to dismiss the appeal, for it is agreed that our statutes are plain and unequivocal in respect to the grounds upon which a dismissal may be had. The approach to our not hearing the appeal has a slightly different slant. The appellee has strenuously argued that this Court should partially open the records transcribed and transmitted from the lower court for the specific purpose of ascertaining whether or not the motion for a new trial was properly denied, and if we find that the judge of the lower court acted in accordance with the law in his fiat that the motion be granted, thus concluding that it was an improper motion. A fortiori, where there is no motion for a new trial there can be no appeal, for such an appeal will thereupon of necessity be predicated upon errors as related to facts adduced at the trial and erroneously determined by the jury. Let us examine this thesis as put forth for a determination of whether or not it conforms to our law. In order to determine whether or not the trial judge correctly sustained the opposition to the motion for a new trial, we must open the record. The question then is, can this Court only partially open records for the purpose of de- 304 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS termining the legal sagacity of the trial judge in his ruling upon the motion for a new trial? Let us even carry the argument one step further, and ask ourselves, when would the case lend itself to being heard in all its aspects if we proceed to review the trial judge’s ruling on the motion for a new trial as a separate proceeding? For it must be admitted that cases come to this Court via direct appeals in jury cases from a judgment predicated upon a verdict. Additionally, where there is no application for the setting aside of a verdict predicated upon one of the provisions included in section 820, this Court may not rule upon the merits, for to do so would be a clear violation of the constitutional provisions making the jurors sole judges of fact. This is true, for as it has been properly said, the appeal is not from the verdict of the jury but, instead, from a judicial judgment of the verdict found by the jury. In argument before this Court, reference was made to section 1 020 of the Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code, tit. 6, which specifies the grounds upon which an appeal may be dismissed. The last paragraph of this section states, and we quote, “An appeal shall not be dismissed on any other ground except as otherwise expressly provided by law.” In respect to this provision, the appellee has contended in its argument before us that an exception to the general provision allows for dismissal of an appeal upon a ground other than those enumerated in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of section 1020. It is agreed that through the Rules of Court an exception has been carved out of the general rule by allowing dismissal before this Court in instances where the appellant or movent fails to appear upon an assignment. In respect to this exception, in our view, the only required utterance at this time has to do with the fact that this being the highest judicial forum in the land, when parties are apprised of the fact that the Court is to, at a designated time, hear a cause at the instance of a particular party, they should be in attendance LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 305 upon court. To do otherwise would reap havoc, for the Court would not be able to control its docket, or the attendance upon court by lawyers or litigants, and thereby greatly enlarge the opportunities for parties to bring matters before this Court for the mere purpose of delaying justice. At this juncture we shall refrain from touching upon the legal validity of the trial judge’s position in respect to the motion for a new trial. We can only say that it is not the policy of this Court, nor is there any known rule of law, that permits of a partial review of a record submitted to this Court. We either have jurisdiction to enter upon the hearing and disposition of a particular case, or acknowledge that jurisdiction required by law is absent. Where all of the steps required by statute have been fully complied with for the perfection of an appeal, and none of the known exceptions to the rules relating to dismissal apply, this Court cannot refuse to review the record in toto. Additionally, the lower court can be ordered to resume jurisdiction over causes fully determined by the particular court and judgment rendered theron only in instances where the jurisdictional steps for executing an appeal have not been complied with by the party appellant. In view of the above, we have no alternative but to deny the motion and order the case continued on our docket for hearing during the ensuing October Term of this Court. Costs to abide final determination of the case. And it is hereby so ordered. Motion denied.