ADELAIDE E. MORRIS, Appellant, v. ELIZA JACKSON, EDITH HERRON, and REGINALD JACKSON, Administrators of the Estate of Z. A. JACKSON, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued April 30, 1969. Decided June 13, 1969. 1. An interest in an estate in intestacy cannot be conveyed by a single heir when there are more than one, without the consent of all the heirs, unless by an order of a court. 2. By virtue of the recording statutes, the failure to record title to an interest in real property within four months of the execution of the instrument of conveyance, renders such conveyance void against an innocent purchaser for value who subsequently duly records an instrument conveying an interest in the property. 3. A court sitting in equity ought not consider relief where there is an adequate remedy at law. Petitioner brought a bill in equity to remove cloud on and quiet title to a sixty-acre tract included in the inventory of an intestate estate by the administrators. Petitioner claimed title by descent, after purchase of the tract from one of the three predecessor administrators, by warranty deed signed by him and his wife, without proof of conveyance to him by the other administrators, and with no witness attesting to his mark on the deed. The deed was not probated until some thirty years after its execution. The circuit court denied the petition and an appeal was taken from the judgment. Judgment affirmed. The Garber law firm for appellant. Samuel B. Cole for appellees. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the 311 court. 312 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Adelaide Morris, of the City of Monrovia, filed a bill in equity in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County, praying the court to remove cloud on and quiet title to a parcel of property consisting of sixty acres, situated in an area now known as Paynesville, formerly called Jacksonville Oldfield. In her complaint Miss Morris alleged that the land which she acquired from her ancestor, J. J. Morris, was included in the inventory of the estate of Z. A. Jackson, by the respondents, Eliza Jackson, Edith Herron, and Reginald Jackson, administrators of the estate. The case was filed during the June 1965 Term, and the respondents were cited to appear for trial on October 22, 1966. Judge John A. Dennis, who presided, denied petitioner’s prayer for relief in the bill on the ground that the petitioner’s remedy was adequate at law. It is from this decree the petitioner appealed to this Court. A synopsis of the contention is as follows : J. J. Morris, the grandfather of Adelaide Morris, during his lifetime purchased a piece of property, the sixtyacre tract of land in controversy, from Robert Jackson and his wife, which he died seized of. Prior to his death, he executed a will, conveying the property to his son, Joseph L. Morris, the father of Adelaide Morris. John L. Morris bequeathed a life estate therein to his wife, upon her death the fee to appellant Adelaide Morris. His wife, Maude Amelia Morris, in consonance with the provisions of the will of her husband, devised this piece of property to Adelade Morris. She now claims this property as hers. The appellees do not actually dispute the foregoing but maintain her possession is illegal, for the reason that they are the surviving legal heirs of Z. A. Jackson, which they establish thus: Z. A. Jackson died in 1918, leaving surviving his widow, two brothers, Robert H. Jackson and Samuel Jackson, and a sister, Eliza Jane Jackson. He died possessed of real property, including a ninety-six LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 313 acre tract of land located in the Settlement of Paynesville, Montserrado County. After his death, no will having been made by him, the Probate and Monthly Court appointed administrators for the estate, issuing them letters of administration. With this authority, they sold thirty-six acres of this tract, leaving a balance of sixty acres. There being no record in the Probate Court showing that the estate was ever closed before the death of the administrators, the appellants applied to the Probate Court of Montserrado County for letters of administration. The application was granted. In the course of acting thereunder, the present suit was begun. What we consider germane in the case is whether Adelaide Morris had legal title from which a cloud should be removed. It is well established that Z. A. Jackson died in 1918, leaving behind two brothers, Robert H. Jackson and Samuel Jackson, and a sister, Eliza Jane Jackson. We gather from the record that J. J. Morris, grandfather of appellant, purchased this piece of property from Robert H. Jackson, one of the surviving heirs of Z. A. Jackson, in 1922. This is also evidenced by the deed made profert and marked exhibit “A,” claiming that this piece of property was a portion of the estate of his brother, Z. A. Jackson. It is this conveyance from Robert H. Jackson to J. J. Morris that has descended to Adelaide Morris. A look at the deed just referred to, shows that the conveyance was made by Robert H. Jackson and his wife, Jane, heirs of Z. A. Jackson. The record shows that both Samuel Jackson and Eliza Jane Jackson were living during the date of the sale of this property by Robert H. Jackson. Although there is a variance with respect to the date of the death of Samuel Jackson, it is conclusive that he died after the conveyance of the property to J. J. Morris. It is puzzling how Robert Jackson and his wife could part with this property as heirs of Z. A. Jackson to the complete exclusion of Samuel Jackson and Eliza Jackson, the other two collateral heirs. 314 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS The deed proferted by the petitioners was not signed nor executed by the administrators of the estate of Z. A. Jackson. Nor could Robert Jackson have legally conveyed it, not being the only legal surviving heir. The deed should have been signed by the three surviving heirs, in the absence of proof of the conveyance of the land to Robert Jackson by the other administrators. The manner in which Robert H. Jackson could have legally conveyed the whole parcel remains unexplained by the petitioner. An unexplained coadministrator, B. J. K. Anderson, also appears in the record. There is no indication of a conveyance by the coadministrators to Robert H. Jackson, who could not have conveyed, of course, to himself. Yet the deed under which petitioner claims is a warranty deed. An interest in an estate in intestacy cannot be conveyed by a single heir where there is more than one heir, except by the consent and agreement of all of the heirs, unless by order of the court. Moreover, appellees offered evidence not denied by appellant, to the effect that Robert H. Jackson was illiterate. One Capehard testified : “Q. In an answer on cross-examination yesterday, you said that the deed was false or forged. Please explain for the benefit of the court what do you mean by this expression? “A. By that I mean that it was not his signature, because my grandfather could not write. “Q. By your last answer on re-direct, we assume that you have seen your grandfather write, or have done correspondence with him to know his handwriting and signature? “A. No. Because he never wrote any letter nor could he read or write.” Succeeding this witness on the stand was A. Dundo Ware: LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 315 “Q. Please say if you were personally acquainted with the late Robert H. Jackson? “A. I was personally acquainted with Robert H. Jackson who was married to my cousin, Mrs. J. D. Watson. “Q. Please tell all you know about his literary qualification, if you can? “A. Mr. Robert Jackson was not a lettered man. He was only a successful trader.” On cross-examination, the same witness : “Q. You have said that R. H. Jackson was a businessman; can you say to any degree of certainty that during his business operations he did not have any literary qualification? “A. Yes. He did not have any literary qualification. “Q. I suggest that you were in his business operations and had to do all his literary work; not so? “A. I was not. I was never employed in his business, but many times in his lifetime he called me to prepare his letters for him. “Q. And from that you arrived at your deduction that he was not literarily qualified, not so? “A. Not because of the preparation of his letters, but we all lived together in one County, and as I have aforesaid, he married in my family.” This testimony tending to invalidate the signature appearing on the deed was not rebutted by petitioner. A person who is incapable of writing and signing his name, should make his mark in the presence of attesting witnesses. The signature appearing on the deed lacks this requirement. What seems very odd, and has a tendency to support the charge of appellee, is that J. J. Morris is said to have purchased this piece of property on March io, 1922. A look at the endorsement on the deed discloses that the instrument was never probated and registered until May 2, 316 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 1952, about two months short of thirty years after the purchase day. While we are loath to give acceptance to this unpleasant accusation, yet we are irresistibly led to ponder why a man of accomplishment and high repute would fail to meet a requirement of the law. Our Property Law provides, 1956 Code, tit. 29, � z : “All persons acquiring any interest affecting or relating to real property shall appear in person or by attorney-at-law before the Probate Court for the county in which such real property is situated within four months of the date of execution of the instrument, and have the deed, mortgage or other instrument affecting or relating to real property publicly probated ; provided however, that this provision shall not apply to persons acquiring an interest affecting or relating to real property prior to October 1, 1862. “In order to be valid and probatable, a deed, mortgage or other instrument shall be witnessed by at least two witnesses.” For failure to probate and register, section 6 of the same title, provides : “If any person shall fail to have any instrument affecting or relating to real property probated and registered as provided in this Chapter within four months after its execution, his title to such real property shall be void as against any party holding a subsequent instrument affecting or relating to such property, which is duly probated and registered.” This Court has said in Smith v. Faulkner, [1946] LRSC 5; 9 L.L.R. 161 (1946), that in legal parlance laches is not merely delay but delay that works a disadvantage to another. Quoting from 10 R.C.L., Equity, � 143, this opinion explains that lapse of time has a tendency to obscure evidence and often makes it impossible to discover the truth and when one, knowing his rights, takes no steps to enforce them, delay becomes inequitable, and should work an estoppel against LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 317 the assertion of the right when a court sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other side. The Court denied the petition, relying on the foregoing, as well as the reason that “in this Country the Probate Court has sole jurisdiction of estates, whether intestate or testate, and a court sitting in equity ought not to interfere where there is an adequate remedy at law.” Therefore, the decree of the court below is affirmed with costs against appellant, and the clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below informing it of this judgment. And it is hereby so ordered. Affirmed.