JAMES E. T. MARKWEI, Petitioner, v. MOHAMMED AMINE and GEORGE W. STUBBLEFIELD, Justice of the Peace, Montserrado County, and their Honors EDWARD SUMMERVILLE and NETE-SIE BROWNELL, Circuit Judges, Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
Argued December 10, 1934. Decided December 21, 1934.
1. Our statute on appeals prescribes the steps to be taken in effecting an appeal, and each such step is jurisdictional.
2. Hence, should a party desire to come to this Court by any of the remedial writs, the burden of proof is upon such party to show that his failure to take a regular appeal was not due to his own lathes.
3. Even though it may appear that glaring errors have been committed in the trial of a cause, this Court is without power to correct same unless the said cause shall have been properly brought within our jurisdiction.
On application for reargument of an order denying a writ of certiorari, application denied.
Anthony Barclay for petitioner.
MR. JUSTICE RUSSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an application on the part of petitioner for a re-argument of an order of Mr. Chief Justice Grimes in chambers, denying a writ of certiorari. The facts briefly stated are :
On the twenty-ninth day of November, 1933, Mohammed Amine instituted an action of damages for trespass against James E. T. Markwei, defendant, before George W. Stubblefield, Justice of the Peace for Montserrado County. The defendant having been returned summoned on the 19th day of November, 1933, the case was assigned for hearing on the 17th day of December following. At the call of the case, the defendant denied the truthfulness of the facts set out in the complaint of the plaintiff; whereupon witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant were qualified and deposed, and after a careful consideration of the evidence on both sides, the Justice of the Peace aforesaid rendered judgment against the plaintiff, and ruled him to pay all costs of the action. To this judgment of the trial justice the plaintiff excepted and prayed an appeal to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit. At the expiration of the fifteen days allowed by our statutes for the completion of all appeals in the courts of justices of the peace in this Republic, the defendant applied to the justice of the peace for the issuance of a writ of execution against the plaintiff for the payment of all legal costs in keeping with the judgment rendered in said cause. The petition of the defendant was granted, and an execution was issued on the twentysecond day of January, 1934, against the plaintiff for payment of all legal costs in the aforesaid action. There is nothing apparent in the records of this case to show that the aforesaid execution was ever served on the plaintiff, because there are no returns of the sheriff endorsed on the back of said writ as is required by our statutes. At this stage of the case, although the fifteen days allowed by our statutes for appeals from the court of the justice of the peace had expired, yet the trial justice, George W. Stubblefield, issued a certificate in favor of the plaintiff which contradicts the date of the rendition of the said judgment in said case as endorsed on the back of the original writ, and allowed him to file an appeal bond.
When the case was called for hearing in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit before His Honor Judge Summerville, quite to the surprise of the appellee this certificate was found in the records of the case and was ordered read; but the appellee objected to said certificate’s being made a part of the records, contending that it was spurious. The trial judge overruled the objection, allowed said certificate to form a part of the record and thereupon proceeded to hear the appeal. Thereafter, during the trial of this case, the appellee requested the court to postpone the trial and allow a writ to be issued for his witnesses in order that they might appear and testify in his behalf. The trial judge ‘denied this application of the appellee, confirmed the assignment for the hearing of the case, and rendered final judgment against the petitioner in certiorari, from which judgment he petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
Although it does appear that there are many irregularities committed by both the justice of the peace and the Judge of the Circuit Court during the trial of this case, which are in direct violation of the statute laws of this country, as well as the Code compiled and legalised for the guidance of all justices of the peace throughout this jurisdiction, yet we have to observe that the course adopted by the petitioner in seeking redress is contrary to the statute laws of this country, in that he assigns no good reason for not having taken a regular appeal after the rendition of the final judgment against him, which alone would have entitled him to the benefits of one of the remedial writs; and for that reason this Court is without any legal authority to assume jurisdiction in reviewing and correcting even what appear to us to be glaring errors committed by both the Judge of the Circuit Court and George W. Stubblefield, justice of the peace for Montserrado County.
But the questions that now claim our serious attention in these certiorari proceedings are : 1) Is the procedure taken by the petitioner in certiorari in keeping with the statute law providing for same? 2) Is the failure of the petitioner to take a regular appeal due to his own laches?
Mr. Chief Justice Grimes, in delivering the opinion of this Court in the case Wodawodey v. Kartiehn and George, 4 L.L.R. 102, I Lib. New Ann. Ser. los (1934), enunciated this principle which all litigants seeking the great benefits secured to them by the Constitution and the subsequent statutes of the Legislature should strictly follow, saying substantially that:
The right to appeal from a court of record to the Supreme Court of this Republic is given in general terms by the Constitution of the Republic ; and several statutes subsequently passed, the most recent of which is that of 1893-94, have set out the method of procedure to be followed. The passage of said statute providing the steps to be taken in removing a cause to the Supreme Court is jurisdictional and must be strictly complied with ; and at the determination of any case the failure to take a regular appeal should not be due to the laches of the party applying for any of the remedial writs.
From the records of this case we find that the petitioner did not take advantage of his legal rights at the proper time, namely when final judgment was rendered against him by His Honor, E. J. Summerville, assigned Circuit Judge, First Judicial Circuit, by taking an appeal as provided for in our statutes. Acts of the Legislature of Liberia, 1893-94, 10 (2nd) ; I Rev. Stat., §§ 424-428.
Indeed it would seem from the hearing had before Mr. Chief Justice Grimes in chambers and mentioned in his opinion,[1] that the appellant desired to appeal, but Counsellor C. H. Taylor who during the absence from the jurisdiction of Counsellor Anthony Barclay was retained to represent petitioner, suggested an application for one of the remedial writs instead, and because of a disagreement between attorney and client which of the two courses was the correct one to follow, it was decided to await the return and advice of Mr. Barclay before any procedure whatever should be taken. Pending his arrival the time for appealing had long expired, and the fault was attributable solely to the disagreement between the attorney and his client as heretofore mentioned.
The counsel for petitioner argued strenuously that the errors committed were so glaring and patent that this Court should by all means intervene or else to leave petitioner without a remedy would be a disgrace upon our judicial system. We regret our inability to share this view. For the jurisdiction of this Court is appellate, save for the few exceptions noted in the Constitution, and hence no matter what errors may be committed by a trial court, if the procedure prescribed for bringing the cause to this Court for review is not followed, we are powerless otherwise to redress the errors complained of.
This act of the petitioner in certiorari compels us to reaffirm the doctrine set up in the case Blacklidge v. Blacklidge, I L.L.R. 371 (1901).
“It is the duty of litigants, for their own interest, to so surround their causes with the safeguards of the law as to secure them against any serious miscarriage and thereby pave the way to the securing of the great benefits which they seek to obtain under the law. Litigants must not expect courts to do for them that which it is their duty to do for themselves.”
We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment of His Honor, the Chief Justice, be, and the same is, hereby sustained, and the petition of the petitioner in certiorari should be denied for the reasons therein stated ; and it is so ordered.
Application denied.
[1] See Opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Grimes in Markwei v. Amine, [1934] LRSC 22; 4 L.L.R. 155 (1934).