LAMCO MINE WORKERS’ UNION OF LIBERIA, and LAMCO J. V. OPERATING COMPANY, Petitioners, v. GBEZOHN TRANSPORT COMPANY, and HIS HONOUR NATHANIEL K. HODGE, Debt Court Judge, Grand Bassa County, Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE DENYING THE PETITION FO A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Heard: December 10, 1979. Decided: December 20, 1979.

1. Accused costs must be determined before they can be paid, and where not determined there can be no payment until the costs are known.
2. The legal requirement that a petition for a writ of certiorari must state that the petitioner is a party to an action pending before a court in the Republic of Liberia is a mandatory requirement of the statute, which cannot be met by implication.
3. Certiorari will not ordinarily be granted to review an interlocutory ruling on a question of law.
4. Whatever errors might have been made on judge’s ruling on the law issues, are properly reviewable by appeal.

Co-respondent, Gbezohn Transport Company, filed an action of debt in the Debt Court for Grand Bassa County against the petitioners claiming a sum of money allegedly owned it as the result of a transportation contract entered into between the parties. Petitioners filed along with their answer a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the co-respondent should have brought an action of damages for breach of contract instead of an action of debt. The trial judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear the case on its merits. Being dissatisfied, the petitioners applied to the Justice in Chambers for a writ of certiorari. Petition for writ of certiorari was denied since it was determined that the same was not the appropriate available remedy.

James M. T. Kandakai appeared for petitioners. M. M. Perry appeared for respondents.

MR. JUSTICE TULAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This action was filed before the Debt Court for Grand Bassa County, in its June Term 1979.
We give below the complaint and the answer, one after the other (captions are left out):

“That the defendants are justly indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $292,697.20 (two hundred ninety two thousand six hundred ninety seven donors twenty cents) as will more fully appear from an inspection of the hereto attached bill of particulars, marked exhibit ‘A’ to form part of this complaint.

Plaintiff further complains and says, that this claim against the defendants, the subject of this action grows out of the fact that the defendants contracted with plaintiff to transport co-defendant company’s workers from and to work in Buchanan City from time to time for and in consideration of the rate of 60¢ (sixty cents) per day for each company’s worker, travelling to and from work daily, which amount the plaintiff is to be paid by co-defendants company to plaintiff, predicated upon agreement signed, executed by, and between plaintiff and the Lamco Mine Worker’s Union of Liberia, affiliated with and represented by United Congress of Liberia, as will more fully appear from an inspection of the hereto attached copy of said agreement, marked exhibit ‘B’ to form part of this complaint

Plaintiff further complains and says that in keeping with the terms and condition of said agreement marked exhibit “B” to form part of this complaint, the defendants made part payment only, but elected not to make payment of the balance herein claimed as will more fully appear from the bill of particulars marked exhibit ‘A.’

Plaintiff further complains and says, that despite several promises made by defendants to pay the amount due plain-tiff as outlined herein, and despite the repeated demands made by plaintiff on the defendants for the said amount, they have refused and neglected to pay same.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants for the sum of $292,697.20 (Two Hundred nine-ty two thousand six hundred ninety seven dollies twenty cents), with interest and costs against the defendants.

Respectfully Submitted,

Sgd: Rosa Dillon

TYPED: ROSA DILLON, PLAINTIFF

BY AND THRU HER COUNSEL, THE

DUKULY & PERRY LAW ASSOCIATION

Sgd. M.M. Perry

SOLICITOR & COUNSELLOR-AT-LAW

DEFENDANT’S ANSWER

1. Defendant Union respectfully says that Your Honour ought not to take legal cognizance of the subject matter of this suit in that this case has been improperly venued in the wrong term of court for same should have been venued in the May Term A. D. 1979 of this Honourable Court which plaintiff miserably failed to do. And for this legal blunder, the complaint and with it plaintiff’s entire pleadings should be dismissed and this defendant so prays.
2. And also because defendant company avers and most ardently asserts that in any event, the venue and cause of action are both improper. Co-defendant union, respectfully avers that where an action is founded upon contract, the remedy is by suit for damages and not debt.
3. Co-defendant Union further avers that debt will lie where a sum certain is due but where the amount sued for is predi-cated upon contract debt will not lie, unless the amount being sued for is mathematically ascertainable.
4. Defendant Union denies the allegation of plaintiff as laid in her complaint that Lamco is indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $292,697.20, Lamco is not indebted to plaintiff in any amount whatsoever.

5. Defendants further state that they are no party to the contract (Ex-B) proferted by plaintiff and on which contract she relies to recover. Defendants strongly contend that they never signed said contract, not even as a witness. The contract proferted by plaintiff was entered into between plaintiff and Lamco Mine Workers Union affiliated with and represented by United Workers Congress, of which they are of no parts.
6. Defendant says that because of the unauthorized act of the United Workers Congress in surreptitiously entering into and signing a contract with plaintiff without the will, con-sent and concurrence of defendant, labor unrest occurred and this resulted into the disaffiliation of defendant from the United Workers Congress (UWC).
7. Defendants say that if at all plaintiff had any claim against them, it should have sued them in their own right and not represented by the United Workers Congress, an organi-zation from which they have been disaffiliated from in early 1978. The Lamco Mine Workers Union under the supervi-sion of the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports according to law had a referendum and during this exercise the member of the Local Union (LMWU) disaffiliated from the United Workers Congress. The Government of Liberia recognized the rights of the Lamco Mine Workers Union as an autonomous body and then Lamco management was duly informed. Defendants make profert hereto documents marked ‘A’ & ‘B.’

WHEREFORE and in view of the above stated facts, defendants pray this Honourable Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff with costs against them.

Respectfully submitted,

LAMCO MINE WORKERS UNION

BY & THRU HER COUNSELS:

SIMPSON, BRIGHT & COOPER LAW OFFICE

11 CENTER STREET,

MONROVIA, LIBERIA

Sgd. H. Augustus Roberts

t/ H. Augustus Roberts

COUNSELLOR-AT-LAW

THE SIMPSON, BRIGHT & COOPER LAW FIRM

_________________________

COUNSELLORS-AT-LAW

$1.00 Rev. stamp affixed on the original.”
The answer was accompanied by defendants’ motion to dismiss the action. Of course, a reply was filed by plaintiff. The court denied defendants motion to dismiss and ruled the case to trial; and even though defendants registered exceptions to the rulings, they petitioned the Justice in Chambers for a writ of certiorari.
As the ruling of the Justice in Chambers embodies the salient parts of the petition and the interposing returns, we hereunder quote said ruling.

“R U L I N G

These proceedings grew out of an action of debt in which it is alleged that the trial judge of the Debt Court for Grand Bassa County erred in not passing upon all of the legal issues raised in the pleadings; in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter; and in deciding that it was proper to have brought an action of debt instead of an action for damages growing out of a contract. Petitioner seeks review of these allegedly erroneous rulings by asking for a writ of certiorari.

The respondent in its returns, contends that the petition should be dismissed because the petitioner had failed to pay the secured cost; has not alleged in its petition that it is a party to the case out of which the petition grew; and that the alleged errors would be properly reviewable on appeal, especially when the petitioner excepted to the ruling and went on to participate in the trial of the case.

It is true that the Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:16.23(3) provides for the payment of accrued cost by the petitioner, but at no tine during the hearing of these proceedings did the respondents say what costs had accrued to them; consequently, until this is known, there could be no payment of costs. See Reeves v. Johnson, [1979] LRSC 4; 28 LLR 30 (1979).

The Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code1:16.23 (1) (a) provides that a petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain a statement that the petitioner is a party to an action or proceedings pending before a court. The petitioner admits that its petition does not carry such a statement but contends that it is a party to a pending proceedings can be implied from the title of the case and can be seen from the records of the lower court. It is our opinion that such a statement is a mandatory requirement of the statute which cannot be met by implication.

Webster Dictionary defines the word statement “as the act of stating, reciting, or presenting vertically on paper.” The title of the petition does not state that petitioner is a party to a pending action, nor can it be implied from a glance at the title. Therefore, the contention of the respondent is well taken.

As to the judge’s ruling on the law issues, it is our opinion that whatever errors might have been made are properly reviewable by appeal. In Raymond Concrete Pile Company v. Perry, 13 LLR 520 (1960), this Court held that certiorari will not ordinarily be granted to review an interlocutory ruling on a question of law.

With respect to the issue of want to jurisdiction over the subject matter the trial court ruled that the debt action was the proper action instead of an action of damages. Again, this is a legal question which could be reviewed on appeal; or if petitioner felt that the lower court was proceeding by wrong rules, then the proper remedy would be prohibition.

In view of the foregoing the petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, the alternative writ is quashed, and the Clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate to the court below commanding it to resume jurisdiction over the case and proceed to determine same. Costs against petitioner. And it is hereby ordered.

Given Under my hand in open Court this 4th day of December A. D. 1979.

George E. Henries

JUSTICE PRESIDING IN CHAMBERS”
From this ruling we note petitioners would have gotten relief under:

“(a) writ of prohibition as prohibition will be granted provided the lower court acted contrary to regular practice” Montgomery v. Findley Haddard, [1961] LRSC 27; 14 LLR 463 (1961); or when the lower court seeks to usurp jurisdiction. Younis, et al. v. Davis et. al.[1953] LRSC 3; , 11 LLR 330 (1953).

(b) Regular appeal–petitioners having excepted to the lower courts ruling which were interlocutory, the exceptions should be preserved for review by the appellate court, particularly the courts lack of jurisdiction to the cause. Koffah v. Republic, 11 LLR 336 (1939). Certiorari will not be granted when relief can be obtained through regular appeal. Wilkins v. Republic and Lewis, 14 LLR 23(1960); Amechi v. Smallwood, [1974] LRSC 16; 23 LLR 3 (1974).
In view of the citation given above, as well as those contained in the ruling appealed from, we affirm the ruling of the Chambers Justice and hold that it ends this petition for certiorari. Costs against petitioners. And it is hereby so ordered.

Certiorari denied; ruling affirmed.