D. KASSABLI, Appellant, v. SIMEON B. COLE, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued March 27, 1969. Decided June 13, 1969. 1. Special damages must not only be alleged, they must also be proved. 2. When a complaint sets forth more than one cause of action, the verdict of the jury must separately state the amount awarded for each cause of action. 3. When, as a matter of law, the jury’s verdict is in excess of the proof, the verdict may be set aside and the case remanded. Plaintiff, after nearly completing payment, sued for breach of a Wilding contract, claiming a penalty provision and special damages, which included the loss to plaintiff of the rental from a lease agreement entered into by him with a third party, and the cost to him necessary to complete the construction of the house. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which bore little relation to the amount claimed and the proof offered, and without specifying the amount awarded for each of the various causes of action contained in the complaint. After affirmation of the verdict, the defendant appealed from the judgment of the court. Judgment reversed, case remanded. The Simpson law firm for the appellant. Richard A. Diggs and S. Raymond Horace for appellee. MR. court. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the In the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County, plantiff-appellee Cole sued on an action of damages for breach of contract against D. Kassabli, in the amount of $9,000.00. 294 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 295 In his complaint he stated that on October 26, 1966, he and appellant entered into an agreement whereby the latter undertook to build a house for him, for which servises appellee agreed to pay the sum of $io,000. According to the agreement, appellant was to complete the building within three months, commencing from the signing of the contract. That of the $io,000.00 agreed upon for the work, appellee advanced $9,350.00, leaving a balance of $65o.00. In keeping with the contract, appellant agreed to pay $ioo.00 a week for each week the building remained uncompleted beyond the time specified in the agreement. Appellee’s contention is that appellant’s delinquency in completion for fourteen weeks entitled him to $1,400.00 as liquidated damages. In addition, he complained that the manager of Mount Coffee Project had arranged to lease the house when completed, at $4,000.0o per annum, but because of the failure on the part of the appellant to complete the building in time, he suffered the loss of $4,000.00 lease money and had been further injured in the amount of $5,000.00, which he claims is required to complete the building. Appellee, therefore, prayed for judgment in accordance with the foregoing. The case came up for trial before Judge John A. Dennis, and after the evidence was presented, the jury returned a verdict awarding plaintiff $8,35o.00 Appellant excepted to this verdict and filed a motion, which was denied. Final judgment was rendered affirming the verdict of the jury. It is from the final judgment that appellant has appealed. Although there are other issues involved in this case, we consider the following of primary importance: ( 1) whether the special damages sought were proved; (2) the jury’s computations fixing $8,350.00 as damages. The special damages claimed by appellee were calculated to be $9,000.00, of which $5,000.00 represented the 296 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS cost to complete the building, and the other $4,000.00 being the amount alleged lost when the lease agreement collapsed. We must determine if the jury’s verdict bears any relation to the damages proved. Mr. James Tay, a professional architect, planner and engineer, who was retained by Mr. Cole to estimate the cost to complete the building, submitted a cost analysis in the amount of $3,95o.00, dated September 9, 1967. This document was produced during the trial and marked P/3 by the court, then submitted to the jury. In addition to this, Mr. Tay, testifying in plaintiff’s behalf during the trial, in an answer to a question put to him, said : “The total estimate is $3,95o.00 to complete the building predicated upon the unit cost and estimate of 1967.” We fail to see how Mr. Tay’s estimate, as well as his testimony, supports appellee’s claim of $5,000.00. Apart from the fact that Mr. Tay, as a qualified professional man, was the proper person to state the cost of completion, no other witness corroborated Mr. Cole’s assessment of $5,000.00. Appellant alleged that an understanding had been reached between him and the manager of the Mount Coffee Project to lease the house when finished at an annual rental of $4,000.00. The manager, in his testimony, said : “Mr. Cole showed me two houses when I came to Liberia, one was near the airport area and the other out of town around Paynesville area. I am not sure. As I remember, one of the houses was being rented for $4,000.00, and the other for $3,600.00 a year. The first house was very large and I was not interested in renting it, and the second house I did not like, but I told Mr. Cole that I would come back and look again at it when my wife arrived ; I think I said that the rent was very high, more than what I could pay. That is all I remember.” Further, on cross-examination, he said : LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS “Q. 297 So then, we gather from your statement you have just made that there was no agreement or decision between Mr. Cole and yourself in respect of renting the said building? “A. I promised to take my wife back to look at it; that is the only thing I can remember ; I do not believe I saw Mr. Cole later.” In our understanding, Mr. Bloom’s evidence is a complete denial of Mr. Cole’s allegation in his complaint, as well as his testimony, which, of course, reflects on the claim of $4,000.00. This Court has, in several opinions, stated that special damages must not only be alleged, but must be proved. Summarizing, we find that the evidence has not been sufficient to establish appellee’s claim. The $4,00o.00 sought for the loss of the lease was not proved at all, and the cost of completion of the building as testified to by plaintiff’s own expert witness was estimated at $3,950.00, not the $5,000.00 claimed. There seems no factual support for the verdict of $8,350.00, nor did the verdict indicate whether it represented special or general damages. A complaint containing more than one cause of action should state each cause of action separately and distinctly. Wright V. Tary, [1955] LRSC 6; 12 L.L.R. 223 (1955). It follows then that when a complaint consists of more than one cause of action, the verdict of the jury must state separately and distinctly the amounts awarded. In this case containing claims for special and liquidated damages, the jury has awarded damages without specifying the bases upon which such awards were made. In all such cases the verdict must specifically state the amount of award on each cause of action. It is our opinion that the verdict, besides being in excess of the amount proved at the trial, is also, in view of the foregoing paragraph, formally incorrect. The judgment is hereby reversed and the case remanded and the clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate