HARRY KANNA, Appellant, v. FRANK W. SMITH, et al., Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GRAND GEDEH COUNTY. Argued May 12, 13, 1975. Decided June 26, 1975. 1. When the term of an attorney’s license has expired, he is barred from practicing law until it is renewed. 2. If a case out of which summary proceedings emanates is not a criminal case, but is a civil matter, costs are permitted against the person instituting the proceedings. Appellant instituted an action in debt in the Magistrate Court. In the course of proceedings therein the counsel for plaintiff grew dissatisfied with the rulings of the magistrate and brought what he called a “bill of information for summary proceedings” against the magistrate and counsel for defendant, in the Circuit Court. The judge therein abated the proceeding on the ground that counsel for informant lacked a valid lawyer’s license, and awarded costs against the informant. An appeal was taken by the informant against the judgment of the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the position of the Circuit Court, but modified it to the extent that the action in debt in the Magistrate Court was dismissed for failure of counsel to have had a valid lawyer’s license at the time he instituted the action. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed as modified. Harper S. Bailey for appellant. appellee. Frank W. Smith for MR. JUSTICE HORACE delivered the opinion of the Court. The appeal before us grows out of what appellant has called a “bill of information for summary proceedings,” 359 360 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS which he brought against Magistrate Jasper W. Chea of the City of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, and Counsellor Frank W. Smith, in the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Grand Gedeh County. The facts of the case have been gleaned from the record before us. Appellant, it appears, instituted an action of debt against a company engaged in the logging business known as the Liberia Forest Operating Company, before Mr. Jasper W. Chea, Acting Stipendiary Magistrate of Grand Gedeh County, for the amont of $300.00, allegedly owed him by the said company for one month’s salary and one month in lieu of notice upon the termination of his contract during the probationary period of his employment. The company upon being summoned engaged the legal service of Counsellor Frank W. Smith to represent it. The first thought that comes to our mind is why a matter of this nature, patently belonging before the Ministry of Labor, Youth and Sports, in the first instant was instituted as it was. When the case was called for hearing by the magistrate, appellant was represented by Counsellor Harper S. Bailey, who had instituted the action for his client. Counsellor Smith appeared and announced that he was representing the company, but because the manager of the company did not appear in person, Counsellor Bailey insisted that the manager should be made to appear. Counsellor Smith countered that he was representing the company and under the Constitution, one may be represented in an action before a court in person, by counsel or both. This perfectly sound proposition seemed to have incensed counsel for appellant to the extent that he and counsel for the company entered into a heated argument which resulted in the court imposing a fine for contempt of court. According to counsel for appellant, a fine of five dollars was imposed on each counsel, but counsel for LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 361 the company said that he was not fined. The record shows that only Councellor Bailey paid, and so we must presume that what Counsellor Smith said is true. We think it important to mention here that counsel for the company objected to appellant’s counsel appearing for his client, on the ground that he did not have a lawyer’s license to practice. This objection of counsel for the company also angered appellant’s counsel, although the allegation was subsequently found to be true. Be that as it may, appellant’s counsel filed a submission before the magistrate, praying that the manager of the defendant company be compelled to appear in court even though he was represented by counsel. Apparently getting no satisfaction from the magistrate, counsel for appellant filed, on November 15, 1973, was he called a “Bill of information for summary proceedings,” against the magistrate and Counsellor Frank W. Smith, counsel for the defendant company, in which he alleged, inter alia, that ( ) he had instituted an action of debt against the Liberian Forest Operating Company; (2) that the company’s counsel had engaged in dilatory practices by refusing to bring his client to court; (3) that counsel for defendant had interposed objections to his representing his client because he did not have a valid lawyer’s license. The other points in the paper filed by appellant’s counsel we do not consider of sufficient importance to mention in this opinion. Counsel ended his “Bill of information for summary proceedings” with a prayer for relief. “Wherefore, in view of the foregoing circumstances, the informant most respectfully prays that Your Honor summon the presence of the respondents in these proceedings, to appear before you, and show cause why: (a) Co-respondent Jasper W. Chea, should not be culpably held for non-feasance; (b) Counsellor Frank W. Smith should not be held to have violated rules of conduct for counsel; and (c) further prays that Magistrate Chea be made to arrest the body of 362 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the defendant, Liberia Forest Operating Company, to appear before the court to pay the debt of the plaintiff.” We cannot understand how a counsellor of this Bar could have brought summary proceedings against a counsellor who is representing his client in a cause. The law on summary proceedings clearly states against whom such proceedings shall be instituted. “Summary proceedings against Stipendiary Magistrate and Justice of the Peace. Any person or party litigant in a judicial proceeding before a magistrate or Justice of the Peace whose rights shall be abridged by the arbitrary action of such Magistrate or Justice of the Peace, shall be entitled to institute summary proceedings against such Magistrate or Justice of the Peace in the Circuit Court of the County where the action occurs; if such action occurs in any of the territories summary proceedings shall be instituted in the Provisional Monthly and Probate Court. As used in this Section, ‘Arbitrary Action,’ shall be any act or action on the part of a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace which violates the legal right of a party litigant, or which is not in keeping with the law of judicial practice under the statutes.” Rev. Code 17:8.12. Further comment on this point we feel to be unnecessary. When the “Bill of information for summary proceedings” was called for hearing, the judge presiding over the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit decided to determine first whether counsel for appellant did have a valid lawyer’s license to practice law before the courts of the country. He, therefore, instituted an investigation on his point and it was shown that although counsel for appellant had been practicing for the whole year of 1973, it was not until his right to practice had been challenged that he went to the Internal Revenues Service and ob- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 363 tamed a license for November and December, 1973. He had, however, instituted the action for his client in July, 1973, when he did not have a license. More unsavory facts came out in that investigation which we prefer not to mention, because they are not germane to the determination of this case. Upon the conclusion of the investigation the Circuit Court judge abated the proceeding before him, with costs against appellant, and ordered the magistrate to resume jurisdiction and determine the debt case pending before him. Appellant excepted to this ruling and his appeal is before us on a two-count bill of exceptions. In the first count of the bill of exceptions, appellant complains that the judge erred when he abated the proceeding on the ground that his counsel did not have a valid lawyer’s license. As far back as 1881 this Court held that an attorney, although qualified, is not entitled to practice before any court before obtaining the license to do so required by statute. Where the term of an attorney’s license has expired he is barred from practicing law until it is renewed. Republic v. Sherman, [1881] LRSC 3; 1 LLR 139 (1881). The present statute applying to the matter is found in our Judiciary Law: “No person shall practice law or appear before any court as an attorney or counsellor at law without a valid license as a lawyer.” Rev. Code 17:17.8. Count one of the bill of exceptions, being without merit, is overruled. Count two of the bill of exceptions complains that the judge erred when he awarded costs against informant because he was not party to the summary proceedings. If informant was not a party to the summary proceedings, who was? It is true that under the old law and practice, summary proceedings against a justice of the peace or magistrate were instituted by the prosecuting attorney upon complaint made to him by a party litigant. Such proceedings partook of a criminal nature and since costs are not allowed in criminal cases, costs were not usually 364 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS assessed. The present law applying to summary proceedings authorizes the party litigant or any person to institute the proceedings. If the case out of which summary proceedings grow is a criminal one, naturally costs will not be allowed, but if the case is a civil one, as in all civil matters, costs will be permitted. Count two of the bill of exceptions is, therefore, overruled. Inasmuch as the debt case that was instituted in the Magistrate Court was instituted by an attorney not legally qualified to do so, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the judge in the summary proceedings should be modified and affirmed ; the summary proceedings are abated and the action of debt in the Magistrate Court is dismissed, because it was instituted by one not qualified to do so. The maxim that what is not legally done is not done at all, holds true in this case. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below to resume jurisdiction and enforce its judgment as herein modified. Costs against appellant. And it is so ordered. Affirmed as modified.