MAUD JOHNS, SARA JOHNS TEJAN by Her Husband, A. TEJAN, VICTORIA JOHNS GRAFFATHS by Her Husband, SAMUEL GRAFFATHS, WESLEY JOHNS, and JULIUS C. JOHNS, Heirs and Administrators of the Intestate Estate of J. C. JOHNS, Deceased, Appellants v. GEORGE ARRASKALAR, Agent for SALAMI BROTHERS, Lebanese Merchants, and JOHNETTA JOHNS, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE MONTHLY AND PROBATE COURT OF MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued March 28, 1966. Decided June 30, 1966. 1. The constitutional privilege against being compelled to furnish or give evidence against oneself is inapplicable with respect to testimony relating to civil liability and not tending to self-incrimination. 2. Where a party to whom notice was given to produce a document refused to do so on the ground of constitutional privilege and the trial court erroneously sustained the objection but the document was subsequently introduced into evidence, the trial court’s error was not sufficient ground for reversal on appeal. 1956 CODE 6 :734, 735. A judgment of the probate court dismissing a complaint alleging interference with a decedent’s estate was affirmed. M. Kron Yangbe for appellants. Cooper Law Firm for appellees. Beysolow and MR. Court. JUSTICE SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the The records in this case show that one J. C. Johns, a Liberian national, lived in the Township of Kakata, Montserrado County, as township commissioner. It is further shown that during his incumbency as commissioner he met a tragically accidental death en route to the seat of the 372 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 373 township government. Subsequent to the death of the commissioner it was discovered that he had died intestate. Predicated upon an application dated July 3o, 1963, letters of administration dated August 6, 1963, were issued by the Monthly and Probate Court of Montserrado County whilst that court was sitting in its August term 1963, in favor of Julius C. Johns, Wesley Johns, and Johnetta V. Johns, the administrators being lineal heirs of the decedent while the administratrix was the widow. It is further evident that prior to the issuance of the letters of administration, the widow wrote Julius C. Johns on the third day of the same month informing him of her unwillingness to coadminister his late father’s estate by reason of poor health coupled with the fact that for the six-year duration of her marriage to his father the latter had never acquainted her with any of his business matters. On August 15, 1963, the widow was brought into court and questioned by the commissioner of probate as to the authenticity of the letter previously presented to the court by Julius C. John’s counsel. She thereat confirmed the letter of August 3rd to Julius C. Johns. Prior to the widow’s being brought into court for determination of the authenticity of the letter mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, that is to say, on August 13, 1963, a complaint was filed against her by the lineal heirs of the decedent, substantially alleging that she, conjointly with George Arraskalar, agent for Salami Brothers, Kakata, had unauthorizedly withdrawn from the account of their father with that store the amount of $1,336, thereby interfering with the intestate estate of their father contrary to statute. The complaint as filed further requested that the court issue a writ of summons against the appellees, respondents in the court below, to show cause why they should not be held answerable and liable for unlawfully and wrongfully interfering with the intestate estate of the aforesaid J. C. Johns. 374 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Count 4 of the complaint additionally requested that a writ of duces tecum issue against the respondents to produce in court the original accounts and receipts of the said J. C. Johns that were in their custody. To this complaint the respondents filed an answer after formally appearing. Pleadings rested after the answer which incidentally was filed on August 2 I, 1963. Thereafter, and on August 26, 1964, the court ruled on the pleadings, holding that all issues raised related to facts to be proven either by documentary or oral evidence. The hearing of the case eventually commenced and continued until conclusion thereof. The court ruled against the informants, appellants in this Court, after which a bill of exceptions was filed. Since the bill of exceptions as filed by appellants contains only two counts, both of which are germane to a determination of this case, we have deemed it best to quote both counts in their entirely as follows : “1. Because on the tenth day of sitting of the monthly and probate court being the 14th of August, 1964, informants made an application for qualification of one George Arraskalar, a Lebanese merchant of the Township of Kakata, Liberia, who had been duly, regularly, and lawfully placed under the jurisdiction of court in the category of a witness by means of a writ of duces tecum and, upon objection made by counsel for respondents, Your Honor made the following ruling, to wit : ” ‘The court says that the record before it shows that the witness George Arraskalar, whose qualification is sought to be made and to which objections have been filed, is one of the respondents in these proceedings, and as such under our Constitution where no one is to give evidence against himself, is highly favored. The application for qualification is hereby denied; to which informants duly excepted.’ LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 375 “z. And also because on the 27th day of August 1964, after evidence rested on both sides, Your Honor made the following final ruling to wit: ” ‘The court says that from the evidence adduced during the investigation held, the informants in the opinion of court, failed to establish a prima facie case against the respondents and hence the respondents are proceedings are disallowed. And it is hereby so ordered.’ “To which informants duly excepted.” hereby not found liable for the interference of the intestate estate of the late J. C. Johns. Costs of these Let us first deal with Count I of the above-quoted bill of exceptions. The issue raised here is whether George Arraskalar, the agent for Salami Brothers, who had been brought under the jurisdiction of the court as a witness by having served upon him a, writ of duces tecum, could be made to testify as a witness for the informants although he had previously been made a respondent after having been complained of as interfering with intestate estate of the decedent. In accordance with the records, the trial judge susstained an objection interposed by counsel for respondent on the ground that respondent was a party to the suit and that the Constitution provides that no one should be made to give evidence against himself. It is the ardent contention of appellant that the judge erred in ruling as he did on this objection, especially since the proposed deponent had within his possession the books of account and receipts that contained the pertinent information relating to the evidence of any personal account of J. C. Johns in Salami Brothers, Kakata, and the then-existing status of said account. This brings us to the following statutory provisions : “If a party desires to give in evidence any document in the possession of his adversary, he shall give 376 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS him reasonable notice to produce it; and the court shall have authority to decide whether the notice is reasonable. “But when the proceedings in the cause give notice that one party means to charge the other with possession of a document, no other notice shall be necessary; and no notice shall be necessary if the document is in the possession of a party who has obtained it fraudulently and to whom it does not lawfully belong.” 1956 CODE 6:734. “If a party to whom notice has been given to produce a document neglects or refuses to do so without proving that it is not within his power to produce it, he shall be taken to admit its existence, and its contents may be proved by a copy or by the testimony of witnesses.” 1956 CODE 6:735. From the above-cited laws it can be seen that the same relate to civil matters. Furthermore, recourse to Article I, Section 7th of the Constitution, clearly shows that the clause: “He shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself. . . .” must be interpreted to mean that no individual criminally charged or being investigated by a tribunal which might institute criminal proceedings against him can be required to testify against himself. From the above it can be readily seen that the trial judge erred in sustaining the objection predicated upon the reasons laid therein. However, for a determination of whether the error committed by the trial judge constituted reversible error, we must have recourse to Sections 734 and 735 of our Civil Procedure Law as quoted above. Although this particular law empowers a party to compel his adversary to produce documentary evidence after reasonable notice, recourse to section 735 shows that the wrongful nonproduction of the document by the possessor constitutes an admission of its existence and serves as a basis for having the contents thereof proved by a copy or by the testimony of witnesses. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 377 In the case at bar the particular document required by the writ of duces tecum was subsequently introduced by the respondent as a part of his defense to the claim asserted against him. We have narrowed this issue to a determination of whether the procedural error of late introduction of the document into evidence constituted reversible error. Before making a final determination of this issue, let us have recourse to the common law for its assistance in a determination of whether or not our statutory law as quoted supra is declarative of the common law or in derogation of the same. “It has become a well-settled practice for the courts to order a party to furnish papers to his adversary or allow copies of them to be taken, if material to his suit or defense, although such practice was not known under the early common law. At common law, parties are not competent witnesses, and under the earlier practice in an action at law, as distinguished from a suit in equity, the only remedy of a party litigant who wished to introduced books or papers’ in evidence which were in the possession of his adversary was by a notice to produce. Such notice did not enable the party to compel the production of such books or papers; its only effect was to lay the foundation for the introduction of parol or secondary proof of their contents, in case it appeared that the books and papers described in the notice were in the possession of the party notified and that he refused to produce them at the trial as requested. Chancery courts, however, possessed the power to compel the discovery and production of papers in virtue of their inherent and general jurisdiction. According to the practice of such courts, a bill called ‘a bill of discovery’ could be filed for the discovery of facts in the knowledge of an adverse party or of deeds, writings, or other things in his custody and power. In most jurisdictions the courts, by 378 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS statute, are given power, upon proper steps being taken, to compel or require parties to actions to produce books or papers in their possession containing evidence pertinent to the issues. The evident purpose and design of such statutes are to furnish a party litigant with a speedy and summary mode of obtaining written evidence pertinent to issue which may be in the possession and control of his adversary and thus to obviate the necessity of a bill of discovery seeking the same end. It was not, however, until the enactment of such statutes that courts of law claimed or exercised full power over the subject.” 20 AM. JUR. 772-773 Evidence � 917. The above demonstrates that at early common law a party to an action at law was not a competent witness, and therefore could not be brought into the forum to give or introduce evidence. In the premises, the procedure was adopted whereby a notice to produce was served upon an adversary in possession of evidence desired in a particular case, and where this evidence was not produced upon rea�sonable notice as requested, the nonproduction constituted a proper foundation for the introduction of parol or secondary proof of their contents. We must now assume that our statutes, as same relate to the present issue, are declarative of the principles utilized at early common law. Although it was error for the court to have ruled as it did predicated upon the cited portion of the Constitution, it was in conformity with law to refrain from compelling a party to be witness against himself in the absence of a statutory commitment to the contrary. In passing, we should also like to state that the requested documents as mentioned above were introduced into evidence and served as a foundation for the final determination by the trial judge. Let us now turn to Count 2 of the bill of exceptions for an examination of the contention that the court’s ruling was contrary to the evidence adduced during the proceedings. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 379 There were three witnesses who testified to the effect that respondent Arraskalar had in his possession certain funds personally owned by the decedent. Whilst on the stand, witness Cheeks gave the following testimony: “He then brought an account book and told me that the late commissioner had two accounts there. On the account of the Township of Kakata, there was an amount of $1,450, and on his personal ( J. C. Johns) account there was an amount of $1,300. I then told him that I was not interested in his personal account, but I was only interested in the money for the township; he then opened his safe and gave me $1,450, for which I gave him a receipt; that is all I know about it.” On cross-examination of this witness the following testimony was elicited. “Q. Did Mr. Arraskalar show you his personal account of the late J. C. Johns, which you said he told you he had? “A. He brought the book and told me that Mr. Johns had two accounts and I told him that I was not interested in his personal account, hence I did not look in the account book. He then asked me what must he do with the amount of money on his personal account: must he give to the widow or must he give to the children? I advised him not to give to either one of them yet because the matter would travel to court. “Q. Is it not a fact that when you went to Mr. Arraskalar, he exhibited to you two accounts in the name of the township of Kakata which were opened with him by the late J. C. Johns and that the amounts in the two accounts respectively were $920 and $1,450, which amounts were drawn by you as acting township commissioner? “A. Yes, this is correct.” Witness Julius Johns testified as follows on cross-examination. 380 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS “Q. Did your informant, Mr. Cheeks, tell you how much money your father had with codefendant Arraskalar and, if so, did he show you a receipt which your said father held for the alleged deposit? “A. He told me the amount, $1,336. And he told me that he went to Cheeks on the township money which was also deposited in George Arraskalar’s store; then he saw my father’s account and he wrote the amount down and showed it to me; he did not tell me that my father had a receipt. “Q. So then, the only thing you know about your father’s alleged deposit with codefendant Arraskalar, for which amount you have brought information to this court that codefendant Johnetta Johns interfered with your father’s estate, was what Mr. Cheeks told you; and you personally had no knowledge concerning said deposit, not so? “A. No, I have no former knowledge, but I do recall codefendant George Arraskalar affirming this statement to me. “Q. Who was present, when, as you said, codefendant Arraskalar confirmed what you alleged Mr. Cheeks told you? “A. Wesley Johns. “Q. Please tell this court what was the confirmation made to you and your brother concerning the alleged information given you by a Mr. Cheeks; that is to say, what amount Mr. Arraskalar said he had for your father. “A. He said it was $1,336.” The third witness whose testimony is pertinent to this factual determination was Wesley Johns who gave the following evidence. “Q. I presume that you and Julius Johns went together to Mr. Arraskalar and your brother was LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 381 present when you inquired about any money which Mr. Arraskalar may have had for your father and, in your brother’s presence, Mr. Arraskalar told you what the amount was ; not so? “A. Yes, he was present with me. “Q. So then Mr. Arraskalar was the first one who told you and your brother the amount that he had in safekeeping for your father but which your stepmother had drawn ; and a receipt therefor had been destroyed by him; not so? “A. Yes. “Q. Mr. Witness, I presume that your first information concerning any alleged amount being in the possession of codefendant Arraskalar belonging to your late father was given you by Hon. Chas. G. Cheeks ; not so? “A. Yes. “Q. And I suggest to you also that Mr. Cheeks in giving you this information told you that the amount in question is $1,336, not so? “A. I can hardly remember the exact figure up to the last cent. “Q. Since you seem not to remember the exact amount which Mr. Cheeks told you codefendant Arraskalar had for your father, nor can you remember the exact amount Mr. Arraskalar admitted he had, according to you, which your stepmother had withdrawn, from where then do you get the figure $1,336 which you have positively mentioned in Count 2 of your complaint as being the amount in question? “A. I remember this figure during the time the complaint was made because it was after the information. Today I said I could not remember because it has been quite a year now since the filing of this complaint. At the time the complaint was made, my mind was then fresh and could remember the figure. 382 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS “Q. Can you remember which of your two informants gave you this figure, that is to say, Mr. Cheeks or Mr. Arraskalar; the figure $1,336? “A. Mr. Cheeks. “Q. Who was present when, as you said, you approached Mr. Arraskalar concerning an alleged deposit of your late father with him during which time he made the admission you have referred to earlier in these proceedings? “A. There were a whole lot of persons present, but whether they were paying attention to the conversation I did not know; but persons that were paying attention to us were my brother Julius and Mr. Arraskalar’s brother Mooney. “Q. Aside from the information which you said Mr. Cheeks and Mr. Arraskalar gave you concerning the $1,336, do you personally know anything concerning your late father depositing any amount, that is to say the amount in question, with codefendant Arraskalar and that codefendant Johnetta Johns withdrew said amount? “A. No. “Q. Do you hold any receipt in favor of your late father for the amount of $1,336 which you alleged he deposited with codefendent Arraskalar? “A. I don’t.” Cross rests with reservations. Redirect and recross waived. COURT’S QUESTION : “Q. How do you, as one of the informants in these proceedings arrive at the amount of $1,336? “A. Through Mr. Cheeks.” In view of the above testimony, it is easily seen that witness Charles Cheeks was not certain as to whether he had been told what the amount of the personal account was or even whether he himself had examined the account book LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 383 and personally discovered that the late J. C. Johns had two accounts with Salami Brothers, one of the same being personal. Furthermore, witness Cheeks tesified that the amount with Salami Brothers on the personal account was $1,300 odd dollars, yet witness Wesley Johns testified that it was the same witness Cheeks who told him that the amount in the personal account was $1,336. Additionally, both Wesley Johns and Julius Johns testified that they spoke with George Arraskalar at Salami Brothers ; nevertheless Wesley Johns testified that Arraskalar told him that the amount of his father’s personal account was approximately $1,200, whereas witness Cheeks hed previously told him that this amount was $1,336. But when witness Julius Johns took the stand, he testified that the amount involved was exactly $1,336. There is quite a discrepancy in the testimony of the two brothers, especially when they both stated that they went together to Salami Brothers and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they both would have heard the same thing. In view of the above, it is our opinion that the trial judge was correct in dismissing the complaint for a lack of factual merit. In the premises, the judgment of the court below is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. And it is hereby so ordered. Judgment anirmed.