HELOU BROTHERS, Lebanese Merchants Doing Business in Liberia, by their Manager, SHAHIN HELOU SAAD, Appellants v. HAWAH KIAZOLU-WAHAB and His Honor, JAMES W. HUNTER,

Assigned Judge of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, Appellees. APPEAL FROM RULING IN CHAMBERS ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. Argued May 19, 1966. Decided July 1, 1966. 1. When a party who has been judicially directed to file a bond under Section 1231 of the Civil Procedure Law files a bond which does not bear the revenue stamp required by Chapter 18 of the Revenue and Finance Law and the party fails to make timely application to correct the insufficiency of the bond under Section 1014 of the Civil Procedure Law, a motion to dismiss the case will be granted. 2. The Supreme Court may simultaneously dismiss an application for a writ of error and modify the judgment below. 3. If a judgment has been entered without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the defect is cured if the defendant thereafter appears and participates in subsequent proceedings or invokes the action of the court for his benefit. A ruling by the Justice presiding in Chambers granting a writ of error in an ejectment action was affirmed by the full Court which, however, modified the judgment of the circuit court in the ejectment action by a remittitur of damages. P. Amos George Law Firm for appellant. Perry Law Association for appellees. Dukuly & MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WILSON delivered the opinion of the Court. To amend a petition for a writ of error previously filed in the Chambers of Mr. Justice Clarence L. Simpson, Jr., 520 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 521 an amendment to said petition was subsequently filed on the 2.8th day of September, 1965, praying for the issuance of an alternative writ of error against a proceeding determined by His Honor Judge Hunter, then presiding over the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County. This petition as amended charged the trial judge with having proceeded illegally with the trial and disposition of an action of ejectment filed against petitioner in error because as the petitioner contended, he did not have his day in court. The petitioner also challenged the correctness of the returns made to the writ of resummons by the sheriff, contending that at the time the writ is supposed to have been served Shahin Helou Saad and Marga Baum, who were named defendants and agents for Helou Brothers, were out of the country–that is to say, Marga Baum left the country in 1962 and did not return to the Republic, and Shahin Helou Saad, at the time of the alleged service of the writ, was in the Republic of Lebanon, which made it impossible for the writ to have been served on them. The petitioner alleged that, notwithstanding this claimed impossibility, the trial judge on the basis of false returns of the sheriff, and in the absence of petitioner in error, entered judgment upon a verdict made by a specially empaneled jury to try said action and assessed damages of $150,000 for an illegal detention of a parcel of land measuring not more than 3o to 40 feet which plaintiffs claim they held on lease from respondent in error, Hawah Kiazolu-Wahab. The returns of the respondents in error, comprising 12 counts, prayed that the petition be denied for legal and factual reasons which we consider necessary to quote word for word, to wit: it 1. Because respondents in error say that the writ as prayed for has no legal foundation in that, in keeping with the statutes controlling the issuance of a writ of error, the parties are referred to as plaintiff in error 522 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS and defendant in error, according to the party suing and the one sued, but to the contrary the petitioner in error, as it styles itself has violated this principle of nomenclature in keeping with our statute, practice and procedure. See 1956 CODE 6:1231. “2. And also because respondents in error say that the writ as prayed for has no legal and factual foundation in that the petitioners are estopped from raising any jurisdictional issue over their persqns and as to the manner of service of process on them in that, on the 21st day of December, 1965, the petitioners voluntarily appeared in the court below by means of what they termed a submission and obtained the release of goods seized by the sheriff ‘to enable the defendants to be in position to pay the costs as well as the prinicipal of the damages … ,’as will more fully appear from an inspection of the hereto attached copies of the ruling of Judge Hunter, one of the respondents herein. (See the submission filed in the court below, the judge’s ruling and orders, and the sheriff’s returns to said orders.) “3. And also because respondents in error say that the petitioners in error are forever barred and estopped for any alleged defects in the issuance and service of process; for in the court below, the said petitioners in error did file an instrument in the proceedings styled ‘Defendants’ Submission,’ hereto attached to form a part of these returns. Respondents in error submit that a ‘submission is a putting one’s property or person under the control of another. A yielding to authority.’ See BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle’s 3rd rev. 1914) Submission. “4. And also because respondents in error further say that, according to the general rule, if a judgment has been entered without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the defect is cured if the defendant thereafter appears and participates in subsequent proceedings or invokes the action of the court for his benefit. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 523 See 3 AM. JuR. 806-807 Appearances � 37. Further : `A general appearance may rise by implication from the defendant’s seeking, taking, or agreeing to take some step or proceeding in the cause, beneficial to himself, or detrimental to the plaintiff, other than one to contest the jurisdiction only.’ 3 Am. JuR. 783 Appearances � 3. “In the instant case the petitioners in error appeared in the court below, sought and obtained the order of the court for the release of the seized goods to them, which was to their benefit and to the detriment of the plaintiff in the main ejectment case. “5. Respondents in error further say that the application for a writ of error is an indirect request made of this Honorable Court by the petitioners for an aid in all their acts which have no foundation of good faith from the facts and circumstances surrounding the case at bar, in that petitioners in error have even failed to disclose in their petition the fact that they filed a submission in the court below as well as obtaining the court’s order to release the goods to them, which the respondent judge did, as per ruling and the returns of the sheriff. “6. And also because respondents in error say that the petitioners in error having undertaken to take delivery of the goods seized to have them sold to enable them to pay the cost as well as the principal, they thereby waived all objections as to the legality of the court’s jurisdiction over their persons. “7. And also because respondents in error further contend that the application for the writ is providently prayed for in the instant case; that is to say, the processes were lawfully issued and properly served in keeping with the returns of the sheriff, as appears from copies of the writ of summons ; and respondents in error further submit that: ” ‘The return is merely evidence by which the court 524 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS is informed that the defendant has been served. When the judgment recites service and there is a return, the recital is always based on the return, and the two are to be construed together.’ 21 R.C.L. Process � 6z. “In the instant case, the record reveals that service of process was had by the sheriff and the writ of resummons issued only for the permissive compliance with Section 1125 of the Civil Procedure Law, quoted supra. ‘Generally, if the record is silent as to service, or in the absence of a return there is a recital of due service, then on a collateral attack jurisdiction will be conclusively presumed.’ 21 R.C.L. Process � 62. “In the instant case, there was both service and return in accordance with the record; furthermore, no evidence was ever introduced to rebut the returns with respect to regular service having been had upon both the persons of plaintiff in error and his codefendant in the court below. In the premises, the recital of service cannot herein be attacked. See Perry v. Ammons, [1965] LRSC 11; 16 L.L.R. 268 (1965). “8. And also because respondents in error say further that as to Counts 1, 2 and 3, as well as 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the petition, the points therein made have no legal efficacy and foundation, in that the said points raised in the aforesaid counts propose issues which should have been presented during the trial of this case in the court below. Moreover, because the petitioners in error wantonly failed to appear and defend even though returned summoned and resummoned, and because of their subsequent submission to the court’s jurisdiction and participation in the judgment to their benefit and to the detriment of the defendants in error coupled with the returns of the sheriff for Montserrado County, they are forever barred and estopped from raising the issues contained in the petition. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ” 525 9. And also because respondents in error say that the petitioners in error herein have greatly misled this Honorable Court in that, although they have filed an instrument entitled ‘Submission’ in the court below, as if seeking a similar relief now sought by them in these proceedings, and although said ‘Submission’ is before the presiding judge for disposition, yet the petitioners have elected, while still said matter is pending before the respondent judge in the court below, to take flight to the Chambers of this Honorable Court for the relief they now seek. (C m. And also because respondents in error further say that it is true that the petitioners in error were served with the processes but that, due to inadvertence of counsel, no formal appearance was filed and, because of such omission, the plaintiff secured a judgment by default from the present term of court, and thereafter final judgment was rendered awarding the property to plaintiff together with damages to amount of $15o,000 as will more fully appear from an inspection of the hereto-attached copy of motion of the International Trust Company of Liberia to intervene. “11. And also because respondents in error further say that the entire proceedings should be dismissed because of the defective indemnity bond filed by the applicant (petitioner in error) in that from an inspection of the bond filed by the petitioner in error, there is no revenue stamp attached thereto in accordance with law. Respondents in error submit that: ” ‘In the year 1906, the Legislature of Liberia, for the purpose of increasing the revenue, passed a statute entitled a “Stamp Act” which provides that certain documents shall be subject to a stamp duty to be thereon affixed as per schedule then prescribed ; among which are bonds, etc. Said act was supplemented and enlarged by a subsequent stamp act approved January 24, 1923, which included appeal bonds etc., and 526 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS provided that no document of the nature of those mentioned therein, issued after the thirtieth day of June, 1906, should be deemed valid, or be received as evidence in courts of justice unless it should have been properly stamped in accordance with the schedule above-mentioned in said Act. Upon careful examination of the records filed, we find that the bond filed in the cause was not stamped according to law, and is, therefore, void and of no legal effect.’ Tisdell v. Zeonvonyon, [1937] LRSC 16; 6 L.L.R. 24, 25-26 (1937) ” ‘No document or instrument subject to stamp duty under the provisions of Section 57o above shall be deemed valid or received in evidence in court unless it bears revenue stamps of the Republic of Liberia cancelled in accordance with the provisions of Section 571 above. This section shall not, however, be understood to exempt from payment of the stamp duty hereinbefore specified any document or instrument even though such document or instrument is not required as evidence before a court.’ 1956 CODE 35 :573. “12. And also because respondents in error say that the bond required to be filed in error proceedings is in the nature of an appeal bond ; for this Honorable Court has only appellate jurisdiction in keeping with provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia. Respondents in error submit that the bond as tendered by the petitioners in error being defective, the writ should be quashed. (See certified copy of the bond filed by the petitioners in error hereto attached.) ” On the same day, that is to say the 3rd of January, 1966, respondents in error filed a motion to dismiss the petition and quash the writ of error setting out two grounds, to wit : “1. Because, in keeping with law, one of the very essential prerequisites of the issuance of a writ of error, if required by the presiding Justice in whose Chambers the appeal is made, is a tender of a valid LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 527 bond by the appellant (in this case the petitioners in error) . In the instant case, the Chambers Justice, His Honor C. L. Simpson, Jr., emphasized the necessity of the conformity with this requirement; in other words, he did not dispense with the said provision, thereby making the tender thereof mandatory and prerequisitory. Nevertheless the petitioners in error, as if to challenge, disregard, and disobey law and procedure relating to the appeals in this Honorable Court, negligently and irresponsibly executed, tendered, and filed a bond without meeting the requirements relating to bonds, that is to say, the petitioners in error refused, neglected, carelessly and improvidently omitted to attach a revenue stamp to the said bond, thereby rendering these appellate proceedings a fit item to crumble as though they never existed. Respondents in error ask this Honorable Court to take judicial notice of the original bond filed in these proceedings and as per certified copy thereof attached to this motion. “2. Respondents in error further say that, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, this Honorable Court is exercising an appellate jurisdiction in these proceedings; consequently the bond tendered and filed in pursuance thereof and in consonance therewith tantamount to any bond ; and the material defect thereof as outlined herein is fatal to the entire proceedings. The entire proceedings should therefore be dismissed and the writ quashed.” Because of the allegations contained in the petition charging false returns of the sheriff regarding the actual service of the writ, His Honor Judge Hunter, on instructions of Mr. Justice Simpson, instituted an investigation and made a report, the last paragraph of which stated that: “From all aspects of the investigation, the defendants were not in the country, as was established by Mr. Halou’s passport. However, the sheriff’s returns were made relying on the information of the bailiff, as 528 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS you will more fully see from the records attached for Your Honor’s final ruling.” This motion, however, was withdrawn by petitioners in error with reservations. Subsequently an amended motion to dismiss the petition and quash the writ of error was filed setting forth, in substance, the following legal and factual reasons : i. Because the bond as filed and tendered by respondents in error carelessly and improvidently omitted to carry a revenue stamp, which rendered said proceedings fit for dismissal. 2. That in keeping with the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia the Supreme Court was exercising appellant jurisdiction in these proceedings ; consequently a bond filed in pursuance thereof is in the nature of an appeal bond and the failure to affix the stamp thereon is a material defect. Respondents in error also maintained that the petitioners in error were estopped from contesting either the issuance and service of said precepts or the validity of the judgment by the rule that if a judgment has been entered without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the defect is cured if the defendant thereafter appears and participates in subsequent proceedings or invokes the action of the court for his benefit. The latter contention of the respondents in error referred to a submission filed by the petitioners in error setting up a claim of not having been placed under the jurisdiction of the court, this time claiming that they were out of the country at the time the writ is supposed to have been served, and that a brother who was in charge of the business had left the City of Monrovia for a period of 5 days. Petitioners in error also submitted that under the statute controlling ejectment proceedings, application should have been made by the respondents in error for a writ of resummons before a judgment by default could be entered against them and that, by recourse to the record, there is no indication that a resummons was either prayed LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 529 for or granted, nor had service of any precept been made on the petitioners in error. This submission concluded with a prayer which we consider it necessary to quote word for word, to wit: “Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, defendant submits therefore that you will investigate the allegations contained herein, and if found to be true and correct, that Your Honor will rescind the judgment given and order the defendant restored to his status quo and a copy of the writ of ejectment ordered served on him, as in keeping with the law.” It was because of this submission that an investigation was ordered by the Chambers Justice to be conducted by the trial judge; however, it seems necessary for us to quote some of the questions and answers that were recorded during this investigation to support his claim of nonservice of the writ and the alleged false returns of the sheriff. The following are some of the questions and answers that were propounded to witness Shahin Helou Saad : “Q. You will please state all facts and circumstances within your knowledge touching the allegations you have made against the sheriff. “A. All I know is that on December 28, 1965, the sheriff came with a writ of possession and closed my business by order of the court and he told me that there was a case against me and I was not present; and it was not true, because I did not know about the summons; I can prove that, because when the writ of summons was served in the month of July, I was not in the country; I was in Lebanon. “Q. Did you leave an agent or representative to succeed you at the time you went to Lebanon? “A. Yes, I left someone, Farood Helou Saad, my brother and my partner in the business. “Q. Can you say as to whether this writ was not served on your brother, partner, or on your agent? “A. I do not think so.” 530 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS As against this testimony was evidence that, although the sheriff did not personally serve the writ on defendant in error, service was made on the representative of the company by his deputy, court bailiff George Sherman, who testified as follows. “Q. Are you acquainted with one Marga Baum and Shahin Helou Saad of Monrovia? “A. Yes. “Q. Can you say as to whether you served any precepts on this company, and if so, what time and on whom did you serve them by orders of the sheriff of this court? “A. I served the writ of ejectment; but when I got there they told me that the manager was gone away; the acting manager who was left in the business and whom I identify now in court was the gentleman who signed and received the writ.” Witness A. Dondo Ware, who accompanied the court bailiff for the purpose of identifying to him the Helou Brothers area so as to be able to serve the writ, testified as follows. “Q. Do you recall at any time accompanying the bailiff of this court, George Sherman, for the purpose of identifying the Helou Brothers area to him for the purpose of serving a writ of summons in this ejectment case? “A. Yes. “Q. Please explain what happened. “A. When the bailiff got to the business house of the company I was with him and I asked for the man that was in charge, and Mr. George Daou said that he was the man. The bailiff summoned him and he read the complaint, writ, and other documents. It was I who told him to sign the papers and he signed his signature to it. When asked to identify the signature of Mr. George Daou, he stated : ‘This is the very writing and signature of LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 531 Mr. George Daou.’ Two days later I went to the office where I met Fred, the brother of Shahin Helou, and he admitted to me of the writ and they were laughing at me and they said to me that the plaintiff will not get anything out of the matter; the German Government will give them that place.” One Moses Duaryenneh was called to the stand and, over objections of the respondents in error, was asked and answered the following questions : “Q. Are you acquainted with George Daou of the Helou Brothers? “A. This is my second time seeing him, but I am not acquainted with him. “Q. Please explain the circumstances under which you saw him in connection with the present ejectment case now under investigation. “A. The only thing that I know about the ejectment case besides being disposed of by this court, it was on the 22nd day of December, 1965, when His Honor the Judge adjourned court to meet after Christmas. I immediately went to the Henries Law Firm to attend some private business of mine. There I met a stout white man before Counsellor Dennis’s desk; he was having on an old white panama hat. Counsellor Dennis then told me to have a seat. I took my seat. This gentleman was telling Counsellor Dennis how a writ of possession was served on him and one Hawah Kiazolu-Wahab was placed in possession of her land. Counsellor Dennis asked me what kind of ejectment case did you people have in court. I told Counsellor Dennis that we had an ex parte ejectment case in which Hawah KiazoluWahab is plaintiff and Helou Brothers are defendants. He then asked me as to whether a formal appearance was filed. I told him, no; no 532 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS formal appearance, neither an answer. He again asked me where was the judge. I told him that the judge was gone to Bassa. Counsellor Dennis then asked this white man whether any writ was served on him. He said : ‘Yes, a writ was served on me and I took same to Counsellor P. Amos George.’ Counsellor Dennis asked me the whereabouts of Counsellor P. Amos George now. I said ‘I did not know the whereabouts of Counsellor P. Amos George.’ I then told Counsellor Dennis that I learned that Counsellor P. Amos George was in Sanniquelli attending a murder case. Whilst talking this, Counsellor Smythe entered the office and we commenced my business. After my business I left and this is all I know.” I want to note here that this witness was the assistant clerk of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, before whom this case was being tried. This brief account and history of the case is not intended to serve as a review of the ejectment proceedings tried and determined by the circuit court since, rather than a regular appeal, we are only considering determination of an appeal from the ruling of Mr. Justice William E. Wardsworth on a petition of a writ of error growing out of said ejectment proceedings. It must be noted here that, notwithstanding the claim of petitioners in error of not having been properly and legally brought under the jurisdiction of the court, they elected very strangely and unprecedently not to move immediately by writ of error but adopted a novel proceeding of a submission contesting jurisdiction over their persons which they claimed to be based on the false and misleading returns of the sheriff. Acting on this submission the trial judge made the following ruling. “In the case of Hawah Kiazolu – Wahab, plaintiff, versus Marga Baum and Shahin Helou, agent for LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 533 Helou Brothers in which final judgment was given and a writ of possession ordered, the court has been informed that the sheriff has duly executed the writ of possession and the plaintiff has been put in possession of the property in the rear of defendant’s business house and has made his returns to this court in the adequate execution of the judgment of this court; but the court was later informed that in executing the damages part of our judgment, he also closed all the business of all the warehouse, which was not ordered in our judgment. So as to mete out transparent justice to both parties and to enable the defendant to be in position to pay the costs as well as the principal of the damages, the sheriff is hereby ordered to release to defendants the key for their business house in which regular commercial business is transacted for income, pending my investigation into the allegation set forth and contained in the submission filed by the defendants, and to make his returns to this court by tomorrow morning as to how he has executed this order. And he is to keep the key for only the warehouse that falls within the value of the damages and nothing in excess of that; and it is so ordered.” This ruling of the judge does not appear to us to be responsive to the submission made by petitioners in error through Counsellor P. Amos George who, strangely, did not except to same but rather permitted his clients to participate in this revival of action on the final judgment of court and had his clients accept the keys of the premises, reenter, and proceed in regular performance of their business to be able to pay costs and damages decreed in said verdict and judgment. It was after this participation in the submission proceedings that the learned Counsellor, for his clients, sought the benefit of a writ of error which was denied by the Chambers Justice. The Chambers Justice’s ruling, however, was exclusively based on the alleged failure of petitioner in error to affix the required revenue stamp on the appeal bond, in 534 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS keeping with the statute, to make said bond valid, since according to the statute, a bond, if required, must possess all of the essentials to make it valid. Section 573 of our Revenue and Finance Law provides that: “No document or instrument subject to stamp duty under the provisions of section 570 above shall be deemed valid or received into evidence in court unless it bears revenue stamps of the Republic of Liberia cancelled in accordance with the provisions of section 57 1 .” Independent of this section is Section 574 which provides a penalty for failure to affix revenue stamps, as is required, subjecting the defaulter to a fine of not more than $5o. It was contended by petitioner in error during the argument before us that the sole purpose of the statutory provision requiring revenue stamps to be affixed to a document to make it valid is to secure revenue to the Government; and where not done, only a penalty is provided. We cannot harmonize our opinion with this contention. The statute, as construed in several opinions of this Court makes the sufficiency of a bond one of the jurisdictional requisites of the completion of an appeal ; and a legal bond must carry a revenue stamp. The penalty for such failure as provided by section 574 of our Revenue and Finance Law does not relieve the defaulting party of the denial of the right to be heard on an appeal because of failure to file a bond that is not timely and legally stamped. Further supporting our position, we quote the following. “The omission to stamp an appeal bond in accordance with the Stamp Act is a material error.” Freeman V. Republic, [1915] LRSC 5; 2 L.L.R. 189 (1915) Syllabus 2. By way of excusing themselves from liability, the petitioners in error invoked Section 1231 (d) of the Civil Procedure Law which provides that a petitioner in error “may” be required to file a bond as contrasted with other LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 535 like requirements under the statute which employ the word “shall.” The learned counsel overlooked the fact that this statutory provision makes the filing of a bond in error proceedings optional, but where, as in the present case, the Chambers Justice requires it, it is mandatory; and in such case, the bond must be stamped, otherwise it is invalid. We desire here to remark that no court in the exercise of its judicial functions is authorized to amend, repeal, modify, or grant any concessions to any party litigant save as expressly provided by statute; nor can any common-law provision be applied in substitution of an existing statute. The Chambers Justice’s ruling applying Section 57o of the Revenue and Finance Law which requires a revenue stamp to be affixed to a bond refers to Section 570 (8) which specifies the instruments to which revenue stamps are mandatorily required to be affixed. Section 1014 of the Civil Procedure Law affords a party an opportunity to make sufficient an insufficiency in his appeal bond by petitioning the appellate court for permission to make it sufficient; but this the petitioner in error hopelessly failed to do until he had been attacked by his adversary. Petitioner’s counsel, however, contended that he made tender of said stamp to the clerk of the Supreme Court who refused to accept same on the ground that he was not authorized to do so except by orders of the Chambers Justice ; yet counsel, knowing this to be a statutory requirement, elected not to apply to the Chambers Justice to make sufficient this insufficiency. We cannot, therefore, but sustain the ruling of the Chambers Justice to the effect that the bond of petitioner in these error proceedings is invalid. The circumstances which obtained in Gibson v. Tubman, 13 L.L.R. 610 (196o), cited by petitioners in error differ from the circumstances in this case, in that the appellants in that case did apply for a revenue stamp to be placed on the appeal bond but there were no flag receipts available for procurement at the time of the filing of the 536 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS bond ; hence the appellants in that case deposited the amount into the Internal Revenue and obtained a receipt which they affixed to the bond, thereby fully complying with the statute relating to the affixing of a revenue stamp to the bond. It was stressed in the argument before us by the petitioner in error that the failure to affix a revenue stamp to the appeal bond was not sufficient ground for dismissal of the appeal or the denial to him of the right of review of the court of the allegedly illegal trial. He cites the opinions by this court in Buchanan v. Arrivets, [1945] LRSC 2; 9 L.L.R. 15 ( 1 945), and Cole v. Williams, io L.L.R. 191 (1949). We must here state that these two opinions just quoted do not harmonize with the statute on this point. These two opinions, in our opinion, seek to amend, modify, and grant concessions which are not reserved as exceptions to this statute by the lawmakers ; hence both are hereby recalled. In our opinion, courts of justice are not lawmakers but law interpreters, which must be strictly in conformity with the statute and not otherwise. Nor, too, should this Court give encouragement to negligence and slothfulness on the part of lawyers who indulge in not only carelessly handling the interests of their clients but failing to comply with the statute in the hope of getting the benefit of concessions from the Court. It has ever and anon been declared by this Court that litigants must not expect the Court to do for them that which they ought to do for themselves. Even if this Court were moved with sympathy to reverse the ruling of the Chambers Justice in this stamp issue as immaterial or technical because of the sentimental contention of petitioners that they should not be subjected to the payment of such an enormous sum of money, namely, $15o,000, on the insignificant and minor default or failure to affix a revenue stamp, it cannot escape us to bring under consideration the legal impossibility of the Court entertaining error at the stage it was applied for and the circumstances which followed the rendition of LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 537 final judgment in this case by the voluntary, inexcusable, and questionable conduct of the petitioners’ counsel–that is to say, waiving the right secured to him under the law to apply for error immediately after the rendition of final judgment which he claimed was rendered not only in his absence but on false returns of the sheriff that his client was actually summoned, when in fact he was not summoned. The record of the investigation of the charge of false returns of the sheriff substantially shows by the testimony of the witnesses recorded and cited supra in this opinion that the service was performed and the documents relating to same given petitioners’ counsel by his clients, which documents he placed in his pocket and obviously carelessly failed to file an appearance and an answer, to the injury and damage of his client. Estoppel has been raised by the respondents against this Court entertaining these proceedings for the reason that petitioner is precluded and estopped from questioning any defects, if at all they existed in the issuance and service of process as well as the validity of the judgment, because of waiver on their part in keeping with the general rule which has been authoritatively summarized as follows. “According to the general rule, if a judgment has been entered without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, the defect is cured if the defendant thereafter appears and participates in subsequent proceedings or invokes the action of the court for his benefit.” 3 AM. JuR. 8o6 Appearances � 37. ” A general appearance may arise by implication from the defendant’s seeking, taking or agreeing to take some step or proceeding in the cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to the plaintiff, other than one to contest the jurisdiction only.” 3 AM. JuR. 783 Appearances � 3. In the instant case, petitioner appeared in the court below and participated in the case to the extent of repos- 538 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS sessing the goods and property seized on the execution to enforce the judgment of the court rendered against him. According to the ruling of the trial judge on the petitioner’s submission, to which he recorded no exceptions, although present in court when same was made, “to enable the defendant to be in position to pay the costs as well as the principal of the damages, the sheriff is hereby ordered to release to defendants the key for their business house in which regular commercial business is transacted for income, pending my investigation of the allegation set forth and contained in the submission filed by the defendants. . . .” Obtaining the benefit of a release of the key and repossession of the property seized on the execution enforcing the judgment in the case for the purpose of continuing business transactions to raise income for the settlement of the costs of court and damages of $150,000 awarded by the jury and confirmed by the judgment of the court precludes the petitioners in error from seeking the benefit of a writ of error to contest the legality of the judgment and the claimed false returns of the sheriff, since the petitioners in error have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by said submission and obtained benefits from the court to the disadvantage of their adversaries. “Admissions which have been acted upon by others are conclusive against the party making them, in all cases between him and the party influenced. It is of no importance whether they were made in express language to the person himself, or implied from the open and general conduct of the party. For, in the latter case, the implied declaration may be considered as addressed to every one in particular, who may have occasion to act upon it. In such cases the party is estopped, on grounds of public policy and good faith, from repudiating his own representations. . . . “It makes no difference, in the operation of this rule, whether the thing admitted was true or false; it being LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 539 the fact that it has been acted upon, that renders it conclusive.” i GREENLEAF, Evidence 329, 333 � 207, 208 (Lewis ed. 1896). We have made this departure in not confining ourselves to the ruling of the Chambers Justice on the question of failure to affix the required revenue stamp to the bond demanded by the Chambers Justice when the alternative writ of error was issued, because of what is felt and alleged to be too insignificant and not sufficiently material to deny issuance of the peremptory writ. We could not avoid taking judicial notice of the circumstances which have provoked these proceedings by the conduct of counsel for petitioners in error as their lawful agent and his failure to timely move for error to bring said proceedings to this Court for review. Counsel elected to move by submission and still, after getting the benefit of said submission, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court by error, which has exposed his clients to grave and serious embarrassments, damages, and injury which we are inclined to feel were deliberate, willful, and therefore unprofessional and unethical. In affirming the ruling of the Chambers Justice, since we have no legal authority to do otherwise, we must here remark that we cannot in good conscience and transparent justice confirm a verdict and judgment in such extremely excessive damages. It is not apparent, according to the record which we cannot escape taking judicial notice of, that by reasonable deductions such an enormous sum of money has justly accrued to respondents in error. We must nevertheless recognize the fact that there was a trespass by the intrusion on and occupation of a piece of real property of respondents by petitioners, which property was not a part of their lease holding. Hence, compensatory damages and eviction from said excess piece of property fairly and justly accrue to the appellees without prejudice to the lease agreement for the property. In 540 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the light of the foregoing, the undescriptive and unqualified amount of $150,000 assessed by the jury’s verdict is hereby reduced to the sum of $20,000. This position is buttressed by the fact that an error proceeding before the Supreme Court has the character of an appeal since it brings under review the entire record of a trial as does a regular appeal ; hence this Court is authorized in a proceeding on a writ of error to give such judgment as ought to have been given by the court from which the appeal was taken. Deciding on the conduct of Counsellor P. Amos George we must here remark that same was unprofessional and unethical, tainted with carelessness and indifference to the interests of his clients, and has a criminal coloring which cannot be condoned by this Supreme Court since it has seriously and adversely affected his clients. He is therefore suspended from the practice of law directly and indirectly for a period of one calendar year from the date of this judgment. The ruling of the Chambers Justice is affirmed with costs against the petitioners in error. And it is hereby so ordered. Ruling in Chambers affirmed; judgment modified. MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON dissenting. The relevant facts have been stated and therefore there exists no need for a further review of these facts. I have refused to sign the majority opinion because of my inability to agree with the proposition that the present error proceedings should be dismissed predicated upon the failure of plaintiff in error, appellant in these proceedings, to have affixed to the petition a revenue stamp as is required by our Revenue and Finance Law. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 541 It is undeniably true that the Revenue and Finance Law requires that revenue stamps be affixed to appeal bonds. Section 570 of the Revenue and Finance Law (1956 CODE 35 :57o) prescribes that bonds of the type used in the present case should have affixed thereto a revenue stamp to be valid. Additionally, Section 574 lays down a penalty for failure to affix or cancel revenue stamps as required by Section 570. On the surface, in reading Section 573 one immediately and understandably gets the impression that a document without the required stamp is invalid and may not be received in evidence in court. However, upon continuing to Section 574 and viewing the criminal implications contained therein, one wonders whether the prime concern of the Legislature is the paying of the required stamp fee or the rendering of the document invalid. In order best to be able to answer this question, we must delve into legislative history to uncover the intention behind the law. Why was this law passed? The first pronouncement on the Stamp Act .by this Court was in the case of Page V. Jackson, [1911] LRSC 6; 2 L.L.R. 47 (191 ) , in which Mr. Justice McCants-Stewart, speaking for the Court, said at 2 L.L.R. 48-49 “The Stamp Act was passed for the purpose of increasing the revenue. The suggestion for such a law emanated from the Postal Department, and was urged upon the ground that it would increase the postal revenue. In his annual message to the Legislature, dated December 16,1904, His Excellency President Barclay said : ‘The Postmaster General is exceedingly anxious to place the service on the same footing in all parts of the country; but he is hampered by want of funds. . . And His Excellency in his annual message to the Legislature dated December 11,1906, dealing with the affairs of the Postal Department, said, among other things : 542 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ” ‘The Postmaster General having made the necessary preparations, the Stamp Act went into force at the beginning of July. This Act will be very helpful as it affords a revenue.’ ” True, the case just quoted was one dealing with the use of a postage stamp in lieu of a revenue stamp due to the lack of a revenue stamp in a remote area of the country. But it is also evident that the legislative history was exposed and the underlying intention of the Legislature for the passage of the particular act made manifest. Next, in the case of Pratt v. Hazeley, [1929] LRSC 10; 3 L.L.R. 127 (1929), this Court reaffirmed two basic principles which, in our view, underlie the reasons for the above-mentioned pronouncement. Quoting with approval from the Page case, supra, Mr. Justice Grigsby pointed out in the Pratt case, 3 L.L.R. 128, that the Court is Ct . . . not inclined to look favorably upon technical points, which do not go to the merits of the controversy. A court of last resort should deal with the principles underlying every issue brought before it.” And Syllabus 2 of the Pratt case reads as follows. “Where a need for a revenue stamp arises and there shall be no more on hand available, an instrument is properly stamped if it has affixed thereto any government stamp of the value required by the Stamp Act.” These two points, in our view, constitute a clear indication of the thinking of this Court more than 37 years ago. Are we to project this thinking to a new horizon or retrogress? In the case of Brownell v. Brownell, s L.L.R. 76 (1936), this Court held that every statute should be expounded not according to the letter but according to the meaning and intent. In that case, at 5 L.L.R. 79, the Court quoted the following passage from Yancy v. Yancy, [1934] LRSC 31; 4 L.L.R. 204, 214–216: “Every statute, it has been said, should be expounded, not according to the letter, but according to LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 543 the meaning; for he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. Qui haerit in litera haerit in cortice. Whenever the legislative intention can be discovered, it ought to be followed with reason and discretion in the construction of the statute, although such construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute. . . .” This same point was again expounded in Massaquoi v. Massaquoi, [1938] LRSC 18; 6 L.L.R. 320 (1938) , where this Court, at 6 L.L.R. 322, through Mr. Justice Tubman quoted with approval the following: “Closely allied to the doctrine of the equitable construction of statutes, and in pursuance of the general object of enforcing the intention of the legislature, is the rule that the spirit or reason of the law will prevail over its letter. Especially is this rule applicable where the literal meaning is absurd, or, if given effect, would work injustice, or where the provision was inserted through inadvertence. * * * . . . If the purpose and well-ascertained object of a statute are inconsistent with the precise words, the latter must yield to the controlling influence of the legislative will resulting from the whole act.” 36 CYC iio8-1111 Statutes. It is conceded that in the case of Leigh v. Taylor, [1947] LRSC 11; 9 L.L.R. 329 (1947), this Court held that the insufficiency of the stamps on an appeal bond renders the bond defective and the appeal dismissable. We are saying that, in accordance with other pronouncements of this Court, the time is ripe that there be a change in the thinking of the Court where the letter of the law killeth and the death was not intended by the lawmakers. We have further observed that in the case of Richards v. Holt, [1956] LRSC 9; 12 L.L.R. 292 (1956), Mr. Justice Pierre, speaking for the Court held that an appeal bond which is not It 544 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS validated by a revenue stamp on its face is materially defective. The Justice also quoted a similar and earlier pronouncement of this Court in the case of Freeman v. Republic, [1915] LRSC 5; 2 L.L.R. 189 (1915). However, it is a strong contention that since the expressed intention of the Legislature was to secure additional revenue, and to this end the Legislature proceeded to prescribe a punishment for failure to affix a revenue stamp on certain types of documents, at all times the prime objective of courts should be the meting out of transparent justice. Additionally, where statutes are construed and interpreted, it is always the responsibility of the Court to determine what the Legislature intended ; for it is axiomatic that legislative will is but the refinement of the general will and this general will is but an expression of the innermost thoughts of the majority of the population; therefore, where a revenue stamp is required to be placed upon a legal document before the same may be admitted into a court of law as evidence, we submit that the affixing of the stamp on the document when the defect is discovered should be sufficient to activate its validity. In other words, the payment should be allowed to be made, nunc pro tunc, as is the case with the late payment of costs of court. If, however, we concede, arguendo that the defect upon the bond renders the same invalid, is that a ground for dismissal of special proceedings in the Chambers of a Justice of this Court without the right to make good this defect at a subsequent time and have the matter attended upon its merits? In other words, is the bond a jurisdictional issue in error proceedings which will necessitate an involuntary dismissal upon the merits? The Civil Procedure Law provides that: “Before a writ issues the plaintiff in error shall be required to pay all accrued costs, and he may be required to file a bond in the manner prescribed in section 468 above, such bond to be conditioned on paying the damages sustained by the opposing party if LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 545 the judgment, decree or decision complained of is affirmed.” [Emphasis supplied.] 1956 CODE 6:123I(d). In contradistinction to the above-quoted provision regarding the filing of bonds in proceedings on writs of error, we find the following relating to bonds in injunction proceedings : “The judge shall require the plaintiff to give a bond with two or more legally qualified sureties before granting a writ of injunction.” [Emphasis supplied.] 1956 CODE 6:1o81. From a comparison of the wording of these two provisions, it can be readily seen that Section 1081, by use of the words “shall” and “before,” makes it a mandatory precondition to the issuance of the writ of injunction that the proper bond be filed with the court. For this reason it has been repeatedly held by this Court that the filing of the bond constitutes a jurisdictional step. However, it is because of this proposition that the Legislature has also provided in Section 597 of the Civil Procedure Law (1956 CODE 6:597) that the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction does not constitute an adjudication upon the merits, thereby granting unto the applicant another opportunity to seek relief. This seems to us to constitute a projection of the concept that cases should not be dismissed on mere technical issues. Should we not in this Court follow the same rule? Turning to subsection (d) of Section 1231, as quoted supra in this opinion, it is made discretionary with the Chambers Justice to require the filing of the bond. It is very noticeable that Section 1231 does not make the filing of the bond a precondition to the issuance of the writ, as indicated by the use of the word “may” which is permissive rather than the mandatory “shall” which was employed by the Legislature in Section 1o81 relating to injunctions. In our view, where a particular act is permitted by the statute to be utilized or invoked by the as- 546 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS signed Justice in his discretion, and the same is not made mandatory by the Legislature, in such event the nonperformance of such act may not constitute a jurisdictional defect that will serve to defeat the merits of the particular case at bar. The next issue which we find ourselves compelled to touch upon is concerned with the modification of the trial court’s judgment by this Court. The Chambers Justice had a motion and resistance made thereto for a quashing of the writ predicated upon what was considered a defective and invalid bond. The assigned. Justice sustained the motion and quashed the alternative writ. His order in Chambers was appealed from the full Court for a review of the order. The full Court determined that the Chambers Justice’s ruling in quashing the writ was wellfounded in law and that, therefore, the same should be affirmed. Now, it is our contention that it would constitute a paradox for this Court to affirm the ruling of the Chambers Justice quashing the writ for lack of jurisdiction and simultaneously determining that the judgment of the lower court was excessive and should, therefore, be reduced or modified by a remittitur. This, in our view, is rather incongruous. We submit that, in accordance with Section io6i of our Civil Procedure Law, this Court may affirm or reverse the judgment of the trial court or award such other judgment as in its opinion will best conduce to the end of law, justice, and equity. However, the modification of a judgment on appeal is predicated upon the power of this Court to review the particular subject matter. It has been said that a writ of error “substitutes” for an appeal and, therefore, since this Court may modify a judgment of a lower Court, it may also modify a judgment-in-error proceeding. To begin with, there has been a lot of controversy and misunderstanding about the definition, scope, and effect of an appeal as distinguished from a writ of error. At early LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 547 view of a matter that had been concluded by a court of lesser jurisdiction; one was by means of an appeal and the common law there were two methods for effecting a reother by means of a writ of error. A writ of error generally was sued out against the judge of a lower court complaining against certain specifically assigned errors of law as committed by the judge in his several rulings in the proceedings. This was the only type of review available to defeated litigants in actions at law. This rule existed predicated upon the rule of law which was legally conclusive to the effect that factual determinations of a jury were not the proper subject of appellate review except in instances wherein the facts submitted to the jury were insufficient in law to constitute a prima facie case. On the other side of the ledger we had, at early common law, appeals which encompassed both the law and the facts and admitted of an appellate review touching both assumed errors of fact and of law. Obviously, all of this was in conformity with the basic constitutional provision that no individual should be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privilege but by judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, meaning thereby, due process of law. A recourse to our law shows that the word, appeal, as used at early common law has been broadened to include writs of error as they were originally understood. In the premises, it cannot be “said, using the past connotation of the phrase, writ of error, that the same substitutes for an appeal; for to say this would constitute an implied assertion to the effect that error proceedings are almost synonymous with a regular appeal. This would be incorrect, for error proceedings are commenced in the presiding Justice’s Chambers, whereas appeals are reviews of either that Justice’s determinations or the final judgments of lower courts. Let us now return to the case at bar. Can we deny the existence of jurisdiction in virtue of the filing of an in- 548 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS valid bond and at the same time impliedly admit the existence of jurisdiction for the purpose of modifying a judgment? Law writers have said over and again that where a particular tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is possessed of jurisdiction solely in the restricted sense of determining the absence of jurisdiction, and when this is determined the action must be dismissed. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority, the naked power, by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. We earlier held that the issue of the bond should not in contemplation of law be deemed a jurisdictional issue so as to defeat the case on its merits. It was contended that in this we were wrong, for this did constitute a jurisdictional issue which in effect left the Court powerless to review the lower court’s proceedings through the writ of error ; consequently, the ruling quashing the writ was sustained. It therefore follows that where the Court was powerless to act in reviewing the whole of the proceedings in the court below it was, a fortiori, powerless to modify any portion of those proceedings. We strongly contended that the appellate review spoken of by the Legislature in Section io6 of the Civil Procedure Law is intended to mean appellate review in instances wherein jurisdiction does exist. And where there is a modification of a lower court’s judgment favorably to a plaintiff in error, this act constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction over the subject matter ; for the Court would have both taken cognizance of the excessive judgment and decided that a remittitur was in order. In such an instance, the whole record would be opened for appellate review. However, it seems to us to be an improper application of the rule to partially open the lower court’s records. Either this Court has the power, the authority, the jurisdiction properly conferred by statute to determine whether errors were committed in the lower court or it does not. It cannot be said that a court partially has jurisdiction. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 549 We have intentionally refrained from delving into the facts of this matter. We are constrained to limit ourselves to the jurisdictional issue involved, our colleague’s ruling on the motion to dismiss and the majority’s determination that the lower court’s judgment should be modified. There are many unsavory aspects of the factual side of this matter which we feel ourselves enjoined from reviewing due to the limitation of the ruling which was sustained by the majority of my colleagues and with which we have been unable to agree. For the above reasons, we have filed this dissenting opinion in the manner in which we have done.