RAMEZ HAIDER, Appellant, v. AREF KASSAS and LA FONDIARA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued May 22, 1971. Decided May 27, 1971. 1. Advancing negative aspects of an adversary’s case presented to a jury cannot, in and of itself, successfully establish the ground for having a new trial granted. 2. The jury is the judge of facts and, in the absence of a clear showing of insufficiency of evidence to support a finding, or a violation of law as provided by statute, its verdict will not be disturbed on appeal and the judgment of the court in affirmation of the verdict will stand. A truck owned by the appellant and driven by an employee, was involved in a collision with a passenger car operated and owned by the co-plaintiff, in which extensive property damage resulted for which co-plaintiff’s insurance carrier compensated him. Under the insurer’s right of subrogation, suit was commenced against the truck’s owner. A jury’s verdict found for the plaintiff and defendant appealed from the court’s judgment. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict and found it sufficient to support the verdict and the judgment of the court based thereon. Judgment affirmed. C. Aboyami Cassell for appellant. well and James Bull for appellees. Christian D. Max- MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court. On July to, 1966, at the Du Bridge located within the property of the Firestone Plantations Company, a motor 324 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 325 accident occurred between a Chevrolet car, license P-51, driven by Aref Kassas, and a Fargo Truck, license No. T-445, driven by Samuel Frazier. Subsequently, it was discovered that Frazier was in the employ of appellant who was also the owner of the vehicle being driven. On the other hand, Aref Kassas owned the vehicle that was being driven by him. A further inspection of the record disclosed that the passenger car was traveling from the direction of Monrovia to Robertsfield, and the truck was traveling in the opposite direction. Additionally, it was revealed that the impact occurred near the Robertsfield end of the bridge, that is to say, the side going deeper into the Firestone Plantations Company and away from the area from which Frazier had come. Apparently, Dr. Kassas was insured by LaFondiara Insurance Company of Monrovia, which in accordance with the insurance contract, had to indemnify him with respect to his financial losses sustained as a result of the accident. Payment was made to Dr. Kassas by the carrier and it was subrogated to his rights to recovery for the allegedly tortious act of appellant’s employee. Under the right of subrogation it sought recovery in the amount of $3,730.00 to Dr. Kassas. LaFondiara made demand by letter to appellant for prompt payment of the amount of $2,800.00 in settlement, as an alternative to an action it would bring to recover the damages sustained by Kassas. Not having obtained a satisfactory response from appellant, suit was filed during the March Term, 1967, of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County, for recovery of the amount of $3,730.00, being the amount paid to co-plaintiff, Dr. Aref Kassas, by the insurance company. After the filing of the formal appearance, and an answer, other pleadings were filed in the lower court, continuing to the point where a triable issue of fact had been arrived at. Thereupon, Hon. Baromi Morris, the Resident Circuit Judge, disposed of the issues of law and the 326 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS case was thereafter brought to trial on its merits during the December Term, 1968, of the aforesaid court, then being presided over by Hon. John A. Dennis. Witnesses testified for both parties and thereafter the jury arrived at a verdict on January 3o, 1969, awarding plaintiffs damages in the sum of $3,73o.00, upon which a final judgment was entered. Exceptions were taken to the verdict and a bill of exceptions containing thirteen counts was thereafter prepared and filed, and the appeal has come to be heard. When this case was called, the Court noted and counsel for appellant confirmed that he had included in his brief all matters that he felt necessary for a reversal of the lower court’s judgment and, therefore, those matters not specifically mentioned in his brief should be deemed waived. Turning to the brief of appellant, count one contends that the verdict of the jury was manifestly contrary to the evidence presented at the trial, because appellee’s first witness, Aref Kassas, who was also one of the drivers involved in the collision had, during his examination-in-chief, made a patently false, erroneous and incredible statement when he mentioned that he was driving at the rate of ten miles per hour. Appellant insisted that no modern vehicle can really travel at this speed, unless it is barely moving, or crawling. In the circumstances, the statement of Kassas is false, a fortiori, all that he had said in his testimony should also be deemed false due to the legal maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. A check of the record shows that the vehicle of Dr. Kassas was between three or four feet away from the end of the bridge at the time of the impact. As to the ability of a car to travel at the speed above mentioned, there was no evidence brought out at the trial to disprove the ability of a car to travel at the stated rate ; this point was first mentioned in the motion for a new trial. Therefore, the jury not having any controverting evidence on this score, we do not see how we � LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 327 can rightly say that their verdict was contrary to the evidence adduced. Count two of the brief touches upon the subject of the statement made by Kassas, who stated that he was taken to court on the day of the accident, which was Sunday, July io, a day on which no court within the Republic functions. Additionally, the witness said that he was acquitted on that day and was told that he was not responsible for the accident and his license returned to him. The argument of appellant here is that the court could not have been held on dies non and, therefore, this statement was also false for, in fact, the ruling of the trial magistrate clearly evidenced that trial was held on the 12th day of July and not the loth as stated by the witness. On first viewing this contention, one would be prone to agree with appellant and wonder how in the face of such evidence the lower court could have effected a determination in the manner it did. Upon closely scrutinizing the record we find that after the collision on July 1o, the police did take in custody both drivers involved and took them to their headquarters at Harbel. After interrogating both drivers and the truck boy who accompanied Frazier, the police released Kassas from further custody, returning to him his driver’s license, and at the same time charging Frazier with failure to yield the right of way resulting in property damage. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that since Kassas was not called to court on the 12th but was left to go free as of the loth, he assumed that the police investigation of the loth constituted a court hearing whereat he was discharged from further custody. Count three of the brief further held the verdict of the jury to be contrary to the evidence, in that the police acted partially when at the time of the occurrence of the collision the driver of the truck went in search of the police officer who arrived at the scene of the collision in his absence, listened to the version of Kassas and thereafter 328 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS made his findings without having heard the other side of the matter. The appellant respectfully contended that the police officer was duly bound to have heard the other side of the matter before arriving at any conclusion in the premises. In view of this partiality appellant contends that the jury should not have arrived at the verdict based on such evidence, and, instead, the court should have granted a motion for a new trial. One wonders whether or not appellant is here contending that the verdict is manifestly against the lack of evidence, because he has plainly stated that the police did not use evidence from Frazier in arriving at his conclusion. We must first state that lack of evidence, in and of itself, does not constitute a ground for a new trial. The statutes hold that newly discovered evidence may serve as a ground for a new trial. In the case at bar, however, the exhibits proferted could clearly show that the statement of Dr. Kassas and appellant’s truck boy were taken in conjunction with that of Frazier, the driver, by Lieutenant Kollie. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that Frazier was not interviewed prior to his being charged. Apparently, the police took into consideration the statements of both Kassas and the truck boy, and especially the latter, who was driving with Frazier and in his statement had said that Kassas was halfway across the bridge when the truck entered the bridge. This in all probability was the reason for the charge, failing to yield the right of way. Count four of the brief dwelt upon the ruling of the stipendiary magistrate which was admitted into evidence in the lower court. Appellant contends that the ruling constitutes a fabrication and that no trial was held because he and his employee Frazier so contended. The magistrate was produced in court and thereat testified to the genuineness of the ruling that had been offered into evidence. In the absence of any cogent testimony to the contrary we must accept the ruling to be genuine and the result of a judicial hearing. It must be remembered that LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 329 both individuals who testified to the fact that there had been no trial were individuals adversely affected by the ruling of the stipendiary magistrate. Count five, which is the last count of the brief, emphatically contends that the evidence presented at the trial does not agree with the verdict of the jury, in that both vehicles were traveling in opposite directions at the time of the collision and, additionally, there was no damage done to the front of appellant’s vehicle; had there been the type of accident complained of, it would have resulted in frontal damage to appellant’s vehicle instead of the damage done to the shock absorber of appellant’s truck. We must hold that the jury is the judge of facts and unless there can be shown clearly that the facts presented were insufficient for them to arrive at a verdict or that their verdict fell within one of the proscriptions of the statute relating to granting new trials, the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court in confirmation of that verdict must be allowed to stand. In the case at bar, the trial was regularly conducted and no actual issues of law have been raised by appellant, for he has contended solely that a new trial should be awarded by virtue of the fact that the verdict is contrary to the evidence without showing any concrete manner where this is true. In the circumstances, this Court is left with no alternative but to affirm the judgment of the court below and allow costs to appellees. Affirmed.