DAVID B. GIBSON, Appellant, v. HON. DESSALINE T. HARRIS, JR., Circuit Judge, Montserrado County, and CEPHAS B. REEVES, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM RULING OF JUSTICE PRESIDING IN CHAMBERS DENYING ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. Argued October 21, 1968. Decided February 6, 1969. 1. Once a proceeding has been duly closed, a trial judge is under no compulsion to reopen it in order to allow exceptions to be taken to a finding. 2. Therefore, a judge cannot be held answerable in mandamus for denial of such application, since mandamus issues only in instances where a purely ministerial function can be imposed upon breach of an official duty. In an action for specific performance of a contract, the trial judge, having heard the facts, notified counsel for both parties that he would issue a final judgment the following morning. Counsel for plaintiff was not in court at the appointed hour, and after a delay until late morning, the judge issued his findings, deciding against the plaintiff. Thereafter, counsel for plaintiff appeared, and unsuccessfully sought to enter exceptions to the judgment of the court. A writ was denied by the Justice presiding in chambers, from which an appeal was taken. The ruling was affirmed and mandamus denied. The Henries law firm for appellant. body for appellees. Albert D. Pea- MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the court. These mandamus proceedings have grown out of an action for specific performance of a contract, filed in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, by Cephas B. Reeves against David B. Gibson. 139 140 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS A review of the record in the case discloses that on March 2I, 1968, having previously heard the facts in the case, Hon. Dessaline T. Harris, Jr., Circuit Judge, notified counsel representing both parties to the action that the final decree would be rendered on the following day at Io:oo A.M. Since both counsel were in court, the judge refrained from ordering a formal notice of assignment issued. The following morning, counsel for David B. Gibson, appellant at this bar, was not in court at the hour appointed for the rendition of the decree. The judge thereupon waited until II :3o in the morning when he finally determined that he would have to proceed with the decree. The final decree was thereupon rendered and thereafter the matter was suspended and a new case gone into. At that time attorney Eugene L. Hilton, of the Henries law firm, arrived in court and since the decree was adverse to the interest of his client, requested the presiding judge to reopen the matter so that he could note his exceptions upon the record. The judge denied the request for the, reopening of the matter. Thereupon, counsellor Joseph J. F. Chesson, of the same law firm, came into court and made a similar request of the judge, but he, too, was denied this request. Predicated upon the aforesaid denial, appellant hastened to the chambers of Mr. Justice Wardsworth, the Justice then presiding in chambers, and requested of him that an alternative writ of mandamus be ordered issued for the purpose of compelling the trial judge to order, the exceptions entered upon the record. Subsequently, the subject case was called up for hearing before Mr. Justice Roberts, presiding in chambers. The facts contained in the petition are not disputed by the respondent in his return. Therefore, this leaves for determination the sole legal issue of whether the trial judge had a duty, by law imposed upon him, to reopen the case after rendition of the final decree, to have the ex- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 141 ceptions entered upon the record. Justice Roberts denied the peremptory writ. We should bear in mind that mandamus is a harsh, remedial writ which issues to compel a particular judge, or other officers, to perform a duty imposed by law where there is a preclusion of the exercise of discretion on the part of the judge in the performance of the subject duty. What have we in the case at bar? Here, an assignment was made by the court, giving actual notice to both parties of the time when the final decree would be rendered. The decree was rendered subsequent to the appointed time, thus allowing additional time for the lawyers to be present in court. Neither the petitioner or his counsel was in court at the designated time. The decree was rendered and the matter brought to a final close. After the official closing of the case in consonance with the law, the judge was requested to reopen the case. There is no known law allowing for the reopening of a case to permit the entry of exceptions to a decree. In the circumstances, it can legally be said that no duty was imposed upon the judge by law which he was requested to perform and refused. Therefore, he cannot be held answerable in mandamus, since he has not violated the performance of any ministerial function. In view of the above, the ruling of the Justice is hereby affirmed. And it is hereby so ordered. Affirmed.