MARY GBEH, Appellant, v. JOSEPH K. GBLAH, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DEBT COURT, GRAND CEDEH COUNTY. Argued May 5, 1975. Decided June 25, 1975. 1. When a document has been admitted into evidence it is error on the part of the judge not to allow it to constitute a part of the evidence in the case. 2. A debt, upon which an action can be based, is a sum of money, which is certainly and in all events payable to another. Appellant commenced an action in debt against the appellee in the Magistrate Court and recovered a judgment, based upon a promissory note executed by the appellee, who claimed he had repaid the money owed indirectly. Appellee took an appeal to the Debt Court, where the judgment was reversed and judgment rendered for the appellee herein who was the defendant in the Magistrate Court. The plaintiff in the action, who is the appellant herein, took an appeal to the Supreme Court. The position of the Debt Court judge in rendering judgment for the appellee herein was that the action in debt had been wrongly instituted, even though the promissory note had been admitted by the appellee into evidence. The Supreme Court took the position that the action in debt had been correctly chosen and found that as a matter of law the appellant had, by weight of evidence, proved her case against the appellee. The judgment of the Debt Court was reversed and judgment rendered for the appellant. David D. Gbala for appellant. Harper S. Bailey for appellee. MR. JUSTICE WARDSWORTH 347 delivered the opinion of the Court. 348 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Appellant was the plaintiff in the court below, instituting an action of debt against Joseph K. Gblah, in the Magisterial Court in Zwedru City, Grand Gedeh County. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff to which judgment defendant announced an appeal to the Debt Court of Grand Gedeh County, which was granted. A motion to dismiss the complaint was heard and denied, and the case was ruled to trial on its merits December 24, 1972. On February 15, 1973, the case was called for trial but it was not disposed of and it was reassigned for trial on February 16, 1973. At the trial plaintiff testified to and identified a receipt or promissory note purportedly issued and signed by defendant, dated April 24, 1969, which stated on its face that defendant had received $so.00 from the plaintiff which would be repaid to plaintiff upon defendant’s return from Monrovia. The said document was marked by the court and admitted into evidence. Subsequent to the admission of this documentary evidence, the defendant testified on direct examination and admitted having collected $so.00 from one Mr. Lawson, which amount he gave to the lawyer who allegedly rendered legal services for the plaintiff by collecting $300.00 from the same Mr. Lawson for plaintiff. Said payment for legal services rendered, was made in the presence of plaintiff. The receipt therefor was signed by Counsellor William Cisco and given to defendant. The original thereof was allegedly given to plaintiff. On cross-examination defendant produced the copy of the receipt in Court. Since said copy was not admitted into evidence in this case we shall refrain from further comment thereon. Recourse to the record certified to this Court reveals that on direct examination appellee denied issuing any promissory note for $5o.00 to appellant, and that at the time of the date of issuance appearing thereon appellee was in the Republic of China for studies. On reviewing LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 349 the record in the case, we are of the opinion that appellee failed to support his denial by any documentary evidence or by any witness corroborating his testimony. The burden of proof rested on him to substantiate the fact that he was outside the Republic of Liberia at the time when the promissory note is alleged to have been issued. He should also have produced evidence at the trial that the handwriting or signature appearing on the promissory note was not his. Counsel for appellee waived direct examination, but later attempted to introduce into evidence a purported document on the ground of what he claimed was redirect examination. To this attempt counsel for appellant objected, which objection was sustained. Documentary evidence not testified to, confirmed by a witness, and identified by the court are inadmissible into evidence. This Court stated the reason for the rule in Smart v. Proh, r� LLR 49, si (1951) : “The ground for requiring sufficient identification of documents in legal proceedings is primarily to avoid reception of faked and false material.” Review of the record certified to this Court shows that notwithstanding the admission of the promissory note into evidence, the trial judge stated that he did not find anything of which to take judicial notice. This we consider error, since courts are bound to take judicial notice of their own records, and where a document has been admitted into evidence it is error on the part of the judge not to allow it to constitute a part of the evidence. In Republic v. Anderson, r LLR 97, 98 (1878), an action in debt was defined as “an action to enforce the payment of a sum of money which the defendant has contracted to pay to the plaintiff.” In further expatiating an action of debt, Judge Bouvier has stated the basis for an action in debt. “When it is founded on a simple contract, the consideration must be averred and a liability or agreement, though not neces- 350 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS sarily an express promise to pay, must be stated.” Debt is defined in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY as “a sum of money which is certainly and in all events payable is a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time.” The action at bar being for a sum certain based on a simple contract, a receipt or promissory note, testified to, identified and admitted into evidence by the court, the trial judge erred in completely disregarding it. However disputable the documentary evidence may have been, it was an issue of fact to be decided by the court or by the jury where a jury is involved. In the absence of a jury, the court being both judge and jury, the court must consider the documentary evidence on its face. Furthermore, the appellee in denying his alleged indebtedness to appellant admitted by way of confession and avoidance that he collected the sum of $5o.00 from one Mr. Lawson, but subsequently paid it to the lawyer who rendered legal service to the appellant and said payment was made on behalf of and in the presence of appellant. The judge on this ground classified defendant as an agent or factor for the plaintiff and, therefore, ruled that the proper action should have been upon fraud or embezzlement. Appellant being dissatisfied with the final judgment thus rendered by the judge in this case, noted exceptions and took an appeal to this Court, based on a bill of exceptions comprising four counts. We cannot perceive by any stretch of imagination how the judge declared he lacked jurisdiction because a wrong form of action was chosen, in that appellant had institued an action in debt, based upon a receipt or promissory note executed for a sum certain to be paid to the appellant, which we hereunder set forth. “Received from Miss Mary Gbeh the sum of $50.00 to be paid as soon as I shall return to Monrovia, April 24, 1975. “[Sgd.] JOSEPH K. GBLAH LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 351 “Witness : “OLD MAN GEEA His X Cross “YOWA WULO His X Cross” According to the record and the evidence in the case, it is obvious that the receipt or promissory note in this case was identified and admitted into evidence with no evidence to the contrary; the claim of appellant was conclusively established. In view of the foregoing, appellant established and proved her action in debt against the appellee. Therefore, it is hereby adjudged that appellee is indebted to appellant. The judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and appellee is to pay appellant the sum of $50.00, the face amount of the note executed by appellee, together with the costs of these proceedings. And it is so ordered. Reversed; judgment for appellant.