FRANCO-LIBERIAN TRANSPORT COMPANY, by and through its Manager, RENE . MARLINE, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA and His Honor, A. LORENZO WEEKS,

Assigned Circuit Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, Appellees. APPEAL FROM RULING IN CHAMBERS ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued December 2, 1959. Decided January 15, 1960. 1. Parties may be added to an action by order of the court on its own initiative. 2. A court may cause a summons to be issued to a party added to a suit on the initiative of the court. 3. An attorney who files an utterly unmeritorious petition for a peremptory writ for the sole purpose of delaying the administration of justice may be disciplined by the Supreme Court. On appeal from a ruling in Chambers denying an application for certiorari, ruling affirmed and counsel for appellant ordered fined. No appearance for appellant. J. C. N. Howard for appellant’s attorney. Assistant Attorney General J. Dossen Richards for appellee. MR. Court. JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the The appellant filed a petition before the Justice presiding in the Chambers of this Court for the issuance of an alternative writ of certiorari, which was ordered issued; but upon the hearing, the Justice presiding in Chambers found no merit in the petition and rendered the following ruling: “The petitioner avers in his petition that the government of Liberia, by and through the Attorney General 542 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS of Liberia, filed an action of damages against the abovenamed petitioners for damages to person and property and damages to personal property, in which action he filed his answer and rejoinder within statutory time; that after he had filed his answer praying the dismissal of the complaint, the Republic of Liberia, through the Attorney General, filed an amended complaint changing the form of action, based upon the point raised in petitioner’s answer, which petitioner contends he could not have done, but should have withdrawn the former action and filed a new one. The above embraces the substance of Counts to ‘3,’ inclusive, of the petition. “Count ‘4’ of the petition avers that on September 25, 1959, the case was heard (presumably on the issues of law raised) , and ruling reserved. Count ‘5’ of the petition avers that thereafter that is to say on September 28, 1959, without notice of assignment to petitioner, respondent Judge Weeks ordered the clerk of the court to issue a writ of summons against one Rene Merline making him a party to said action without first giving ruling on the law issues raised by defendants ; this act of Judge Weeks making the said Rene Merline a party without first giving ruling on the law issues is materially prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. “Count ‘6’ of the petition admits that the statute gives the Judge the right to add or drop parties to a suit, but contends that it must be done for just cause or upon application of either party, and that in this case neither party made application. “Count ‘7’ of the petition further submits that the court has a right to add parties to a suit but does not have the power to issue writs of summons adding parties to a suit. “The respondent filed returns containing four counts; the first count thereof attacks petitioner’s coun- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 543 sel, James H. Smythe, as being a non-licensed lawyer and hence not legally entitled to practice law. “Count ‘2’ of the returns alleges that the petition does not allege any prejudice to the petitioner as a result of the acts of the respondent Judge. Said count further submits that summoning the manager of the company, thereby placing him under the jurisdiction of the court, was lawful for the court to do ( as was admitted by the petitioner in Counts ‘6’ and ‘7’ of the petition) and was also to afford him his right of ‘a day in court’ which can certainly work no prejudice to him. “Count ‘3’ of the returns attacks Count ‘6’ of the petition as being a deliberate misstatement of the law on the point as to whether, a Judge may add or drop parties on his own initiative. This the respondent Judge did upon authority of law; therefore no injury or prejudice could have resulted to the petitioner. “Count ‘4’ of the returns attacks Count ‘7’ of petitioner’s petition as being confusing, and containing no statement or conclusion of law, but simply the illogical and absurd conclusion of the petitioner that a court could never acquire jurisdiction over a person except by the usual manner of the service and return of process, so that the contention of the petitioner that the court has no power to issue writs of summons to bring a party into court is abject nonsense; that the alternative writ was improvidently issued because there was no showing of any act of the respondent Judge which may be consistently regarded as materially prejudicial to the rights and interest of the petitioner. “Nowhere has the petitioner made profert a copy of the amended complaint of the plaintiff in the court below showing that he changed his form of action in his amended complaint and that the court made a ruling thereon adverse to defendant in the court below, now petitioner, which was materially prejudicial to . 544 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS his interest; nor does the record of the lower court show the same. “When it comes to the court adding parties to an action and having them summoned, it is the right of the court so to do, and the court need not wait on the application of either party, but may do so on its own initiative; and we have support of this in the following statutory provision: `Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action on any terms that are just.’ 1956 Code, tit. 6, � 122. “In that the Judge ordered a party added and a writ of summons issued to bring him into court, we find no error committed by the Judge; but on the contrary, he acted in strict conformity to the law of the land. On the whole, we find no error committed by the respond ent Judge. We further find that the petition of the petitioner is baseless and unmeritorious and filed simply for the purpose of baffling and delaying justice. Counsel is hereby warned never again to file any petition of such baseless and unmeritorious nature calculated for the sole purpose of baffling and delaying justice, lest he be penalized as the law directs in such cases. Moreover, the worst of all is that petitioner’s counsel is not a licensed lawyer and therefore cannot practice in any court of this Republic. This was proven by a certificate from the Bureau of Internal Revenues, Treasury Department, Monrovia, over the signature of Edward B. McClain, Supervisor of Internal Revenues, made profert by the respondent in these proceedings. This therefore vitiates the entire action. The peremptory writ of certiorari prayed for by the petitioner is denied ; costs in these proceedings ruled against the petitioner. The clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate to the court below in- LIBERIAN* LAW REPORTS 545 forming it of this ruling and ordering that the Judge resume jurisdiction and continue the trial of the case. And it is so ordered.” From the above-quoted ruling the petitioner took exceptions and has appealed to this court en banc. This Court, after a careful perusal of the appellants’ petition and the grounds laid therein for the issuance of a peremptory writ of certiorari, is so much in agreement with the ruling of the Justice presiding in Chambers that we have quoted it and made it a part of this opinion. This Court is of the opinion that the ruling of the Justice presiding in Chambers should be affirmed without further comments, with this addition : that Counsellor Smythe, in keeping with the act of the Legislature passed and approved March 22, 1956, be fined the sum of $25 for bringing such an utterly unmeritorious petition before this Court of last resort for the sole purpose of baffling and delaying justice; the fine to be paid within 3o days from date; costs to be paid by the petitioner. And it is hereby so ordered. Ruling affirmed.