FIRESTONE PLANTATIONS COMPANY, Appellant, v. BETON KOLLIE, Appellee.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MARGIBI COUNTY.

Heard: March 21, 2002. Decided: June 14, 2002.

1. The courts of Liberia, including the Supreme Court. are duty bound to first determine its own jurisdiction over a given matter because where jurisdiction is wanting, every action taken by such courts is null and void ab initio.
2. Whenever objection to a court’s jurisdiction is raised, that court must put aside all other concerns and issues raised and first determine its competence and authority over the case before proceeding any further.
3. It is essential to the proper rendition of a judgment that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
4. In order to confer jurisdiction on a court, the subject matter must be presented for its consideration in some mode sanctioned by law.
5. Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term.
6. A court which is competent to decide on its own jurisdiction in a given case may determine that cause, whenever the fact is made to appear to its satisfaction either before or after judgment.
7. Whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court’s examination of the case or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to consider it, for if the court is without jurisdiction it is powerless to act in the case.

In a motion filed by the appellee to dismiss the appeal taken by the appellant from a ruling of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to rescind a default judgment entered by the court, the appellee contended that the appellant’s appeal bond was defective, in that the property used to secure the bond had been used to secure two other bonds and hence was encumbered. In their response, the appellant contended, amongst other things, that the appellee had waived the right to challenge the sufficiency of the bond since he had not made the challenge within the three-day period prescribed by law, and further that the appellee had withdrawn its motion to dismiss and replaced the same with an amended motion to dismiss, which was not permissible under the law.
The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant, noting that under the opinion of the Supreme Court, a motion filed before the Supreme Court and withdrawn could not be substituted with an amended motion. The Court observed that once the motion was withdrawn, it called into question the jurisdiction of the Court to decide on the merits of the motion. Noting that unless it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the motion, its judgment would be ineffectual and null and void ab initio, the Court opined that once the appellee’s motion to dismiss was filed and thereafter withdrawn, the appellee forfeited his right to challenge the appeal or to seek the dismissal thereof, and further, that by the said withdrawal of the motion the Court thereby lost jurisdiction over the motion. Accordingly the court denied the motion and ordered that the appeal be heard on the merits.

G. Moses Paegar and I Johnny Momoh of the Sherman and Sherman Law Firm appeared for the appellant. Francis Y. S. Garlawolu of the Garlawolu Law Associates appeared for the appellee.

MR. JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a motion to dismiss an appeal growing out of an action of damages for a wrong filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Margibi County. The movant herein is the plaintiff in the court below and appellee on appeal, while the respondent in this motion to dismiss is defendant in the court below and appellant on appeal. These terms may therefore be used interchangeably in this opinion to refer to the respective parties.
The appellee, Beton Kollie, plaintiff in the lower court, instituted an action of damages for a wrong and obtained a unanimous verdict against the appellant, Firestone Plantations Company, defendant in the lower court, growing out of an ex parte trial held on November 25, 2000. The jury awarded the appellee US$15,000.00 as special damages and US$75,000.00 as general damages.
In his final judgment handed down on December 22, 2000, the trial judge confirmed the verdict of liable against the appellant, but struck off or deleted the special damages and confirmed only the general damages. The appellant excepted thereto and appealed therefrom to the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed its bill of exceptions within the ten days allowed by law on January 2, 2001. Subsequently, it filed its appeal bond on January 29, 2001, and served the same on the appellee’s counsel on January 30, 2001. The appellee then filed his exceptions to appellant’s sureties on February 1, 2001 in the trial court.
In his exceptions to the appellant’s sureties, the appellee alleged that the property offered to secure the appellant’s ap-peal bond had liens thereon as the same property had already been used as security to secure an appeal bond in favor of one Joseph N. Cornomia and an attachment bond in favor of one Mohamed Diallo. The appellee gave notice in his exceptions in the trial court that he would file a motion to dismiss the appeal before the appellate court in keeping with law.
On February 2, 2001 the appellee went to the post office and sent by registered mail the appellant’s copy of the appel-lee’s exceptions to the appeal bond because, according to the appellee’s counsel, he could not locate any of the lawyers of the Sherman & Sherman Law Firm which represented the appellant.
As per his notice in his exceptions to surety, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss in the Supreme Court praying this Court to dismiss the appellant’s appeal on the ground that the property offered to secure the appellant’s appeal bond was encumbered with prior liens from other bonds. He contended that because of said prior liens, the appeal should be dismissed and the judgment ordered enforced. In support of the prayer, the appellee outlined the commonality in all three bonds: The property owner in all bonds was David Dey-you-gar; the amount of land was one lot or 1/4 acre, located at GSA Road, Paynesville, bearing lot No. NN, with the following metes and bounds: “Commencing at the Northwestern Corner of L. Toles adjoining lot marked by a concrete monument, thence running S 30° W 165 feet, parallel with said lot, thence running North 60° at 66 feet parallel with a 40 foot St., thence running N, said 30° A 165 feet parallel with a 16 foot street, thence running 5 60° E 66 feet to the place of commencement and containing one lot and no more.”
The appellant, in response, filed an eleven-count resistance to the motion to dismiss, Firstly, it contended that a copy of the motion was not served on it and that it became aware of the motion only after the appellee had secured a notice of assignment for the hearing of the motion; that the motion was filed on February 28, 2001 and the notice of assignment served on March 13, 2001 at 5:20 p. m., but that it was only on March 19, 2001 that the appellee served a copy of the motion on it, a period of six days in between.
Further in the resistance, the appellant contended that final judgment in the parent case, the action of damages, was rendered on December 22, 2000 in the trial court and that it appealed therefrom and filed its approved bill of exceptions on January 2, 2001 and its approved appeal bond on January 29, 2001, both with the clerk of court, and that thereafter, on the next day, being January 30, 2001, it served a copy of the appeal bond on the appellee. Yet, the appellant asserted, the appellee did not file and serve any exceptions to its appeal bond for the next fifteen days, after he had been served with said appeal bond, and that therefore the appellant had proceed-ed to file and serve its notice of completion of the appeal on February 14, 2001. It maintained that the appellee, not having filed and served his exceptions to appellant’s appeal bond within three days, as provided by law, the appellee had there-by waived his right to either seek justification of sureties or to require another surety in place of any that had not been justified.
Additionally, in count eight of the resistance, the appellant contended that this Supreme Court was not expected to, nor did it conduct hearings to determine the sufficiency of a surety bond and that the appellee therefore waived his right in not filing and serving exceptions to the surety bond in the court below, in which case the trial court would have had the opportunity to investigate and determine the veracity of his claims against the bond.
On the issue of encumbrances, or prior liens on the same property used to secure the bond, the appellant, in count nine of its resistance, contended that it had no independent means of knowing whether or not property posted to secure an appeal bond has a lien or other encumbrances on it except by way of information given it by the Ministry of Finance, which is the agency of the government authorized by law to keep such records. The appellant reasoned that since the Ministry of Finance did not indicate that there was any prior lien on the property, the law takes it that there was no lien on said property.
With respect to the issue of similarity or identity of the features on the three bonds, the appellant contended that its surety and the property put up to secure its appeal bond are not the same as those in the Cornomia case. Firstly, it said, the surnames of the two sureties were different; secondly, that the valuation of the two properties were different; and thirdly, that the surety in the Cornomia case used his thumb print, while in the instant case the surety signed his signature.
Finally, the appellant contended that the fact that a piece of property had been used to secure a previous bond was not a sufficient reason to preclude the said property from being used to secure a subsequent bond provided, however, that the ag-gregate value of both bonds did not exceed the assessed value of the property. In that connection, the appellant asserted that the appellee’s exhibit “A” showed that the bond in the Cornomia case was approved for L$10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Liberian Dollars), while appellee’s exhibit “C” showed that the appellant’s appeal bond was approved for US$125,000.00 (One Hundred twenty Five Thousand United States Dollars), whereas the assessed value of the property, as stated by the Ministry of Finance in the certificate attached to appellant’s appeal bond, was US$150,000.00 (One Hundred Fifty Thou-sand United States dollars). Thus, it said, the aggregate value of both bonds was less than the assessed value of the property.
Upon being served with the appellant’s resistance to the motion to dismiss, the appellee filed an answering affidavit, wherein he contended that he had filed written exceptions to the surety, that the filing had been done in the trial court on February 1, 2001, and that he had served the same on the appellant by registered mail, the appellant having failed on two occasions to receive and sign for the same through its legal counsel. Moreover, the appellee said in his answering affidavit, in response to counts five to eight of the resistance, that the exceptions to the bond were duly filed in the trial court within statutory time.
On the issue of the surety and the appellant’s assertion of Mr. Day-you-gar signing his name on one bond and his finger print appearing on the other, as stated in count ten of the appellant’s resistance, the appellee retorted that those aver-ments compounded the defectiveness of the bond, in that both bonds were secured by the same piece of property with the same metes and bounds.
In count four of the answering affidavit, which was in res-ponse to count nine of the resistance, the appellee contended that the appellant, in count nine of its resistance to the motion to dismiss, admitted the existence of the prior lien or encumbrance on the property but imputed the blame on the Ministry of Finance.
Finally, the appellee contended in count ten of his answering affidavit that property offered as security to a bond ought to be free from all liens and encumbrances and thus the appellant, in count three of the affidavit of sureties, had averred that there were no liens, unpaid taxes, or any other encumbrances on or against the property which was being used as security to the appeal bond.
Upon receiving the foregoing answering affidavit from the appellee, the appellant withdrew and amended its resistance to the motion to dismiss, in which amended resistance, it alleged and accused the appellee of engaging in a continued pattern of artifice, tricks and chicanery throughout the case, even from its inception. It contended, firstly, that although the writ of summons was never served on any officer, manager or autho-rized official of the appellant, yet the appellee had proceeded to get the ministerial officer of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court to make returns to the effect that the writ of summons was served on Mr. John Samuels, the employee-relations manager for the appellant and that the said Mr. John Samuels had refused to accept the aforesaid writ of summons. It also contended that the appellee had obtained a default judgment in which the jury awarded the appellee US$15,000.00 as special damages and US$75,000.00 as general damages without any evidence being produced to support such verdict. The appel-lant further alleged that it had become aware of the case only after the return of the jury’s verdict and, hence, it had filed a motion to vacate and grant relief from the default judgment. The appellant cited four defects in the institution of the suit:

1. That the appellant was never served with the writ of sum-mons and therefore never brought under the jurisdiction of the court;
2. That the complaint and writ of summons contradicted one another and were therefore suspect of fraud, in that the clerk of court, who also served as justice of the peace for the affidavit, signed the affidavit of June 28, 2000 but filed the complaint more than three months later, on October 2, 2000;
3. That the written directions, which formed the basis for the issuance of the writ of summons, was dated September 25, 2000, directing the clerk to command the defendant, now appellant, to appear and file its answer on October 10, 2000, which was fifteen days instead of the usual ten days;
4. That the date of the writ of summons is October 2, 2000, not the same as the date of the written directions, which was September 25, 2000, and that instead of command-ing the appellant to appear on October 12, 2000, ten days as of the date of the summons, as provided by statute, the writ of summons commanded the appellant to appear on October 10, 2000, thus reducing the lawful period from ten to eight days to appear.

The appellant contended that the four defects enumerated above rendered the writ of summons materially defective and therefore void, and also that they showed the tricks, artifices and chicanery committed by the appellee to deprive the appellant of its day in court, and to obtain a judgment without any defense from the appellant. In addition, the appellant alleged that the trial judge ignored all the legal deficiencies outlined above, as well as the tricks and artifice perpetrated by the appellee and, instead, struck off from the award the amount of special damages US$15,000.00 and confirmed only the general damages of US$75,000.00.
On the basis of the trial judge’s ruling or final judgment, stated above, the appellant announced exceptions thereto and appealed therefrom, which were noted and granted. Then appellant discovered that the lawyer who filed the complaint and conducted the trial for the appellee was not licensed to practice law for the year 2000. Hence, it moved the trial court to grant the appellant relief from the final judgment, noting as the reason that the lawyer who had filed all the papers and conducted the proceedings in this case was not licensed for the year 2000 and that therefore all the papers filed and proceed-ings conducted were a legal nullity. The judge denied this second motion and again the appellant excepted to the ruling and announced an appeal therefrom. Thereafter, the appellant perfected its appeal in keeping with the law.
The appellant also repeated the averments of the initial resistance as regards the appellee having waived his right to challenge the appellant’s appeal bond within the three days allowed by law. In that connection, the appellant contended that when it filed, served and returned served its notice of completion of appeal, there were still five days remaining out of the sixty days for the appeal process to elapse, and that if the appellee had filed his exceptions within three days of the appeal bond being served, and at the time the notice of completion of appeal was requested, issued and served, there still would have been ample time to dispose of it before the sixty days were completed. It asserted that once exceptions to the sureties were filed and pending before the trial court and not disposed of, the filing and service of the notice of completion of appeal would not have divested the trial court of its jurisdiction over the exceptions to the sureties. Thus, it said, if the exceptions had been timely served, the clerk would not have had the authority to issue the notice of completion of appeal before the disposition of said exceptions to the sureties. It maintained that the appellee had further demonstrated his fraudulent conduct when he did not exercise his right to move the trial court to set aside the notice of completion of appeal, which had been erroneously issued by the clerk.
In addition, the appellant said that the appellee could not have moved the court because the truth of the matter was that when the notice of completion of appeal was requested, issued and served on February 14, 2001, the appellee had not yet filed his exceptions to defendant’s sureties, but that he (the appellee) had thereafter connived with the clerk of the trial court and had back dated his exceptions with a filing date of February 1, 2001, so as to be within the three days for filing of exceptions to the sureties to the bond, which he then took to the post office and sent by registered mail to the appellant’s legal counsel. The appellant also accused the appellee of conniving with the attendant at the post office to alter the date on the stamp so as to bring the date of mailing within the time allowed by law for service of the exceptions on the appellant, which was February 2, 2001.
The appellant then set out to prove the appellee’s fraud at the post office by examining postal receipt no. 5195. It was matched with other receipts in the series 5195-5199 and observed that this particular receipt along with all the other receipts was issued on February 7, 2001 and not February 2, 2001. In addition, the rubber stamp carried everything (all wri-ting) in rubber stamp ink except the date which was in hand writing, the same as the date which was written-over by hand.
The appellant also repeated the contention stated in the initial resistance that to cover up his fraud, the appellee filed his motion to dismiss on February 28, 2001, obtained a notice of assignment from the Supreme Court, and had it served on the appellant on March 13, 2001, but did not serve the motion to dismiss on the appellant until March 19, 2001. The appel-lant alleged that it was only because the Supreme Court did not hear the motion to dismiss as scheduled that it was able to more fully investigate and uncover the fraud committed by the appellee in altering the date of delivery of the exceptions to surety to the post office for mailing by registered mail. The appellant therefore urged this Court to impose the harshest sanctions on the appellee and his counsel for their fraud at the post office.
Finally, the appellant repeated the other defenses raised in the initial resistance as regards the prior lien on the property.
In view of the amended resistance filed by the appellant, the appellee withdrew and amended his answering affidavit. In count one of the amended answering affidavit, the appellee contended that the allegations accusing him of fraudulent acts and other defects in the institution of the suit were all tending to go into the merits and demerits of the case, which are not yet before this Court and therefore could not be passed upon by the Supreme Court, especially since the motion to dismiss the appeal dealt solely with the failure of the appellant to file a valid appeal bond, same being a jurisdictional step.
Further to the above, the appellee contended that said allegations were sentimental and frivolous and merely intend-ed to invoke the sympathy of the Court by insinuation that he had perpetrated fraud to secure the money judgment. He said that even though the said allegations were not a subject of the motion to dismiss, same were false and misleading, in that the judgment was commensurate with the evidence adduced at the trial, which showed that he was brutally arrested, tied with an inner tube, hanged, tortured, excruciated, and dehumanized by the appellant’s private securities, and which was evidenced by the authentic and unimpeachable testimony of a competent medical practitioner, in the person of Dr. Barkolie (MD).
On the issue of the appellee not excepting to the appeal bond, the appellee contended in his amended answering affidavit, as he did in his initial answering affidavit, that his exceptions to the bond was indeed filed on February 1, 2001 and served on the appellant by mail because the appellant had failed on two occasions to receive and sign for the same through its legal counsel.
With regard to the issue of the appellant’s allegations of fraud at the post office, the appellee responded that the best evidence is the receipt from the post office to show that the written exceptions to the bond was filed within statutory time and served by mail, and that the records in the case file in the trial court speak for themselves. The appellee also contended that he had not perpetrated any fraud at the post office, that the receipt for the registered mail was genuine, that the author, Ms. Theresa Kokro, who received and registered the subject mail, was the counter supervisor of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, and she had confirmed in her sworn statement before a justice of the peace that she did indeed receive the mail containing the subject document and accordingly registered same on February 2, 2001.
With reference to the appellant’s submission of a certifi-cate signed by one Stephen Kollie, the appellee contended that the said certificate was not legal and not cognizable before this Court since Stephen Kollie had not appeared before a justice of the peace to testify to the allegations contained in the said document, under oath, and further that this Court could not take evidence. Hence, he said, the certificate, not being sworn to before a duly qualified justice of the peace or otherwise authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an official document, the same could not be considered by this Court. Moreover, the appellee said, Stephen Kollie was not in charge of receiving and registering mail, and hence his certificate was null and void, especially since he is not autho-rized by law to issue an official certificate for the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.
In addition, the appellee also contended that the envelope proffered by the appellant as part of its amended resistance, constituting a receipt by the appellant’s counsel of the mail containing the exceptions to the bond, was an admission which should operate against the appellant, especially since the envelop did not indicate on what date it was delivered.
With regard to the issue of the property offered as security to the appeal bond, the appellee maintained, as he had done in the initial answering affidavit, that the property on both the appellant’s appeal bond in the instant case and that in the Cornomia case were one and the same piece of property with identical metes and bounds, which he had quoted in the amended answering affidavit, the same as he had done in his motion to dismiss. He submitted that as the two bonds bore the same metes and bounds, and given that the bond of Mr. Cornomia had a prior encumbrance, an absolute lien was im-posed on the subject property, thereby rendering the subse-quent bond offered by the appellant null and void ab initio.
On the issue of the assessed value of the subject property, the appellee averred that the Ministry of Public Works, thru its senior architect of the Architectural Division, had profession-ally conducted a comprehensive assessment of the property of David Day-you-gar and found that the actual value of the property was US$25,000.00 and not US$150,000.00, as claimed by the appellant.
In response to the amended answering affidavit, the appel-lant filed a replying affidavit containing 13 counts. Basically, the appellant confirmed and reaffirmed the allegations made and contained in its amended resistance to the motion. It de-nied ever arresting, tying with inner tube, hanging, torturing, inflicting any excruciating pain, or dehumanizing the appellee, and it asserted that such false and misleading allegations were never authenticated by the unimpeachable testimony of Dr. Barkolie. It also denied and controverted all the allegations made by the appellee in his amended answering affidavit as regards the transactions at the post office with Ms. Theresa Kokro, and it further explained that Stephen Kollie was the head post master and custodian of all registered mails and records at the Minis-try of Post and Telecommunications. It noted that, as such, Mr. Kollie was competent and authorized to issue certificates as to records in his possession and that he therefore did not need to appeal before a justice of the peace or otherwise have his records authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The appellant further contended that the assessment of the property, performed by Mr. A. B. Campbell of the Ministry of Public Works was self-serving and contrary to law because only the Ministry of Finance was authorized by law to issue certificates relating to the value of property being used as security to a bond.
In face of all the above, the appellee withdrew his motion to dismiss and filed an amended motion to dismiss, this time charging the appellant with having obtained the property valuation of David Dey-you-gar illegally and without his knowledge and authority, since he had not signed both the property valuation and surety affidavit, as falsely appeared on those documents. The appellee alleged, and attached a con-firming affidavit, that David Dey-you-gar, now deceased, was helplessly sick for three years prior to the alleged signing, was suffering from acute blindness and deafness, and was totally illiterate. As such, the appellee said, Mr. Dey-you-gar did not have the strength or the ability to sign his name on the appellant’s surety affidavit, the property valuation form from the Ministry of Finance, and the appeal bond. The appellee repeated his contention that even if David Dey-you-gar had offered his property, same would still have been illegal and invalid because the same ¼ acre or one lot had earlier been used as security on two other bonds in favor of Joseph Cornomia in an action of damages and Mohamed Diallo in an attachment bond in an action of debt. The appellee also reiterated his contention that the appellant, having arbitrarily secured and used the subject property without the owner’s knowledge and consent, which act he said was illegal, and further, that although the appellant had realized that property used to secure a bond must be free from liens and encumbrances, and knew that there was a prior lien imposed on the property which had been used to secure the appellant’s appeal bond, yet the appellant had falsely vouched on page two, count three, of its sureties affidavit, dated January 29, 2001, “that there are no liens, unpaid taxes, or any other en-cumbrances on or against said properties.” (emphasis added).
With regard to the issue of the value of the property, the appellee contended that even if the property of David Dey-you-gar were obtained with his consent, the value of US$150,000.00 appearing on the face of the appellant’s bond was totally false and misleading in that the aggregate value of the entire property issued on the three bonds was US$65,000.00, as per bills and receipts for real estate taxes of David Dey-you-gar attached to the amended motion. The appellee asserted that the Ministry of Finance having assessed the property of the late David Dey-you-gar as stated above, it could never have contradictorily issued another value for the self same property, as the administrators were even contesting the value imposed on the two zinc shacks and one unfinished concrete building located on the property. The appellee attached photographs of the buildings in support of the contention, and repeated that, consistent with law, he had excepted to the appeal bond in the trial court on February 1, 2001, and that he had subsequently mailed the same to the appellant’s counsel through lawful means at the post office.
Finally, and in view of the appellee having amended his motion to dismiss, the appellant likewise amended its resistance thereto. As in its initial resistance, the appellant reaffirmed and reasserted in the amended resistance that from the inception of the case, the appellee never had the writ of summons served on it, by and thru any of its managers, officers or other authorized representative, that and as such, the appellant was never brought under the jurisdiction of the trial court. It recounted all of the defects in the institution of the suit and the alleged fraud perpetrated by the appellee in obtaining a verdict and the denial by the judge of an oppor-tunity to be relieved from the judgment. It also recounted the procedures and processes which it had followed in perfecting its appeal, the exchange of pleadings, and the withdrawal and amendment of same by both parties. It restated the allegations of fraud on the part of the appellee in serving the appellant with the exceptions, and the transactions at the post office.
With regard to the issue of prior liens on the property, the appellant also repeated that it was justified in relying on the truthfulness of the certificate of property valuation issued by the Ministry of Finance. And, on the question of the value of the property and prior liens, the appellant reasserted its contention that where the aggregate value of all the bonds on which the property was used as security did not exceed the value of the property, then all the bonds are allowed. It relied on the case Lewis and Lewis v. The Original African Hebrew Israelites Foundation, [1984] LRSC 9; 32 LLR 3 (1984) to support those contentions.
On the issue of the legality of obtaining the property of David Dey-you-gar, the appellant contended that the said David Dey-you-gar was healthy and well, and that he did at the time authorize the use of his property as security to the appellant’s appeal bond, as per his surety affidavit which was executed in the presence of co-surety Joseph G. White and before the justice of the peace, for which the appellant attached an affidavit of confirmation.
The Court notes that of the 45 counts of the appellant’s amended resistance to the amended motion appellant, in counts 15, 16 and 17, called the Court’s attention to the fact that the appellee had withdrawn his motion of dismiss on May 21, 2001, shortly prior to the calling of the case on that same day for hearing of said motion. For the benefit of this opinion, we shall hereunder quote verbatim the said counts 15, 16, and 17 of the appellant’s amended resistance:

“15. That on May 19, 2001, prior to the call of the case on the self-same day, movant/appellee filed and served a notice of withdrawal of the motion to dismiss respondent/appellant’s appeal at 9:05 and 10:10 respectively. So when the case was called for hearing movant/appellee informed this Court that movant/ appellee had withdrawn his motion to dismiss respondent/appellant’s appeal and hence the motion to dismiss was not heard.

16. That on May 28, 2001, movant/appellee filed an amended motion to dismiss respondent/appellant’s appeal, but did not serve same on respondent/appellant until October 10, 2001, a period of about five (5) months after the filing of the said amended motion to dismiss. In the amended motion to dismiss, movant/ appellee raised substantially the identical issues raised in the motion to dismiss. Respondent/appellant requests Your Honours to take judicial notice of the records in these proceedings and observe that both the motion and the amended motion contain the self-same issues.
17. Respondent/appellant submits and says that predicated upon the averments contained in counts one (1) through seventeen (17) above, movant/appellee is estopped from filing an amended motion. Respondent/ appellant submits that this Honourable Court held in the case M I M Timber Company v. Yeh, [1971] LRSC 45; 20 LLR 357, Syl. 1, text at page 358, that a motion withdrawn before an appellate court cannot thereafter be amended; hence, movant/appellee’s amended motion to dismiss is a fit subject for dismissal, and respondent/appellant prays Your Honours to so rule.”

This issue now calls into question the jurisdiction of this Court over the amended motion and everything therefrom arising. This Court has held over and again that every court, including the Supreme Court, is duty bound to first determine its own jurisdiction over a given matter because where jurisdiction is wanting, every action taken by the court is null and void ab initio. And whenever objection to a court’s jurisdiction is raised, that court must put aside all other concerns and issues raised and first determine its competence and authority over the case before proceeding any further.
This Court, speaking first through Mr. Justice Azango and twice later through Mr. Justice Henries, in the case Union National Bank SAC, v. M.C.C., Inc., held as follows:

“It is essential to the proper rendition of a judgment that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. In order to confer jurisdiction on a court, the subject matter must be presented for its consideration in some mode sanctioned by law. Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term. A court which is competent to decide on its own jurisdiction in a given case may determine that cause, whenever that fact is made to appear to its satisfaction either before or after judgment. Therefore whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court’s examination of the case or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to consider it, for if the court is without jurisdiction it is powerless to act in the case.” Union National Bank, SAC, v. M C. C., Inc., [1971] LRSC 71; 20 LLR 525 (1971), text at 530-31; Union National Bank v. M.C.C., [1973] LRSC 31; 22 LLR 32, Syl 3 (1973); Union National Bank v. Monrovia Construction Company, [1974] LRSC 45; 23 LLR 197 (1974).
Therefore, we shall take recourse to the records and thereafter apply the relevant law commensurate with the situation and the findings. The records in the case file reveal that indeed on May 21, 2001 movant did in fact file a notice withdrawing his motion with reservation to refile. We now quote the said notice verbatim:

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA SITTING IN ITS MARCH TERM, A. D. 2001.

PRESENT: HER HONOUR GLORIA M. MUSU-SCOTT ..CHIEF JUSTICE

“HIS HONOUR JOHN NATHANIEL MORRIS….. …ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

“HIS HONOUR M. WILKINS WRIGHT ……………….ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

“HIS HONOUR KARMO G. SOKO SACKOR. SR. ..ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

“HIS HONOUR EL WOOD L. JANGABA …………….ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

Beton Kollie of Camp # 2 )

Lower Margibi County…MOVANT )MOTION TO ) DISMISS

VERSUS )APPELLANT’S

Firestone Plantation Company, Harbel, ) APPEAL

Margibi County.. RESPONDENT )

GROWING OUT OF THE CASE )

Firestone Plantation Company )

Harbel, Lower Margibi County )

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT )

VERSUS ) ACTION OF

) DAMAGES

Beton Kollie of Camp #2 ) FOR A WRONG

Lower Margibi County )

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE )

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL

To the Clerk

Supreme Court of Liberia

Temple of Justice, R. L.

Madam Clerk:

You will please spread upon the minutes of Court in the above entitled cause, that movant hereby withdraws his motion to dismiss appellant’s appeal bond with the right to amend and refile same in keeping with law.

Dated this 21st day of May, A. D. 2001

Respectfully Submitted:

Francis Y. S. Garlawolu

COUNSELLOR-AT-LAW
From the records, we also find that on the same day, May 21, 2001, movant filed his “Appellee’s Amended Motion to Dismiss” to which he attached photographs of the two zinc shacks and one unfinished concrete building, as well as bills and revenue flag receipts for real estate taxes of David Day-you-gar (David Dey-you-gar, David Dayagie) for taxes for 1996-2000, and other exhibits. The records speak for them-selves and stand to verify and confirm the allegation made by the appellant in its amended resistance at counts 15-17, thus leaving this Court with no other alternative but to apply the relevant law controlling such cases.
This court has held that unlike other areas, “in appeals before the appellate Court, though a motion may be filed and amended, when filed and withdrawn it cannot thereafter be amended.” M. I. M Timber Company v. Bayeh. [1971] LRSC 45; 20 LLR 357(1971), text at 358. The holding in the above case compels this Court to grant the prayer of the appellant in counts 15-17 of the amended resistance and thus prevent this Court from going any further with the issues raised in the motion to dismiss or the amended motion to dismiss, thereby compelling us to refuse to pass on said issues of dismissing the appeal and to simply proceed to hear the appeal on the merits.
This is not to say that this Court condones or ignores all the acrimonious trading of allegations of fraud by the parties against each other, but we are impotent to act on them because the motion raising or presenting them was withdrawn and does not have the possibility of being amended and refiled, thus leaving nothing before this Court. Had the motion not been withdrawn, it having generated the trading of allegations of fraud by both parties against each other, and since the Supreme Court does not take evidence on appeal, we would have remanded the motion to the lower court, with instruct-ions that it should investigate the allegations and make a ruling based on the findings, after which this Court would have been able to review such a ruling.
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, it is the ruling of this Court that the amended motion be and the same is hereby ordered stricken from the records of this case in this Court as it is improperly before this Court. The Court shall proceed to hear the appeal on the merits. Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to re-docket the case for the hearing of the appeal on its merits. Costs are to abide the final determination of the case. And it is hereby so ordered.

Motion to dismiss denied.