JOHN AFRICANUS DENNIS and WILLIETTE V. RUSSELL, Executor and Executrix of the last will and testament of MARTIN NEMLE RUSSELL, Appellants, v. CHRISTIANA BROWNE-PHILIPS and ELIZABETH BROWNE-DOSSEN, grantors to OSCAR S. NORMAN, grantee, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE MONTHLY AND PROBATE COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued October 15, 17, 1968. Decided February 6, 1969. 1. When a proceeding has been dismissed by the court, other than for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, those proceedings, or any part of them, such as the pleadings, may not be invoked by one party against the other in subsequent proceedings. 2. When a document may be offered in evidence without need to prove its validity, such as an official record, or, as in the instant case, a copy of a filed will, the party proffering the document cannot be denied the ‘right to prove some aspect of the document which he considers necessary for his case, as in the instant case to prove a fee simple devised under the will. Objectors filed a caveat to a sale of land by the greatgrandchildren of testator whose devise by will to their principal’s immediate grantor was challenged by respondents as having constituted only a life estate and not the fee. At the first hearing, due to clerical error in the court, the petition was dismissed, with the right allowed to objectors to refile. At the subsequent hearing, portions of the dismissed pleadings were accepted by the court as admissions against interest of the objectors, nor were they permitted to offer evidence proving the devise under the will proferted by them was in fee �imple absolute and not merely a life tenancy. The court ruled against the petitioners, from which judgment an appeal was taken. The judgment was reversed, the objections to probate and registration of the deed made by the respondents were sustained. 189 190 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS G. P. Conger-Thompson and John A. Dennis, pro se, for appellants. M. K. Yangbe for appellees. MR. JUSTICE the court. WARDSWORTH delivered the opinion of In passing upon this appeal, we observe from the record filed by the parties herein that the bone of contention centers around the attempted transfer of title by appellees to some other parties of a parcel of land, which appellants have contested. It is alleged that appellees are legally incompetent to transfer the property described in the deed offered for probation and objected to by the appellants, because said parcel of land is the bona fide property of the late former Chief Justice Martin Nemle Russell, who purchased it February 1, 1948, acquiring four acres of land situated and lying on the southwest corner of one Walter W. Holt’s adjoining eastern block, Oldest Congo Town, from Messrs. C. F. Browne and P. A. Davies, after he had paid to them the amount of $400.00. The payment was acknowledged by the execution of a warranty deed, duly registered and probated on February 27, 1948. It is alleged that nineteen years later, the greatgrandchildren of Thomas Browne, respondents herein, commenced conveying this tract of land to several persons by warranty deed, without first having been put in possession thereof by any court. Among these persons are co-respondent Oscar S. Norman. This transaction came to the attention of the objectors, who filed in the office of the Probate Clerk of the Monthly and Probate Court, Montserrado County, a caveat, on November 17, 1956, against the admissibility to probate and registration of any and all such deeds from the respondents herein to any person or persons. Accordingly, on December 8, 1965, objectors received formal notification from the Probate Clerk of the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 191 Monthly and Probate Court, Montserrado County, of a warranty deed from respondents to co-respondent Oscar S. Norman, for lot no. 5, situated and lying at Oldest Congo Town, Monrovia, Liberia, and that the necessary objections were to be filed within the period of time allowed by statute. On December 16, 1965, objections were duly filed and the pleadings progressed as far as the rejoinder filed by the respondents. The legal issues raised by the pleadings came on for trial before Hon. J. Gvalfen Davies, Judge of the Monthly and Probate Court, Montserrado County, on June io, 1966, whereupon the entire pleadings were dismissed due to certain irregularities attributable to the negligence of the clerk of court, and objectors granted the right to refile. Respondents excepted thereto and announced an appeal therefrom. The appeal thus announced by the respondents against this judgment of the Probate Judge was formally withdrawn on June 17, 1966, by the respondents. In consequence of the withdrawal of the appeal by the respondents, objectors renewed their objections on June 27, 1966, alleging that the said piece of realty was conveyed to the late Martin Nemle Russell by the ancestors of forebears of respondents Browne-Philips and BrowneDossen, and proferted their title deed, which would ordinarily bar re-conveyance of the identical parcel. The renewed, or amended pleadings, progressed as far as the filing of objectors’ surrejoinder. On October 28, 1966, after arguments pro et con were heard by the court and the case submitted, the court proceded to rule on the issues of law raised by the pleadings, which ruling was adverse to the objectors, whereupon, objectors excepted thereto and announced an appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted. The necessary appeal steps having been taken, they are before this Court for the adjudication of said appeal 192 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS based upon a bill of exceptions containing six counts, of which we deem two and four worthy of consideration. “a. Objectors-appellants further submit, that the trial judge erred in sustaining count 4 of the rejoinder of the respondents over and against count 5 of the surrejoinder and one of the reply, in that a misstatement of fact or law of a party is not legally tantamount to an admission, which, when made by a party in a previous pleading, cannot be corrected in a subsequent or renewed or amended pleading, the primary purpose for renewal and amendment of a pleading. A party is only legally barred from changing his form of action; in such a latter circumstance, the party loses the benefit of the bar. The court erred in overruling count 3 of the surrejoinder and count r of the reply, and by sustaining count i of the answer and count 4 of the rejoinder. Objectors-appellants submit, by the dismissal in the former action of objections and the written pleadings, the court can exercise no further jurisdiction over same by invoking issues for consideration and adjudication therein raised and employ the same to the prejudice of a party. In this respect, and in this ruling, the trial judge erred.” From the contention of the objectors-appellants in count two of their bill of exceptions, it is obvious that they are contesting the validity of the trial judge’s ruling with respect to the alleged admission made in the pleadings by the said objectors-appellants which were dismissed by the trial judge because of certain irregularities committed by the clerk of court in those proceedings. Hence, according to their contention, it is improper for the trial judge to inject into these proceedings matters contained in the pleadings which he dismissed, granting them an opportunity to refile. In such a circumstance the statute provides, inter alia: “Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this section or any LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 193 other dismissal not provided for in section 596 above, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6:597 (in part). Further implementing this statute is a vital principle enunciated by common law authority. “A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is a bar to any further suit between the same parties or their privies, upon the same cause of action, in the same or another court, so long as it remains unreversed and not in any way vacated or annulled. This rule rests upon fundamental legal principles, and cannot be abrogated or waived at the will or discretion of any judge. Nor can the rule be abrogated or waived by the consent of the parties themselves.” Accordingly, since the dismissal of the case under review was not for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, the dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits. Therefore, it was illegal and legally improper for the judge to have considered any portion of the previous pleadings and thereon based his opinion overruling the objections and ordering the deed probated and registered, vacating the caveat filed by objectors. Therefore, count two of the bill of exceptions is sustained. Count four of the bill of exceptions reads : “And also because objectors-appellants further submit that the trial judge erred in overruling count 8 of the surrejoinder, respecting the failure of the court to hear evidence, this being a mixed issue of law and fact; for whefe a party may aver an official document, without proferting same in his complaint or pleading, the burden of proving the existence thereof, especially when attacked, rests on that party. Objectors-appellants deny objecting to the proving of the will, but denied that their late grantor was a life tenant accord- 194 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ing to the said last wills and testaments of Tom Browne and Thomas Browne, but one to whom the property was devised in fee simple, which does not legally create a life estate.” The appellants-objectors in this count of their bill of exceptions are complaining that the trial judge erred in failing to hear evidence, for the reason that where a party is permitted to offer an official document, without need to offer proof of authenticity, the burden of proving the existence thereof, especially when attacked, rests on the party. “Other proof of official record.–The provisions of sections 721-723 above do not preclude proof of official records or of entries or lack of entries therein by any method authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules of evidence at common law.” Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6:724. Objectors-appellants contend further in this count that their grantor was not a life tenant according to the said last will and testament of Tom Browne, but one to whom the property was devised in fee simple. In the last will and testament of Tom Browne, under clause “C,” the testator made this declaration: “I also declare that after the death of the said Tom Browne, my son, if in case that he should have any heir or heirs, the above-named parcel of land shall become their (his or her) property, and not to be sold by the said Thomas Browne. And, this shall also be in the case from me, and known to be the estate property to my generation unborn. As time permits, my great-grandchildren shall have the right to determine what they want to be done with the said parcels of land as they may see fit. But my son, Thomas Browne, shall not dispose of the same.” The will was executed on June 17, 1917. In the son’s will, Thomas Browne declared : “After my burial expense and just debts shall have LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 195 been paid, I give and bequeath the following to my son Chancy F. Browne, and my daughter Sarah Browne, ten ( io) acres of land on the Old-Road on both sides of the road commonly known as the John Lewis-Morris Road, to them and their heirs and assigns forever.” It can be readily seen and understood that neither the will of the late Tom Browne nor that of his son, the late Thomas Browne, created life estates in the legatees. Judge Bouvier defines “fee simple” as : “An estate of inheritance. The word simple adds no meaning to the word fee standing by ‘itself. But it excludes all qualification or restriction as to the persons who may inherit it as heirs, thus distinguishing it from a fee-tail, as well as from an estate which, though inheritable, is subject to conditions or collateral determination. In modern estates the terms fee, feesimple, and fee-simple absolute, are substantially synonymous ; “The word ‘heirs’ is necessary, in a conveyance, to the creation of a fee-simple, and no expression of intention, in substituted terms, will have an equivalent effect.” Further, in Watson v. Ware, io L.L.R. 158 (1949), the Court stated, at p. 162: “Ruling Case Law states the following: A tenant in fee simple is one who has lands or tenements to hold to him and his heirs forever. A fee, in general, signifies an estate of inheritance, and a fee simple is an absolute inheritance, clear of any condition, limitation, or restriction to particular heirs. It is the highest estate known to the law, and necessarily implies absolute dominion over the land. . . .” Therefore, count four of the bill of exceptions is sustained. The excerpts quoted from the wills of Tom Browne and his son, Thomas Browne, indicate unequivocally that 196 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the estate herein devised in said instruments vested title to said property in Thomas Browne and from him to his heirs, and his heirs absolutely. It is obvious that C. F. Browne, son of the late Thomas Browne, objectors’ grantor, was legally clothed with the right to convey title thereto. In view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of the Court that the ruling of the trial judge should be reversed, and objections to the probation and registration of the deed in question sustained, with costs against appellees. And it is hereby so ordered. Reversed; objections to probate sustained.