CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AT THE MARCH TERM, 1969. AUGUSTUS W. COOPER, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, AND CROSS-MOTION TO REVERSE THE COURT’S JUDGMENT. Argued March 27, 1969. Decided June 13, 1969. 1. When a motion to dismiss an appeal is not based upon a ground recited by statute, the motion will not be granted, even though the ground set forth may suffice for the Supreme Court’s refusal to reverse the lower court’s judgment. 2. When the Term of a circuit judge assigned to preside has expired, or the Jury Session has terminated, the circuit judge no longer can assert jurisdiction in a case, except to make rulings and render judgment in cases already tried, provided they are rendered within ten days after the end of the Jury Session. 3. The issue of jurisdiction of a particular court over the subject matter of an action may be raised at any time in the lower court, before final judgment, or retrospectively by way of a motion in arrest of judgment, or initially on appeal. 4. Generally, where there is no express grant of original jurisdiction to another court, then the Circuit Court is deemed to possess original jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. 5. The crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, being one which is punishable by fine of not more than one hundred dollars, properly falls within the concurrent jurisdictions of the Stipendiary Magistrate and the Justice of the Peace, and the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is appellate only and not original in such cases. 6. A case brought improperly before the Circuit Court, as in the instant case, renders the judgment of that court reversible for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. 269 270 7. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 8. It is a rule of statutory construction that where the plain wording of a statute if given other than its unambiguous meaning would serve to confuse other statutes read in conjunction therewith, no meaning should be read into the statute other than its apparent meaning. The Supreme Court is always reluctant to reduce or nullify statutes enacted pursuant to law, or declare them unconstitutional, and acts thus only when it must. The defendant was indicted for obtaining money under false pretenses, having sold the same parcel of realty twice. He was tried in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, and final judgment was entered against him by the court after trial, but more than ten days beyond the termination of the Jury Session for the Term. An appeal was taken by defendant, and during its pendency a motion to dismiss the appeal was made by the appellee, contending that appellant had failed to lay the ground for a motion in arrest of judgment (its denial by the trial judge constituting the basis of the appeal), by not first moving for a new trial. A cross-motion was brought by appellant to reverse the judgment of the trial court for its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The appellee’s motion was denied, the motion to reverse the judgment was granted. Joseph P. H. Findley for appellant. Samuel E. H. Pelham and Momo Fahnbulleh Jones for appellee. MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the court. Predicated upon a writ issuing out of the Magisterial Court for the Commonwealth District of Monrovia, on October 14, 1964, appellant, the movent herein, was arrested upon the charge of obtaining money under false pretenses. However,’ before the matter could be entertained by the court, a true bill was found against appellant by the grand jurors of Montserrado County, sitting LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 271 in the August Term of the Criminal Assizes of the aforesaid County. By virtue of the indictment found against appellant, he was again arrested upon a writ dated the day the indictment was filed, that is to say, on November 2, 1966. Thereafter, the sheriff’s return evidenced that the accused was duly arrested and thereupon placed under bond. The gravamen of the complaint, as included in the indictment, was to the effect that the appellant, then defendant, obtained money from one W. N. L. Cobb, agent of Shell Company of West Africa, Limited, with a design to cheat. It was averred that the defendant represented to the aforesaid company that he “had” a piece of land at the corner of Randall and Carey Streets, in the City of Monrovia, and that he wanted to lease said property, knowing fully well that he had previously leased the identical property to one S. M. Kadii, in 1961. It was additionally averred that in reliance upon the misrepresentation as made by defendant, he was given the sum of $9,000.00 as lease money for the subject property. While Judge D. W. B. Morris was presiding over the February Term of the First Judicial Circuit Court, Criminal Assizes, the present case was called for trial. Upon arraignment the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Issue having been joined, the court proceeded to go into the merits of the case and evidence was presented by both sides. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, for want of jurisdiction. Succinctly stated, the motion contended that by effluxion of time the judge no longer possessed jurisdiction and could not continue with the disposition of the case. It was contended that fifty-five days had elapsed since the judge entered Chamber Session at the commencement of the Term and it was then three days in excess of the time allotted by statute. In the circumstances, since no extension of time had either been requested or granted by the 272 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Chief Justice, the judge was without jurisdiction and could not continue in the case. Count two of the motion contended that the court was further without jurisdiction, for the Penal Code imposed a fine of not over $1oo.00 as the penalty for obtaining money under false pretenses. Defendant contended that the punishment and restitution required by law savored of the enforcement of contract and, therefore, was rightly within the province of the civil law courts by way of an action for specific performance. The two points quoted above constituted the issues of substance raised in the motion in arrest of judgment. The trial judge, after receiving and reviewing the opposition to the motion, and upon hearing arguments thereon, in his best judgment proceeded to disallow the motion, and thereafter rendered final judgment. The procedural steps that constitute preconditions to the bringing of an appeal for final adjudication before this Court having been complied with, the case entered upon our docket. However, before we were able to proceed upon the hearing of the merits of the suit, two motions were filed, one by each side. On November 11, 1969, a motion to dismiss was filed by the prosecution. Thereafter, on the 14th day of the same month, a motion to refuse jurisdiction was filed by appellant. Since the prosecution’s motion was brought first, we shall deal with it first, and thereafter, if need be, dwell upon the motion of appellant. The motion to dismiss was concerned primarily with the issue of the substitution of a motion in arrest of judgment for a motion for a new trial. It is the contention of the appellee that exception to the verdict, the stating of an intention to seek a new trial, and the actual filing of the motion for a new trial and disposition thereof by the court, constitute indispensable prerequisites to the taking of an appeal. In the circumstances, the appeal should be dismissed. This Court has held often that the failure to file a mo- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 273 tion for a new trial may constitute a ground for refusal to reverse the lower court’s judgment, which is predicated upon the verdict of a jury duly arrived at in accordance with law. However, our statutes are vocal in respect to reciting the grounds upon which a dismissal in this appellate court may be had, and where the request for dismissal does not include a ground recited by statute or the law of the land, this Court will not favorably consider such a motion. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied. Let us, therefore, center our attention upon the motion to refuse jurisdiction, to reverse the judgment of the lower court for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Count one of the motion raises the issue of effluxion of time in form and fashion akin to the proposition included in the motion in arrest of judgment mentioned supra. In fine, it is contended that the final judgment was rendered by the court three days in excess of the tenday period allotted by the statute for the holding of Chamber Session subsequent to the adjournment of Jury Session. It is contended that since that issue was called to the attention of the trial judge in count one of the retrospective motion filed at that court, he should have referred the matter to the Chief Justice in a request for additional time or, alternatively, he should have discharged the defendant-appellant without delay. In his ruling on the issue of whether or not his jurisdiction over the tribunal had expired by effluxion of time, the trial judge contended that the courts do not sit on Saturdays because the judge has to rest. He continued by saying that it is almost impossible and beyond human capacity to have a single judge sitting every day, from Monday to Saturday, without even a break to study and prepare rulings. He also held that in his opinion it was a hardship to have jurors from remote areas in the country remain in court daily at their expense when there was no matter assigned for business. 274 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS We cannot agree with the position of the judge in this instance, for this Court has held, “In computing the statutory 42-day period of a quarterly session of a circuit court during which a jury may be empaneled, only Sundays and holidays may be excluded; any other days on which the court is adjourned or for any reason fails to convene may not be excluded.” [Emphasis ours.] This position was reaffirmed only a little over four years ago when Mr. Chief Justice Wilson spoke for the Court in Sherman v. Clarke, [1965] LRSC 8; 16 L.L.R. 242 (1965). In addition to the above, this Court has held in Thomas v. Dennis, [1936] LRSC 5; 5 L.L.R. 92 (1936), that a trial judge can exercise trial jurisdiction only upon assignment given by the Chief Justice and that when the jurisdiction of a circuit judge assigned to preside within a given circuit shall have expired either by his adjournment before the term normally expires, or by effluxion of time, he loses trial jurisdiction except for the purposes of hearing motions arising out of cases already determined and giving judgment thereon, or approving bills of exceptions, all of which should be concluded within ten days. And he can exercise trial jurisdiction thereafter only in the event (a) a case in which a jury was impaneled before the end of the trial term had not been concluded, or (b) in the event he had received a special assignment from the Chief Justice which had extended his jurisdiction beyond the term. The cases just cited show clearly that where the regular period for the sitting of a particular term of court has expired, the judge presiding may not continue to sit at will but only upon being granted an extension of time by the Chief Justice, except if the continuation of the Jury Session falls within one of the exceptions allowed by statute or this Court. This brings us now to the second major issue wherein we have been called upon to refuse jurisdiction and at the same time reverse the judgment of the lower court for LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 275 the lack of that court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter. Therefore, the first question with which we are confronted is that of determining whether this Court may at the same time refuse jurisdiction and order the reversal of a lower court’s judgment. This obviously would constitute an anomaly. We must, ergo, determine if this is a permissible anomaly within the context of our laws. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority or power which enables the court to sit upon the hearing of the particular matter. It constitutes the sine qua non of the hearing and subsequent determination of a case. However, at some stage of the trial there must of necessity be an actual determination by the court of whether this authority or power in fact exists. Since courts do not as a rule sua sponte raise issues, the presentation of the issue must be by a party litigant at a proper time during the trial. In the premises, there are instances wherein the issue is deemed waived when untimely raised. A court always has jurisdiction to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction. This we must accept since there has to be some determination of the issue of the existence or lack of jurisdiction. Having now determined that we do have power to establish the existence of jurisdiction, let us approach the issue at bar. In our view, the issue of jurisdiction of a particular court over the subject matter may be raised at any time in the lower court until final judgment, including retrospectively by way of a motion in arrest of judgment. The issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may also be raised upon appeal to this Court. We have stated this position giving full appreciation to the fact that the criminal code upon which the present case was tried makes no specific allowance for this. However, the spirit of the law was ascertained by referral to our Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6:296 (in part) : “But the defense that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter may be made at any time in 276 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the action until final judgment (on appeal if an appeal is taken), and the court may at any time dismiss the action on that ground.” Let us now examine the relevant statutes. What constitutes obtaining money under false pretenses? “Any person who makes false representation, with a fraudulent design to obtain goods, wares or merchandise, with intent to cheat another, or a representation of some fact or circumstance alleged to be existing calculated to mislead, which is not true, or does not exist, with intent to cheat another of his goods, wares, money, merchandise or other property of value, is guilty of obtaining money under false pretense and punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ; he shall be required to make restitution of the money or thing of value obtained.” Penal Law, 1956 Code 27 :302. Since we have now established what must transpire to constitute the offense, and the penalty imposed for the commission of these acts, let us next determine what type of offense we are dealing with and, thereafter, the designated situs for the trial, so that we can ascertain where jurisdiction over the subject matter lies. In respect to categorization of crimes, our statute recites : “r. A crime is an act or omission forbidden by law, and is either a felony or misdemeanor. “2. A felony is a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment without the option of a fine. All other crimes are misdemeanors. “3. Any offense punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or less without imprisonment as a necessary element of the punishment is a petty offense.” Penal Law, 1956 Code 27:5 (in part) . It is, therefore, established that the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses is a petty offense. Therefore, though a misdemeanor, it has been classified by the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 277 Legislature as an offense of a low grade. Having thus resolved the issue of the category of the offense, we should now train our attention upon the proper tribunal before which such an offense should be brought. Our Judiciary Law provides, in the 1956 Code 18 :556 “Trial jurisdiction of justices of the peace.–Justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction within the county for which they were appointed to try the following without jury: . . . (d) Cases of petty larceny, and of any other crime punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or less without mandatory imprisonment, if no court or officer other than a magistrate has jurisdiction by express provisions of statute. . . .” Section 557 thereof, provides, inter alia: “The jurisdiction of stipendiary magistrates.–Stipendiary magistrates shall have jurisdiction to try the following matters without jury: . . . (h) Cases of petty larceny and of any other crime punishable by a fine of one hundred dollars or less without mandatory imprisonment if no court or officer other than a justice of the peace has jurisdiction by express provision of statute ; provided that a stipendiary magistrate shall not have jurisdiction over ( 1) any crime committed under section To’ of this Title; or (2) any violation by a judicial officer of section 366 of this Title; or (3) any violation of the income tax provision of chapter 5 of the Revenue and Finance Law; . . .” The above-quoted sections clearly evidence that it is the intention of the Legislature that justices of the peace and stipendiary magistrates have concurrent jurisdiction in respect to particular enumerated offenses. We have, however, additionally observed that except for these tribunals, the Legislature does not intend that other tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction with either stipendiary magistrates or justices of the peace. This is clearly seen by the recurring provision which holds : IC . . . . If no court or officer other than a Justice of 278 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the Peace has jurisdiction by express provision of [Emphasis ours.] In view of this position, we must search to see whether by express provision of statute any other court has been awarded jurisdiction, meaning, of course, the circuit court. The following is found in the Judiciary Law, 1956 Code, tit. 18 : “Section 51o. Original Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court –The Circuit Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over all cases as to which another court or government agency or official is not expressly given original jurisdiction by Constitutional or statutory provision ; provided that: ” (a) The Circuit Court may hear and determine civil actions which may also be heard and determined by a court of a magistrate or a justice of the peace, except that a plaintiff commencing such an action in the Circuit Court must pay all costs incurred by himself or by the defendant, under the provisions of section 864 of the Civil Law Procedure. “(b) The Circuit Court may hear and determine objections in relation to registration for voting brought in accordance with the provisions of sections 72-74 of the Election Law. “(c) The Probate Divisions of the Circuit Court of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits shall have jurisdiction to try those cases specified in section 512 of this Title. “In Montserrado County, those cases of which the Circuit Court has jurisdiction under this section shall be divided between the First and Sixth Judicial Circuits as follows : The First Judicial Circuit shall have jurisdiction to try only criminal cases, and the Sixth Judicial Circuit shall have jurisdiction to try only cases other than criminal cases. “Section 5ri. Appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts.–Except where otherwise provided by law, statute.” LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 279 each Judicial Circuit of the Circuit Courts shall hear appeals from administrative decisions of government agencies and officials and from decisions of courts not of record made within the county in which it sits ; provided, that the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit shall hear only appeals in criminal cases and the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit shall hear only appeals in cases other than criminal cases arising in Montserrado County; and provided further that the Circuit Courts of neither the First nor Sixth Judicial Circuits shall hear appeals from decisions made in the Territory of Marshall, the District of Careysburg, the Township of Kakata, or the Bondiway Magisterial Area.” The beginning paragraph of Section 510 is concerned primarily with a general expression of the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts. In other words, where there is no express grant of original jurisdiction to another court by the Constitution or a statute made in pursuance thereof, then the circuit court has original jurisdiction. In the case at bar, the possibility of the existence of original jurisdiction in the circuit court seems completely precluded by virtue of the provisions of sections 556 and 557 cited supra which expressly confer jurisdiction upon the magistrate and justice of the peace in such cases. Additionally, the converse of the proposition is not here to be found, for there is no express (nor implied for that matter) statutory provision that permits of the exercise of original jurisdiction by the circuit court in such an instance. We must, therefore, conclude that in cases as the one at bar, the jurisdiction of the circuit court over the particular subject matter can only be appellate. Now, where does this place us, for it is a basic premise that we are governed by stare decisis. In Yancy v. Republic of Liberia, [1934] LRSC 31; 4 L.L.R. 204 (1934), the Court, speaking through” Mr. Chief Justice Grimes, held that a similar motion as filed by appellant’s counsel should be denied. 280 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS This Court then held under an almost identical set of circumstances, that the circuit court did have jurisdiction. In that case this pronouncement was made at p. 21o: “It is unthinkable to us that the Legislature of Liberia, in enacting the law defining petty offenses, ever conceived the idea of giving to a justice of the peace the power or privilege of passing upon fraud in any way, shape or form.” The Court then proceeded to hold that the gravamen of the offense was the false pretenses and this implied fraud. Therefore, the deduction was that the Legislature would not want a justice of the peace to pass upon the issue of fraud. In our view, statutory construction falls within the province of this Court and the interpretation of statutes constitutes one of the prime functions of this Court. However, when the wording of the statute is devoid of ambiguity, the plain wording must be given its proper effect. And this is especially true where the plain wording, if given an interpretation other than its natural meaning, would serve to confuse other statutes which must be read in conjunction therewith to be given proper effect and understanding. Unless a particular provision of law is violative of the basic law, the Constitution, and this issue is timely and squarely raised at the proper forum, this Court will always be loath either to declare a law unconstitutional or to reduce or nullify the intention of a particular statutory provision. Now, in the Yancy case, the Court held that since cases properly brought before the magisterial court could also be commenced at the Civil Law Court, then although there is an express conferral of jurisdiction upon magisterial and justices of the peace courts, the circuit court may exercise concurrent jurisdiction in cases of petty offenses with these other tribunals not of record. Here again, we must assert ourselves as not being in agreement with our predecessors, for the statute specifically provides LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 281 for the conferral of jurisdiction and, additionally, the concurrent jurisdiction spoken of in section 5 io (a) cited above relates specifically to civil cases. There is no mention of criminal cases, and in the circumstances we see not how we can read into the law something that it specifically prohibits, especially so when by so doing we would impliedly negate the effect of other expressly worded statutes directly related to the one being interpreted. We have no alternative other than to reverse Yancy v. Republic, [1934] LRSC 31; 4 L.L.R. 204 (1934) In view of the above, it is our determination that the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, wrongfully assumed jurisdiction over the case, for the subject matter of the particular cause was not properly before that court, but should have been before the Magisterial Court. The appellant’s motion is, therefore, granted, the motion to dismiss the appeal denied, and the judgment reversed for want of proper jurisdiction over the subject matter in the court of first instance. And it is hereby so ordered. Motion to dismiss appeal denied, motion to reverse judgment granted; reversed.