WILLIAM T. KNOWLDEN, Informant, v. WILLETTE R. JOHNSON et al., Respondents.

INFORMATION PROCEEDINGS AND APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE GRANTING THE PETITIONS FOR THE WRITS OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION.

Heard: (Undated): Decided January 21, 1999.

1. A concurrent or succeeding judge cannot review and/or reverse the decision or acts of another concurrent or preceding judge.

2. Propertied deeded remains the properties of the owners in whose names the deeds were issued, and which deeds have been probated and registered, especially where the grantors do not disclaim their acts.

3. Persons in whose names administrators deeds have been issued have the right to take possession of and exercise full control over properties deeded and their benefits.

4. Prohibition will lie to prohibit a succeeding judge from reviewing the acts of his predecessor.

5. Illegitimate children who have not been legitimized or otherwise recognized as provided by statute may not inherit from their putative father.

6. The invitation by legitimate children to their illegitimate sisters and brothers does not confer legitimacy on the illegitimate children, but the rights conferred by such invitation are not limited to the extent of the invitation.

7. The voluntary invitation by legitimate children to illegitimate children to share or benefit from inherited property of a deceased parent is based on acknowledgment by the legitimate children that the illegitimate children are brothers and sisters, and as such creates a duty on the legitimate to continue to regard the illegitimate children as brothers and sisters with equal rights to share or benefit in the intestate estate of their deceased father, share and share alike.

8. By their voluntary invitation to their illegitimate brothers and sisters to share in the benefit of the intestate estate of their father, the legitimate children thereby waive their rights to asset themselves a legal heirs with the exclusive rights of inheritance and are estopped from denying the illegitimate children the right to benefit equally.

9. The illegitimate children who have been extended a voluntary invitation to share in the benefit with their legitimate brothers and sisters of the intestate estate of their deceased father cannot be deprived of the right or be prevented from making a demand for accountability.

10. Legitimate children who voluntarily invite illegitimate children to share in the benefit of the intestate estate of their deceased father suffer from lashes and waive their right to assert the illegitimacy of the invitees, and having dealt with such illegitimate children as if they had inheritable blood, they (the legitimate children) cannot disavow their act.

11. The waiver by legitimate children to assert the right of exclusive inheritance to the exclusion of illegitimate children does not confer legitimacy on the illegitimate children but only confers the right on the illegitimate children to benefit from the estate and to demand accountability.

12. Admission, whether of law or fact, which has been acted upon by another is conclusive against the party making it in all cases between him and the person whose conduct had been influenced.

13. Where, by failure to diligently act, an antiquated demand is raised, the Supreme Court will invoke the doctrine of lashes and refuse to interfere in a matter so as to preserve the peace of society.

14. The plea of estoppel is a good plea and will prevent a party from denying his own acts, if well founded; and neither law nor equity will permit a party to disclaim his acts.

15. When a man stands by and permits another to act without objecting, when from the usage of trade or otherwise, there is a duty to speak, his silence will preclude him as much as if he proposed the act himself.

16. Acquiescence or standing by, where there is a duty on the part of the person acquiescing to speak or assert a right, amounts to a representation by him.

17. Section 3.2 of the Domestic Relations Law stipulate the conditions under which an illegitimate child or his issue shall inherit from his lineal or collateral relatives.

18. Waiver is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference or the relinquishment of such right, or when one dispenses with the performance of something he is entitled to exact or when one in possession of any right, whether conferred by law or contract, with full knowledge of the material facts, does or forbears to do something, the doing of which or the forbearance to do which is inconsistent with the right or his intention to rely on it.

19. Lashes is the neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.

20. Conduct of a party which has placed another party in a situation where his rights will be imperiled and his defenses embarrassed is a basis of lashes; knowledge, unreasonable delay, and change of position are essential elements.

21. Estoppel by lashes is a failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time; a neglect to do something which should be done or to seek to enforce a right at a proper time.

22. One an alternative writ is issued with a stay order, the matter remains in status quo.

23. The statutory period for keeping open an intestate estate is one year.

Informants and petitioners, legitimate heirs and beneficiaries of the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden, at various times filed information and petitions for certiorari and prohibition against the illegitimate children of the deceased and the trial judge for errors allegedly made in the handling of said estate, including the review and reversal by the probate judge of the acts and decisions of his predecessor. The petitioners, amongst other issues, contended that the administrators could not make any further deeds to the illegitimate children of the deceased, in favour of whom in the first partial distribution of the estate properties deeds had previously been issued, since the said illegitimate children had no inheritable rights. Amongst the contentions of the informants were that the trial judge had reversed the ruling of his predecessor approving the issuance of administrators’ deeds to the children of the deceased, and that in the request of certain of the illegitimate children he had ordered that the rents of persons to whom deeds had been issued be held in escrow rather than paid to such persons, that an accounting be undertaken, and that certain property claimed to have been sold by one of the children of the deceased while the deceased was still alive be cancelled.

The Supreme Court consolidated the various petitions and information, and proceeded to resolve the various issues raised therein. On the issue of whether the illegitimate children were entitled to inherit from the decedent and to bring action for accountability by the administrators of the intestate estate, the Court expressed its agreement with the ruling of the Chambers Justice that the previous issuance of deeds to the illegitimate children was a mere invitation to them and did not thereby confer on them the status of legitimacy, but disagreed that the illegitimate children, as invitees, were not entitled to further inheritance from their deceased father. The Court held that extension of the initial invitation by the legitimate children to the illegitimate children to share in the benefits of the estate was a recognition by the legitimate children of the illegitimate children as their brothers and sisters. That invitation, the Court said, conferred on the illegitimate children the right of inheritance to share in the benefit of the estate the same as the legitimate children. The Court noted that by extending the invitation, the legitimate children waived their right to regard the illegitimate children as illegitimate not entitled to the right of inheritance, suffered lashes, and were estopped from challenging the illegitimate children right of inheritance.

The Court further opined that the illegitimate children having been extending the invitation under which they became entitled to the right of inheritance, they acquired the right to demand an accounting by the administrators of the estate.

On the issue of the reversal of the probate judge of the decision of his predecessor, the Supreme Court held that the said judge was without authority to review and reverse the ruling of his predecessor and that his action constituted a reversible error. The Court therefore ordered the release of the funds which the probate judge had directed be held in escrow.

With regard to the execution of a deed by one of the children of the deceased allegedly conveying property of the deceased while the latter was still alive, the Court said that not only could this not be legal, but also that while the deceased was still alive he had denied that his child had issued or had the authority to issue such deed. Hence, the property held by Mr. Sesay remained the property of the estate and that the judge of the monthly and probate court should therefore proceed to serve a writ of execution on Mr. Sesay and to have the estate take possession of the said property.

Ishmael P. Campbell of the Legal Aid Inc., appeared far the informant and Cyril Jones of the Jones and Jones Law Firm, in association with the David A. B. Jallah Law Firm, appeared for the informant/respondent/petitioners in prohibition. Salia A. Sirleaf of the Henries Law Firm appeared for petitioners and informant/petitioner in prohibition discovery proceedings. David A. B. Jallah, Cyril Jones, Frederick Cherue and Benedict F. Sannoh of the Center for Law and Human Rights appeared for respondents.

MADAM CHIEF JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This matter involving the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A.A. Knowlden has, come before this Court on two petitions for a writ of prohibition and three bills of information. This Court, sitting en banc, therefore ordered a consolidation of all pending causes before it involving the said intestate estate.

The facts in these cases, as revealed by the records, are that Kaiser A. A. Knowlden died intestate on April 20, 1983. Upon petition duly filed before the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, letters of administration were issued in favor of Winston Knowlden, Walmsley Garber Knowlden and Samuel Knowlden. Walmsley Garber Knowlden was objected to on the ground that he was the offspring of holy matrimony between Cynthia Garber and Joseph Garber. This objection was sustained by the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County and the name of Walmsley Garber Knowlden was dropped and deleted as one of the administrators of the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A.A. Knowlden.

Some time thereafter, a partial distribution was made of the said intestate estate and administrators deeds were issued, registered and probated, and turned over to beneficiaries. This act was approved by the judge of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, Heir Honour Luvenia Ash-Thompson. This judge was succeeded by His Honour Harper S. Bailey who, on the 16thday of May, A. D. 1989, issued letters of administration de bonis non in favor of Benjamin Knowlden, Williette R. Johnson and Samuel Knowlden. On May 22, 1989, a petition for the closing of the said intestate estate was filed by Co-administrators Williette R. Johnson and Samuel B. Knowlden. Also presented along with the petition were twenty-two administrators deeds, and Co-administrator Benjamin Knowlden, and Barbara Knowlden objections to the closure of the estate and request for an accounting of monies collected by the petitioners. The judge of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, His Honour Harper S. Bailey, sustained the objections and ordered the previous partial distribution approved by the preceding probate Judge, Her Honour Luvenia Ash-Thompson, declared null and void and further ordered the appointment of two appraisers, Counsellors T. Edwin Swen and Osborne K. Diggs, to work along with the administratrix and administrators for an impartial distribution and subsequent closure of the said intestate estate. The judge so ruled that pending the filing of the final report of the said intestate estate, all rental payments in favor of the intestate estate shall be made to the sheriff of the monthly and probate court who shall thereafter proceed to open a bank account in favor of the distributees, of the late Kaiser A.A. Knowlden. The respondents in these objection proceedings took exceptions to the action of the judge and took recourse to the Chambers Justice praying for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit His Honour Harper S. Bailey, judge of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, from enforcing his ruling on the objections to the closing of the said intestate estate. The alternative writ of prohibition was ordered issued on June 12, 1989, which ordered a stay in the proceedings in the matter in the monthly and probate court pending the final determination of the petition for prohibition filed before the Chambers Justice, His Honour James K. Belleh.

During the pendency of the petition for a writ of prohibition, Co-administratrix Williette Johnson, by and thru her counsel, Jones and Jones Law Firm, on October 26, 1989, filed a bill of information before the presiding Chambers Justice, David D. Kpomakpor. The informants brought to the attention of the Chambers Justice that in violation of the stray order issued in the alternative writ of prohibition Corespondents Benjamin Knowlden and Hilary Knowlden were leasing and collecting rentals from real properties part and parcel of the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden.

On January 3, 1990, Justice David D. Kpomakpor, presiding in Chambers, handed down a ruling on the petition for the writ of prohibition. The petition for the writ of prohibition was granted and the peremptory writ of prohibition ordered issued. The respondents announced as appeal from the ruling of the Chambers Justice to the Supreme Court en banc.

On June 15, 1990, the then Clerk of the Honourable Supreme Court, upon orders of the presiding Chambers Justice, Associate Justice J. D. Baryougar Junius, wrote the following letter to Judge Harper Soe Bailey to further restrain him from proceeding in the said intestate estate. The letter read:

June 15, 1990
His Honour Harper Soe Bailey
Probate Court Judge
Montserrado County
Monrovia, Liberia

May It Please Your Honour:
Attached, Your Honour is a self-explanatory ruling handed down by the then Chambers Justice, His Honour David D. Kpomakpor.

Our minutes of Court show that an appeal to the Full Bench was announced from said ruling and granted by the Chambers Justice, leaving the probate court powerless to handle any aspect of said matter pending disposition by the Full Bench.

The Associate Justice now presiding in Chambers, His Honour J. D. Baryougar Juinus, directs that Your Honour adhere to the appeal announced from the attached ruling.

Please be informed Your Honour that as of June 1990, the marshal of the Supreme Court has been instructed to collect all rents due the properties subject of the appeal.

You are further informed that any amount of money collected from the properties subject of the appeal will be counted for by the Probate Court for Montserrado County, presided over by Your Honour.

Thanks for your kind cooperation.
Kindest regards,
Respectfully yours,
Emily M. Badio
CLERK, SUPREME COURT OF LIBERIA

On the 29th day of June A. D. 1990, Co-administrator Benjamin Knowlden, along with Barbara Knowlden, filed a bill of information before this Court. The said bill of information informed the Court that while the appeal on the writ of prohibition remained pending before this Court, Co-respondent herein, Jennifer Knowlden, represented by Shirley Carter, had proceeded to receive rents and filed a petition for cancellation of lease agreements for premises part and parcel of the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden and that as a result of the filing of the said petition, the assigned judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, His Honour Sebron Hall had ordered the sequestration of future rentals of the said property.

On the 4thday of July A. D. 1989, Co-administrator Benjamin Knowlden instituted discovery proceedings in the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, against Sekou Sesay, complaining that the said respondent, Sekou Sesay, was withholding a portion of land containing a building which was owned by the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden. In defense, Respondent Sekou Sesay in his returns contended that he had purchased the said real property located near the Barclay Training Center on United Nations Drive in Monrovia, from William T. Knowlden, son of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden and brother of Petitioner Benjamin Knowlden, on November 8, 1980 for an amount of $59,000.00.

Proceedings in this matter were held in the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County wherein it became clear that the purchase of the property by Respondent Sekou Sesay ways made in 1980 prior to the death of Decedent Kaiser A. A. Knowlden who, at the time of his death in 1983, was seized of title to the real property in issue. The judge of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County upheld the discovery proceedings and ordered the respondent ousted and evicted from the said premises which he declared to be part and parcel of the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden. Respondent fled to the presiding Chambers Justice on a petition for a writ of prohibition, to which an alternative writ was issued restraining the Judge of the monthly and probate court from proceeding pending the determination of the petition for a writ of prohibition.

The issues considered by this Court to be decisive of this matter are:

(1) whether or not a succeeding probate judge may review and reverse the acts and decision of the preceding probate judge?

(2) whether or not a probate judge can order that rentals and other incomes from real properties of an intestate estate which have been distributed by administrators’ deeds and the beneficiaries have been put in full control and possession of their real properties placed in escrow?

(3) whether or not a beneficiary under an intestate estate who has been issued an administrators’ deed which was duly registered and probated can become true owner of and alienate that portion of the intestate estate subject of the administrators deed?

(4) whether or not illegitimate children who were included in the partial distribution of an intestate estate may also benefit from a subsequent distribution with the same rights and privileges as legal heirs?

(5) whether or not illegitimate children born posthumously after the death of their putative father may inherit from their said father

We shall now examine the issues beginning with issues Nos. 1, 2 & 3.

This Court has held in a long line of cases that a concurrent or succeeding judge cannot review and/or reverse the decision or acts of another concurrent preceding judge. It follows therefore that one probate judge cannot review the acts of another probate judge. Accordingly, we confirm the portion of the then Chambers Justice, Associate Justice David D. Kpomakpor’s ruling, now before this court on appeal, which reads:

“The fact that Judge Baily recalled those deeds from persons to whom they have been issued and interfered with the payment of rents, he thereby committed reversible error. In the case Balla v. Johnson, [1978] LRSC 62; 27 LLR 343 (1978), at page 438, this Court ruled that “whatever might be one’s personal feelings, we cannot ignore fundamental principled of law, in particular, in this case, the principle that a commissioner of probate cannot review a ruling of his colleague or predecessor, another commissioner of probate. “Prohibition will therefor lie to restrain Co-respondent Judge Bailey from recalling or attempting to review any of the acts of his colleague or predecessor, Her Honour Judge Ash-Thompson, especially as it relates to the undoing or cancellation of deeds probated and registered while Judge Ash-Thompson presided over the trial of the Knowlden estate. Every such fact of his is set aside and made null and void …

….the petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby granted and the peremptory writ of prohibition ordered issued against the respondents herein. The orders of the co-respondent judge and his ruling ordering the petitioner to return all deeds issued by orders of Her Honour Luvenia Ash-Thompson, which were probated and registered, and ordering all rents accruing from leases made by Winston Knowlden, Gloria Knowlden, Stalin Knowlden, Roland Knowlden, Jennifer Knowlden, Levi Knowlden and William Knowlden to be collected by the sheriff of the monthly and probate court to be controlled by the co-respondent judge are hereby ordered set aside, they being null and void.”

Justice Kpomakpor also dealt with issue no 3, which is whether one in whose favor an administrators deed has been issued can take possession, exercise control over anal receive rental and other income from the property covered by the deed?

This is the contention raised by Informant William Knowlden, Benjamin Knowlden and Barbara Knowlden in their respective bills of information filed against Jennifer Knowlden Anderson, by and thru her legal representative, Shirley D. Cooper, and other beneficiaries of the partial distribution. Once again Associate Justice Kpomakpor soundly expressed in the said ruling referred to and quoted above the clear view of this Court on this point. We herewith quote the relevant portion of the said ruling: “….It was also disclosed that Corespondents/Co-informants Barbara Knowlden and Benjamin Knowlden received real property through the Probate court”.

We hold that all properties deeded, probated and registered shall remain the properties of the owners in whose names the deeds were issued and which deeds hard already been probated and registered, especially where, as here, the grantors are not disclaiming their acts. Petitioners also informed this Court that some of the beneficiaries of the distribution, had entered into lease agreement and were receiving rents from properties, for which they had deeds in their names and that the co-respondent judge issued judicial orders for the proceeds from the said lease agreements to be brought within the Knowlden estate and paid to the sheriff of the Probate Court for Montserrado County and held in escrow. This act of the co-respondent judge is over-ruled and the parties ordered returned to status quo ante. Fazzah Bros. v. Collins, [1950] LRSC 1; 10 LLR 261 (1950)”.

Benjamin Knowlden and Barbara Knowlden, the records reveal, had received personal control and possession over their benefits under the partial distribution and were entering into lease rind sale of real property for which administrators deeds were issued in their favor. Yet they sought the authority of this court to prevent Jennifer Knowlden Anderson from entering into and canceling lease agreements and receiving rental and income for premises or real properties for which administrators’ deeds had been issued in favor of the said Jennifer Knowlden Anderson. We believe that this is unfair and petitioners have not come to this Court in good faith. Hence this court will disallow the bills of information and the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court is ordered to proceed to hear and determine the cancellation proceedings filed by Jennifer Knowlden Anderson, by and thru her representative, Shirley D. Carter. Further, the order of Co-respondent Judge Sebron Hall to sequestrate rental from the premises, subject of the cancellation proceedings is erroneous and reversible and hereby declared null and void.

In this same vein, the order of then Chambers Justice J. D. Baryougar Junius told the marshal of the Supreme Court to collect rental from the entire intestate of tile late Kaizer, A. A. Knowlden is hereby lifted and declared null and void. Persons in whose favor administrators’ deeds have been issued can now take possession and exercise full control over their benefits. Theadministrators de bonis non are ordered to administer the undistributed portion of the intestate estate, including the real properties in the United States and Great Britain, and the twenty-two deeds presented to the probate court for the final distribution of the said intestate estate.

The marshal of the Supreme Court is ordered to turn over all such amounts collected to the owners and the administrators of the said intestate estate. Persons who illegally received monies from the real properties in question herein may be held accountable.

This brings us to the issue which is the crux of the controversy in these proceedings. Can illegitimates who were invited to share in the intestate estate of their putative deceased father by administrators and legal heirs, assert the same rights and privileges as the legal heirs?

All parties to this controversy, with the exception of Sekou Sesay, claim that the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden was their father. This fact is uncontroverted amongst the claimants.

The controversy exists between the six children of Williette R. Johnson, namely, Winston Knowlden, Gloria Knowlden, the late Stalin Knowlden, Roland Knowlden, Jennifer Knowlden and Levi Knowlden all of whom were duly legitimized on one side. On the other side is William Knowlden who was legitimize, along with the children of Williette Johnson, Benjamin Knowlden, Barbara Knowlden and the rest of the children who are illegitimate.

The first partial distribution in this intestate estate, done by one of the original co-administrators, Winston Knowlden, included all the children, illegitimate as well as legitimate. The letters of administration de bonis non was issued by the Monthly and Probate Court of Montserrado County in favor of Williette Johnson, representing her children who were legitimized by law, and Benjamin Knowlden, the illegitimate child. No contention of legitimization was raised up to this point. Benjamin Knowlden, Barbara Knowlden and others were accepted and dealt with as children of the decedent. All the children, legitimate as well as illegitimate and other persons, benefitted from the initial partial distribution.

The controversy arose when Co-administratrix Williette R. Johnson petitioned the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County to close the said intestate estate, and presented twenty-two (22) administrators’ deeds representing the final distribution of the said intestate. Co-administrator Benjamin Knowlden and Barbara Knowlden formally objected to this petition and requested the court to order an accounting of the personal properties of the intestate and further informed the Court that the twenty-two (22) administrators deeds did not include real properties in the United States and Great Britain. The objectors also contended that the previous administrators had distributed the choicest prime property in the heart of Monrovia to the children of Co-administratrix Williette Johnson in the partial distribution. This abjection was upheld by Judge Bailey who also erroneously proceeded to review and recall the partial distribution approved by his predecessor, Judge Luvenia Ash-Thompson. To prohibit the erroneous recall and review of the judicial act of Judge Ash-Thompson by Judge Harper Bailey, Co-administrator Williette Johnson filed a petition praying for a writ of prohibition before the Chambers Justice. The Chambers Justice granted the petition for a writ of prohibition and ruled that:

(1) prohibition will lie to prohibit a succeeding probate judge from reviewing the act of his predecessor probate judge.

(2) that the statutory provision that illegitimates may not inherit from their deceased putative father is upheld. The Chambers Justice held that the illegitimate children were invitees of the legitimate heirs to share in the intestate of their father. This invitation, did not confer legitimacy on the illegitimates; hence, they could have only as much rights and benefits as the legitimate children would allow them to have.

The respondents announced an appeal to the full bench to review the decision of the Chambers Justice.

We concur in part with the finding of Associate Justice Kpomakpor that the invitation by the legitimate children to their illegitimate sisters and brothers does not confer legitimacy on the illegitimate. But this court disagrees that as a result of the invitation the rights of the illegitimate children are limited to as far as the invitation extends and no more.

This Court sitting en banc holds that the invitation to share or benefit is based on the premise that petitioners acknowledge the respondents and other illegitimate children as brothers and sisters. We believe this acknowledgment was the basis of the voluntary invitation extended to the illegitimate children to share in the partial distribution. We hold that the acknowledgment and voluntary invitation created a duty to continue to regards the respondents and other illegitimate children as brothers and sisters with equal rights to share or benefit in the intestate estate of their deceased father, share and share alike. By this act of voluntary invitation, petitioners have waived their rights to assert themselves as legal heirs with the exclusive rights of inheritance and are estopped thereafter from denying the respondents the right to benefit equally. Neither can the illegitimate be prevented from making a demand for accountability.

This Court further holds that the petitioners, by petitioners own voluntary act of knowingly dealing with respondents as persons who have inheritable blood., suffered laches and therefore waived the right to assert that respondents are illegitimates Under the circumstances, petitioners cannot disavow their act or halt it in midstream. Petitioners must maintain their posture of dealing with respondents as persons with inheritable blood until the laid intestate estate is finally closed. The voluntary waiver by legitimate children to assert right’ to exclusive inheritance but includes illegitimate brothers and sisters does not confer legitimacy but confers the right for illegitimate children to benefit share and share alike and the right to demand accountability.

This Court has held:

I. An admission, whether of law or of fact which has been acted upon by another is conclusive against the party making it in all cases between him and the person whose conduct has thus influenced. It is immaterial whether the thing admitted was true or false. Smith et al. v. Barbour[1944] LRSC 5; , 8 LLR 229 (1944).

II. Freeman v. Firestone Plantations Company, [1974] LRSC 53; 23 LLR 276 (1974), “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right by a party”.

III. In Tuning et al. v. Thomas et al.[1972] LRSC 5; , 21 LLR 33 (1972), at Syl. 6, this Court held: “Where, as in the case at bar, by failure to diligently act, am antiquated demand is raised, the Supreme Court will invoke the doctrine of laches and refuse to interfere in a matter, so as to preserve the peace of society.

And further that:

“There is a defense peculiar to courts of equity founded on lapse of time and staleness of claim where no statute of limitations directly governs the case. In such cases, the courts often act upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging for the peace of society antiquated demands by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.” Id., at 42.

Moreover, in Clarke et al. v. Lewis[1929] LRSC 5; , 3 LLR 95 (1929), at Syl. 2, 3, 4 and 5, this Court said:

“(2) The plea of estoppel is a good plea and will prevent a party from denying his own acts, if well founded; neither law nor equity will permit a parry to disclaim his acts. The same rule applies to privies.

(3) When a man stands by and allows another to act without objecting, when from the usage of trade or otherwise, there is a duty to speak, his silence would preclude him as much as if he proposed the act himself.

(4) Acquiescence, or standing by, where there is a duty on the part of the person acquiescing to speak or assert a right, amounts to a representation by him. Clearly put, acknowledgment as children followed by an expressed invitation to illegitimates by persons who have exclusive right of inheritance creates a duty to continue to ensure that the illegitimate children benefit equally until the estate is closed. The acknowledgment and voluntary invitation does not confer legitimacy, but , the laches and waiver create a duty to ensure that illegitimate children and legitimate children benefit share and share alike.

This Court affirms and uphold its previous opinions, which reads:

“It must be remembered that the law of decent is founded on good reason, that it encourages good order in society and makes it certain to whom estates of deceased persons shall come. Fuller v. Johnson, [1872] LRSC 3; 1 LLR 56 (1872), text at page 57.

In our Domestic Relations Law, Rev. Code 8:3.5, we also find the following support for the position which we have taken. The section states:

“Sec. 3.5. INHERITANCE BY, FROM AND THROUGH ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.

An illegitimate child and his issue shall inherit under the provisions of section 3.2 from his mother and from her lineal and collateral relative shall inherit from such child and his issue as if he were legitimate. An illegitimate child and his issue shall inherit under the provisions of section 3.2 from his father and his lineal and collateral relatives shall inherit from such child and his issue as if he were legitimate under any of the following conditions:

(a) If the child is adopted by his father; or

(b) if the .father acknowledges his paternity in writing before a justice of the peace or notary public and such acknowledgment is probated and registered; or

(c) If the parents marry subsequent to the birth; or

(d) If the child has been legitimated under the provisions of the Domestic Relations Law; or

(e) If the paternity of the child has been adjudicated by a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Such child shall be treated as if he were the legitimate child of his mother, and, if any of the conditions enumerated in this section is present, as the legitimate child of his father, for the purpose also of receiving benefits under sections 4.3 and 4.4.”

The Black’s Law Dictionary (6thed.) gives the following definitions:

(1) Waiver. The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right, “or when one dispenses with the performance of something he is entitled to exact or when one in possession of any right, whether conferred by law of by contract, with full knowledge of the material facts, does or forbears to do something the doing of which or the failure of forbearance to do which is inconsistent with the right, or his intention to rely upon it. The renunciation, repudiation, abandonment, or surrender of some claim, right, privilege, or of the opportunity to take advantage of some defect, irregularity, or wrong. An express or implied relinquishment of a legal right. A doctrine resting upon an equitable principle, which courts of law ill recognize. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Schrimsher, 179 Old. 6453, 66 P.2d 944, 948. Essential to waiver is the voluntary consent of the individual. See e.g. Fed. R. Crim. p. 44(a).

(2) Laches. “Doctrine of laches,” is based upon maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity. Wooded Shores Property Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law, should have been done. Lake Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Kojetinsky, Mo. App., 410 S.W. 2d 361, 367. Conduct of party which has placed other party in a situation where his rights will be imperiled and his defenses embarrassed is a basis of laches. State v. Abernathy, 159 Tenn. 175, 17 S. W. 2d 17, 19. Knowledge, unreasonable delay, and change of position are essential elements. Shanik v. While Sewing Mach. Corporation, 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A.2d 831, 837. Laches requires an element of estoppel or neglect which has operated to prejudice of defendant. Sacrbrough v. Pickens, 26 Tenn. App. 213, 1709 S.W. 2d 585, 588. See also Equitable estoppel.

(3) Laches, estoppel by. A failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper time. Hutchinson v. Kenney, C.C.A.N.C., 27 F 2d 254, 256. A neglect to do something which should do, or to seek to enforce a right at a proper time.

“An element of the doctrine is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by or resulted from the conduct, misrepresentation, or silence of the plaintiff. Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 40 A.2d 374, 379. Delay in enforcement of rights until condition of other party has become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state.

This brings us to the next issue, which is whether or not real property purchased from the son of the true owner who is seized of title but in which the owner has not made a conveyance, or transfer prior to the owner’s death may be considered part and parcel of the intestate estate of the deceased owner?

Prior to his death, the decedent, Kaizer A. A. Knowlden wrote the following letter:

K.A.A. Knowlden, Sr.
Corner of Carey & Randall Streets
Monrovia, Liberia
July 25, 1982
Mr. Yellah T. Kebbeh
Capitol Building
Capitol Hill
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Mr. Kebbeh:
Relating to our discussion held on July 20th, 1982 between one Sasay Sekou of, Guinea and 1, K.A.A. Knowlden, Sr.. Mr. Kabbeh, I done know really what’s happening to the legal system of Liberia. How can we allowed a nation of over hundred and thirty years of legality allow itself to go so low; it’s a shame.

Mr. Kabbeh, we have a Mandingo man who rented one bed room in my house on U.N. Drive at the rate of 50.00 dollars a month and he could not afford to pay on time. Mr. Sekou some time ago asked if he would collect my rent from the other tenants at the end of every month. Mr. Sekou would bring the total amount of two hundred and fifty (250) dollars at my office. Mr. Sekou started to play trick, when he collected said rent he would eat part of the money and lie to me by saying certain amount has not yet been paid. When I found out this trick, I took this criminal to the Ministry of Justice to be jailed and his son Samuel Sekou stood his bond that he would produce his father and later my money be paid, but to my surprise this criminal had manipulated most of the Liberian tenants out and brought in his Mandingo tribal people.

Now, this criminal was paying rent up to the time my little son William left the country in 1981. It was Mr. Sesay Sekou who brought two sheets of paper stating that he had bought my house, and it was only when I sent to collect rent in March 1981. A house that I, K. A.A. Knowlden, Sr. rented only one room to Mr. Sekou.

Mr. Kebbeh, this Guinean Sekou, he is a criminal and nothing more: (1) The writing and signatory on that piece of paper, Mr. Sekou has is not the writing nor the signatory of my son. (2) That is no deed from me, Mr. Knowlden, Sr. to Sekou presented, and Sekou has no deed. (3) According to Mr. Sekou, the deal to buy the house started on October 29, 1980, and by November 8th80, which only eight day, Mr. Sekou supposed to have given my minor son fifty nine thousand (59,000.00) dollars only after knowing my son for: eight days without consulting the, owner of the property, it’s a lie. (4) If Mr. Sekou claimed to have bought my house on November 8, 1980, then why was he paying rent up to 1981 and did not say nothing about buying house until my son left the country.

Mr. Kebbeh, no one can sell any of my property while I am alive and know one that include my children have any of my deeds nor can any one get to them simply because all of my deeds are placed in Chase Manhattan Bank. And Mr. Sekou who could not afford to pay rent and stole my rent money in the pass can stand before me and say that he bought my house from my fifteen year old son, its nothing but a big lie and I am requesting my house balance rent and damages done my building.

Kind regards and best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
K.A.A. Knowlden, Sr.”

This letter, signed by decedent Kaiser A. A. Knowlden prior to his death, is clear that the said decedent died seized of the premises that Sekou Sesay claims he purchased from the son of Kaiser A. A. Knowlden. This is the basis for the discovery proceedings filed by Co-administrator Benjamin Knowlden in the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado on the 4th day of July, 1989. The court granted the petition and ordered the said real property returned and repossessed as part and parcel of the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden.

The respondent herein, Sekou Sesay, filed with the Chambers Justice a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Judge of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado county from placing the said premises in the possession of the intestate estate of Kaiser A. A. Knowlden. An alterative writ containing a stay order was issued by the Clerk of the Supreme Court on the 17t h day of August 1989.

The brief filed by counsel for Sekou Sesay also informed the Court of a second undetermined petition for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Ministry of Justice from ousting and evicting him from the same said premises.

We note that this intestate matter is before the Supreme Court not on a regular appeal, but all of the several actions which are before the Supreme Court at the Chamber Justice level and the Court en bane; are remedial writs. Once the alternative writ is issued with a stay order the matter remains in status quo. The tactic has kept the said intestate estate opened for more than 15 years; far beyond the statutory period of one year.

The first petition for a remedial writ was filed by Sekou Sesay on July 4, 1989, almost 10 years ago. The said petition remain heard and determined. The second writ of prohibition filed by Williette Johnson et al has also been pending for nearly 10 years. This Court en bane has decided to consolidate all the matters growing out of the intestate estate of the late Kaizer A. A. Knowlden pending before the Supreme Court to ensure that the process of the closing of this intestate estate is begun and that all persons who stand to benefit are put in possession and control of their inheritance.

This Court will not encourage the numerous filing of petition for remedial processes and indefinite suspension of that matter. We believe remedial writs have been used to delay, baffle, and deny people their rights indefinitely. Thus, where an aspect of a cause of action comes squarely before the Supreme Court en bane and another aspect is lingering before the Chambers Justice, this Court shall consolidate all of the various causes of action and make a determination.

Sekou Sesay in his petitions for a writ of prohibition informed the Court that he purchased the premises on November 8, 1980, from William T. Knowlden. The records in the matter of the intestate estate of the late Kaizer A. A. Knowlden revealed that prior to the death of the said decedent he became aware of Sekou Sesay’s claim and decedent protested and sought relief from the rent commission of the People’s Redemption Council. The records further reveal that the premises in question was included in the partial distribution and was distributed to William T. Knowlden. The decedent died in 1983. Up to his death, the decedent was seized of the premises in question. This premises in question are therefore part and parcel of the intestate estate of the late Kaizer A. A. Knowlden.

Petitioner Sesay contended that the probate judge had, among other things, proceeded by wrong rules when, without duly serving the writ of execution on the petitioner personally, he proceeded to enforce his final ruling in the discovery proceedings. This Court now holds that the premises withheld by Sekou Sesay is part and parcel of the intestate estate of the late Kaizer A. A. Knowlden. Hence, the judge of the monthly and probate court should proceed to serve the writ of execution as provided for by law and return the premises to the said intestate estate.

We note further from the records that the premises in question are included in the partial distribution. In view of this, after the intestate takes possession of the premises, same should be placed in the possession of the distributees. This holding does not preclude or prevent Petitioner Sekou Sesay from pursuing legal action against William Knowlden. This Court will not go into other aspects of the petition for disco-very proceedings for this matter is not before us on a regular appeal. Instead, we are reviewing the matter from the court below brought to us on a remedial writ, a petition for a writ of prohibition.

We shall now handle a very interesting issue raised by William Knowlden, Benjamin Knowlden and Barbara Knowlden. The contention raised by these three informants in two separate bills of information and their briefs filed before this court is that Stalin Knowlden, Jr. and Stalina Knowlden are illegitimate children fathered by their late brother Stalin Knowlden. The said minor children were born by separate mothers out of wedlock after the murder of the said Stalin Knowlden, their putative father. The informants contend that all the benefits from the intestate estate of the late Kaiser A. A. Knowlden in favor of the late Stalin Knowlden should revert to the estate instead of being distributed to the said illegitimate children of Stalin Knowlden who were born posthumously, as had been done in the partial distribution.

It was brought to the attention of the Court that Barbara and Benjamin Knowlden were accused of the murder of their brother Stalin. Benjamin and Barbara were tried and convicted of manslaughter and served their respective sentences.

The transaction complained of is included in the partial distribution and this Court has held that the partial distribution was not appealed from. Also, we have held that the succeeding probate judge had no authority whatsoever to recall and review the act of his predecessor. Hence, we will not review same.

Wherefore and in view of the foregoing we herewith affirm the decision of the Chambers Justice with the modification, as follows:

(1) that it was erroneous for the succeeding probate judge to recall and review the act of preceding probate judge. The partial distribution is a completes act and all persons benefitting therefore shall take possession of their inheritance as all administrators deeds issued under the partial distribution are valid.

Further, the Court is ordered to resume jurisdiction of the said intestate estate and all of the remaining properties wherever situated whether in Liberia or abroad, shall be included in the inventory and the Court should proceed to close the estate and all of the children of Kaizer A. A. Knowlden shall benefit, with children not borne of the body of Williette Johnson given the right to benefit along with those children borne of the said Williette Johnson’s body. The final closing of the said intestate estate must be done within the statutory period as of the date of this opinion.

(2) The monthly and probate court is also ordered to resume jurisdiction in the discovery proceedings matter and proceed as provided by law to recover the premises being withheld and to further proceed as per the partial distribution.

(3) The marshal of the Supreme Court is ordered to turn over all monies collected from the premises for which beneficiaries possess Administrators’ deeds to the true owners and al such other moneys which belong to the intestate estate to the administrators of the said intestate estate of the late Kaizer A. A. Knowlden..

(4) The bill of information against Respondent Jennifer K. Anderson, et al is denied and Sixth Judicial Circuit Court is hereby ordered to resume jurisdiction in the cancellation proceedings filed by Jennifer K. Anderson, by and thru Shirley Carter, and all rentals held in escrow are ordered paid over to the said Jennifer Knowlden or her authorized representative.

(5) The bills of information filed by Petitioners William T. Knowlden and Williette Johnson respectively is dismissed. Costs are assessed against the petitioners and informant.
And it is hereby so ordered.

Petition and information denied.