MAX BRANLY, Informant, v. VAMPLY OF LIBERIA, INC., Respondent.

INFORMATION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. Argued October 16, 1973. Decided November 23, 1973. 1. Under the division of power contemplated by the Constitution, it is the function of the Judiciary branch to hear and decide cases according to the facts and the law and to interpret the laws enacted by the Legislature. 2. The doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 3. Generally, acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court. 4. The Supreme Court has the inherent right to punish for contempt of court any person who disobeys its mandates or who induces, coerces, compels, or maneuvers another into doing so. 5. The definition of contempt of court applies in a special manner to lawyers and the offense is deemed much more grave than when committed by laymen. Information alleging contempt of court was filed in the Supreme Court. Informant had claimed that he was wrongfully discharged by respondent corporation, contrary to the terms of a written employment contract. The complaint was presented to the Labor Practices Review Board, which ruled in favor of the employee after a hearing, ordering Vamply of Liberia, Inc., the employer, to pay $21,000.00 to the complaining party. When the corporation refused to pay the amount of wages ordered, the employee filed suit in the Circuit Court to compel enforcement of the Board’s ruling. Vamply appeared in the proceedings, filed an answer, and defended. The matter was heard and judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court affirming the ruling of the Board. Counsel for Vamply announced an appeal, but never perfected it. Five months thereafter, counsel for 337 338 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Vamply applied to the Justice in chambers for a writ of certiorari, which subsequently was denied by the Supreme Court on July 13, 1973, when the Court ruled that certiorari could not perform the functions of an appeal. Thereafter, its judgment was sent to the Ministry of Labor, commanding that the ruling of the Labor Practices Review Board, as contained in the Circuit Court’s judgment, be enforced. Thereupon, at a meeting of the parties before the Board, the Labor Practices Review Board ordered that the amount owed be paid within fortyeight hours, which the corporate employer failed to do. Thereupon, a bill of information alleging contempt of court on the part of the employer, was presented by the employee to the Court. In his return to the charges filed, counsel for respondent primarily alleged that cases of wrongful dismissal presented matters to be disposed of administratively by the Executive branch of government and, in effect, questioned the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over enforcing decisions in those cases. The Supreme Court emphatically rejected such contention, pointing to the Constitution and the functions reserved for the Judiciary branch in interpreting the statutes enacted into law and deciding the cases thereunder. The Supreme Court confirmed its opinion of July 13, 1973, and for a second time ordered that the judgment of the Circuit Court affirming the ruling of the Labor Practices Review Board be enforced. Because the Court felt that the general manager of Vamply of Liberia, Inc., had been misled by counsel and would not otherwise have disobeyed an order of the Court, he was absolved of blame and not adjudged in contempt of Court. For what the Court considered the defiance of respondent’s counsel, the Court ordered that he be cited to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of court. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 339 Toye Barnard and Moses Yangbe Lawrence Morgan for respondent. for informant. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PIERRE delivered the opinion of the Court. Information growing out of charges of contemptuous conduct on the part of Vamply of Liberia, Inc., was filed in the Supreme Court by Max Branly. The informant, a foreign national, had earlier complained against Vamply of Liberia, Inc., an American company, for having illegally dismissed him from their employ contrary to the terms of a written contract of employment. The complaint was heard and determined by a Board in the Ministry of Labor, an agency of the Executive branch. The ruling of this Executive agency was in favor of informant, and Vamply was thereby ordered to pay Max Branly the amount of $zi,000.00, representing the balance of salary claimed under the terms of the aforesaid written contract of employment. Because Vamply refused to pay in obedience to the order of this Executive agency, Max Branly filed suit in the Civil Law Court in Monrovia to compel enforcement of the ruling in his favor. This suit, brought in accordance with the Labor Practices Law applicable in such circumstances, removed the matter from the Executive to the Judiciary branch. “Any respondent aggrieved by an order of the Labor Practices Review Board may appeal therefrom and the Board may obtain an order of the court for enforcement of its own order, in a proceeding as provided in this section. Such proceeding shall be brought in the Judicial Circuit of the county in which the Board held its hearing in the case, or, if the hearing was held in the Hinterland, in the Judicial Circuit of the Circuit Court most convenient to the place 340 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS where the hearing was held. Such proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in such Court, together with a written transcript of the record upon the hearing before the Board and the issuance and service of a notice on the Board and on the respondent of the time and place fixed for the proceeding. Thereupon the Court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems fit and to make an order enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board shall be considered by the Court unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. Either party may move the Court to remit the case to the Board in order to adduce additional specified and material evidence and seek findings thereon provided he shows reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence before the Board. The findings of the Board as to the facts shall be conclusive if supported by sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole. All such proceedings shall be heard and determined by the Circuit Court, and if an appeal is taken, by the Supreme Court, as expeditiously as possible. The judgment and order of the Circuit Court shall be final, subject only to review by the Supreme Court. The Board’s copy of testimony shall be available at all reasonable times to the parties for examination without cost and for the purposes of judicial review of the order of the Board. A respondent who institutes a proceeding under this section must institute it within thirty days after service of the order of the Board.” L. 196o-61 Ch. LVII (1956 Code 19A :203). The requirements of this statute were fully met, and LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 341 the Civil Law Court heard the matter as provided in the section quoted. We hold that to the same extent that it was the constitutional duty of the Legislature to have passed this statute, giving to the courts jurisdiction over such administrative matters when the circumstances warranted, as in this case, by the same Constitution it was the duty of the Judiciary to have interpreted the statute when it was made applicable in this matter of wrongful dismissal. In the proper performance of that duty the Supreme Court reviewed the matter brought on certiorari by Vamply’s counsel, counsellor Lawrence Morgan, and ruled that according to the aforesaid statute the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court did have jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue as it had done. The Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the Labor Ministry’s ruling contained in the Circuit Court’s judgment. This judgment handed down by the Supreme Court should have put the matter to rest according to our laws, which are as old as the Republic itself, and in keeping with our judicial procedure which has obtained in all other cases. But this was not to be the case as we shall see later. The petition for enforcement referred to was filed in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, and Vamply appeared, filed an answer, and defended against it. The case was then heard and determined by judgment upholding the ruling of the Ministry of Labor, again in Max Branly’s favor. Vamply announced an appeal to the Supreme Court, as we have said before, and the appeal was granted by the trial judge. For reasons which remain unknown, Vamply thereafter failed to complete its appeal in accord with appellate procedure, which requires that within ten days after rendition of judgment in the Circuit Court the appealing party shall file his bill of exceptions, and within sixty days file his appeal bond together with notice of comple- 342 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS tion of appeal. In the light of later events this failure to have completed the appeal announced from an adverse judgment must be regarded as dereliction of professional duty to their client on the part of Vamply’s lawyers. Every appeal reaching the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court has had to conform to these requirements or the announced appeal could not be heard. Requirements for completion of an appeal from circuit courts contained in our Civil Procedure Law are summarized again. “(a) Announcement of the taking of the appeal; “(b) Filing of the bill of exceptions; “(c) Filing of an appeal bond; “(d) Service and filing of notice of completion of the appeal. Rev. Code i :51.4; see also �� 51.7, 51.8, 51.9. The Civil Procedure Law also defines the consequences of failure to comply with appellate procedures outlined above. “Dismissal of appeal for failure to proceed. An appeal may be dismissed by the trial court on motion for failure of the appellant to file a bill of exceptions within the time allowed by statute, and by the appellate court after filing of the bill ‘of exceptions for failure of the appellant to appear on the hearing of the appeal, to file an appeal bond, or to serve notice of the completion of the appeal as required by statute.” Rev. Code :51.16. Instead of completing the appeal within the time allowed . by statute, Vamply’s lawyers waited for five months after judgment, and then applied to the chambers of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as mentioned hereinbefore, to review what they regarded as prejudicial errors in the case adjudged against their client, even though they had announced an appeal from the judgment. Naturally, in accord with a long line of opinions, as well as with the universally accepted principle controlling, the Supreme Court ruled that certiorari could not take the place or perform the functions of an appeal, and there- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 343 fore denied the petition and ordered the Civil Law Court to resume jurisdiction and enforce its judgment. Harris v. Harris, [1947] LRSC 13; 9 LLR 344 (1947) ; Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Perry, 13 LLR 522 ( 196o). Judgment of the Supreme Court in this matter was rendered on July 13, 1 973� It is significant, and we would like to call attention to it at this point, that even though the losing party in the Supreme Court had the right to petition for reargument, if they were dissatisfied with the judgment, Vamply’s lawyers took no steps to avail themselves of this redress. In the light of later events, this seems to be another instance of neglect on the part of Vamply’s lawyers. When this Term of Court began we noted among the cases set down for hearing, this present bill of information which had been filed in the chambers of Mr. Justice Wardsworth. Without hearing it, he had sent it forward for the bench en banc to consider. Alpha v. Tucker, [1964] LRSC 12; 15 LLR 561 (1964). The bill recited the facts given above and alleges failure of respondent to pay within 48 hours after the Ministry of Labor and Youth ordered him to do so upon receipt of a mandate from the Circuit Court. Counsel for respondent filed his return to the bill of information on October 16, 1973, when the matter was argued. The salient points raised by the return in opposition to the bill of information may be summarized. 1. Count one denies that the respondent had knowingly or intentionally disrespected, ridiculed, or defied the authority, dignity, or majesty of the law or of this Court, and that he would under no circumstances engage in such conduct. 2. Counts two, three, and four refer to informant’s charge of wrongful dismissal filed with the Ministry of Labor against Vamply, the respondent, and contended that the decision in this matter should be disposed of adMinistratively by the Executive branch. In effect, these 344 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS counts question the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over enforcing decisions in cases of wrongful dismissal, and over questions of wages in cases of labor disputes. 3. That the bill of costs submitted for payment has been paid in full to the Marshal, thus satisfying the judgment of the Supreme Court. 4. That at no time had any approach been made to Vamply to satisfy any mandate of the Supreme Court which Vamply ignored or refused to comply with. They, therefore, denied this representation made in the bill of information. We shall pass upon these points in reverse order of their presentation. During argument before us, counsellor Morgan denied that any approach had ever been made to his client to satisfy a mandate of this Court, as we have said earlier, or that the Court’s mandate for satisfaction of the judgment had been presented for enforcement. He argued that had such approach been made, the amount involved would have been paid. There was no cause to believe that a counsellor of the Supreme Court bar would have made a contention that was not absolutely true. Therefore, we took his argument at face value and on his professional honor. When counsellor Toye Barnard, of counsel for the informant, rose to argue, he opened by labeling count five of the respondent’s returns, which counsellor Morgan had just argued, as being false and untrue. To support his argument he produced his copy of the minutes which had been kept by the Ministry of Labor, when the agency had the parties appear for the Supreme Court’s mandate to be read. Counsellor Morgan objected to the document being used, on the ground that no previous notice for its use had been given, so as to have afforded him an opportunity to resist the document if necessary. We conceded this position under the rule requiring notice. Then we put the question to him as to whether he wanted an oppor- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 345 tunity to argue the point of the document before his adversary continued his argument. He consented and took the paper from counsellor Barnard, read it for the benefit of the Court, and commented upon it. The Court then recessed for lunch to meet again at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. This, as we said before, was on October 16. Because we attached great importance to this document, we ordered it entered into the Court’s record to form a part thereof when the case was resumed in the afternoon, since neither side had made prof ert of it. Counsellor Morgan again objected, even though he had not in the morning when it was produced, nor had he in the afternoon, in the course of his second objection to it, denied the authenticity of the document or the truthfulness of its contents. In the circumstances we have to assume that everything written therein is true, and that the document contains the minutes of the meeting of the parties at the Ministry of Labor. The document has been set forth. “The Chairman of the Board opened proceedings at the hour of 2:3o with the following members present: Rudolph E. Sherman, Chairman, Rushu A. Karnga, and Louis Sackoh. “The Chairman : This afternoon we have convened as per a mandate from the Supreme Court of Liberia which directs that this Appeal Board regularize the decision rendered in the case: Max Branly versus Vamply of Liberia, Inc., which was rendered on March 25, 1971. “According to our understanding of this mandate, the Board is required to have the signature of another person, after which the Board is further required to seek enforcement of the decision. It is also our understanding that as Mr. Rogers was Director of Labor Standards and one of the three officials who held the case, his signature as well as that of Mr. J. Lamax 346 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Cox, who had already signed the document, should be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Court. I shall now read the decision. . . . “Having thus read the decision and in keeping with the mandate from the Supreme Court, I hereby order that the decision just read be complied with within forty-eight hours. It is so ordered. “Counsellor Morgan, counsel for Vamply, would like to observe the following: ( 1) that the ruling of Judge Dennis of the Circuit Court which the mandate of the Supreme Court has ordered to be implemented, plainly states that the Act of the Legislature of 1960-61, created a Labor Review Board to be constituted of three persons appointed by the President of Liberia to review all matters of the nature of this; (2) that this Board had never heard nor disposed of this case. In consequence of which the matter must be heard by a Labor Review Board under the Department of Commerce Act of 1960-61 and a ruling to be enforced ‘must be signed by a quorum of not less than two of the Board’s three members.’ The decision of J. Lamax Cox, dated March 25, 1971, is not a decision of the Labor Review Board, for Mr. Cox has never been a member nor is he now a member of the Labor Review Board nor is Edwin L. Rogers, Director of Labor Standards, a member of the Labor Review Board. In consequence of which these persons have no judicial authority to sign for this Board. Further, that the Board is duly constituted and comprised of three members: R. E. Sherman, Rushu Karnga and Louis Sackoh, none of whom have heard this case nor signed a decision after hearing. More than this, at no time did Mr. Cox, Mr. Rogers, and Mr. Sackoh sit and hear this case out of which a mutual decision was arrived at. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion and in this light request that pursuant to the ruling of Judge Dennis which is being LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 347 implemented, hearing of this matter be had so as to permit Vamply to show that the complaint is totally unmeritorious. In the absence of this we would have no alternative other than to note our exception and to pray an appeal. “Counsel for Max Branly wishes to bring to the attention of the Board this mandate of the Supreme Court commanding you to sign the decision of J. Lamax Cox and enforce it. Judge Kandakai modified the ruling of Judge Dennis, that instead of sending the ruling back to the Circuit Court after signing it you should enforce it. And it was this decision of Judge Kandakai Vamply appealed from but failed to perfect the appeal and after the expiration of the statutory period to perfect the appeal Vamply resorted to certiorari, and as a result the chamber Justice of the Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of Judge Kandakai, and Vamply again appealed to the full bench of the Supreme Court. During a special session of the Supreme Court, the ruling of the chamber Justice was confirmed. The contention of Vamply this afternoon, is an attempt to have you reopen the matter instead of enforcing the mandate of the Supreme Court, which would be an affront by disobeying the mandate of the Supreme Court. Therefore, we ask you to proceed to enforce the mandate and entertain no objection to reopen the case contrary to the Supreme Court. We submit. “The Chairman: I have heard the statements of both parties, including the application by the representative of Vamply praying an appeal, and the mandate of the Supreme Court and can therefore entertain no appeal contrary to the mandate which directs that another signature be added to the decision of March 25, 1971, after which the Board should enforce that decision. It is so ordered.” This document placed a new light on the matter, for 348 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS we had had the impression that it was the manager of Vamply who had deliberately ignored the Court’s authority, and intentionally disobeyed the mandate. It was now clear from the contents of this document that nonsatisfaction of the Court’s judgment had been occasioned by counsellor Morgan’s insistence that his client defy the authority of the Court and refuse to obey its orders. Although the present hearing afforded counsellor Morgan the opportunity to explain his behavior toward the Court, his general attitude during his appearance before the Supreme Court was unsatisfactory. For instance, he made no attempt to explain why a counsellor of the Supreme Court bar, such as he is, would attempt to render ineffectual a judgment of the Supreme Court, of which he is an officer. There are several similarities between the events in the case of In re Harmon[1936] LRSC 32; , 5 LLR 334 (1936) and the matter now before us, in which counsellor Morgan seems to have taken a page out of counsellor Harmon’s book. For counsellor Harmon wrote a letter to Chief Justice Johnson in which he misled the Chief Justice into ordering the issuance of a writ of possession to deprive Jacob King of property in dispute while a criminal case in which the said property figured was still pending. The Supreme Court in contempt proceedings condemned this act of counsellor Harmon in the strongest terms. In this case, counsellor Morgan has committed a similar contemptuous act, for he sought to mislead the Ministry of Labor into ignoring a Supreme Court order in a matter finally determined by this Court’s judgment, on the ground that the courts of Liberia did not have jurisdiction over wrongful dismissals. Counsellor Morgan knew better, since it was he who had appealed the matter and had argued the case in the Supreme Court. Again, when counsellor Harmon’s client, William Murdoch, the agent of the Cavalla River Company, was subpoenaed to go to Bassa and testify in the criminal case against the aforesaid Jacob LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 349 King, upon advice of counsellor Harmon he refused. Counsellor Morgan has done the same thing in this case, for when the Supreme Court summoned the manager of Vamply to appear before it, the manager’s failure to appear and counsellor Morgan’s appearance in his stead, is clear indication that he had advised his client, as counsellor Harmon did, not to attend. We might mention that although his client was notified to appear in person to explain why he refused to obey this Court’s order to comply with the ruling of the Ministry of Labor contained in the Circuit Court’s judgment, the respondent never appeared. Instead, counsellor Morgan appeared before the Supreme Court and did not even show us the courtesy of explaining the very significant absence of his client. We had regarded counsellor Morgan as one of the most informed practitioners at the Supreme Court bar, so we assumed that he must have known that it was his duty to have advised his client to appear in answer to the Court’s call. We had also expected of him that where his client had failed to, or could not, appear he would have at least explained the absence before he began his defense of his client’s apparent defiance of the Court’s order. But till now the learned counsellor has not seen fit, nor apparently thought it necessary, to do so. As a layman, the foreign client expects his Liberian lawyer to give him the very best professional service and advice, but no foreign client expects a lawyer to disregard his duty to his profession. Although counsellor Morgan argued, and count five of the return stated, that had any demand for satisfaction of the Supreme Court’s judgment been made it would have been complied with, yet he also argued before us that the reason the judgment was not satisfied was because the Minister of Labor had been ordered by letter from the President not to enforce the mandate. These arguments run counter to the record of the year in the Ministry of 350 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Labor and therefore are inconsistent and contradictory. The Court is of the unanimous opinion that counsellor Morgan has deliberately tried to inject the President into a civil judicial matter, in the hope that he can sow seeds of disharmony between the Executive and Judicial branches of Government to cover up his faulty handling of Vamply’s case. But to continue. In Ghoussalny v. Nelson, [1972] LRSC 71; 20 LLR 591 (1972), this Court took the view and stated as its opinion that the Supreme Court cannot compel the Executive branch to enforce the Court’s judgments. We are still of that opinion and we maintain that view in this case. The Constitution, in dividing the functions of Government under our system, gave to the Executive department, among other things, the duty of enforcing the judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction. In the words of the Constitution, it is the duty of the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Art. III, Section 1st. Consequently, whereas the courts may hear and determine litigation by rendition of judgments, it is not the duty of the courts to enforce those judgments; that duty belongs to the Executive department. Under penalty of being removed from office for failure to perform, or for corrupt performance, judges must hear and decide cases according to the facts and the law. In the Supreme Court they must decide them by opinions which expound the views of the Justices, and which interpret the applicable laws. These opinions are implemented by judgments bearing the signatures of the concurring Justices. The judgments are sent for enforcement to the subordinate courts of origin, which completes the duty of the Supreme Court in respect to particular cases. “The decisions and opinions of the Justices are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the law which are binding upon all citizens. They declare the unwritten law, and construe and declare the meaning of the statutes. Every citizen is presumed to know LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 351 the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to show that justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest knowledge of the public the statutes or the decisions and opinions of the Justices. Such opinions stand, upon principle, on substantially the same footing as the statutes enacted by the Legislature.” 34 CYC. 1614. Although case law stands on the same footing as statutes enacted by the Legislature, yet neither the Legislature nor the courts can enforce the laws they make. As said before, this is the function of the Executive branch of Government. But the Executive branch does not make the laws, for this function belongs to the Legislature. Nor does it interpret those laws passed by the Legislature, because that would be usurping the functions of the Judiciary, and would be in violation of Article t, Section 14th, of the Constitution: “The powers of this government shall be divided into three distinct departments : . . . and no person belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of the powers belonging to either of the others.” In Ghoussalny v. Nelson, supra, the Supreme Court had rendered judgment deciding litigation in keeping with its constitutional functions, but when that judgment was placed in the hands of the sheriff for execution, the Executive department refused to enforce it. But there is another classic case in our history wherein the Executive department neglected for many years to enforce a Supreme Court judgment. I refer to Karmo v. Morris, [1919] LRSC 2; 2 LLR 317 (1919). In that case, although the Supreme Court therein declared unconstitutional the interior policy which imposed a government in the hinterland different from that which was operating in the counties on the littoral, that landmark opinion was not implemented till 1964, 45 years later, when the Act to establish four new counties in the hinterland was passed into law. 352 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS It is our opinion that, whereas the Judiciary cannot compel the enforcement of its judgment, any more than the Legislature can compel execution of the laws they enact, it is in the best interests of good government, and in obedience to the spirit of the Constitution, that legislative enactments, as well as court judgments, be executed and enforced by the Executive department. What chaos would result if the Legislature refused to meet in session, to consider conditions in the country, and not pass laws to meet the exigencies presented? Or, if the Supreme Court failed to meet according to law, or neglected to decide cases appealed according to the laws passed by the Legislature, or to perform the other duties imposed upon it by law? As these two branches must fulfill the requirements of their designated constitutional duties if orderly government is to continue to function, to that same extent must the laws enacted by the Legislature and the judgments of the courts be implemented to serve the ends of good and stable government. But while we might not be able to compel the Executive branch to enforce the judgments we render, we have the means to, and we can and shall, compel lawyers practicing before us to have regard for the dignity of the Court, respect our authority, and obey our orders. This Court has always made it clear to lawyers that unless they are prepared to render the Court this respect, and obey its every order, they will not be allowed to continue to practice before us. Our only hope for being able to maintain an effective Judiciary is to discipline insubordination and disrespect, to thereby restore our dignity, and re-establish the independent authority our founding fathers envisioned as the foundation of our Judiciary. Without a strong Judiciary the Nation is not safe. This Court addressed itself to the point in In re Cassell[1961] LRSC 22; , 14 LLR 391, 404 (1961) . “The judiciary is the anchor which holds stabilized government in balance; without it, vested interest LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 353 might suffer, sacred rights [might] be violated, constituted authority be challenged; and in fine, administrative chaos could result. ‘Whilst it is true that the judiciary is dependent upon the executive branch for the enforcement of its mandates and judgments, it is equally true that the executive branch must wait for the courts to try violators of the laws which regulate society, and may not exceed the limits of punishments set by the courts for these violations. It is true that the courts cannot enact the laws which govern our society, but it is also true, under our system, that a law enacted by the Legislature and approved by the President, might be nullified by the judiciary and made void. Andrew Jackson is said to have made the remark: ‘John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.’ Irresponsible as this expression might seem to be, no President would go beyond mere words to defy the Supreme Court in the performance of its constitutional duties.” It is the duty of the Judiciary not only to protect the rights of parties, and that includes the Government as well, but to also keep separated in their functions the three branches of Government in their relationship to each other. According to the constitutional process adopted for our system of Government, the Legislature must enact the laws, the Executive must execute those laws, and the Judiciary must interpret them. There would seem to be no latitude for ambiguity in this clearly defined separation of duties of the three branches. The contention that because the bill of costs had been paid the judgment of the Court had thereby been satisfied, is not only untrue, but the statement is calculated to deceive the Court. For the judgment ordered that the ruling of the Ministry of Labor should be enforced, which was that Vamply should pay to Max Branly $21,000.00, in keeping with the terms of a contract, and an inspection of the bill of costs shows that the principal 354 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS sum of $21,000.00 was never entered upon the bill. Payment of the bill of costs without payment of the principal amount owing could not have satisfied the judgment which required that the principal amount of $21,000.00 was to be paid, with costs. This part of the return is, therefore, untrue and untenable. We will now consider counts two, three, and four of the respondent’s return, in which it has been contended that payment of disputed employees’ wages and illegal dismissals are matters which should be determined administratively by the Executive branch of Government. This issue was raised in the certiorari proceedings decided by an opinion delivered on July 13, 1973, earlier in this Term. Every phase of this issue was weighed against the statute cited in the opinion at that time, and referred to earlier in this opinion. Moreover, if for any reason Vamply’s lawyers did not feel that the point in that opinion had been adequately considered, what prevented them at the time from petitioning for reargument? It is certain that counsellor Morgan cannot claim that he did not know that he could so proceed by a rule of Court almost as old as the Republic. Counsellor Morgan knows, or should know, that under the doctrine of res judicata the question of whether or not the courts had jurisdiction over Max Branly’s wrongful dismissal could not be raised again before the Supreme Court, having already been adjudicated in the opinion of July, 1973. Liberia Trading Corp. v. Abi-Jaoudi, [1960] LRSC 38; 14 LLR 43 (196o). “Briefly stated, the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.” 3o AM. JuR., Judgments, � 161: LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 355 Not since Tubman v. Murdoch, [1934] LRSC 26; 4 LLR 179 (1934) and In re Harmon, supra, has there been a reported instance in which a counsellor conducted himself toward the Court as defiantly, and without regard for its orders and mandates, as counsellor Lawrence Morgan has done in this case. In Tubman v. Murdoch, supra, after the Supreme Court had rendered judgment in the case, the Court’s judgment was later, after adjournment of the term, interlined and a sum of money added, to be paid by relator, whereby the counsellor’s foreign client would benefit. It was discovered during the hearing of the case in the Supreme Court that the counsellor, with the assistance of one of the Justices, had inserted between the lines of the judgment the interlineation by which his client was to be thus illegally enriched. The Justice was subsequently removed from the Court. In this case, after the Supreme Court’s opinion which reviewed the issues involved had been read, and after the Court had adjourned, its judgment, commanding that the ruling of the Ministry of Labor as contained in the Circuit Court’s judgment be enforced, was sent to the Ministry for execution. Counsellor Morgan, as counsel for one of the parties, had been summoned and was present. As one of the lawyers who had taken part in the hearing of the matter before the Supreme Court, he knew that disobedience of a judgment of this Court was contemptuous, yet objected to and resisted the enforcement of the Court’s judgment, as the minutes earlier set forth reflected. He also announced an appeal after the hearing. We wonder : appeal to where? In the case In re Harmon, supra, counsellor Harmon was counsel for the Cavalla River Company, a foreign concern which was the private prosecutor in a case of grand larceny brought against Jacob King, who, with a band of armed men and in daylight, had broken into the Company’s store. Counsellor Harmon undertook to write letters to the Supreme Court and to his foreign 356 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS client in which he misrepresented the facts of the trial, in which the jury had returned a verdict against the state. The defendant had admitted at the trial that he did break into the store, but that his forcible entry upon the premises in daylight to take possession of his property, did not amount to larceny, for which he was indicted. In his letter to the Court, as well as in that which he wrote to his foreign client, counsellor Harmon gave the impression that the trial court had connived during the trial with the accused against his foreign client’s interests, which had resulted in the acquittal of the man charged with the crime. He elected not to truthfully report that the case had been lost because the evidence at the trial did not support the charge of larceny. The Court thereupon investigated the allegation and allowed the trial judge to intervene and explain what had happened at the trial. It was then discovered that counsellor Harmon had not correctly informed the Court of the facts. It was also discovered that his letter to his foreign client, who appeared at the investigation with the letter, had included in it a statement which had impliedly accused the Liberian courts of unfair handling of foreigners’ interests. For the benefit of this opinion I will quote the relevant portion of counsellor Harmon’s letter reported at page 340 of the opinion cited before. “I attach hereto copy of the detail report which I received from my assistant . . . at Grand Bassa, who assisted in the prosecution of the criminal case against this man, in the interest of the Company and on my behalf, I having been requested to do so by the Supreme Court of the Republic; from it you will see the flimsy points on which the verdict and judgment were lost, the main point of the defendant’s defense being that although your factor was in possession of the premises he had title to it and therefore had a right to enter and to do what he did, and the court seemed to have sustained this defense against the commission LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 357 of a criminal act. I rather not make any further comments on the way foreigners’ interest is handled by our courts now-a-days, I leave it to you to make your own decision in the premises.” (Emphasis supplied.) Counsellor Morgan’s misrepresentation to his foreign client, Vamply of Liberia, Inc., is intended to conceal the real reason for the dilemma in which the company finds itself in this case, its lawyer’s flagrant neglect to have completed the appeal from an adverse judgment in the circuit court, and is similar to the misrepresentations made by counsellor Harmon to his foreign client, the Cavalla River Company, in the case just mentioned. Both lawyers sought to “impugn the justice of our courts . . . in its administration of justice to foreigners.” In re Harmon, supra, 342. In that same case the Supreme Court found counsellor Harmon guilty of contempt for what he had done, and rendered judgment against him at page 342 of the Court’s opinion. “Our opinion, therefore, is that the offense of the . . . respondent, has been considerably aggravated by the actions hereinbefore mentioned ; and that the mildest punishment appropriate to the misconduct should be his suspension from the legal profession for five calendar years from the date of the judgment presently to be pronounced.” In this case opportunity will be afforded counsellor Morgan to explain his contemptuous behavior. And now we come to consider the first point in the return, the denial of the respondent’s general manager that he had either knowingly or intentionally defied the authority, dignity, or majesty of this Court, and that he would under no circumstances engage in such conduct. Considering the record which we have reviewed in this opinion, and especially the record made August i in the Ministry of Labor referred to before, we are of the firm opinion that the manager of Vamply would not himself have disobeyed any order of this Court. We feel strongly 358 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS that his counsel, counsellor Lawrence Morgan, whose professional advice he had every reason to follow, is responsible for any disrespect which has been shown to the Court. For this reason we hereby absolve the respondent, general manager G. G. Gray, from blame and from answering further in these proceedings. As a layman, which we presume him to be, the aforesaid record in the Ministry of Labor shows that he could very well have been misled in determining whether it was necessary to comply with the Labor Ministry’s ruling which the court ordered to be enforced. There has been a great deal written on what constitutes contempt of court. There also are varying degrees of contempt. Writers have differed on interpretations, but generally any “disobedience or resistance to, or an attempt to prevent the execution of a lawful order, judgment, decree, or mandate of a court is an interference with, or an attempt to obstruct the due administration of justice, and is therefore a contempt.” 9 CYC. 8. “The acts constituting contempt cover a wide range. The most familiar forms of contempt of court are found in acts which hinder, delay, and obstruct the administration of justice, which are usually committed in the course of the adjudication of some cause or the execution of its judgment. Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court.” 12 AM. JUR., � 394. The Supreme Court has the inherent right to punish for contempt any person who disobeys its mandates, or who induces, coerces, compels, or maneuvers another into doing so. In illpha v. Tucker[1964] LRSC 12; , 15 LLR 561 (1964), this Court said that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to punish for contempt persons who disobey its mandates. The definition of contempt applies in a special manner to acts committed by lawyers who disobey, belittle, and bring into disrepute the courts of the Country. When LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 359 lawyers defy the courts, or encourage others to do so, the offense is much more grave than when committed by laymen, because “he who knoweth the will of the Master and doeth it not shall be beaten with many stripes.” It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that what has prevented the Supreme Court from being able to pass upon the merits of the issues raised in the matter of Max Branly’s dismissal, cannot be attributed to any cause other than gross neglect of professional duty by the lawyer for the corporation. As a consequence of such failure to complete the appeal, which would have enabled the Supreme Court to review the issues involved, any merit in Vamply’s protests against enforcement of the Board’s ruling is irrelevant. We, therefore, confirm our opinion of July 13, 1973, and for a second time order that the judgment of the Civil Law Court upholding the Labor Ministry’s ruling in Max Branly’s favor be enforced. Because of what we consider disrespect and defiance shown to the Court by counsellor Morgan, as has been mentioned hereinbefore, it is our order that the Clerk of this Court cite the said counsellor to appear before the Supreme Court to show cause why he should not be made to answer in contempt of Court. Costs in these proceedings are disallowed. And it is so ordered. Order affirmed.