CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA � AT MARCH TERM, 1960. BRACKOLDT AND COMPANY (LIBERIA), LTD., a German Firm Transacting Mercantile Business in Liberia, by its Agent, H. ROGGER, v. BITTER AND FADL, by its Agent, H. K. FADL, TRIPOLI STORES, by its Agent, B. 0. GINDI, and SYRIA TRADING COMPANY, Appellees. .

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued March 22, 1960. Decided May 6, 1960. An appeal from a decree dissolving an injunction will be dismissed when facts upon which issuance of the injunction was predicated have ceased to exist, so that reinstitution of the injunction would serve no proper purpose. On appeal from a decree dissolving an injunction, appeal dismissed and decree affirmed. MR. JUSTICE WARDSWORTH delivered the opinion of the court.* According to the records of this case, the appellants were defendants in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, in.an action for the replevin of sundry goods. Appellecl Bitter and Fadl were plaintiffs in the said action. Aldng with their complaint the ” Mr. Justice Harris was absent because of illness and took no part in this case. 3 4 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS plaintiffs in the replevin case filed a bond in the sum of $6,000, thus making themselves both principals and sureties therein. The replevin suit was heard by the then presiding Circuit Judge McDonald M. Perry who, on February 25, 1957, entered final judgment dismissing the said action of replevin and adjudging that the replevied goods be returned to the appellants. To this judgment the plaintiffs in the said replevin suit excepted, prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Liberia, and filed an appeal bond making themselves, together with Tripoli Stores, principals and sureties. During the pendency of the appeal of the replevin case, the present appellants were credibly informd that the plaintiffs-appellants in the replevin case, who were principals under both the replevin and appeal bonds, were winding up, liquidating and disposing by sale and otherwise all of their assets and property in Liberia, fixed, liquid and otherwise, and dissolving their partnership business. In order to prevent this fraudulent and unconscionable course of conduct the, present appellants, on September 24, 1957, prayed the circuit court for the issuance of a writ of injunction against appellees in these proceedings, enjoining and prohibiting appellees from disposing of the assets they had pledged as security under the replevin bonds. Appellees Tripoli Stores filed an answer and motion for dissolution of the injunction. The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, granted appellees’ motion and dismissed the action with costs against appellant. It is from this ruling that this appeal derives its birth. Appellants filed a bill of exceptions containing one count which reads as follows : “Because Your Honor on October z, 1957, sustained Count ‘V of defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction and dismissed the action with costs against plaintiffs in so far as it related to the codefendant Tripoli Stores; to which plaintiffs then and there excepted.” LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 5 Taking recourse to the judge’s ruling dissolving the injunction, it is discovered that, although Counts “2,” “3,” “4” and “5” of defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction were denied, the trial judge granted the said motion on grounds not laid in Count “1” thereof. We quote hereunder relevant portion of ruling under review, which reads as follows : “As to the first count of defendants’ motion, although the plaintiff strove very vigorously to convince the court that it is not necessary to end a complaint or each count thereof with the statutory words : ‘All of which plaintiff is ready to prove,’ or to commence each succeeding count with the words : ‘And the said plaintiff further complains,’ which is mandatory in all cases, especially in equity, the court is unwilling to agree with his position, and hereby holds that the said complaint is legally defective and bad, because of which the said complaint in injunction, in so far as it relates to codefendant Tripoli is dissolved with costs against the plaintiffs. And it is hereby so ordered.” To introduce a clear picture of the variance observed between the allegations contained in Count “I” of defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction and the judge’s ruling on said Count “1,” we quote hereunder the said Count “1” of defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction, which reads as follows : “Because codefendant Tripoli Stores avers that it has filed a verified answer to plaintiffs’ complaint and prayed this honorable court to take judicial notice of said answer. And this codefendant Tripoli Stores is ready to prove.” The Court observes that this particular issue ruled on by the trial judge purporting to be embraced in Count “r” of defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction, is raised in Count “z” of defendants’ said motion, but is overruled by the said trial judge, thereby depriving this Court of the opportunity of passing upon the merits of said issue, same 6 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS not being grounds of appeal in this case. It is obvious from the foregoing that the trial judge erred in dismissing the injunction proceedings upon an issue overruled by him. What an anomaly! During the argument in this case it was shown that the case of replevin to which the injunction was ancillary has been settled ; and thus there would seem to be no further need for an injunction. Moreover, the goods replevied in the main suit have been turned over to the rightful owners; so the injunction which was sought to protect the said goods from being sold during the alleged liquidation of the partnership business is unnecessary. We have, therefore, upon these grounds, affirmed the dissolution of the injunction and dismissed the instant appeal. And it is so ordered. Affirmed.