SOLOMON BAKEH, Appellant, v. ZACHARIAH T. GREENE, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MARYLAND COUNTY. Argued November 8, 1960. Decided December 16, 1960. 1. The words : “You stole the church money” are slanderous per se as imputing guilt of a crime. 2. Allegations of slander per se constitute a cause of action without allegations of special damages. 3. The function of redirect examination of a witness is to contradict matter brought forth on cross-examination and to amplify matter previously brought forth on direct examination. 4. Greater latitude in questioning is permissible on cross-examination than on direct examination. 5. A motion in arrest of judgment cannot be sustained solely on grounds relating to the weight of evidence. On appeal from a judgment in an action for damages for slander, judgment affirmed. Momolu S. Cooper for appellant. 0. Natty B. Davis for appellee. MR. JUSTICE WARDSWORTH delivered the opinion of the Court. The record in the above-entitled cause of action reveals that the appellee, Zachariah T. Greene, a citizen of Pleebo Settlement, Maryland County, having erected for himself a couple of houses in the aforesaid settlement of Pleebo, did rent out one, or a portion thereof, to appellant Solomon Bakeh, ostensibly for the purpose of conducting a mercantile business therein. On November 16, 1956, a dispute arose between appellant Bakeh and appellee Greene in the presence and hearing of a number of persons, during which altercation the said appellant is LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 205 alleged in the complaint filed by the said appellee as plaintiff in the court below to have uttered -the following slanderous language to the said appellee : “You are a bloody rogue. You stole the church money to build your two concrete houses.” Appellee, feeling that his name had been assailed, was moved to institute an action of damages for slander, which cause came for trial before Judge McDonald M. Perry during the May, 1958, term of the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Maryland County. Pleadings in the case progressed as far as the rejoinder. Law issues having been duly disposed of, the case was submitted to an empanelled jury. After hearing evidence on both sides, the said empanelled jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee Zachariah T. Greene, awarding him damages in the sum of $1,5oo. Motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial were duly filed by appellant, which motions were heard and denied; whereupon, the trial court entered final judgment confirming the verdict of the empanelled petty jury. The defendant-appellant, being dissatisfied with the several rulings and final judgment, as made manifest in his bill of exceptions, has brought the said case to this Court of last resort for review and final determination. In Count “2” of the complaint the plaintiff alleged : “And the plaintiff further complains the said defendant, knowing the premises, but contriving and maliciously intending to injure, defame and slander said plaintiff in his good name, fame and reputation, on the 6th day of November, 1956, in a certain oral statement which said defendant then and there in the Township of Pleebo, before the premises of plaintiff, uttered in the premises and hearing of certain good and worthy persons, to wit: Messrs. James Monger, Baley and others, of and concerning said plaintiff in the following false, scandalous and defamatory words did speak and declare, to wit: ‘You are a bloody rogue. 206 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS You stole the church money to build your two concrete houses.’ ” In answering the above-quoted Count “2” of the complaint, defendant contended in Count “2” of the answer : “And also because, defendant further denies the right of plaintiff to recover in this action, and says that Count 4 2 1 of plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because the words alleged to have been spoken by defendant are not actionable per se; further, plaintiff has failed to allege special damage, as provided for by law, in that where words alleged to have been uttered by defendant are not actionable per se, and there is no averment of special damage, the complaint should be dismissed ; and this defendant prays with costs against plaintiff.” The ruling of the trial judge made clear this issue in respect to the two classes of actions into which slander is divided. In buttressing this citation of law relied on by the trial judge we have the following: “Actionable words are of two descriptions : first, those actionable in themselves, without proof of special damages ; and secondly, those actionable only in respect of some actual consequential damages. “Words of the first description must impute : “First, the guilt of some offense for which the party, if guilty, might be indicted and punished by the criminal courts…. And although the imputation of guilt be general without stating the particulars of the pretended crime, it is actionable. . . . “Of the second class are words which are actionable only in respect of special damages sustained by the party slandered…. In this case special damage is the gist of the action, and must be particularly specified in the declaration.” BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY Slander (Rawle’s 3rd Rev. 1914). From the foregoing, the contention of defendant in Count “2” of his answer to the effect that the words alleged LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 207 to have been spoken by defendant are not actionable per se, is untenable in law, and as such has no legal foundation. As legal basis for defendant’s appeal in this case, he has submitted a bill of exceptions containing twelve counts. We deem worthy of consideration Counts “3,” “4,” “5,” “6,” “7” and “II.” We shall first pass to Count “3” of the bill of exceptions, which reads : “In answer to a question put to you by the crossexaminer, you said, in substance, that you have always had respect for plaintiff Greene, and therefore you were surprised when you heard this thing against him. On redirect examination you were asked : ‘Please explain what you meant by saying you were surprised ; was your confidence shaken in him?’ This was objected to by defendant on the ground that same was cross-examining one’s own witness.” Which said objection the court did not sustain. This question was put by plaintiff on the redirect examination; which brings us to consider the function or office of the redirect examination of the witness. It has been held by this Court that : I( . . . the function of a redirect examination is by legal writers declared to be primarily explaining away whatever might be brought out adversely in the crossexamination and/or bringing in what might be inadvertently omitted in the direct examination, what is commonly called the examination in chief.” Firestone Plantations Company v. Greaves, [1947] LRSC 5; 9 L.L.R. 250, 2 5 2 ( 1 947) � This question being based on what was brought out in the cross-examination of the witness, the court did not err in overruling the objection interposed by defendant; therefore the position of the trial court is sustained. In Count “4” of the bill of exceptions the question was put to appellant Solomon Bakeh on direct examination: “Were you in Pleebo in the month of November, 1956?” To this question plaintiff objected on the grounds of its 208 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS being leading, which said objection the trial court sustained. It is elementary that the foregoing question suggests an answer either in the affirmative or negative, which is forbidden by law on the direct examination of witnesses. Hence the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection interposed by plaintiff. In Count “5” of the bill of exceptions, defendant complains that the trial judge sustained objections to the following question : “Since the incident, please state for the benefit of the court and jury whether you do or you do not regard the said Mr. Greene with disdain, disgust and disrespect, based upon the cross words or quarrel which the two of you had?” The objection to this question is based on the grounds of cross-examining one’s own witness. Having perused the statement in chief of the witness Bakeh, it is to be observed that no mention is made of the subject matter embraced in the question under review. It being a principle of law in the direct examination of witness, that a party who produces a witness has a right to elicit by question any fact which the witness omitted to mention in his general statement before the cross-examination by the other party commences, the trial court erred in sustaining the objection to this question. Count “6” of defendant’s bill of exceptions interposed objections to the following question on grounds of (I) assuming the fact not proven; (2) travelling beyond the res gestae of the case at bar; (3) irrelevancy and immateriality: “The alleged peace-making you referred to–say whether this was done before you had been summoned and this suit brought against you?” However, this question being on the cross, the overruling of the objection by the trial judge was no error; and same is hereby sustained. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 209 In Count “7” defendant applied for the qualification of Zachariah T. Greene, appellee, as witness to testify for the benefit of his defense, to which application plaintiff objected on the grounds that it would violate the provision of the Constitution to the effect that a party shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself, which objection was sustained by the court. Whilst there is technically no constitutional inhibition imposed in civil actions, as in criminal causes, against a party furnishing evidence against himself, yet there are obvious and cogent reasons why, under certain circumstances, parties litigant in civil actions should not be compelled to furnish evidence against themselves, especially so when written pleadings are conducted, as in the instant case. Parties to the action should, in keeping with the statute governing pleadings in respect to notice and time, set forth every relevant issue of fact and law, thereby affording the adverse party an opportunity to traverse same. And, too, where the party plaintiff takes the stand and deposes in his own behalf, the cross-examiner should do all that is legally possible to develop and draw out every fact touching the cause, although not specifically pleaded ; barring which, it would seem legally inconsistent to have either party testify for the benefit of his adversary. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing, the position of the trial judge is hereby sustained. In Count “I” the defendants complain as follows : “And also because said motion in arrest of judgment was duly filed in keeping with law on the grounds that the evidence adduced at said trial does not go to prove that plaintiff was ever damaged, in that such position and direct evidence established on record, as also the law controlling, that even though the complaint of plaintiff on its face alleges that he has been damaged, such testimony, which remains unattacked, unrebutted and unimpeached on record, goes to show that there was a big quarrel on that occasion between plaintiff 210 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS and defendant, and that plaintiff provoked such a quarrel. Said motion in arrest of judgment was denied by the court; wherefore the defendant then and there duly excepted.” Let us examine the grounds laid in the motion in arrest of judgment in this case, as revealed or brought out in Count “Ii” of defendant’s bill of exceptions. Defendant contended : ( ) that the evidence introduced at the trial does not go to prove that plaintiff was ever damaged; and (2) that there is evidence which remains on record unattacked, unimpeached and unrebutted, to show that there was big quarrel between plaintiff and defendant, and that plaintiff provoked such a quarrel. “A judgment may be arrested when the record shows that the court had no jurisdiction, or that the plaintiff had no cause of action, or whenever the declaration on its face is for any reason clearly insufficient. . . . Judgment may also be arrested when the issue was joined on an immaterial point, or when the verdict was imperfectly found.” rs R.C.L. 684 Judgments � 135. “At common law the arrest of judgment is a withholding or staying of judgment notwithstanding a verdict has been given on the ground that there is some error appearing on the face of the record which vitiates the proceedings. As a general rule judgment cannot be arrested if it appears on the whole record for which party judgment ought to be given.” 23 CYC. 824 Judgments. It can be readily observed from the foregoing that the motion in arrest of judgment in these proceedings is not based on any of the grounds mentioned in the citations of law quoted supra. The record clearly shows on its face that the defendant does not deny making the slanderous expression to the plaintiff, but is endeavoring to shield himself from liability on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove any LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 211 damages sustained as a result of the said slanderous remarks. In this connection, in buttressing the common law citations, supra, we would like to reiterate that, in cases of slander, where the words spoken are actionable per se, as in the instant case, this Court has held : “Actions of slander are divided into two general classes; the one where the words alleged to have been spoken charged the defendant with an indictable offense or tend to render the party odious or ridiculous in his personal or business relations; the other when the words alleged to have been spoken are not actionable per se, but only because some special damage resulted therefrom. In the former kind of action the plaintiff need not prove special damage, but in the latter special damage must both be alleged and proven.” Woodin V. Gibson, [1923] LRSC 1; 2 L.L.R. 409 (1923), Syllabus 3. In view of the foregoing it is our considered opinion that the judgment of the court below be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellant. And it is hereby so ordered. Affirmed.