ADOLPH AJAVON, Appellant, v. J. EVERETT BULL, MAI L. BULL and PETER B. JALLAH,

Stipendiary Magistrate, City of Monrovia, Appellees. APPEAL FROM ORDER IN CHAMBERS ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE MAGISTERIAL COURT, CITY OF MONROVIA. Argued November 8, 1960. Decided December 16, 1960. 1. A voidable contract remains valid and binding until duly voided by a party entitled to do so. 2. Certiorari will not lie after enforcement of a judgment. 3. Certiorari will not lie where the record below has not been produced. 4. A judgment of summary ejectment may not properly be granted or enforced against a defendant whose occupancy is supported by a prima facie valid lease agreement unless the trial court has duly determined that the lease agreement is ineffective as a defense in the summary ejectment proceeding. 5. On appeal from an order in Chambers denying certiorari after judgment in summary ejectment proceedings, the Supreme Court, in affirming the order, may direct that the parties to the ejectment proceedings be placed in status quo pending immediate adjudication by the circuit court of an appeal from the judgment. Appellees, as lessors under a lease agreement, obtained a judgment of summary ejectment against appellants as lessees in possession. Appellants perfected an appeal to the circuit court from the judgment of the magisterial court in the summary ejectment proceeding. Before this appeal was heard by the circuit court, appellees obtained a writ of possession from the magisterial court, upon which the appellants were ousted from the leased premises. Appellants applied to the Justice presiding in Chambers for a peremptory writ of certiorari, which was denied. From the order denying certiorari, appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, en banc. This Court affirmed the order in Chambers denying certiorari, but modified the order by directing that the appellants be permitted to retain possession of the leased premises pending immediate adjudication of the appeal in the Circuit Court. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 0. Natty B. Davis Morgan for appellees. 179 Lawrence 4. for appellant. MR. Court. JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the opinion of the According to common law, a contract requires the agreement of two or more minds and is binding on the parties thereto contracting. But if the contract presents a voidable aspect, it remains valid and binding until it is voided by the party entitled to do so. In that event, the law requires such voidable aspect to be remedied within reasonable time by invoking the aid of equity; otherwise, its enforcement may not be impeded except for fraud. Article I, Section loth of our Constitution is also explicit on the point when it states that even the law-making body of the Republic is without authority to enact any law impairing a contractual obligation. The records from the court below filed in this case along with the returns of the appellees show that on July 6, 1956, J. Everett Bull and Mai L. Bull sued out an action of summary ejectment against one Adolph A. Ajavon. The suit was brought in the Magisterial Court for the City of Monrovia. The said plaintiffs alleged that the said defendant withheld from the plaintiffs their premises on Benson Street, Lot Number 132, without any color of right. Because of circumstances which we now regard as immaterial, this case remained on the docket of the court below until January, 1959. An assignment was then made for hearing of the case; and thereafter the court recorded its judgment on the back of the writ as follows : “At the call of the case the parties were present. Plaintiff gave notice that he amended his notice of representation, because of the unfortunate incident concerning his former lawyer, to include Counsellor Lawrence A. Morgan. Defendant was represented in 180 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS person. The mandate from the Supreme Court was read and noted. At this stage the writ and complaint were read. Defendant pleaded Not Liable. Plaintiff then asked for the qualification of his witnesses. Witnesses qualified and deposed. Witnesses for plaintiff testified, deposed and discharged with thanks of the court. Plaintiff rested evidence. At this stage defendant was called upon to testify if he so desired. Having failed to testify or produce any evidence to court, the court will now proceed to render its judgment. In view of the evidence adduced at the trial, and the defendant having waived his right to produce any witness, the plaintiff is hereby entitled to the possession of the premises in question. The defendant is to be ousted from said premises and the plaintiff put in possession of said premises; to pay costs of court. And it is so ordered. Plaintiff prays for a writ of possession ; same granted. January 19, 1959. “[Sgd.] P. BONNER JALLAH, Stipendiary Magistrate, City Court. “To which ruling defendant excepts and prays for appeal to the Circuit Court; same granted. “[Sgd.] P. BONNER JALLAH, Stipendiary Magistrate, City Court.” As a natural sequence the Magistrate ordered the writ of possession issued and served on the same day. According to petitioner’s petition, he and his tenants were ousted from the premises on the same night. Right here we would like to say that, from the judgment quoted above, it does seem that the trial below was comical; but because of the fact that the records also show that a regular appeal was prayed for by the defendant and granted, we will not make ourselves hasty in commenting on anything in connection therewith. It was at this point of the proceedings that the defendant below, now appellant was moved to file a petition with the Justice presiding in Chambers praying for the issuance of the peremptory writ of LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 181 certiorari with the intention to offset the enforcement of the aforesaid judgment rendered by the magistrate; and hereunder we give the substance of the said petition : 1. The petitioner and J. Everett Bull entered into a regular lease agreement on October 1, 1955, for the second and third floors in the building of the said J. Everett Bull, erected on Lot Number 132, on Benson Street, in Monrovia, which lease agreement having been signed and sealed, was admitted to probate on the zoth day of said month and year. A copy thereof is herewith filed and forms a part of petitioner’s petition. By virtue of said agreement petitioner from that time held the property under the aforesaid leasehold. 2. In spite of the fact that the term of the said lease agreement had not expired–same having been made for a period of ten calendar years, that is to say, from October I, 1955, to October 1, 1965, yet the plaintiff, intending to take undue advantage of him, instituted an action of summary ejectment against him in the magisterial court. His leading lawyer was not available at court when the case was called, regardless of the fact that Attorney Samuel E. H. Pelham appeared and asked the court to grant an adjournment. All of petitioner’s documents were in the hands of his leading lawyer, Counsellor 0. Natty B. Davis, including the contract for the premises and other papers. The respondent magistrate flatly refused to grant his request and did arbitrarily proceed to the hearing of the case over and against the protest of Attorney Pelham. 3. Attorney Pelham later raised the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, since a valid lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant could not be vitiated by summary proceedings; but all of this did not claim the magistrate’s attention; 182 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS and he proceeded rashly, arbitrarily and illegally to hear and determine the said matter by rendering and enforcing his judgment against the petitioner. 4. In furtherance of the illegal acts of the respondent magistrate, he issued a writ of possession. Without serving same on defendant below, petitioner merely took the house, threw all of his tenants out, locked the premises and gave the keys to the plaintiff, now one of the respondents. 5. In further perpetration of their unlawful and illegal acts, respondents did send police officers on the premises during the nighttime who arrested several of petitioner’s tenants and took them to the police station under the pretext of the charge of housebreaking. The appellees, when summoned as respondents on the alternative writ, filed their returns in which they stated, inter alia, that the trial of the summary ejectment case in the court below was regular and legal ; that petitioner had taken exception to the judgment of the court and prayed for an appeal which had been granted him by the respondent magistrate; that the judgment had been already enforced; that the plaintiff had been placed in possession of the premises, and returns had already been made to the writ of possession before the petitioner filed his petition for certiorari ; and that therefore, according to law, certiorari would not lie because the petitioner enjoyed an adequate remedy at law in consequence of his appeal. Respondents contended that certiorari will lie only to review an illegal or prejudicial ruling of a judge of an inferior court in a matter pending before the said court, and not in a matter in which judgment has been rendered and enforced. They further contended that all other allegations laid in petitioner’s petition were false, untrue and unsupported by the records in the case which they filed along with their returns; that the petitioner was entitled to file, along with his petition, copies of the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 183 records of the court below which he sought to have reviewed ; that his failure to do so necessarily rendered his petition unmeritorious ; and that, therefore, the same should be dismissed. When the matter was heard by the Justice presiding in Chambers, issuance of the peremptory writ was denied. From this ruling, petitioner excepted and brought this appeal to be heard by the full bench. At the call of this case before us, counsel representing both sides ably argued their respective grounds. Appellant’s counsel strenuously contended that he could not file the records from the court with his petition because the respondent magistrate had assured him that there was no record taken at the trial and that the records brought up by the respondents were made after the trial of the case. He also argued that the arbitrary attitude assumed towards his client during the trial below in denying his request for an adjournment, as well as the refusal of the magistrate to give consideration to the jurisdictional plea interposed by Attorney Samuel Pelham in behalf of his client, were all in absolute disregard to his client’s rights under the law, and therefore were arbitrary acts of the court which were prejudicial to his interest. He said further that his client did not enjoy the right of an impartial trial; so there was no alternative left other than to have applied to the Chambers of this Court for the issuance of the writ. Appellees’ counsel maintained that the records filed with the returns were the records that were actually taken at the trial of the case in the court below, and that at no time had the appellant’s counsel been denied the right of obtaining the records as he had represented. Appellees’ counsel said further that appellant’s counsel–Counsellor Davis–was never announced as counsel for the defendant during the trial below, but that the defendant below, later petitioner, and now appellant, appeared and represented himself in person ; and the judgment entered against him 184 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS having been enforced, the writ of certiorari would not lie. At least these were the same grounds argued before the Justice presiding in Chambers, from whose ruling this appeal has been brought before us. We have sat patiently and digested the respective arguments. We have also carefully scrutinized the records in the case before us. Besides, we have exercised extreme diligence in our effort to arrive at the opinion that we feel would legally justify every phase of the case. It is true that a writ of certiorari will not lie when the matter sought to be reviewed has already reached a conclusion and judgment thereon been enforced. It is also true that the law requires the party petitioning this Court for the writ to bring forward the records of the court below, which has not been done in the case before us. These points were legally sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the petition and deny the writ. Yet, for one or two strange and peculiar methods of procedure and practice that have presented themselves during the hearing of the case, and which we would like to embrace before concluding this opinion, we feel ourselves compelled to address our attention thereto before proceeding further. The petitioner appended to his application for certiorari a copy of a lease agreement signed by J. Everett Bull as lessor and Adolph A. Ajavon, lessee, for the second and third floors of lessor’s building situated on Benson Street, Monrovia, and bearing the number 132, for a period of ten years, ending October 1,1965. This lease agreement, according to its endorsements, shows that it was probated and registered in the Monthly and Probate Court on October 2o, 1955, recorded in Volume 68o, pages 266-268, and witnessed by Mai L. Bull, one of the plaintiffs below in the summary ejectment suit. Upon scrutiny of this lease agreement we have not been able to understand why the defendant would waive evidence at a trial for summary ejectment when his right of possession was based upon an agreement of leasehold, as the judgment of the court would go to show. But, grant- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 185 ing that he did waive his right to produce any evidence at the trial, our statute controlling summary ejectment provides “When a person who is entitled to the possession of real property is unable to obtain same by peaceful means, he may obtain possession thereof by a summary proceeding before a justice of the peace or magistrate. The jurisdiction of such justice or magistrate shall be limited to the adjudication of the right of possession, never of title. . . .” 1956 Code, tit. 6, �1123. The right of possession being the main issue involved, it does appear to us that the trial magistrate should have exercised some diligence to determine upon what right the defendant below occupied the premises. We are in perfect agreement with the ruling made by the Justice presiding in Chambers denying the issuance of the peremptory writ of certiorari so far as it refers to the grounds being inapplicable; but because this is the Court of last resort, we are of the strong opinion that the trial magistrate was hasty in adjudicating the right to possession of the premises, especially since, in summary ejectment suits, an appeal does not operate as a supersedeas to the enforcement of the judgment of the court. Appellees’ counsel argued that the lease agreement in question has some fictitious aspects about it which detract from its legal validity. Granting that his argument were true, that phase of it would still have to be determined by some court and not by the voluntary act of either of the parties thereto without the intervention of equity. Therefore, not having previously sought the strong aid of equity, we are hesitant to say what legal effect could be given to this point of argument, although we fail to understand why a lease agreement that seems to possess all of its requirements in law should be disregarded merely by the assertion of one of the parties. “A void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one and is a mere nullity. . . . A voidable contract, on the other hand, is valid and binding until it is avoided by LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the party entitled to avoid it.” 12 AM. JUR. 507-08 Contracts � 10. From the appellant’s argument, it was upon this contract that he occupied the premises in question for almost a year before the institution of the summary ejectment suit; and therefore, if there are voidable aspects in the contract it was the duty of the plaintiff below to have instituted cancellation proceedings. The Constitution of Liberia makes it plain that not even the Legislature, which is the law-making body of the Republic, has the right to enact any law impairing the obligation of contracts ; and as the Court of last resort, whose responsibility it is to probe into the minutest points in litigation for the purpose of administering justice with that usual degree of equipoise, we would not feel ourselves justified to permit the petitioner to be dispossessed of the premises before his appeal to the Circuit Court had been prosecuted and heard. Because of the reasons above stated, it is our opinion that the judgment of the Magisterial Court rendered against the defendant below, now petitioner, on January 19, 1959, should remain in status quo ante, unenforced ; and the defendant below, now petitioner, is granted the right to prosecute his appeal nunc pro tunc without the least delay. The respondent magistrate is also ordered to approve the petitioner’s appeal bond accordingly, so that the appeal may be heard without prejudice to either party concerned. And the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit is hereby ordered to give priority to the said appeal case at the December, 196o, term of the aforesaid court. The ruling of the Justice presiding in Chambers is hereby affirmed with the foregoing modifications, and with costs against the appellant in these proceedings. And it is hereby so ordered. Affirmed as modified. 186