REIDE C. COOPER, Appellant, v. ADIB ALAMENDINE,

Appellee APPEAL FROM DEBT COURT, SINOE COUNTY. Argued October 28, 1971. Decided November 25, 1971. An order of the Justice presiding in chambers directing a matter be re-tried in a specified court must be complied with by the party affected. 2. Objection to the lack of a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 3. A judgment is void if it is not rendered by a court competent to render it. 4. The Debt Court, although empowered to try actions in debt exclusively in suits seeking $2,000.00 or more by way of judgment, is without jurisdiction to try actions in debt for less than such amount, and any judgment obtained in the latter instance is void. 5. The authority of an agent terminates upon the death of his principal. 6. The approval by the trial judge of a bill of exceptions without express reservations admits of the correctness of every material statement which precedes his signature. 1. In a debt action brought in the Magistrate Court by an agent for his principal, judgment was taken by default against defendant, who thereafter appealed to the Circuit Court. In the absence of the appellant the trial court ruled against appellant. He thereafter applied for a writ of error to the Justice presiding in the chambers of the Supreme Court, which was granted, the judgment of the Circuit Court vacated, and the case remanded, to be tried de novo in the Circuit Court. The plaintiff in the case thereafter instituted an action in the Debt Court and obtained a judgment. The appeal is from the judgment of the Debt Court. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, principally on the ground that the Debt Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter, the amount sued for being substantially under the jurisdictional minimum of $2,000.00. T. E. Cess Pelham for appellant. Clarence 0. Tuning for appellee. 416 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 417 MR. JUSTICE AZANGO delivered the opinion of the Court. This case has come before us on appeal from the Debt Court of Sinoe County, based upon a bill of exceptions containing seven counts. In essence, they allege that on August 31, 197o, judgment was rendered against defendant; that the trial court would not entertain a motion to dismiss complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over person and subject matter; that irregularities of proof were permitted by the court; that the court did not consider counterclaims to plaintiff’s suit. In the record we find that Abraham Alamendine, of the City of Greenville, Sinoe County, employed the appellant as his lawyer, at the rate of $2o.00 per month. That after several years, on July 3o, 1966, the client voluntarily terminated the agreement and departed from Greenville, Sinoe County, for reasons of health to his home in Lebanon, on July 31, 1966. The record also discloses that prior to his departure on July 3o, 1966, by limited power of attorney, he appointed appellee, Adib Alamendine, as his agent, under which power he was authorized to collect by suit or otherwise, his principal’s claims. Subsequently, on August I, 1966, Adib Alamendine also contracted with appellant to serve as his lawyer and for such engagement of his legal services, he was to be compensated at the rate of $2o.00 per month. Appellant served appellee in this capacity from August 1, 1966, to November 3o, 1967, at which time appellee terminated the services of the appellant without any satisfaction and/or adjustment of accounts between them. But more than this, during the sixteen months’ period of service by appellant, he also agreed to serve appellee in transporting parcels and letters in vehicles owned by appellant, with the understanding that appellee would in due time compensate him. This was never done. How- 418 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ever, the charge for these services rendered is reflected in the counterclaim set up by appellant, which will later be dealt with in this opinion. According to the record also, after the appellee had terminated all contractual relations with the appellant, on November 3o, 1967, during the early part of January 1968, it became necessary for appellant to go to Monrovia, Montserrado County, for reasons of health and also to attend to other business, and he did not return to Greenville, Sinoe County, until about the end of March 1968. Shortly after appellant’s return to the City of Greenville, appellee served on appellant a writ of summons in a debt action, commanding him to appear before the Stipendiary Magistrate for Sinoe County. The writ was returned by Meyer Chea, a member of the National Police Force, Sinoe County, as having been served on appellant on April 26, 1968. Witnesses were immediately subpoenaed to appear before the Magistrate Court on the aforesaid April 26 to testify in the case. We see that when the case was reassigned for trial on May 15, 1968, and appellant and his lawyer, counsellor T. E. Cess Pelham, appeared for trial, surprisingly, Magistrate Brown informed them that the case had been called and judgment by default had been entered against the defendant, even though before the hour of 3 :3o P.M., on May 15, 1968, the date of trial, appellant had appeared at the Stipendiary Magistrate Court for trial, at which time appellee also appeared and asked permission of the court to call his lawyer, counsellor Clarence 0. Tunning; appellant also had asked leave of the magistrate to call his lawyer. However, appellant’s vehicle broke down causing some delay, so that when appellant appeared at the Magistrate Court with counsellor Cess Pelham, the magistrate stated that the trial was over and judgment had been rendered against appellant by default. Counsel for appellant then demanded an inspection of the record. However, no record had been kept nor judg- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 419 ment entered on the back of the writ. After argument, the magistrate consented to note the exceptions of the appellant, upon which an appeal was based and taken be fore the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Sinoe County, which was heard before that tribunal, then presided over by Hon. James W. Hunter, and subsequently decided against appellant. That by virtue of an application for a writ of error instituted by appellant’s counsel, by a ruling made thereon by our distinguished former colleague Mr. Justice Clarence L. Simpson, Jr., the Justice then presiding in the chambers of the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Third Judicial Circuit Court was vacated and the case ordered remanded for a trial de novo, because the circuit judge then presiding had omitted to assign the case for hearing on appeal from the magistrate. Clearly, the ruling of Justice Simpson directing a trial de novo after vacating the judgment of the circuit court, intended the case be heard in the same circuit court and not elsewhere. To the contrary, counsel for appellee elected to reinstitute his action in the Debt Court in Greenville, Sinoe County, before Hon. James A. Clarke. In this court, a motion to dismiss the appeal because of an insufficient appeal bond was made by the appellee and was denied. Thereafter appellee moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that plaintiff’s principal was the proper party to have been named, and since he was deceased and no appointment to his estate had been made, the plaintiff had no standing in court. What confuses this Court is that the Debt Court judge denied the motion after hearing, conceding in his ruling on appellant’s motion to dismiss the appellee’s complaint that where want of jurisdiction over the case appears upon the record, it may be taken advantage of by a plea in abatement or objections made to the jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, and that any act of a court be- 420 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS yond the jurisdiction conferred upon it is null and void. Hill v. Republic of Liberia, [1925] LRSC 7; 2 LLR 517 (1925). Yet when appellant’s counsel drew the court’s attention to the fact that although it possessed jurisdiction over debt actions, it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case, in that the nature of the case partook of a decedent’s estate, and should, therefore, have been brought in the Probate Division of the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Sinoe County, in total disregard of our statutes he ruled as he did. “A judgment is void, if it is not rendered by a court with competency to render it. Even though the State in which a judgment is rendered has jurisdiction over the defendant, a court of the State has no jurisdiction to render a judgment against him if the State has not given to the Court power to entertain the action. Although the State has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it may not have given a particular court or it may not have given to any of its courts power to entertain the action. In such a case the court has no `competency’ to render a valid judgment. The court has no power to render a valid judgment, not because the State lacks power but because it has not conferred power upon the court.” Restatement of Judgments, 7 (1942) ; also see French Cable Company v. Johnson,it LLR 264 (1952). “Further to render a judgment binding, the court must have jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, otherwise the judgment is void and of no effect. Jurisdiction according to the weight of authorities is the right to speak. It is the right to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case, and it is a power introduced for the public welfare, through the necessity of administering the law.” Id. “Jurisdiction of the subject is the power conferred upon courts by law to hear a particular class of cases, or to determine controversies of a specified character. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 421 This jurisdiction is indispensable to the validity of a judgment, and where a court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judgment is void and may be so treated in collateral proceedings. It may be added that jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by the assent or neglect of the parties, nor will any amount of Judicial discretion of a court supply a defect or want to jurisdiction in a case.” 15 R.C.L. 844. The statue creating the Debt Court is specific as to its jurisdiction : “Section 1. A Debt Court is hereby established, which shall be a court of record, in each of the counties and territories. “Section 2. The Debt Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all debt cases in which the amount of the debt is $2,00o.00 or more.” Session Laws, 1966-67. It would appear that the proper court to which the action should have been brought was the Probate Division of the Third Judicial Circuit Court. “(c) To direct and control the conduct and settle the account of executors and administrations ; ” (d) To enforce the payment of the debts and legacies of intestates, and to direct the distribution of their estates. . . .” Judiciary Law, 1956 Code, Supp. Vol. V, 18 :531. He further contended that the only way the appellee in these proceedings could have been legally clothed with authority to act was by an appointment of him as administrator for his late brother’s estate. Counsellor T. E. Cess Pelham contended that there is no suit at all, because Adib Alamendine is not the man to whom Reide C. Cooper is indebted ; rather it was Abraham Alamendine, who is now dead. He added that the limited power of attorney was executed by Abraham Alamendine to Adib Alaniendine, as set forth below, and at the death of Abraham, the agency ceased. For the 422 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS benefit of this ruling, we shall quote the Power of Attorney : “Greenville, Sinoe County. “July 3oth, 1966. “KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT I, Abraham Alamendine, have this day and date turned over my business to Mr. Adib Alamendine to act as my legal representative, during my absence, as if I would be present. He is also authorized to sue and be sued, i.e. to say to collect all my outstanding claims for and on my behalf. And to pay all legal claims that will be brought against me during my absence if same is genuine. “[ Sgd.] Abraham Alamendine.” This contention is borne out by Caranda v. VanFiske, 12 LLR 246 (1956) , in which the Court held that the authority of an agent terminates upon death of the principal. The text writers further support this argument. “Since the agent can and only does act in the name of the principal and executes his will, it therefore follows as a general rule that the death of the principal ordinarily works an immediate revocation of the authority of the agent by operation of law. Accordingly any acts subsequently done or transactions entered into by the agent as such are not binding on those claiming under or through the principal, and afford the agent no basis for a claim against the principal’s estate ; but on the contrary they expose the agent to liability to the representatives of the deceased principal, and to the third person with whom the subsequent dealings are had, for acting without authority.” 31 CYC. 1312-14. The trial court also seemed to agree with the argument, but decided that since the death of the principal had not been publicly announced, nor had been acted upon by the courts, the power of attorney was still valid. Authority seems to differ with the trial court’s opinion. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 423 “At common law, a principal’s death operates as a revocation of an agency, regardless of whether the agent or the party with whom he deals has notice of such death.” 2 AM. JUR., Agency,,� 62. “The majority of cases follow the rule of the common law and hold that unless the authority given to an agent is coupled with an interest, it will terminate on the death of the principal, notwithstanding the agent’s and third person’s ignorance of the fact.” 2 AM. JUR., Agency,� 63. Another point raised by counsel for appellant was that the approval of the bill of exceptions by the trial judge without expressed reservation admits of the correctness of the points therein raised. We must express our agreement with this position. “When the judge signs the bill of exceptions he thereby adopts and certifies every material statement in the bill which precedes his signature.” 2 R.C.L. 1 43� Judges should remember that a bill of exceptions is a formal statement in writing of the exceptions taken to the opinion, decision, or direction of the judge, delivered during the trial of the cause, setting forth the proceedings at the trial, the opinion or decision given, and the exceptions taken thereto, and signed by the judge in testimony of its correctness. When this is done without reservation, the unexpressed qualification of the statement that would, if uttered, so affect or alter its meaning for the persons addressed as to vitiate its truth, what does he expect the Appellate Court to do? Counsel for appellant argued that he filed a counterclaim in the court below and insisted upon its hearing, but it was not accorded.’ These, and many other irregularities, even though they were brought to the attention of the trial judge, were approved by him in appellant’s bill of exceptions. 424 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS There are also questions unresolved pertaining to the accounts sued upon for they appear to be the accounts of both brothers, the plaintiff and the deceased, sued for in the name only of the appellee. We could continue much further, particularly on the question of the counterclaim, but having carefully considered the entire trial and the evidence in the case, and being convinced that the court below had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and being further convinced of the numerous errors and irregularities committed during the trial which are apparent upon the face of the record, including the ruling on agency after the death of principal, we are left with no alternative but to declare the judgment of the Debt Court void and of no legal efficacy. The clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below informing it of this judgment. Costs in these proceedings are ruled against appellee. Judgment vacated;