DOWAYEE, Appellant, v. MAMADO KONNEH, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GRAND GEDEH COUNTY. Argued March 25, 1969. Decided June 16, 1969. 1. In order for evidence to be considered by a trial judge, or a jury, should the case be tried before one, the evidence must first be formally admitted, and no opinion or verdict, in which such evidence plays a part, will be allowed to stand by the Supreme Court when this requirement has not been met. 2. The Supreme Court will take judicial notice of incredibility of facts alleged, when to accept them would signify endorsement of a party’s conduct indicative of his mental derangement. As in the instant case, where defendant claimed plaintiff had sold him his house and lot for an amount equal to the yearly rental charge thereon payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. Appellant, as an aborigine, had been granted a lot by the Tribal Authority of his District, upon which he erected a house. He later rented the house at $20.00 per annum, to the defendant. The defendant thereafter leased the property to a third party at an annual rate greater than his rent, without the knowledge of plaintiff, who unsuccessfully brought a complaint before the District Commissioner. But when the defendant fell in arrears, the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment. At the trial, the defendant alleged a purchase agreement for the house and lot, claiming plaintiff had agreed to accept $20.00 as the sale price, and produced a receipt bearing a mark, which he alleged had been made by plaintiff. The receipt was never introduced into evidence, but the trial court based its opinion primarily thereon, and rendered judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court which affirmed the Magisterial Court’s judgment and an appeal was taken from the Circuit Court’s judgment, judgment reversed. 330 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 331 Joseph F. Chesson and Joseph F. Dennis for appellant. Clarence 0. Tuning for appellee. MR. JUSTICE WARDSWORTH delivered the opinion of the court. According to the record before us this case originated in the Magisterial Court of the City of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, upon the complaint of plaintiff-appellant, which resulted in a ruling in favor of defendant-appellee, to which ruling plaintiff noted exceptions, announced and took an appeal to the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, sitting in its Law Division, February 1968 Term. Appellant had availed himself of the opportunity under the law controlling lands in the public domain exclusively inhabited by aborigines. Appellant applied for and was granted a house lot in Zleh Town, Gbarzon District, Grand Gedeh County, by the Tribal Authority in 1942, upon which he erected a dwelling. He later rented the house to the appellee at a rental of $20.00 per year, as a tenant at will. Appellee at a later date undertook to rent the said premises to a Lebanese national living in the area for a consideration higher than the rental that was payable to the appellant by him, against which act appellant protested, since it was done without his knowledge and consent. In order to eject appellee from the premises, a complaint was filed before the then District Commissioner Baimbah Larsannah, who rendered a decision in favor of the appellee to which appellant excepted but was denied an appeal. Although appellant complained to the Secretary of the Interior at the time, he did not fully follow up the complaint before the Secretary of the Interior because of stringent financial circumstances and he continued receiving the rent. However, during the early part of January, appellant, because appellee was in arrears on his rental payment, and for other 332 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS reasons, instituted an action of ejectment by summary proceedings before the Magisterial Court of the City of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, against appellee. The trial was conducted by the Magisterial Court, judgment was rendered against appellant and an appeal effected to the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Grand Gedeh County. Accordingly, the case was duly assigned for hearing by the said Circuit Court, Judge Emmanuel N. Gbalazeh presiding. At the call of the case, appellee made a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was denied by the court. The matter was eventually heard on its merits. Witnesses for both parties were sworn and testified, and the court, having heard arguments pro et con, rendered final judgment on February 19, 1968, dismissing the appeal and ordering the enforcement of the judgment of the Magisterial Court, to which judgment appellant took exceptions and prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Liberia for review and final determination of the cause. The jurisdictional steps to perfect the appeal were duly taken and completed within the statutory time. Appellant filed an approved bill of exceptions containing six counts. We deem counts one and three worthy of consideration. IC I. Because appellant says that he excepts to the court’s final judgment on the grounds that he categorically denies his forged signature, meaning his x-cross that has been surreptitiously attached to the purported receipt upon which the court, although it was never offered by defendant’s counsel into evidence, relied and rendered final judgment against him sua sponte. “3. And also because appellant further says that the presentation of the purported receipt by the appellee and its acceptance by the court without its admission into evidence, is contrary to fundamental principles of pleading, yet when appellant’s counsel objected to it, the court overruled the objection, with- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 333 out stating the basis for the ruling.” See Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6:252. In searching through the evidence in this case, we observe that the appellee introduced a receipt purporting to cover an amount allegedly paid to plaintiff-appellant as rent. On direct examination, appellee testified : “Q. The receipt you made mention of, were I to show you same will you recognize it? (To which question plaintiff objected, and was overruled.) “A. Yes. “Q. I now hand you said receipt, please look at it and say what you recognize it to be? “A. This is the receipt the plaintiff issued me. (Appellant’s counsel requested the court to mark the receipt for identification. The Court: Said document is hereby marked.)” Nowhere in the record is it shown that defendant offered the receipt into evidence. Its presence, therefore, in the record is contrary to the law of evidence. Despite this fact the judge based his opinion primarily thereon, for the latter part of the court’s ruling reads: “In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his adversary’s. Plaintiff having lost his right to possession by the sale of his but to defendant, as evidenced, for value received and approved by the District Commissioner at the time, he is estopped to eject the defendant. There is no title involved but the right to possession, for the title which was vested in plaintiff by virtue of his being an aborigine of the area, was transferred to defendant by a contract of sale.” It is imperative that evidence, in the course of a trial before a court sitting in law or equity, be offered in evidence and admitted for the court, as in the instant case, or the jury to pass upon it. 334 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS “Admissibility of evidence generally.–All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the laws of the Republic of Liberia or in courts of equity or law. . . .” Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6 :680. Further, in going through the record we have not been able to come across any corroborative evidence in support of defendant’s allegation that he concluded the arrangement for the purchase of appellant’s house by paying $20.00, the price alleged by him. In view of the foregoing, and especially because appellant disputes the genuineness of his mark on the receipt, the judgment of the court is a legal nullity. Moreover, considering the circumstances and facts surrounding this matter, it seems very unlikely that appellant, who must be regarded as sane, would divest himself of his title to the house and lot for a sum equal to a year’s rent which was to be paid to him by the appellee. Especially so in view of the fact that appellee had undertaken to rent the house to a third party, without appellant’s knowledge or consent, for an annual sum greater than the purchase price to be paid by him to appellant. Nor did the defendant ever contest this significant allegation made by the plaintiff. Therefore, the judgment in this case is hereby reversed with costs against appellee. And it is hereby so ordered. Reversed.