BOIMA LARTEY, ALHAJI J. D. LANSANAH, MUSA FON JEH, FRIMA KAMARA, TETEE OF MANDO, et al., Surviving Heirs, Descendants, and People of CHIEF MURPHEY and VAI JOHN, Deceased, of Vai Town, Bushrod Island, Monrovia, Appellants, v. ALHAJI VARMUYAH CORNEH, Attorney in Fact for the People and Tribal Authority of Vai Town, SUNDIFOO SONI, Paramount Chief of Vai Town, and all other Persons Acting Directly or Indirectly for or on behalf of the People and Tribal Authority of Vai Town, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued March 16, 17, 1966. Decided June 30, 1966. 1. Under the rule of idem sonans, if a name misspelled in a document conveys to the ear a sound practically. the same as the correctly spelled name when properly pronounced, the name as pleaded is a sufficient identification of the person referred to, and no advantage can be taken of the misspelling. A deed executed by the President of Liberia granting certain lands in fee simple to a named chief and tribal residents and “his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever” in consideration of “the various duties of citizenship hereafter to be performed” by them must be construed as vesting legal title in the tribal authority as trustee for the tribal residents. An equitable title or right to beneficial occupancy vests in the tribal residents. In such case, the statutory prohibition against alienation of the lands by the trustee constitutes a bar against descent of legal title to the heirs or descendents of the chief named in the deed. Consequently they cannot succeed in an ejectment action against the tribal authority, the incumbent paramount chief, and the tribal residents. 1956 CODE 1 :271. 2. On appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants on the pleadings in an ejectment action, the judgment was affirmed. Morgan, Grimes and Harmon Law Firm for appellants. 0. Natty B. Davis, Nete Sie Brownell, and Anthony Barclay for appellees. 403 404 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS MR, JUSTICE SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In consequence of written directions to the clerk of the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, sitting in its law division, December term 1963, a writ of summons was issued to the present appellees as defendants in an action of ejectment instituted by the present appellants. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were the direct heirs of Chief Murphey and Vai John, deceased, of Vai Town, Bushrod Island, Commonwealth District of Monrovia, Montserrado County, who was the owner in fee simple of a certain 25-acre tract of land by virtue of “an aborigine land grant deed from the Republic of Liberia to the said Murphey, the residents of Vai Town (Vai John’s People), and that title had descended to plaintiffs by inheritance, as appears more fully by a copy of the said aborigine land grant deed, hereto annexed marked Exhibit A and made a part of this complaint.” The complaint also alleged that the defendants were unlawfully and arbitrarily withholding the said parcel of land from the plaintiffs without any color of right whatsoever. In a special appearance, the defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. In an answer subsequently filed, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs were not the proper parties to bring an action of ejectment for recovery of property belonging to the Vai Community, commonly known as Vai Town. It was the defendants’ further contention that the tribal authorities of Vai Town were the proper parties to maintain an action in respect of the subject property, predicated upon the fact that the fee for these communal holdings was vested in the aforementioned tribal authorities as trustees. As an additional plea in bar the defendants contended that the deed made profert by the plaintiffs conveyed a communal holding granted by the Republic to Chief Murvee Sonii and residents of Vai Town (Vai John’s LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 405 People), and that the name “Murphey” constituted but an incorrect spelling of the name of the chief, Murvee Sonii, who was commonly called Murphey. The defendants asserted that this aboriginal grant was not intended to devolve on the heirs of Vai John but was intended to be enjoyed in common by all the residents of Vai Town under the supervision and administration of the tribal authorities. In addition to the above-named pleas in bar there were certain pleas in abatement to the effect that not all of the defendants were named in the complaint or in the writ of summons; instead, the words et al. were inserted, which constituted a bad plea. Lastly, it was averred in the answer in the court below that Vai John was never seized of the subject property, since the grant from the Republic was made in 1906 whereas Vai John had passed unto the great beyond during the year 1899, quite 6 years prior to the alienation of the fee by the Republic to Murvee Sonii and the residents of Vai Town. The pleadings rested with the rebutter as filed on the 4th day of November, 1963, and thereafter, on the 15th day of May, 1964, his Honor John A. Dennis, then presiding by assignment over the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, ruled on the issues of law. In his ruling, the judge held that under the principle of idem sonans, Murphey was but a corruption of Murvee, and as both names sound alike, they refer to one and the same person. This Court is of the opinion that that particular portion of the trial judge’s ruling was in consonance with law. This Court further takes cognizance of the fact that Murvee is a name strange to the English language, the same being Vai in derivation, whereas Murphey constitutes a name that uses English language as its source of origin. The next point touched upon by the trial judge which we feel ourselves compelled to deal with here relates to the question of possession of the fee. It was claimed by 406 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS the appellants in their complaint that they were the direct heirs of the late Murphey and Vai John and that title to the subject property had descended to them by inheritance. To buttress this contention they made profert of a document over the signature of President Arthur Barclay entitled “Aborigines Deed.” We find it relevant to quote the following portion of this deed : “To all to whom these presents shall come: “Whereas it is the true policy of this Government to induce the aborigines of the country to adopt civilization and to become loyal citizens of this Republic; and whereas one of the best means thereto is to grant lands in fee simple to all those showing themselves fit to be endowed with the rights and duties of full citizenship as voters; and whereas Murphey and the residents of Vai Town (Vai John’s People) have shown themselves to be persons fit to be entrusted with said rights and duties. “Now, therefore, know ye that I, Arthur Barclay, for and in consideration of the various duties of citizenship hereafter to be legally performed by the said Murphey and the residents of Vai Town, I, Arthur Barclay, President of the Republic of Liberia, for myself and my successors in office, have granted, and by these presents do give, grant, and confirm unto the said Murphey and the residents of Vai Town, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever, all that piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being in the Island Bushrod in the County of Montserrado and bearing in the authentic records of said Bushrod Island the number one (r) (1st range) and bounded and described as follows. . . .” This deed clearly shows that the grant was intended for both Murvee and the residents of Vai Town, since they had shown themselves fit to be entrusted with certain rights and duties, amongst which was the basic right of franchise which could only be exercised by one possessing LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 407 real property in pursuance of Article I, Section Tr of the Constitution. Having established this, let us now have recourse to our Aborigines Law as same relates to tribal lands : “Each tribe is entitled to the use of as much of the public land in the area inhabited by it as is required for farming and other enterprises essential to tribal necessities. It shall have the right to the possession of such land as against any person whomsoever. “The President is authorized upon application of any tribal authority to have set out by metes and bounds or otherwise defined and described the territory of the tribe thus applying. A plot or map of such survey or description shall be filed for reference in the archives of the Department of State within six months after the completion of such survey. The omission of a tribe to have its territory so delimited shall not, however, affect in any way its right to the use of the land.” 1956 CODE I :270. “The interest of a tribe in lands may be converted into communal holdings upon its application to the government. The proposed holding shall be surveyed at the expense of the tribe making the application. The communal holding shall be vested in the members of the Tribal Authority as trustees for the tribe, but the trustees shall not be able to pass title in fee simple in such lands to any person whomsoever.” 1956 CODE I :271. “If a tribe shall become sufficiently advanced in civilization, it may petition the government for a division of the tribal land into family holdings. On receiving such a petition, the government may grant deeds in fee simple to each family of the tribe for an area of twenty-five acres.” 1956 CODE :272. The above three sections, in varying extents and for different purposes, relate to interests in real property as owned by those of our compatriots who have been desig- 408 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS nated aborigines by our Aborigines Law. The sections establish a jus in re to public land by tribes to an extent necessary for farming and other enterprises by the particular tribe. Section 270, however, gives only beneficial occupany to lands publicly owned ; the fee remains in the Republic. Section 271 relates to ownership of land where both the legal and equitable titles have been granted by the government to the tribe. Here, although the total fee passes at the time of the alienation thereof by the state, the legal title thereupon vests in the tribal authority as trustees. The equitable title or the right to beneficial occupancy of the property vests in the people of the tribe resident in the particular area. It therefore follows that where the statute imposes a total restriction upon a transfer of the fee by the tribal authority to any person or persons whatsoever, it is impossible for the fee to be passed by descent as to make available the right to maintain an action at law against the residents who in reality are the cestui que trust. All of this is in harmony with the legal maxim jus descendit et non terra. Obviously, Section 272 is here inapplicable. Reference to the deed as signed by President Arthur Barclay clearly shows that the grant was not a division of tribal land into family holdings but was in effect the grant of a communal holding to a certain class of people. The common law, in speaking of defenses to actions of ejectment, has this to say : “Generally speaking, whatever shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to the immediate possession of the premises claimed constitutes a good and valid defense in an action to recover the possession. Since the plaintiff in an action of ejectment must, as a general rule, recover, if a recovery may be had, on the strength of his own title, and not from the weakness or want of title of his adversary, the defendant, unless estopped from controverting the plaintiff’s title, may rest on his LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 409 possessions and attack the title under which the plaintiff claims. Though offering no evidence of title in himself, he may in any legitimate manner assail or destroy the title of the plaintiff and thereby prevent a judgment in his favor.” i8 AM. jUR. 50-51 Ejectment � 52. The above cited law is in harmony with the several pronouncements of this Court to the effect that the immediate right to possession of property to the exclusion of the defendant constitutes an indispensable requisite to the maintenance of an action of ejectment. Additionally, where two or more parties are possessed of a common interest in and to a particular piece of property, and there is no evidence to show that one party has granted unto the other special possessory rights in respect of his common interest, an action at law is not maintainable by one of the said tenants as against his cotenant in possession. We have carefully explored the other portions of the trial judge’s ruling on the issues of law presented by the parties in their pleadings and have been unable to find any reversible error contained in the same. In our view, the judgment of the trial judge dismissing the complaint and subsequent pleadings possessed sound basis in law; and therefore the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. And it is hereby so ordered. Judgment affirmed.