ELIZA JACKSON, EDITH HERRON, and REGINALD JACKSON, Administrators of the Estate of Z. A. JACKSON, Deceased, Appellants, v. J. B. TRINITY, SR., Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued November 14, 1966. Decided December 16, 1966. 1. 2. Points not raised in the bill of exceptions will not be considered on appeal to the Supreme Court. A demand that an opposing party produce documentary evidence must be made on reasonable notice in a special application to the trial court for a subpoena duces tecum and cannot properly be made in an ex parte pleading. Irrelevant evidence is generally inadmissible. A court of equity will not countenance or lend itself to the perpetration of fraud. 3. 4. On appeal from a decree on a bill in equity to quiet title to real property, the decree was affirmed as modified. Richard A. Diggs for appellants. Joseph W. Garber for appellee. MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the opinion of the Court. In an age of rapid development, progress, and advancement, civilization continues its prospective coexistence with both the good and the evil, which are all interrelated factors found in the characteristic of Man that constitutes component parts of his peculiarity, and it is those characteristics which often move him to do the wrong in performance of the right; otherwise our society and the courts would hold the place of mere nominal institutions. Because of this growth of disagreement in understanding, the desire to impose the will of one upon the rights of another without regard for the engendering consequences, 631 632 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS makes the court the forum of grave responsibility to determine the rights and wrongs of the parties concerned in litigations regardless of what the standard of one may be above the weakness of the other. To do this, judges are admonished to be poised in the interpretation of the law so that the strong may not prevail against the weak, whose rights are all regarded to be equal in the sight of the law. Suits of this kind are very frequently liable to be introduced in our courts, and many times from a fraudulent desire of one party with hopes to deprive the other of his property rights, and these rights the law must safeguard ; otherwise the margin between human activities and the rapidity of a developing age would soon widen beyond grasp of the law. And for that matter this Court, sitting as the Court of last resort in this country, must always be awake to a sense of deep concentration on the issues presented before us so that our conclusions may demonstrate the virtue of sound judgment on the facts in any given case and a sound and clear interpretation of the law controlling, holding as our guideline the principle that the rights of all parties are equal in the sight of the law. This is a bill in equity to quiet title and remove cloud ; and because of good reasons, we have felt it right and timely to make the preface we have thus made in the premises. One J. B. Trinity of Monrovia, Liberia, filed his bill in the June 1964 term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, equity division, against Eliza Jackson, Edith Herron, and Reginald Jackson, administrators of the estate of the late Z. A. Jackson, praying to have cloud removed, and his title quieted to a 36-acre tract of land known as Block No. 2 and Block No. 3, situated in an area formerly known as Jacksonville, Old Field, now a part of the settlement of Paynesville, Montserrado County. This land he got by purchase on November 1 1943, from one Mary B. Merrian of the City of , LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 633 Monrovia. He said grantor had bought the same tract on the 7th day of August, 193o, from one T. G. Norfleet, who acquired title thereto from one B. W. Payne on the same date by purchase, and who was the original buyer of said 36-acre tract of land on April z, 1923, from one C. H. Jackson and Benjamin J. K. Anderson, then serving in the capacity of administrators of the intestate estate of the late Z. A. Jackson, which sale was made upon an order given by the probate division of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County. The bill was filed in consequence of the fact that notwithstanding plaintiff was in possession of his chain of title, even including the title deed of the late Z. A. Jackson from which the aforesaid tract of land was sold and had paid all of the taxes due thereon from the time of the purchase, yet defendants Eliza Jackson and Reginald Jackson, subsequent administrators over the identical intestate estate of the late Z. A. Jackson that had already been administered and closed, undertook to include the very 36-acre tract of land in an inventory which they filed in the Monthly and Probate Court of Montserrado County on the 25th day of November, 1961, and prayed the court to grant permission for them to offer same to the public for sale, claiming the same to be their property, and had a portion thereof surveyed and sold to third parties. The defendants averred the following in Count 4 of their answer : “And also because defendants submit as to Count 3 of the complaint that it is a fact that when they were appointed administrators of the estate of the late Z. A. Jackson, they did submit an inventory to the probate court of said estate, in which was included 96 acres of land situated in Paynesville, Montserrado County, because they did come across a deed in favor of said estate for 96 acres of land, and they did not know nor was it recorded on said deed that 36 acres thereof had 634 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS been sold to the plaintiff who laid claim to said 36 acres of land ; they have not insisted in including same in the estate.” Pleadings in the case rested as far as the rejoinder, and his Honor A. Lorenzo Weeks, disposed of the issues of law and ruled the facts to trial. At the March 1966 term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, His Honor James W. Hunter, presiding, heard the facts and rendered the decree from which this appeal has been taken. The bill of exceptions which presents the grounds of the appeal is composed of five counts, and we quote them as follows. “1. Because His Honor, Alfred L. Weeks, then circuit judge, presiding, in passing on the issues of law raised by the appellants in their pleadings, on the 3rd day of February, 1966, overruled several salient law issues raised by them in said pleadings. “2. And also because appellants submit that on the 26th day of January, 1966, being the loth day’s session, counsel of respondent on the cross-examination, put the following question to J. B. Trinity, plaintiff, a witness on his own behalf, as follows, to wit: ‘In the answer of the defendants, they have requested you to produce the originals of certain letters addressed to you by them, dated January 11 1962, and August 2, 1962. Have you brought these documents and if so, please produce them to the court.’ To this question, counsel for plaintiff interposed an objection on the ground of irrelevancy, ‘in that the only means prescribed by law for one party to have his opponent produce written evidence in court is by a writ of duces tecum.’ Which objection Your Honor sustained ; to which defendant then and there excepted. “3. And also because on Monday, February 7, 1966, being the 27th day’s session, counsel for defendants on , the cross-examination put the following question to Lawrence Sawyer, witness for the plaintiff, to wit: LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 635 `Prior to your survey of the property in question, were you made to know by the petitioner herein that this matter was in court?’ To this question, counsel for plaintiff objected on the ground of irrelevancy, which objection Your Honor sustained. “4. And also because defendants submit that on Monday, February 7, 1966, being the 27th day’s session, at the conclusion of the evidence of the plaintiff herein, he offered into evidence a document marked by court R/ 1, to which counsel for defendant objected, but which objection Your Honor overruled and submitted said document into evidence. To which defendant then and there excepted. “5. And also because defendants submit that on the 11th day of March, 1966, Your Honor rendered a final decree, to which ruling defendant excepted and prayed an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia at its October 1966 term.” Our minds have been placed in a state of wonder to understand why the appellants decided to burden this Court with an appeal if they were conscious of the fact that there appeared no cogent grounds in equity for a review. Ever and anon this Court has said that only matters or grounds made a part of the bill of exceptions in an appeal case will claim the attention of the Court and that all other exceptions, even if apparent on the records in the case and precluded from the bill of exceptions, are presumed to be waived. It does not concern us what arguments may be presented ; if they are not in harmony with the grounds of the bill, they cannot be traversed by this Court. Now here is a bill of exceptions which embraces no substantial issues at all, very unscientifically prepared and void of any material matter ; however, we shall proceed to consider it as it is. In Count 1 of the bill, appellants have not averred the salient law issues raised by theirs and overruled by the trial judge, hence we are not able to presume that which , 636 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS they intend for us to traverse therein. Count t, therefore, not having presented any issue for consideration by this Court, is hereby dismissed. With respect to Count 2 of the bill of exceptions, our Civil Procedure Law makes this requirement: “If a party desires to give in evidence any document in the possession of his adversary, he shall give him reasonable notice to produce it; and the court shall have authority to decide whether the notice is reasonable.” 1956 CODE 6:734. A subpoena duces tecum is a writ which furnishes notice to bring documents to court. This writ was not prayed for and served on the plantiff so as to require him to bring documents under date of January i t, 1962, and August 2, 1962, respectively, to court. Moreover, the law makes it discretionary for the court to decide whether or not the notice served is reasonable; and the court in the exercise of that discretion sustained objections against the questions on the ground that all evidence must be relevant to the issues involved and that copies of letters concerning a survey were not relevant to the right of plaintiff with respect to land to which he claims title since these two documents had no tendency to prove or disprove the facts at issue in the case. (See Section 698 of the Civil Procedure Law, 1956 CODE 6:698.) It goes without further saying that this Court sustains the trial court’s ruling given on Count 4 of defendant’s answer declaring it to be insufficient. Count 2 of the bill of exceptions therefore is not sustained. Counts 3 and 4 of the bill of exceptions, being vague in substance are also dismissed. Count 5, being a question of formula, induces no comment thereon. This is a case in chancery. This is a case in which the plaintiff would have the court remove a cloud and quiet his title. Mr. Chief Justice Johnson, speaking for this Court in Thorne v. Thomson, [1930] LRSC 8; 3 L.L.R. 193 ( 93o) , said at 3 L.L.R. 196 : LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 637 “Lord John Freeman-Mitford Redesdale, in his treatise on the pleadings in suits in the Court of Chancery by English Bill, remarks that the jurisdiction of a court of equity assumes that a power of decision should be exercised when the principles of law by which the ordinary courts of law are guided, give a right, but the powers of those courts are not sufficient to afford a complete remedy or the modes of proceedings are inadequate to the purpose. Courts of Equity administer to the ends of justice (r) by restraining the assertion of doubtful rights in a manner productive of irreparable damage ; (2) by preventing injury to a third person by all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed and are injurious to others, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. REDESDALE, PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY (Am. ed. 189o), 207, 208.” A close study of the records in this case brings our minds to the conclusion that the surviving heirs of the late Z. A. Jackson’s estate are inclined to perpetrate fraud on persons who lawfully bought property from said estate when it was under legal administration more than 4o years ago. Hence in countering Count 2 of plaintiff’s complaint in their answer, they strongly maintained that “a bill to remove cloud and quiet title was not the proper form of action chosen.” Appellants were fully aware that Z. A. Jackson’s estate had been administered and closed as an intestate estate. They were aware of the fact from the records before us that plaintiff possessed title to the 36-acre tract of land in Block No. 2 and Block No. 3, because they had seen his title deed to the property and read the description of the land ; yet in their blind effort to dispose of property that was no longer that of their ancestor, they persisted in claiming a right thereto. In their answer, they admitted plaintiff’s title 638 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS to be genuine; yet they refused to yield to him the right to possess the property according to his metes and bounds, which practice equity frowns upon and lends aid against the fraud. The decree from which this appeal has been taken removes the cloud and vests the plaintiff in fee simple title of the property which is therein described by its metes and bounds in his title deed; but since this is the Court of last resort, and equity does not give aid by halves, we hereby affirm the same with the following amendment : The plaintiff is not to be further molested in the free enjoyment of his vested right in the property by any person whomsoever ; and the court below in the enforcement of its decree will send a public land surveyor to the spot for a double checking of the metes and bounds according to plaintiff’s deed; the expense for such services to be borne by the plaintiff. Costs in these proceedings are hereby ruled against the appellants. And it is hereby so ordered. Decree affirmed as modified.