JOE POPPOH PENNOH, Appellant, v. SARR JUAH BROWN, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE MONTHLY AND PROBATE COURT OF MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued December 10, 1962. Decided February 8, 1963. 1. To conclude a party against whom a judgment is rendered, the judgment Must determine an issue joined between that party and an adversary in interest. 2. Issue can only be joined in a court of record by complainant or petitioner filing the proper pleading, asking the court to grant a right, or give relief or redress ; and by defendant or respondent challenging that right by an answering pleading, praying the court to refuse the relief or redress sought in the complaint or petition. 3. The Constitution of Liberia does not authorize the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction over issues not pleaded and decided in a subordinate court, except in specified cases. Const., Art IV. Sec. 2nd. On appeal, a ruling of the probate court on a petition for admeasurement of dower was reversed and remanded. Richard fl. Diggs for appellant. C. Lorenzo Simpson for appellee. MR. JUSTICE PIERRE delivered the opinion of the Court. Solomon Y. Brown, late of the City of Monrovia, died intestate on October 19, 1959. It is not shown in the record now before us, but is alleged in the briefs on both sides, that Sarr Juah Brown, the appellee, who had lived with the deceased for a number of years prior to his death, and who claimed to be his lawful wife, filed a petition, together with one R. T. Tarpeh, in the probate court in Monrovia, before His Honor, I. Van Fiske, then commissioner of probate, for letters to administer the estate of the late Mr. Brown. It is alleged in the briefs that Mr. Tarpeh later withdrew his name from this petition; but there is nothing in the record to show that the petition 237 238 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS was either filed or withdrawn. The Supreme Court cannot give consideration to such issues concerning documents, since according to law we can only review upon the record. On April 2 I, 196o, Joe Poppoh Pennoh and Blammoh Saymu, both claiming to be relatives of the late Solomon Brown, filed a petition praying to be appointed administratrix and administrator, respectively, of said estate. The record does not show that any objections were filed to this petition. On April 26, 196o, just five days after said petition had been filed, Sarr Juah Brown filed a petition praying the court to admeasure unto her dower out of the estate of her alleged husband. Again, the record does not show that any objections were filed, or that Sarr Juah Brown’s right to dower out of the aforesaid estate was challenged. Notwithstanding this fact, the court on April 26, 196o, proceeded to institute an investigation into whether or not she was legally married to the late Mr. Brown in accordance with native customary laws. This strange and unsolicited investigation continued for several weeks; but before it could be terminated, the commissioner of probate resigned and was replaced by His Honor, J. Gbarflen Davies who as counsel, filed the petition for Joe Poppoh Pennoh and Blammoh Saymu. In keeping with statute, Stipendiary Magistrate Peter Bonner Jallah was invited to preside over the continuation of the investigation. On January 18, 186r, Magistrate Jallah assigned ruling in the matter; and on the 25th of that month he gave the following ruling: “I have examined with considerable diligence the evidence produced at the trial ; and in keeping with native customary law, it is the opinion of this court that Mme. Sarr Juah Brown is the legal wife of the decedent, Solomon Y. Brown, and that, under the law, she is entitled to her dower out of the estate of her late husband aforesaid.” To this ruling, Joe Poppoh Pennoh and Blammoh LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 239 Sayrnu took exceptions, and have appealed from it to the Supreme Court. The briefs filed and argued here by both sides have raised several issues which, according to our procedure, should have been pleaded in the court below. In the first place, there is no showing as to how Joe Poppoh Pennoh and Blammoh Saymu came to be parties opposing the petition filed by Sarr Juah Brown for the admeasurement of dower. In the second place, the several issues involving native customary laws, with respect to rights of a dowry wife according to customs of the Kroo tribe, which were argued here, were never pleaded by the parties so as to give the probate court jurisdiction over them. Had these issues been pleaded in the probate court, and had they been passed upon below, we would not have hesitated to determine them on appeal. Then again, the rights of a woman who had lived continuously with a man for over 20 years without having been married to him civilly or according to native customary law, urged and insisted upon in appellee’s brief, are not set forth in any pleadings filed in this case; nor is there anything to show that anyone disputed a wife’s legal right to one-third of her husband’s property in keeping with statute. Yet all of these issues were raised here for the first time. This Court has repeatedly held that a judgment, to conclude a party against whom it is rendered, must determine an issue joined between that party and an adversary in interest. Issue can only be joined in a court of record by complainant or petitioner filing the proper pleading asking the court to grant a right or give relief or redress, and by defendant or respondent challenging that right in an answering pleading, praying the court to refuse the relief or redress sought in the complaint or petition. No court has authority to assume jurisdiction over defenses not pleaded or properly raised before it; nor should a court, sua sponte, raise issues upon which it must pass. In order to give a court jurisdiction over an issue, it must 240 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS have been raised in the pleadings. See Tubman v. Murdoch, [1934] LRSC 26; 4 L.L.R. 179 (1934). In this case there is no challenging pleading to Sarr Juah Brown’s petition, and no opposing party appearing of record ; yet the court proceeded to render judgment and decide an issue that was never in controversy. It is clear from the record of the investigation that Joe Poppoh Pennoh and Blammoh Saymu desire to challenge Sarr Juah Brown’s right to dower. They have contended that she was never a legal wife of the deceased and therefore not entitled to enjoy any rights of a widow; they have relied upon native custom, especially of the Kroo tribe, to back their contentions. Why, then, could all of these issues not have been raised in a regular pleadings so as to give the probate court original and regular jurisdiction? The only issue which could have been raised on appeal before this Court is whether Sarr Juah Brown’s petition for the admeasurement of dower should be granted or denied ; but this issue could not be raised on appeal unless it had been contested in the court below. If there was no challenge to the petition, what was the basis of the appeal? The investigation instituted by Commissioner Fiske could not have made an issue of the grounds of objections to the petitioner’s prayer, although several persons testified against granting of said petition; nor could Magistrate Jallah’s ruling in the investigation make Joe Poppoh Pennoh and Blammoh Saymu legal objectants to the petition, even though they appealed from said ruling. Jurisdiction is not conferred by a court, but rather the law confers jurisdiction over the issues and the parties upon the court. The Constitution of Liberia does not authorize the Supreme Court to take original jurisdiction over issues not pleaded and decided in a subordinate court, except in specified cases. Consequently we find ourselves unable LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 241 to review the many interesting issues raised in the briefs on both sides, although we would like to do so. We will, therefore, reverse the judgment rendered in the court below, and remand the petition of Sarr Juah Brown, with instructions that any objections thereto should be filed in the probate court in keeping with procedure in such cases made and provided. And any such objections should be filed nunc pro tunc, as of the date of the receipt of this mandate from the Supreme Court. Costs will abide final determination. Reversed and remanded.