FAROUK KANAWATY, H. LOOSER, as Agent of Looser & Co. (Liberia) Ltd., His Honor, SAMUEL B. COLE, Circuit Judge Presiding by Assignment over the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, and URIAS N. DIXON, Sheriff, Montserrado County, Appellants, v. PINCKNEY KING, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM ORDER IN CHAMBERS ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued November 14, 1960. Decided December 16, 1960. 1. Prohibition will lie to restrain enforcement of a void judgment where no other remedy is available. 2. A court has no power to alter or interfere with a judgment of another court of concurrent jurisdiction. 3. An application for a writ of prohibition must be duly verified and cannot be granted if not verified. 4. Upon an unverified application for a writ of prohibition the Supreme Court may, in the interest of justice and in the exercise of its discretionary powers, direct the court below to correct gross irregularities or errors arising from the attempted enforcement of a void judgment. 5. When a court, with the assent of the holder of an unexecuted judgment, has accepted a postdated check in satisfaction of the judgment, it will be deemed satisfied, and, if the check is subsequently dishonored, the holder of the judgment can obtain relief only through an action upon the dishonored instrument, and not upon such bond as may have been posted to assure satisfaction of the judgments. 6. An obligation due and owing on a bond cannot be legally enforced except by due process of law including an opportunity for the debtor to appear and be heard by a court of competent jurisdiction. On appeal from an order in Chambers denying an application for a writ of prohibition with respect to the execution of a judgment in an action of debt by attachment, but ordering the court below to resume jurisdiction and take action as directed in the interest of justice, order affirmed. T. Gyibli Collins for appellants. C. Abayomi Cassell for appellees. Albert Reeves and 242 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the opinion of the Court. It is a well settled principle that courts have no power to interfere with the judgments and decrees of other courts of concurrent jurisdiction. This Court has over and again emphasized this principle, so that judges of subordinate courts should understand the limitations of their jurisdiction and refrain from interfering with matters already disposed of by other courts of the same functions and authority. It is hoped, however, that this evil that is liable to loom into unnecessary complications will be guarded against in the future, since the jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law and not by consent of the parties. This is an appeal that has come before the full bench on exceptions taken against an order of Mr. Justice Pierre, delivered in Chambers on August is, 196o. It grows out of a petition filed by Pinckney King praying for the issuance of the writ of prohibition. We herein summarize the allegations set forth in the said petition : i. That Farouk Kanawaty, a building contractor of Monrovia, was sued by Looser & Company (Liberia) Ltd., a mercantile firm doing business in Monrovia, in an action of debt by attachment; and that judgment of the court below was rendered in favor of plaintiff. 2. That defendant was required by the sheriff of Montserrado County to file a payment bond, which bond petitioner in these proceedings signed as surety. That the defendant-principal had been taken before His Honor, Judge John A. Dennis, at the March, 196o, term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, the same term in which the aforesaid judgment was rendered against his principal, and there he made payment of costs and part of the debt including the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 243 sheriff’s collection fees on the execution, and tendered a postdated check on the Bank of Monrovia, Inc., Monrovia, for the remaining portion of the debt in complete settlement of the judgment of the court, which postdated check was received by the court, and both his principal and himself, the within petitioner, were thereupon released by the court from further obligation; but being laymen, they did not understand the law to request the return of their bond ; and that the court thereafter adjourned and the said Judge Dennis went out of term. 3. That to the embarrassment and disappointment of the petitioner, His Honor, Judge Samuel B. Cole, presiding over the June, 1960, term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, had reopened the identical matter that had been closed by Judge Dennis at the March, 1960, term of the said court, and ordered petitioner to pay the same amount for which the postdated check was given, because the sheriff reported that, upon presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment, he was informed that Farouk Kanawaty, the defendant-principal, had no funds thereat. That regardless of the explanation he endeavored to give the court, Judge Cole had ordered a writ of sale issued against him for his property to be sold in satisfaction of the execution issued against the defendant; therefore he sought the issuance of the writ of prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the ruling of Judge Cole. Respondents, when summoned, appeared and filed their returns in which they stated in substance : 1. That petitioner’s petition was insufficient in that it failed to set out (a) want of jurisdiction; (b) that the judge exceeded his jurisdiction; or (c) that he proceeded by improper rule; and that the pur- 244 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS pose of the writ is only to restrain an unlawful exercise of judicial functions by an inferior tribunal. 2. That a writ of prohibition will not lie to restrain the enforcement of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. 3. That the preliminary writ was improvidently granted by the Justice presiding in Chambers, and should be quashed because petitioner’s petition was not verified by himself but rather by his counsel, and the same was not stamped as the law requires. Those were the arguments which the Justice presiding in Chambers passed upon in a very elaborate and comprehensive ruling which we feel covered every aspect of the matter. The respondents, however, excepted to that ruling, and have carried the case on appeal before us en banc. Before we undertake to express our opinion, we quote the concluding portion of the ruling on which this case has reached us : “We come now to consider the contention that the writ should not issue to restrain the enforcement of a judgment. On this point respondents’ counsel has relied upon the following authority. ” ‘The enforcement of a judgment, where there is a remedy by appeal or otherwise, or the enforcement of an execution issued thereon where there is a remedy by motion to quash, will not be restrained by prohibition. But if there is no other remedy available to the party aggrieved; prohibition will lie to restrain the enforcement of a void decree or judgment.’ 32 CYC. 621-622 Prohibition. “We are in complete agreement with this position. Prohibition will not restrain the enforcement of a valid judgment or decree ; but no court of law or equity will enforce a void or invalid judgment. The execution which Judge Cole sought to enforce, had already been nullified by his colleague who had issued it; so LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 245 its legal effectiveness had been rendered invalid ; and besides, he was without legal authority to review and set aside what his colleague had done without exceeding his jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, no court should allow such an enforcement. It is clear from the above that Mr. King, the petitioner, was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, in the matter out of which these proceedings have grown. The fact that his bond was still in court does not make that bond valid to hold the check which the bond guaranteed, to hold the principal to the bond, and also to hold Mr. King as the surety. The unfairness of the entire situation is so apparent that further comment is unnecessary. “A further point insisted upon in the returns is that the petition was not stamped and that it was not verified by the petitioner as the law requirei in all matters on prohibition. We have examined the petition and the affidavit, and we find that both were indeed stamped ; so we will pursue this point no further. But the petition was not verified, although both our statutes and the rules of this Court require that all applications for prohibition must be verified by the petitioner. (See : 1956 Code, tit. 6, � 1221; R. Sup. Ct. XII (2), 13 L.L.R. 693, 704 (1959). “Under the law controlling, we could not grant the writ of prohibition requested by an application which had so flagrantly violated the controlling statute. On the other hand, we feel that it is our duty to take such action and give such a ruling as would correct patent miscarriage of justice in the court below. We also feel that to fail to give some relief would be perpetuating the gross injustice already committed against the petitioner, and would also deprive the plaintiffrespondent of that proper legal redress which his action of debt sought in the court below. The courts 246 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS of this country have a solemn duty to litigants coming before them, and the performance of that duty should be executed in keeping with law and procedure. “In view of the foregoing, we find ourselves unable to grant the petition for a writ of prohibition on the application as filed ; however, we cannot overlook the patent irregularities committed in the court below, against the interests of both the plaintiff and the surety to the defendant’s bond in the action of debt. It is therefore our order that the clerk of this Court send a mandate to the court below commanding the judge assigned therein to resume jurisdiction over the action of debt and to return Mr. King’s bond. He will then have the defendant come into court and make good the payment of the check he has issued in satisfaction of the debt he was sued for ; and upon failure, the court will then proceed to hold him in contempt for having attempted to deceive by the issuance of the check, thereby making the court a party to fraud. He will then be confined in prison until he can purge himself of the contempt. “Because we feel, there was merit in the ground laid in the petition, which said petition, however, is not properly verified, we have disallowed any costs in these proceedings. And it is so ordered.” After having closely inspected the records and heard arguments in the case, we have not been able to discern the reasons which prompted the respondents to except to such a ruling, because in the first place, we are in perfect agreement that Judge Dennis, presiding over the March, 196o, term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, having finalized the case of debt by attachment and gone out of term, it was contrary to our procedure and law for Judge Cole to have assumed jurisdiction over the same matter at the June, 196o, term of the same court. Besides that imprudent act of the judge which led to his rendering a void judgment, he never afforded the petitioner his day LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 247 in court, a principle as hoary with age as the law itself, and a right which could not be denied. And whereas the peremptory writ was denied mainly because the petitioner did not verify his petition, yet the ruling seems to import the exercise of sound discretion in correcting the gross miscarriage of justice in the court below. Respondents’ counsel, whilst arguing strongly, held the view that the postdated check was accepted as a guarantee for the payment of the money, and not in settlement of the execution ; and that, therefore, Judge Cole was of right entitled to resume jurisdiction and issue the writ for sale of the surety’s property, citing in support of this contention 17 CYC. 1391-93 and 3o CYC. 1187 which refer to media of payment and condition of payment under bond. This implied that the condition and media of payment should have been made by cash moneys in circulation and not by check. We feel that such an argument is baseless because, being present in court and raising no issue against the acceptance of the check at the proper time when the court received it, the respondents would obviously be barred against raising such an issue before an appellate court. Hence there arises no necessity for us to review the authorities cited. It was the duty of the court to have obtained certification of the check before it was accepted ; and if the court failed in that wise to do that which it should have done, it was the place of counsel for the plaintiff below, now one of the respondents, as the party whose interest was directly concerned, to have requested this privilege of the court for the purpose of seeing his interest secured ; and where this was not done, the postdated check accepted by the court discharged the principal and his surety to the bond without any contingency. We cannot agree that the check was accepted as a mere guarantee. “It is well settled that one paying a negotiable instrument has the right to, and should require, production of surrender of the instrument. With respect to registered bonds, it has been held that where there is 248 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS no express provision in the instrument making surrender a condition to payment, such a condition may fairly be implied.” 8 AM. JUR. 732 Bonds � 62. Under the authority cited, supra, even where the bond remains in the court and the negotiable payment has been accepted by the court, it is implied that the condition of the bond has been fulfilled and it has been discharged. Even if the conditions of the bond had not been met, an action of contract would have been the proper remedy ; and petitioner should have been given his day in court by due process of law to show why his bond should not be forfeited ; and here is what our statute requires in the premises : “Whenever a person is bound under a penalty that he or any other person shall do or omit any act and the obligation is violated, or whenever any person is bound in any sum of money, the obligation to be released or void, on the omission or doing of any act by himself or any other person, in case of a breach of the contract or condition, an action for breach of contract shall be the proper remedy. In such action the plaintiff may recover the amount of the damages sustained by him in consequence of the act or omission complained of, and no more, even though the penalty or sum in which the party is bound, may exceed such amount of damages.” 1956 Code, tit. 7, � 4. Under the statutory provision quoted, supra, if there did exist a genuine bond, and its terms had been violated by the principal and his surety, the court should not have proceeded as was done in the absence of both the principal and his surety. This Court, having therefore considered all of the facts and circumstances involved in this case, has no alternative other than to affirm the ruling made by the Justice presiding in Chambers with costs against the respondents. And it is hereby so ordered. Affirmed.