DANETTA C. SMALLWOOD, Appellant, v. R. F. D. SMALLWOOD, Appellee.

JUDGMENT WITHOUT OPINION. Decided December 3, 1976.* At the call of this case on November 22, 1976, the appellant appeared for herself and gave notice that her new lawyer was sick, and asked for continuance on that ground. Counsellor J. Dossen Richards, Joseph P. H. Findley and Raymond Hoggard appeared for the appellee and moved the Court to deny the continuance asked for on the following grounds : 1. Because no notice of change of counsel had been served on the appellee in keeping with statute. 1956 Code 6:229. 2. That the continuance had been asked for in bad faith, in that the counsel, referred to as “new,” Counsellor Wollor, had previously, on October Is, filed petition for mandamus in this case, so that the contention that Counsellor Wollor is a new counsel in the case is not true. 3. That on November 8, 1976, the Court in passing on one of several motions, granted continuance in the following ruling : “In view of the circumstances the Court feels justified in granting her (appellant) this request, that whether or not she retains a lawyer to represent her interest, this is an assignment to her. The matter will be heard at the end of this period based upon her prayer. . . . The matter is hereby suspended until the 22nd instant at 9 :oo A.M.” 4. That the medical certificate filed by Counsellor Woller in this new motion for continuance is spurious, � Mr. Justice Horace, having rccused himself, did not participate in the decision. 477 478 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS in that it does not state any definite time within which the counsel might be well enough to appear before the Court. The certificate states that Counsellor Wollor “is not fit for duty,” and that “he should report to the hospital for treatment on” a date not mentioned. The Court after hearing argument on these and other grounds, suspended hearing on the motion for continuance of the case, and ordered the Clerk to notify Counsellor Wollor to be present at 3 o’clock in the afternoon to show cause why the motion to dismiss his appeal should not be heard. When the Court met in the afternoon, not only had Counsellor Wollor failed to appear, but he had also failed to acknowledge the assignment served on him by the ministerial officer. The Court therefore proceeded to pass upon appellee’s action to dismiss the appeal, which had been filed previously. Grounds for the motion to dismiss are: “(1 ) That the bill of exceptions was filed beyond the time required by statute for the taking of this jurisdictional step; and therefore the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Caulker v. Republic, [1936] LRSC 12; 5 LLR 145 (1936). “(z) That no valid appeal bond was filed, nor was appellant’s counsel licensed to have prepared the bill of exceptions.” There is no resistance to this motion. It is therefore adjudged that the motion to dismiss should be and the same is hereby granted, and the appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellant. And the Clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate to the trial court, commanding the judge therein to resume jurisdiction over the cause and enforce the judgment. And it is so ordered.