HIS HONOUR JOHNNIE N. LEWIS, Assigned Circuit Judge, Eighth Judicial Circuit, and FOFANA W. DOLO, Appellants/Respondents, v. HIS HONOUR PAYE D. TROKPAO, Judge, Debt Court for Nimba County, Appellee/Petitioner.

APPEAL FROM THE RULINGS OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND A BILL OF INFORMATION.

Heard: May 17, 1979. Decided: June 14, 1979.

1. Even though a court of record has the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus, said writ should not be issued when the prisoner is legally detained, such as, where the prisoner is detained pursuant to the orders of a court of concurrent jurisdiction.
2. Lower courts have the duty to respect and honor the perquisites of the Supreme Court and one such duty is to comply with all orders emanating from the Chambers Justice or the Full Bench.
3. Prohibition will lie to prohibit and restrain a lower court from undoing the act of another court of concurrent jurisdiction, such as the release of an offender from prison through the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
4. A judge shall not be held civilly liable for acts done in the exercise of his judicial function where he has jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous such acts might be. The law is settled that no action can be maintained against a judge or any court, nor should he be mulcted in costs or other forms of damages because of judgments rendered by him.
5. The law provides only one instance in which a judge might be liable in damages and that is where he refuses to issue a writ of habeas corpus without good and sufficient legal reason as specifically provided by statute.

In the enforcement of a judgment debt, the Debt Court Judge for Nimba County had the judgment debtor imprisoned. The judgment debtor applied to the Circuit Court Judge presiding over the Eight Judicial Circuit, Nimba County, for the writ of habeas corpus. The writ was granted and the judgment debtor was released from prison. The debt court judge ordered the re-arrest of the judgment debtor, and this was done. Thereupon, the circuit court judge held the debt court judge and his clerk in contempt of court, had them arrested and brought to the circuit court. The debt court judge thereupon fled to the Chambers Jus-tice for the writ of prohibition. The writ was issued and the circuit court judge was commanded to refrain from further proceeding in the matter and to file his returns. No returns were filed but the judgment debtor was released from prison subsequent to the service of the writ of prohibition, even though the circuit court judge’s second order for the release of the judgment debtor was issued before the service of the writ of prohibition. For this release of the judgment debtor after the service of the writ of prohibition, the debt court judge filed information against the circuit court judge.
When the matter was assigned for hearing before the Chambers Justice, the circuit court judge did not appear. Hence, the hearing was held and rulings made in both the prohibition proceeding and the information proceeding in his absence. For the prohibition proceeding, the circuit court judge was adjudged liable and ordered to pay a fine of $500.00. For the information proceeding, again the circuit court judge was found liable and ordered to either have the judgment debtor rearrested or satisfy the judgment debt. However, the judgment debtor had by then left Liberia.

On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that although the circuit court judge, as a judge of a court of record, had the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus, he did so erroneously in the instant case because the judgment debtor was in prison upon the orders of a judge of competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court also found that the circuit court judge disobeyed the writ of prohibition and disrespected the orders of the Chambers Justice. For this reason, the fine of $500.00 was affirmed. As for the information proceeding, the Supreme Court again found that the circuit court judge had disobeyed the orders of the Chambers Justice but held that a judge, when exercising a judicial authority or function, cannot be held liable in civil damages. Therefore, the circuit court judge should not be made to satisfy the judgment against the judgment debtor in the debt case, but rather the judgment debtor should be required by the debt court to satisfy the judgment upon returning to Liberia.

Based on these reasons, the ruling in the prohibition proceeding was affirmed and the ruling in the information proceeding was reversed.

Judge Johnnie N. Lewis pro se. Joseph J. F. Chesson appeared for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE HENRIES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellee, His Honour, Paye D. Trokpao, Judge of the Debt Court, Nimba County, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in which he alleged, inter alia, that he had heard and determined an action of debt involving Anthony Jonah, plaintiff, and Fofana W. Dolo, defendant, and adjudged Fofana W. Dolo liable to pay the amount of $1,043.48 to Anthony Jonah, plus costs of court. After a writ of execution for the enforcement of the judgment had proved ineffective, Fofana W. Dolo, the judgment debtor was arrested and jailed until he could satisfy the judgment. Subsequently, Dolo petitioned the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court for Nimba County for a writ of habeas corpus. That petition was heard by His Honour Johnnie N. Lewis, assigned Circuit Judge, and co-appellant in this prohibition proceeding. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was granted and Fofana W. Dolo, the judgment debtor, was ordered released.

In the meantime, Judge Trokpao, appellee, wrote two letters, one on June 6, 1978 and the other on June 9, 1978, informing Judge Lewis that Fofana W. Dolo was incarcerated as a result of his being unable to satisfy a judgment debt. These letters were mailed, but it is not known whether they were received before the termination of the habeas corpus proceeding.

In passing, one wonders why, knowing the slow mail delivery system in certain parts of the country, the debt court judge did not have these letters hand delivered to the Circuit Court Judge, since both courts are not far apart in the city of Sanniquellie. In any event, upon hearing that the judgment debtor had been released, the debt court judge had him rearrested and jailed. The circuit court judge then had the clerk and judge of the debt court arrested to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for re-arresting Fofana W. Dolo. The debt court judge alleged that he was arrested inside the debt court and dragged into the circuit court where he was put on the stand and questioned.
For the reasons stated above, the debt court judge fled to the Chambers Justice and prayed for a writ of prohibition. The writ was issued and the circuit court judge was ordered to file returns to the petition on or before June 27, 1978. No returns were filed.
The debt court judge later filed a bill of information in the Chambers of Mrs. Justice Brooks-Randolph, alleging in sub-stance that despite the service of the alternative writ of prohibition and the stay order on the circuit court judge, the judgment debtor was again released and had later left Liberia. This time, returns were filed in the information proceeding.

Mrs. Justice Brooks-Randolph heard both the information and the prohibition proceedings and ruled in the latter that the circuit court judge pay a fine of $500.00 for the crippling effect his action had on the debt court, and in the former that the circuit court judge return the judgment debtor to jail or pay the amount for which the prisoner was liable. The circuit court judge was not present at the hearings or the renditions of the rulings of the Chambers Justice. However, another lawyer was asked to take the ruling, and he announced appeal from these rulings to the Full Bench on behalf of the circuit court judge.

At the call of the proceedings, upon application of the appellants, the bill of information and the petition for prohibition were consolidated. There it was discovered that a submission had been filed by the circuit court judge alleging that because he was not informed by a notice of assignment of the day and time of the hearing before the Chambers Justice, he was denied his day in court. He therefore prayed that the rulings of the Chambers Justice be vacated, the writ quashed and the information dismissed. The Court said that it would not hear the submission since the matters out of which the submission grew had been consolidated and sent to the Court en banc on appeal, and that his contention of being denied his day in court would be considered during the review of the Chambers Justice’s rulings.

A review of the records before us shows that according to the returns of the deputy marshal of the Supreme Court, a writ of prohibition was served on the circuit court judge on the 20th day of June, A. D. 1978, and the bill of information, which mentioned the prohibition and its service on him, was served on August 4, 1978. Two telegrams addressed to the circuit court judge, dated November 9 and 11, respectively, were sent to Greenville, Sinoe County, the judge’s residence, by the Chief Clerk of this Court. The first informed him that the proceedings before the Chambers Justice would be heard on November 10, at 3:00 p.m., and the second informed him of a reassignment for Monday, November 13.

The circuit court judge, co-appellant before this Court and co-respondent in both the prohibition and information proceedings, argued that he had left Sinoe for Lower Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, but there is no showing when he left Sinoe or that he did not receive either of the telegrams before he left Sinoe. Even if he were denied his day in court by the Chambers Justice, this was cured by the announcement of an appeal from her ruling on his behalf and his appearance before the Full Bench. Therefore, the submission must fall.
The records show that the circuit court judge did not file any returns to the writ of prohibition, which was served on him, and he has not given any satisfactory reason for his failure to file his returns.

As for the writ of habeas corpus, it was within the power of the circuit court judge, who was presiding over a court of record, to issue the writ. Assuming, as the circuit court judge argued, that the returns to the writ of habeas corpus did not clearly state the reason for the prisoner being detained, the circuit court’s minutes of June 9, 1978, in the contempt proceeding against Judge Trokpao and his clerk, do show that he informed the circuit court judge that the petitioner in the habeas corpus proceeding against Judge Trokpao was imprisoned as a result of a judgment entered against him by the debt court. In spite of this information that the prisoner was being detained upon orders of a court of competent jurisdiction, the circuit court judge, on June 17, 1978 ordered the prisoner released. The prisoner was actually released on June 22, according to the release signed by the jailer.

The law is clear that the writ of habeas corpus “shall not issue if the court or judge knows, either from the proceeding had upon a writ recently issued or from other judicial proceeding within the personal knowledge of such court or judge, that such confinement, detention, or custody is legal.” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:16.55.
Furthermore, in spite of the service of the alternative writ of prohibition on the circuit court judge on June 20, requiring him to refrain from proceeding in the matter, he allowed the prisoner to be released on June 22. The circuit court judge contended that he did not disobey the writ of prohibition because he had ordered the prisoner released on June 17, three days prior to the service of the writ on him. While, according to the records, it is true that he ordered the prisoner’s release on June 17, there is no explanation for the release not being carried out until June 22. It appears to us that if the circuit court judge’s order had been given to the clerk of court on June 17, then the clerk must not have sent the order to the jailer until June 22. If after having been served with the alternative writ on June 20 the judge had inquired from the clerk about the prisoner’s whereabouts, he would have been informed that the prisoner was still being detained and the circuit court judge would have rescinded his order for the release of the prisoner. In the face of the records before this Court, the circuit court judge’s submission that he did not disobey the writ of prohibition is baseless and unfounded.

This Court has held that judges of lower courts are required to respect the perquisites of the Supreme Court. Morris et al. v. Saad and Cooper, 13 LLR 135 (1958). Because of the circuit court judge’s violation of the writ, and his failure to file returns thereto or to appear for the hearing of same, the penalty imposed by the Chambers Justice is hereby affirmed.
While this is clearly a case in which prohibition would normally lie, the peremptory writ cannot be issued because it would be of no avail since the judgment debtor has been released and has fled from Liberia. This, however, does not absolve him from satisfying the judgment rendered against him should he return to this country.

We refrain from considering the issue whether it was proper for the circuit court judge to initiate contempt proceeding against the debt court judge because it is not necessary to the determination of the matters before us; and since no ruling has been made in the contempt proceeding, the issue is not properly before us.

As to the ruling of the Chambers Justice in the information proceeding ordering the judge to pay the amount owed by the judgment debtor, it is our opinion that it would be improper to hold a judge civilly liable for acts done in the exercise of his judicial function where he has jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous such acts might be. The law is settled that no action can be maintained against a judge or any court, nor should he be mulcted in costs or other forms of damages, because of judgments rendered by him. This principle rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary and to ensure that judges will act on their own free, unbiased convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehensions of consequences. Generally this exemption from liability extends to all grades of judges. 46 AM JUR 2d., Judges, §§72,73; Brown v. Brown, [1861] LRSC 1; 1 LLR 1 (1861).

Our law provides for only one instance in which a judge might be liable in damages, and that is where he refuses to issue a writ of habeas corpus without good and sufficient legal cause as provided by statute. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:16.56.
In view of the foregoing, the ruling of the Chambers Justice in the prohibition proceeding is affirmed, but the ruling of the Chambers Justice in the information proceeding is hereby reversed. Costs disallowed. And it is so ordered.

Prohibition granted; information denied.