PRINCE A. WILSON, Appellant, v. FIRESTONE PLANTATIONS COMPANY and THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPEALS, Ministry of Labour, Appellees.

APPEAL FORM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: April 1 & 2, 1986. Decided: July 31, 1986.

1. Where the contract is concluded between the employer and the employee for an indefinite period, the employer shall have the right to dismiss the employee on condition that he gives him two weeks written notice in the case of non-salaried employee and four weeks written notice in the case of a salaried employee, or payment in lieu of such notice.
2. An employer may dismiss an employee engaged for an indefinite period without notice, subject to payment only of wages due, where it is shown that the employee has been guilty of a serious breach of duty.
3. When an employee commits a serious breach of duty, the employer may terminate his services without notice or payment in lieu of notice if the contracts of employment is for an indefinite period.
4. Gross breaches of duty committed by the employee relieve the employer from payment of compensation upon dismissal of an employee.
5. Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can desire and are resorted to by one individual to gain an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of the truth. In its general or generic sense, it comprises all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another.
6. Fraud is any cunning deception or artifice used to circumvent, cheat or deceive another.
7. Constructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt of the party committing the fraud, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interest. Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty where a relationship of trust and confidence exist.
8. The term ‘due process of law’ is synonymous with the ‘law of the land’. It is a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiring, and renders judgment only after trial.
9. The essential element of due process of law are notice, and an opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case .
10. The best evidence which the case admits of must always be produced; that is, no evidence is sufficient which supposes the existence of better evidence.
11. A bill of exceptions is a specification of the exceptions made to the judgment, decision, order, ruling, or other matter excepted to on the trial and relied upon for the appeal together with a statement of the basis of the exceptions. The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within ten days after the rendition of judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court.
12. While it is true that a bill of exceptions does not necessarily require a special form, practice in this jurisdiction is that a bill of exceptions, no matter how many counts it contains, is usually begun with an opening paragraph, followed by either a one-count exception or multiple counts exceptions, whether alphabetized or enumerated, with a concluding paragraph containing the appellant’s prayer for its approvals.
13. The approval by the trial judge of a bill of exceptions without express reservations admits of the correctness of every material statement which precedes his signature.
14. When the judge signs the bill of exceptions, he thereby adopts and certifies every material statement in the bill which precedes his signature.
15. Judges should remember that a bill of exceptions is a formal statement in writing of the exception taken to the opinion, decisions or direction of the judge delivered during the trial of the cause; and when same is signed by the trial judge without reservations, he admits to its correctness.
16. It is settled law that a court may correct its records or judgment during term time. A court may alter its judgment at any time before it is entered or, if it is entered, before it is made final, but it should not be allowed to do so without notice to both parties.
17. A judgment is the law’s last word in a judicial controversy. It is the result of the application of legal principles to the set of facts presented to the court. It may be defined as the court’s official and final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties, as those rights and obligations presently exist, upon matters submitted to the court in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters in the record, as they appear from the evidence in the case and as found by the court .
18. A judgment is irregular where its rendition is contrary to the course and practice of the courts; that is, where proper rules of practice have not been followed or where some necessary act has been omitted or has been done in an improper manner
19. The validity of a judgment may be affected by fraud in the obtainment thereof, or by collusion between the parties, especially where the court was imposed upon by either of the parties, and the complaining party was prevented from having his interest fairly presented or fully considered by the court .
20. It is one of the fundamental rules of law as well as of pleading and practice that issues must be joined before the cause can be legally tried, and it is an equally basic rule of law that all issues of law must first be disposed of by the court before considering the issues of facts.
21. Before an employee can be dismissed by his employer for having allegedly committed a gross breach of duty, there must be an investigation properly conducted at the place of business of the employer, otherwise the dismissal of the employee will be deemed legally unjustified.
22. Where wrongful dismissal is alleged, the Board of General Appeals shall have power to order reinstatement but may order payment of reasonable compensation to the aggrieved employee in lieu of reinstatement. The party against whom the order is made shall have the right of election to reinstate or pay such compensation.
23. This Court has no authority to extrapolate the intent of the Legislature beyond the specific wording of a statute. This limitation is all the more mandatory where the statute in question specifies the only manner in which an act is to be performed. Our law does not give us authority either to add or take from what the Legislature has commanded unless the said command breaches provisions of the Constitution, and in such case the constitutional issue must be raised squarely.

The appellant, who was employed by the appellee for a period of ten years, was dismissed for allegedly engaging in fraudulent acts involving the purchasing of tickets from a travel agency contrary to the appellee’s regular purchasing procedures. The appellant thereupon filed a wrongful dismissal complaint with the Ministry of Labor. The hearing officer found the appellee liable for wrongfully dismissing the appellant and awarded the appellee an amount of $25,012.00. The appellee appealed to the Board of General Appeals, which affirm the finding of the hearing officer, but reduced the award to $12,457.00. Being dissatisfied with the said ruling of the Board, the appellant sought judicial review by the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Montserrado County.

On appeal the trail judge reversed the ruling of the Board and reinstated the ruling of the hearing officer. The appellant excepted to the judge’s ruling and announced an appeal to the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the trial judge, sua sponte and without notice to the parties, reversed his earlier ruling and instead confirmed the ruling of the Board of General Appeals.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court upholding the decision of the Board of General Appeals and reinstated and confirmed the ruling of the hearing officer.

The Adighibe Law Firm appeared for the appellant. The Carlor Gordon Hne & Teewia Law Offices and George E. Henries appeared for the appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BIDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a case of wrongful dismissal, originating from the hearing officer of the Ministry of Labor, assigned at Harbel, Firestone Plantations Company, Republic of Liberia. It is before this Honorable Court on appeal on a bill of exceptions containing six counts. We shall come to the bill of exceptions later on in this opinion. Firestone Plantations Company is co-appellee in these proceedings.

The proceedings progressed from the ruling of the aforesaid hearing officer through the Board of General Appeals, Ministry of Labour, to the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County, on a Petition for Judicial Review.

According to the records certified to this Court, the following facts were culled out:

Prince A. Wilson, appellant, a Liberian citizen, was on July 1, 1972, employed by co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company as a secretary. Because of his efficiency and dedication to duty, coupled with ten (10) years of continuous and faithful services rendered, appellant was elevated to the position of personnel services superintendent with a monthly salary of $965.00 and classified as a staff employee. As a further appreciation of his dedicated services rendered to co-appellee, Firestone Plantations Company, appellant was commended as a “DEDICATED EMPLOYEE WHO CONTINUES TO DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE’ RESULTS IN CARRYING OUT HIS DUTIES”. He was therefore considered . . . A GOOD ‘COMPANY MAN’ AND A HARD WORKING EMPLOYEE”.

However, six months later, that is, on January 6, 1983, appellant received a letter of dismissal from co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company terminating his services. It reads thus:

“Jan. 6, 1983
Mr. P.A. Wilson
Firestone Plantations Company
Harbel, Liberia
Dear Mr. Wilson:
Sometime in December 1982 we received a letter dated December 24 from the West Africa Travel Agency stating that you, in your capacity as superintendent of personnel services, have obtained from them airline tickets under fictitious names without FPCO (Firestone Plantations Company) purchase orders under the pretext that they were being procured for public relations and that Firestone did not want these transactions to pass through its regular accounting procedure.

This fraudulent act on your part and in your capacity as an agent of Firestone, gives management no alternative but to terminate your services in order to preserve the credibility and integrity of the personnel department in particular and Firestone in general.

Accordingly, you are hereby requested to hand over to the personnel operations manager all properties of the company which are now in your possession, and vacate the company’s assigned house no later than January 31, 1983.

Please feel free to contact the personnel operations department concerning compensation for the number of days which you have worked (to date) in the month of January, 1983.
Kind regards, Very truly yours, FIRESTONE PLANTATIONS COMPANY /s/ E. Beysolow PERSONNEL OPERATIONS MANAGER APPROVED: /s/ C.M. Barbel EMPLOYEE RELATIONS MANAGER /s/ P. J. Bracewell, Sr. LEGAL ADVISOR”.

Based upon this letter of dismissal, appellant filed a complaint against co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company before the Ministry of Labor for wrongful dismissal. In accordance with Title 19-A, part 1, chapter 1, under section 1 of the Labor Practices Law of Liberia, the Labour Ministry’s hearing officer assigned at Harbel, Firestone, was instructed by the Ministry to investigate the complaint of appellant.

It is interesting to note here that the original letter of dismissal, substantially alleged that appellant did commit a fraudulent act, principally based upon a complaint filed against appellant with co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company by West Africa Travel Agency (WATA). WATA alleged that appellant obtained “airline tickets (from its agent) under fictitious names without Firestone Plantations Company purchase orders and under the pretext that they were being purchased for public relations . . .” There is no showing how many tickets were so obtained, or in what respect were they detrimental to coappellee’ s business interest.

Under section 1508 of the Labor Practices Law of Liberia, subsections (3), (5) and (6), page 72, it is provided:

“(3) Where the contract is concluded between the employer and the employee for an indefinite period, the employer shall have the right to dismiss the employee on condition that he gives him two weeks written notice in the case of non-salaried employee, and four weeks written notice in the case of a salaried employee or, payment in lieu of such notice.

(5) Notwithstanding the provision of section 1508 of this chapter an employer may dismiss an employee engaged for an indefinite period without notice, subject to payment only of wages due, where it is shown that the employee has been guilty (emphasis ours) of a serious breach of duty.

(6) The following acts and violations shall be deemed to be serious breaches of duty within the meaning of the preceding section entitling the employer to terminate without notice or pay in lieu of notice contracts of employment for an indefinite period:

(a) any of the acts or violations specifically set in subsection of this section;

(b) lack of skill or manifest inefficiency of the employee which makes impossible the fulfillment of his duties under the contract;

(c) if the employee commits any other serious offense against his obligations under the contract”.

Appellant, a salaried employee, falls under the category of an employee for an indefinite period, whose dismissal must fall within the scope of section 1508, subsections 3, 5 and 6 as herein above quoted.

We therefore come to the question of whether or not appellant was illegally dismissed? To aid us in arriving at the answer, we must take recourse to the law as well as the records certified to us by the court below. Under section 1508, subsection 2(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Labor Practices Law of Liberia, it is provided that:

“DISMISSAL of EMPLOYEES
2. The following acts and violations shall be deemed to be gross breaches of duty (without limiting the generality of the term) within the meaning of section 1 of this chapter and shall dispense the employer from payment of compensation for dismissal under the provisions of that section:

(a) any unprovoked assault by an employee upon the employer or his agents in the course of or arising out of employment;

(b) persistent disregard by an employee of the technical measures for safety of the staff of the undertaking, provided that the said measures have been embodied in rules posted as required by law and the employer or his agent have ordered the employee in writing to comply with the said rules;

(c) disclosure by an employee of the working secrets of the employer’s undertaking;

(d) absence of an employee for more than ten consecutive days (or more than 20 days over a period of six months) without good cause, in which case the employee shall be deemed to have terminated his contract. Save in the case of vis major, an employee shall be required to notify the employer or his agent of the reason for his absence”.

According to the records of the hearing officer, especially sheets 14 through 18, the following were observed: “CROSS EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVE

“Q. Mr. Witness, you have spread on record that Mr. Wilson admitted obtaining airline tickets from West Africa Travel Agency under fictitious names and without Firestone’s purchase orders. How did you obtain his said admission?

“A. Mr. Wilson was confronted by a team of management personnel of which, unfortunately, I was not a part at that time. Additionally, the letter from the West Africa Travel Agency as referred to throughout this investigation, copy of which has already been accepted into evidence, will show that the travel agency did indeed serve Mr. Wilson a copy.

“Q. Mr. Witness, as management representative, did Firestone call in a representative of the West Africa Travel Agency to confront Mr. Wilson since the travel agency alleged that they issued the tickets upon the instruction of Mr. Wilson? “A. To my knowledge, no meeting with Mr. Wilson involving a representative from the West Africa Travel Agency was held and this is to the best of my knowledge. “Q. Mr. Witness, in your statement in chief, you stated positively that Firestone did not pay the ticket bills. Are we to understand by this that Firestone did not suffer any financial loss in a transaction for which you accused and dismissed Wilson of having committed a fraudulent act and serious breach of his employment obligation? “A. It is true that Firestone did not pay the airline ticket bills referred to. In direct answer to the question, I would like to observe that we are dealing with the issue of semantics. Inherent in this act is an element of dishonesty which is tantamount to a crisis of confidence or serious breach of his employment obligation. The phrase ‘fraudulent act’ is used in this context to suggest, describe and establish the presence of dishonesty only but not in any manner to take up an issue of a criminal nature as far as Firestone Management chose to deal with the issue”. QUESTION BY HEARING OFFICER:

“Q. Mr. Witness, besides the fraudulent act for which Mr. Wilson, the complainant, was dismissed, can you remember as personnel operations manager any time where the complainant has involved himself into any other act contrary to the policy of FPCO?

“A. With all due respect to the hearing officer, I feel that this question is irrelevant from the standpoint that we were not asked through this investigation to address ourselves to anything other than the issue at hand. It seems to me that to discuss or introduce any issue which is not germane to discussion to this case will be most unfair to Mr. Wilson, to us as a management, and to the hearing officer himself for that matter”. Why this all important question by the hearing officer was so evasively answered by witness Beyslow, co-appellee’ s representative and appellant’s immediate supervisor, leaves one to wonder.

ANOTHER QUESTION BY THE HEARING OFFICER

“Q. Mr. Witness, are we correct to say the dismissal of Mr. P. A. Wilson, the complainant, was based upon the complaint from the West Africa Travel Agency, dated December 24, 1982, addressed to the controller of FPCO and annex “B” signed by one Joseph Peterson involving photograph of bills from annex “B-111, “B-4″, not so?

A. Yes, that is correct, sir.”

From the above quoted testimonies, it is evident that prior to his dismissal, appellant was not confronted with the accuser, the West Africa Travel Agency, whose letter to the co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company led to the dismissal of appellant. In other words, co-appellee made no effort to conduct an inhouse investigation to establish appellant’s guilt or innocence before dismissing him. The records also show that appellant was initially dismissed for an alleged fraudulent act, yet during the investigation before the hearing officer the reason for his dismissal was adroitly changed from an alleged commission of
“fraudulent act” to “serious breach of his employment obligations”. We are left in a quandary. What is fraud?

“Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can desire and are resorted to by one individual to gain an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of the truth. In its general or generic sense, it comprises all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting to damage to another. . . ” Fraud has also been defined as “any cunning deception or artifice used to circumvent, cheat or deceive another . . .37 C.J.S., Fraud, §1.

In the instant case, even though appellant was denied an opportunity to be heard, let alone defend himself, yet the assertion before the hearing officer for the first time that appellant was instead dismissed not for fraudulent act but for a “serious breach of his employment obligation”, did not vitiate the fact that fraud was proven. For according to the same law writers, fraud may be classified into several categories such as actual, constructive, intrinsic, etc.

“Constructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interest . . . Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty where a relationship of trust and confidence exist. . .” Ibid., § 2.

Whether the initial charge for which appellant was dismissed was a “fraudulent act” or conveniently changed to “serious breach of his employment obligation”, the onus of proving such charge or allegation still rested on co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company. It is an established rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who alleges the existence of a fact and his failure so to do must operate in favor of the accused.

The establishment of the guilt of the accused presupposes that a fair and impartial trial or hearing has been conducted, whether judicial or administrative, which must conform to existing laws. Under our system of justice, no one can be deprived of life, liberty or property except by due process of law.

Mr. Chief Justice Grimes, laying down the guideline for this Court regarding due process of law, in the case .Wolo v. Wolo[1937] LRSC 12; , 5 LLR 423, 428-29 (1937), had this to say:

“The term ‘due process of law’ is synonymous with the term the ‘law of the land’. “It is a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.. .

“The essential elements of due process of law are notice, and an opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case” . . . In the absence of these fundamental principles, “it is judicial usurpation and oppression and can never be upheld where justice is fairly administered.”

There is no showing that these fundamental principles were adhered to by co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company prior to appellant’s dismissal, nor was there established any evidence to prove that appellant’s dismissal falls within the scope and meaning of section 1508, subsection 2 of the Labor Practices Law as herein above quoted. As the records show, and according to the testimony of witness Winston Edward Beyslow, testifying for co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company before the hearing officer, appellant was never confronted with a representative from the West Africa Travel Agency, the accuser. Witness Beyslow who also testified that appellant admitted committing the so-called “breach of his employment obligation” before a team set up by co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company, stated on record that he (Beyslow) was not a member of that team. The records also show that no member of the self-same team was ever produced to testify against appellant before the hearing officer during the investigation even though both parties were represented by competent lawyers. The testimony of Mr. Beyslow, the principal witness of co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company, who also signed appellant’s letter of dismissal as personnel operations manager must crumble under the best evidence rule. Under the law, “the best evidence which the case admits of must always be produced; that is, no evidence is sufficient which supposes the existence of better evidence”. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1: 25.6(i). In this case, the team or a member thereof before whom appellant allegedly admitted committing the purported “fraudulent act”, or “serious breach of his employment obligation”, would have been the best evidence, not witness Beyslow who was not a member of the so-called team.

Now to the bill of exceptions: “A bill of exceptions is a specification of the exceptions made to the judgment, decision, order, ruling, or other matter excepted to on the trial and relied upon for the appeal together with a statement of the basis of the exceptions. The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within ten days after rendition of the judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court.” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.7.

While it is true that a bill of exceptions does not necessarily require a special form, Cole v. Williams,l0 LLR 191, 192 (1949), the traditional practice in our jurisdiction shows that a bill of exceptions, no matter how many counts it contains, is usually begun with an opening paragraph, followed by either a one-count exception or multiple counts exceptions, whether alphabetized or enumerated, with a concluding paragraph containing the appellant’s prayer.

The bill of exceptions in the case at bar presents a different characteristic. The six counts therein contained are preceded by some 19 unnumbered paragraphs containing several averments. For the benefit of this opinion, we hereunder quote firstly the relevant paragraph and secondly counts 2, 5 and 6 of the bill of exceptions:

“Petitioner (appellant) avers that after the above entitled cause of action was ‘CALLED FOR FINAL JUDGMENT” with all parties cited by regular notice of assignment served and returned served being present, Your Honor indicated that you forget your reading glasses and therefore would not read the entire ruling but would read the concluding portion ofthe court’s final judgment and later distribute same to the parties because the clerk had not made copies. Petitioner also avers that after borrowing a pair of eye glasses from Counselor David Dwanyen, Your Honor read the pertinent portion which petitioner, a shorthand secretary of considerable experience, took verbatim in shorthand and transcribed as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Board of General Appeals reducing the hearing officer’s award of 24 months salary to 11 months is hereby set aside. And in its place, the court confirms and affirms the hearing officers’s ruling awarding petitioner 24 months salary compensation at the rate of $965.00 per month, totaling $23,100.00 plus other benefits awarded by the Board of General Appeals against which no appeal was taken by co-respondent, that is, unclaimed vacation pay of $887.00 and January, 1983 salary of $965.00, making a grand total of $25,012.00.

It is the order of this court that co-respondent management company, Firestone Plantations Company, should immediately pay Petitioner Prince Wilson a total sum of $25,012.00 as detailed above. Costs against corespondent. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. . .”

“Petitioner also avers that after Your Honor had rendered the said final judgment and noted on court’s record “COURT’S FINAL JUDGMENT SEE RULING ATTACHED”, counsel for co-respondent Firestone Plantations Company, Counsellor J. D. Gordon of the Carlor, Gordon, Hne & Teewia Law Offices, reacted as follows: “To which final judgment of Your Honour respondent excepts and announces appeal to the Honourable People’s Supreme Court of Liberia, sitting in its March Term, A. D. 1985”. Your Honour immediately noted on the record: “THE COURT: The said appeal is hereby granted’. . . .”

“Petitioner further avers that on the same day and date, by order of Your Honour, a notice of assignment was issued, served and returned served on the parties, citing them to appear on the 1st. day of February, A. D. 1985, at the hour of 9:00 a. m. for “THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RULING IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSE OF ACTION”.

“Petitioner further avers that surprisingly when both parties appeared before Your Honour, in obedience to the notice of assignment to receive the court’s final judgment rendered on the 35th day jury session on Thursday, January 31, A.D. 1985, Your Honour failed to distribute copies of the said judgment and without any notice to the parties, Your Honour reopened the case, rendered another final judgment in the same case, reversing the previous final judgment as follows:

“COURT’S RULING: Having reconsidered my ruling in the aforementioned cause, the appeal in the said case is hereby affirmed and confirmed and the respondent company is ordered to reinstate the petitioner or pay him in lieu thereof $12,457.00 which is broken down as follows: 11 months pay at $965.00 per month totaling $10,615.00; unclaimed vacation pay, $887.00; January 1985 salary $965.00 And it is hereby so ordered. To which reconsideration of the court petitioner excepts and announces an appeal to the People’s Supreme Court of the Republic of Liberia. And submits. THE COURT: Noted, and appeal granted. MATTER SUSPENDED. Petitioner further avers that thereafter by order of Your Honor, copies of the said second final judgment in the same case rendered on the 36th day jury session, dated February 1, 1985, were distributed to the parties but Your Honor withheld the distribution of the first final judgment of court rendered on the 35th day jury session of January 31, 1985, which Your Honor noted on the record ‘SEE RULING ATTACHED’ and which ruling and final judgment of court had been appealed by the respondent herein named. Predicated upon the above stated facts and being dissatisfied with what seems to be strange happenings and precedent setting judicial act of Your Honor ever to occur in recent years in our law courts, as well as the obvious prejudice manifested in Your Honor’s second final judgment against petitioner and legal errors in your judicial review of the case, appellant respectfully submits hereunder several errors which Your Honor committed:

2. Petitioner also submits that Your Honor committed an illegal act and reversible error by sua sponte resuming jurisdiction over the said case and without an order from the Supreme Court, after Your Honor had noted on the records of the case that appeal announced by the respondent had been granted by you which appeal stays further action and divests you of jurisdiction over said case.”

5. Petitioner submits that Your Honor erred when you failed to pass on an issue of law specifically contained in count one of petitioner’s petition for judicial review that the Board of General Appeals did not give any reason for modifying the ruling of the hearing officer contrary to the statute and as required by the Supreme Court of Liberia, and therefore the modification is unjustified. This error of Your Honour partakes of prejudicial haste which adversely affects petitioner’s right and entitlement, and Your Honour’s neglect to follow the rules laid down by the Supreme Court constitutes a reversible error.”

6. Petitioner submits that Your Honour erred when you decided the case in your second judgment on the issue of whether the petitioner was qualified for pension at the time of his dismissal because the records of the Hearing Officer did not show that the parties joined issue on dismissal to avoid pension and petitioner’s letter of complaint did not accuse the respondent/appellee of dismissing him to avoid pension. These facts ascertainable from the record were overlooked by Your Honor in your haste to rule against petitioner/appellant, it being a general rule of law that courts do not pass on any issue not raised by the parties. This act of Your Honor is a reversible error.”

Recourse to the transcribed records shows that the said bill of exceptions was duly approved by the trial judge within statutory time and without any notation or expressed reservation. This Court has held that:

“The approval by the trial judge of a bill of exceptions without express reservations admits of the correctness of every material statement which precedes his signature.

When the judge signs the bill of exceptions he thereby adopts and certifies every material statement in the bill which precedes his signature.

Judges should remember that a bill of exceptions is a formal statement (of averments or accusations against them -emphasis ours) in writing of the exception taken to the opinion, decisions or direction of the judges delivered during the trial of the cause. . . and when same is signed by the trial judge without reservations, he ‘admits of its correctness. “See Cooper v. Alamendine, [1971] LRSC 54; 20 LLR 416, 423 (1971).

We hold therefore that the material statements or averments contained in said bill of exceptions were admitted to by the trial judge as being true.

Further perusing the bill of exceptions, the material statements which, in the opinion of this Court, accuse the trial judge of the commission of reversible errors as well as gross judicial irregularities, may be summarized as follows:

(a) that there were two separate final judgments rendered by the trial judge in the same case;

(b) that the first final judgment was rendered on January 31, 1985, against respondents below (now appellees), thereby reversing the decision of the Board of General Appeals and upholding the ruling of the hearing officer, but only a portion thereof was read with the help of a pair of reading glasses borrowed from Counselor David Dwanyen, one of counsel for appellant, at which time the trial judge promised to distribute copies of the said first final judgment to the parties at a later date;

(c) that appellees (respondents below) excepted to the first final judgment and duly announced an appeal to this Court, which was granted;

(d) that in fulfilment of his promise to “distribute” copies of said first final judgment, the trial judge caused a notice of assignment issued for the “DISTRIBUTION OF COURT’S FINAL JUDGMENT” to be served on both parties for the following day (February 1, 1985);

(e) that in obedience to the said notice of assignment both parties along with their respective counsel appeared for the sole purpose of receiving copies of the (first) final judgment as promised by the trial judge, but to the amazement, if not disappointment, of appellant the trial judge sua sponte reopened the case under the theory of reconsideration and, by manipulation, reversed his first judgment, this time swapping the parties, that is, changing appellee below to appellant and vice versa, and rendered a second “final judgment, upholding the decision of the Board of General Appeals and “concealing” copies of the first final judgment from appellant;
(f) that petitioner, appellee below, having been mysteriously made “appellant” in this manner, excepted to the second final judgment and announced an appeal to this Court, which appeal was granted;

(g) that to substantiate his averments in the unnumbered paragraphs of his bill of exceptions, appellant attached thereto some sheets of paper on which were inscribed what appellant referred to as a verbatim translation in shorthand of the trial court’s first final judgment (see paragraph one of the bill of exceptions).

During argument before this Court, counsel for appellant contended that once a trial judge renders final judgment in a case, exception is taken, and an appeal is announced, said ruling or judgment cannot be set aside by the trial judge without order from this Court. Appellant, through his counsel, further argued that such final judgment could not be reconsidered or materially altered by the trial judge without prior notice to the parties of the judge’s intention to reopen or reconsider same.

On the other hand, counsel for appellees contended that once the trial judge has not lost jurisdiction over the case, he may reconsider same for the purpose of modifying, altering or rescinding his judgment. It is interesting to note that appellees, in their brief, denied that the trial judge rendered two final judgments, yet they unwittingly admitted that the judge did indeed render two final judgments and cited law in defense of the trial judge in so doing. For the judgment sought to be defended by the appellees is in fact the second judgment. For example, appellees, in count five of their brief as found on page 6 thereof, contended:

‘`. . . The trial judge has not made his judgment final as erroneously contended by the appellant and, therefore, the trial court had not lost jurisdiction over the case, especially so when he was legally authorized to correct, alter or modify his judgment within term time, after having observed errors in such judgment” (emphasis ours). They cited the case of Bonah et. al. v. Kandakai[1971] LRSC 86; , 20 LLR 677, 678-679 (1971), in which this Court held that:

“It is settled law that a court may correct its records or judgments during term time. A court may alter its judgment at any time before it is entered or if it is entered before it is made final. But it should not be allowed without notice to both parties”.

During the argument, appellees were asked if the trial judge ever sent out notice to both parties before reconsidering or correcting same. The answer was in the negative.

According to the bill of exceptions and the records certified to this Court, the notice of assignment issued on January 31, 1985, served and returned served, on its face plainly contained:

“for distribution of the ruling in the above entitled cause of action” —to be distributed on February 1, 1985 (emphasis ours).

Count two of the bill of exceptions states: “In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Board of General Appeals reducing the hearing officer’s award of 24 months’ salary to 11 months is hereby set aside. And in its place, the court confirms and affirms the hearing officer’s ruling awarding petitioner 24 months’ salary compensation at the rate of $965.00 per month, totaling $23,100.00 plus other benefits awarded by the Board of General Appeals against which no appeal was taken by co-respondent, that is, unclaimed vacation pay of $887.00 and January 1983 salary of $965.00, making a grand total of $25,012.00”. Having pointed out that a trial judge may rescind, correct, modify or alter his records, decision or judgment during term time, but must do so after notice to both parties as opined by this Court in the Bonah et al v. Kandakai case as herein above cited, count 2 of the said bill of exceptions is sustained. Count 3 of the bill of exceptions, a recitation of paragraph 10 of the said bill of exceptions, is also sustained.

According to law writers, “a judgment is the law’s last word in a judicial controversy. It is the result of the application of legal principles to the state of facts presented to the court. It may be defined as the court’s official and final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties, as those rights and obligations presently exist, upon matters submitted to the court in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters in the record . . . as they appear from the evidence in the case and as found by the court . . .” 46 AM. JUR. 2d, Judgment, § 1, —Definition).

Where there has been no judgment either rendered or to be made final, can it be modified, altered, corrected or reconsidered, as contended by appellees in this case, or conversely, should a judgment entered, corrected, modified altered or reconsidered, without prior notice to both parties for an opportunity to be present, as done in manner and form by the trial judge in the so-called second “final judgment”, be considered valid?

Again, legal authorities are in agreement that: “A judgment is irregular where its rendition is contrary to the course and practice of the courts; that is, where proper rules of practice have not been followed or where some necessary act has been omitted or has been done in an improper manner…

Moreover, the same legal authority states:

“The validity of a judgment may be affected by fraud in the obtainment thereof, or by collusion between the parties, especially where the court was imposed upon (by either of the parties — emphasis ours) thereby and the complaining party was prevented from having his interest fairly presented or fully considered by the court . . .” Ibid. , §§ 15 and 16.

Therefore, and in view of the laws cited supra, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 of the bill of exceptions, not denied by the trial judge, are hereby sustained.

Count 5 of the bill of exceptions states: “Petitioner also avers that after Your Honor had rendered the said final judgment and noted on court’s record “COURT’ S FINAL JUDGMENT SEE RULING ATTACHED”, counsel for co-respondent Firestone Plantations Company, Counselor J. D. Gordon of the Carlor, Gordon, Hne and Teewia Law Firm reacted as follows: “To which final judgment of Your Honor respondent excepts and announces appeal to the Honorable People’s Supreme Court of Liberia, sitting in its March Term, A. D. 1985.” Your Honour immediately noted on the record the following: “THE COURT: The said appeal is hereby granted” (emphasis mine). Your court’s minutes of the 35th day jury session, December Term, A D. 1984, Thursday, January 31, 1985, of the Civil Law Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia, is hereunder quoted in support of petitioner’s averment.” Count one of the petitioner’s petition alluded to in count five of his bill of exceptions quoted supra, avers in part:

“That petitioner contends and submits that the Board of General Appeals committed a reversible error in modifying the ruling of the hearing officer in respect to the 24 months’ pay compensation awarded petitioner in lieu of reinstatement in keeping with Section 9 of the Labor Practices Law by reducing said award from 24 months to 11 months without showing any reason as required in the recent holding of the Supreme Court . . .”

Further examination of the records certified to us reveals that the trial judge did not pass upon this vital issue raised in count one of the petition as neither of the two “final judgments” traversed the issues of law raised in count 1 of the petitioner’ s petition. The question which comes to mind is whether or not the trial judge’s failure to pass upon the law issue raised before him, and the subsequent trial of the cause, is supported by law? This Court has ever and anon held that all issues of law raised in a pleading must first be disposed of before consideration of factual issue therein raised. In Johns v. Witherspoon, [1944] LRSC 32; 8 LLR 462, 464 (1944), it was held that:

“It is one of the fundamental rules of law as well as of pleading and practice that issues must be joined before the cause can be legally tried, and it is an equally basic rule of law that all issues of law must first be disposed of by the court before considering the issues of facts. What therefore could have possessed the trial judge to violate this fundamental rule is beyond the powers of this Court to define. ..”

Also in Wolo v. Wolo, 8LLR 36 (1942), the Court said that 101 questions of law raised in the pleadings must first be disposed of by the trial court.” The failure of the trial judge to pass on the law issue raised in count one of the petition was a reversible error. Count five of the bill of exceptions is therefore sustained.

The next issue to be considered by this Court is whether or not the decision of the Board of General Appeals reducing the hearing officer’s award in favor of appellant was rendered in harmony with the statute controlling. Before traversing this issue, this Court would like to point out here that co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company being dissatisfied with the hearing officer’s ruling, appealed to the Board of General Appeals. The said Board of General Appeals sustained or affirmed the hearing officer’s ruling that appellant (appellee before the Board) was wrongfully dismissed in all respects, except the calculation of award. Here is the Board’s final decision:

“We have already stated above that there was no investigation conducted into the alleged involvement of appellee Prince Wilson with the West Africa Travel Agency. We hold, therefore, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s ruling above, that the appellee’s dismissal was wrongful.

In view of the facts, evidence and the law cited, we hereby modify the ruling of the hearing officer and hold that the defendant/appellant wrongfully dismissed the plaintiff/appellee and that the former should reinstate the latter or pay him in keeping with section 9 of the Labor Practices Law. Compensation is calculated as follows: “APPELLEE’S LAST MONTHLY SALARY: $965.00 11 months at $965.00…$10,615.00 unclaimed vacation pay. . . . 887.80 January 1983 salary 965.00 $12,467.80 MODIFIED, AND WE SO HOLD. (Sgd.) Col. J. Cyrus Marshall-Chairman ” Abraham M. Fully . -Member ” Sylvester S. Kpaka -Member Dated and delivered this 5th day of December, A. D. 1984″.

The Supreme Court’s ruling relied upon by the Board, coappellee before this Court, states in part: “It is therefore our interpretation of the above quoted law (section 1508(5)) that the Legislature intended that before an employee can be dismissed by his employer for having allegedly committed a gross breach of duty, there must be an investigation properly conducted at the place of business of the employer to established the accused employee’s innocence or guilt; or else the dismissal of the employee involved is legally unjustified. United Liberia Rubber Corporation and The Chairman of the Board of General Appeals v. McCauley, [1981] LRSC 34; 29 LLR 342 (1981). The Board of General Appeals, in addition to the above referred to case, also decided that appellant Prince Wilson should be paid “in keeping with section 9 of the Labor Practices Law”. Section 9, upon which the Board of General Appeals relied, provides:

“Wrongful dismissal. Where wrongful dismissal is alleged, the Board of General Appeals shall have power to order reinstatement, but may order payment of reasonable compensation to the aggrieved employee in lieu of reinstatement. The party against whom the order is made shall have the right of election to reinstate or pay such compensation. In assessing the amount of such compensation, the Board shall have regard to:

“(a)(i) reasonable expectations in the case of dismissal in a contract of indefinite duration.
(ii) length of service; but in no case shall the amount awarded be more than the aggregate of two years salary or wages of the employee computed on the basis of the average rate of salary received six months immediately preceding the dismissal; however, if there are reasonable grounds to effect a determination that the dismissal is to avoid the payment of pension, then the Board may award compensation of up to but not exceeding the aggregate of 5 years salary or wages computed on the basis of the average rate of salary received six months immediately preceding the dismissal”

To this decision of the Board, co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company, then appellant before the Board, did not except. It is was appellee Prince Wilson, now appellant before this Court, who noted exceptions principally to the modification of the award by the Board of General Appeals, as contained in count five of his bill of exceptions.

We hold, therefore, that the correct application or interpretation of section 9(a)(i)(ii) of the Labor Practices Law of Liberia is: where and whenever an employer is found liable or guilty of wrongfully dismissing an employee as in the instant case, said dismissed employee shall be entitled to either: (a) reinstatement by the employer or (b) payment in lieu thereof; a sum certain under the reasonable expectations and length of service doctrine, the aggregate of which shall not exceed two years’ salary or wages of the employee based on the last salary earned six months immediately preceding his alleged wrongful dismissal. The Board of General Appeals therefore committed a reversible error when, in calculating the award in favor of appellant Prince Wilson, having ruled that appellant’s dismissal was wrongful, it reduced the alternative payment of 24 months in lieu of reinstatement to 11 months. This was done without stating any legal reason or regards to its own ruling or decision that appellant be paid in keeping with section 9 of the Labor Practices Law which we have already dealt with in this opinion. It was indeed the Board of General Appeals which extrapolated the intent of the Legislature beyond the specific wording of section 9 of the Labor Practices Law, against a long line of opinions of this Court governing construction of statutes, as laid down in the case George v. Republic, 14LLR 158, 159 (1960). The Court held in that case that:

“This Court has no authority to extrapolate the intent of the Legislature beyond the specific wording of a statute. This limitation is all the more mandatory where the statute in question specifies the only manner in which an act is to be performed. Our law does not give us authority either to add or take from what the Legislature has commanded unless the said command breaches provisions of the Constitution; and in such case the constitutional issue must be raised squarely.” Consequently, the trial judge erred by upholding the erroneous decision of the Board of General Appeals, coappellee herein, especially in his (trial judge’s) second final judgment which in the opinion of this Court was rendered in contravention of the statute and several opinions of this Court, as herein above cited.”

Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the court below upholding the decision of the Board of General Appeals is hereby reversed and the ruling of the hearing officer, awarding appellant Prince Wilson an aggregate sum of $25,248 as calculated in his said ruling, is hereby affirmed and confirmed, with costs against co-appellee Firestone Plantations Company. And it is hereby so ordered.

Judgment reversed.