LUCY TROWEIN, Appellant/Respondent, v. SYLVESTER S. KPAKA, Chairman and Members of the Board of General Appeals, Ministry of Labour, and THE MANAGEMENT OF MONROVIA BREWERIES, INC., by and thru its General Manager, PETER M. GERHARDT, Appellees/Movants.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: July 1, 1986. Decided: July 31, 1986:

1. The following acts shall be necessary for the completion of an appeal: announcement of the taking of the appeal, filing of the bill of exceptions, filing of an appeal bond, service and filing of motion of completion of the appeal.
2. The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within ten days after the rendition of judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court.
3. The Supreme Court will not dismiss an appeal on a “spider weblike” technicality or legal rigidity if it is shown that the appellee will not suffer substantial injustice, and the appellant has made earnest effort to comply with the statutory requirement.

Respondent/appellant announced an appeal from an adverse judgment in the Circuit Court growing out of a wrongful dismissal suit emanating from the Ministry of Labor.

The bill of exceptions was approved on the tenth day after the rendition of judgment but counsel for respondent/appellant did not file the documents with the Clerk of the Supreme Court until the following day, one day later then the statutory required period of ten days. Movants/appellees thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the bill of exceptions was filed late.

The Supreme Court denied the motion noting that the Court will not refuse to hear an appeal because of “spider weblike technicality,” especially when the appellees will not suffer substantial injustice and as the appellant had made an earnest effort to file the bill of exceptions within the statutory time.

Alfred Flomo appeared for appellant/respondent. Johnnie N. Lewis appeared for appellees/movants.

MR. JUSTICE TULAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, Lucy Trowein, was an employee of the appellee company, represented by a Mr. Sylvester S. Kpaka, for some years. She was reported to have become short in her accounts and for this she was arrested, and later on released, but was required by management to tender an indemnity bond with personal security. Because she was unable to tender the bond, management refused to reinstate her, whereupon, she filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor for wrongful dismissal. A team of three hearing officers heard the complaint and, after the hearing, awarded her $17,536.31 or reinstatement.

The defendant company (now movant/appellee) appealed to the Board of General Appeals and the ruling was reversed. Ms Trowein then announced an appeal from the decision of the Board and filed a seven-count petition before the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County. After a regular trial on July 29, 1985, the Circuit Court sustained the decision of the Board. Thereupon, appellant announced an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Appellant had her bill of exceptions approved by the trial judge on August 8, 1985, the tenth day after the entry of judgment, but her counsel did not file it with the clerk of the court until the following morning, same being the eleventh day, August 9, 1985. The co-appellee obtained a certificate from the clerk verifying that the bill of exceptions was filed on the eleventh day after the rendition of the judgment appealed from.

At the call of this case before us, it was brought out that coappellee had filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on grounds that appellant had failed to file the bill of exceptions within the statutory time. We therefore leave the file in this case untouched and concern ourselves with the motion and the six-count resistance.

What strikes the Court the more is that during arguments both parties relied on the same statute, 1 LCLR, Section 51.4 and 51.7, even though counsel for movant cited four opinions of this Court in his brief. For the benefit of this opinion we quote below verbatim the law relied upon:

“51.4. Requirements for completion of an appeal. The following acts shall be necessary for the completion of an appeal:

(a) Announcement of the taking of the appeal;

(b) Filing of the bill of exceptions;

(e) Filing of an appeal bond;

(d) Service and filing of notice of completion of the appeal.

Failure to comply with any of these requirements within the time allowed by statute shall be ground for dismissal of the appeal.” “§ 51.7. Filing of the bill of exceptions.

A bill of exceptions is a specification of the exceptions made to the judgment, decision, order, ruling, or other matter excepted to on the trial and relied upon for the appeal together with a statement of the basis of the exceptions. The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within ten days after rendition of the judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court.”

The law demands that the bill of exceptions and appeal bond be approved by the court and filed with the clerk of the court within the statutory time and this Court has, on many occasions, dismissed appeals for filing the bill of exceptions or appeal bond late.

However the case in point is unique and, therefore, differs from the cases of record in that the bill of exceptions was approved on time but filed the day after the statutory time expired. Section 51.7, above quoted, is silent on the filing date. Is this statute in conflict with section 51.4?

We should, and no doubt must, construe the aforementioned statute in such a manner to reflect substantial justice where the circumstances are unique, and avoid a strict technical interpretation that might bring hardship to litigants. The fact that the document was approved within statutory time, and filed the next day, must be interpreted to mean that appellant made an earnest effort to meet the time requirement. We are therefore unwilling to brush aside an appeal in a case like this on a “spider weblike” technicality since hearing this appeal will in no way prejudice appellees’ interest. Our position is also supported by a previous opinion of this Court in the case Biggers v. Wesley, 23LLR 285 (1974).

In view of the foregoing, and in the interest of transparent justice, it is our determination that the motion to dismiss be and the same is hereby denied with the order that the appeal be regularly heard. And it is so ordered.

Motion to dismiss denied