LAMINIE TRAWALLY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. HON. JENKINS K. Z. B. SCOTT, Minister of Justice, R. L., His Deputies and Assistants, the Solicitor General, the County Attorney and all other Officers serving under the Ministry of Justice, AND ABRAHAM TRAWALLY, Respondents/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

Heard: May 22, 1985. Decided: June 21, 1985.

1. Except in cases of treason or when the existence of the state is at stake, the Minister of Justice himself cannot arrest and jail a person who is a suspect.
2. The police and members of the Criminal Investigation Bureau are vested with the power to temporarily arrest and detain suspects, and to keep them in police custody, within a specified period of time, pending conclusion of the investigation. Thereafter, within the specified period of time, the matter must be forwarded to the court of justice of the peace or magistrate where a proper writ of arrest is issued and the defendant bailed or committed to jail under a commitment of the court.
3. The Minister of Justice does not have the power to dispossess any person of property claimed by him and place another in possession thereof, as such action can only legally be done by a writ of possession, the issuance of which is a judicial function which no other agency of the government can perform.
4. The commitment of a person to jail can only be done legally by a writ or order, the issuance of which is exclusively a judicial function which cannot be assumed by anyone outside the Judicial Branch of the Government.

The petitioner/appellant filed a petition for issuance of a writ of prohibition against the Minister of Justice and others to prevent them from evicting petitioner from a disputed parcel of land, and to gain his release from imprisonment, done at the instance of the said Minister. The petitioner, who had made a part payment of $10,000.00 to the Dennis heirs for a parcel of land, had filed a caveat in the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, upon learning that the Dennis heirs had subsequently received $38,000.00 from the co-respondent Abraham Trawally and had executed a warranty deed to the said Abraham Trawally for the identical parcel of land. The probate judge ignored the caveat and ordered the warranty deed probated and registered. When petitioner did not vacate the premises, co-respondent Abraham Trawally sued out summary proceedings to recover the real property. The petitioner in the mean time brought an action for specific performance against the Dennis heirs. While the two actions were still pending, Abraham Trawally filed a complaint with the Minister of Justice, alleging that the petitioner was illegally withholding from him his real property. Thereafter, the petitioner was committed to jail on the orders of the Minister of Justice. It was from this action by the Minister that the petitioner filed the petition for prohibition.
The Justice in Chambers denied the petition, holding that the Supreme Court was not in the position to question the directive of the Head of State, upon which the Minister of Justice had acted.
On appeal to the full Bench the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court rejected the argument that ordinarily the Head of State has the authority to commit a person to jail, or that the Minister of Justice, acting upon the directive of the Head of State, had the authority to commit a person to jail. The Court pointed out that the President possesses such authority only with regard to treason and when the security of the States is at stake. The Minister of Justice, the Court noted, cannot himself arrest or jail a person, or dispossess such person of property except upon a criminal writ or a writ of possession issued by the court.
The Court observed that in the exceptional instance when such arrest is permitted, it can only be carried out by the police of the Criminal Investigation Division of the security organiza-tions, and such arrests are only temporary as the suspect must, within a specific period of time, be presented to the court and a proper writ of arrest issued. The Court therefore opined that the Minister of Justice had exceeded his authority when he com-mitted the petitioner to jail.

On the question of the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed property, the Court held that the Minister was likewise without authority to dispossess a person of disputed property, that authority being one vested strictly in courts of competent jurisdiction.
Since there was no legal commitment and the Minister of Justice is without the authority to dispossess a person of his property, prohibition will lie to restrain the Minister, the Court concluded.

J. D. Gordon of the Carlor, Gordon, Hne and Teewia Law Offices appeared for the petitioner/appellant. Francis Y. S. Garlawolo and Deputy Minister of Justice David M. Toweh appeared for the respondents/appellees.

MR. AD HOC JUSTICE TULAY Delivered the opinion of the Court.

These proceedings spring from the handling of a land/house dispute between two Trawallys—Abraham Trawally and Lar-minie Trawally—who both negotiated, severally, with the Dennis heirs for the purchase of a piece of land with a house thereon. Abraham Trawally had a warranty deed executed to him by the Dennis heirs after he had paid them $38,000.00, and at a time when Larminie Trawally had already paid them the sum of $10,000.00,
Upon hearing of the execution of the warranty deed to Abraham Trawally, Larminie Trawally filed a caveat before the People’s Probate Court for Montserrado County to prevent its registration and probation. Despite this fact, however, the judge at the time admitted the deed into probate and regis-tration without informing the caveator, who then moved to the Supreme Court on error for a review of the matter. The error was heard and the probation of the deed declared null and void, with the Supreme Court ordering that Larminie Trawally, the caveator, be allowed to file his objections to the admission of Abraham Trawally’s deed into probate and registration. The objection proceeding is still pending before that court.

On August 17, 1984, Abraham Trawally filed an action of summary proceeding to recover real property against Larminie Trawally in the Civil Law Court, Montserrado County. Plead-ings have rested and the case is pending before that court. There is also pending before the Civil Law Court, Montserrado County, another action of specific performance filed by the petitioner in these proceedings against Wilmot Dennis, et al., the Dennis heirs, for the same property. In November 1984, Abraham Trawally lodged a complaint with the Honourable Minister of Justice that Larminie Trawally was illegally with-holding his property from him. Larminie Trawally must have appeared before the Ministry and what transpired there must have led to his commitment to jail where he still was when his counsel, on the 19th of November, 1983, filed this petition for prohibition. The case awaited hearing for three months.
Abraham Trawally had sued out an action in summary proceeding to recover possession of real property, that is, to have Larminie Trawally evicted from the premises. Two months later he filed a complaint with the Minister of Justice for the same purpose, the eviction of Larminie Trawally from the property. We know that cases in court sometimes take long to be determined but we frown on the practice of people having one case before the Ministry of Justice, the Circuit Court, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Executive Mansion, as this practice, instead of expediting the termination of the matter, rather prolongs it.
On the 5th of March 1985 the Justice in Chambers ruled on the petition, dismissing the same, quashing the alternative writ and denying issuance of the peremptory writ.
The petitioner appealed from this ruling and has brought his case before the full bench for review.
The ruling appealed from reads in part:

“Since we are not in the position to prohibit the directives of the Head of State, there being no law empowering us to do such, we shall accept the letter of directive from the Head of State as it is. Further to this, the respondents during the argument contented that while they were in the process of sending the petitioner to court for the prosecu-tion, he filed this prohibition proceeding. Otherwise, respondents would have prosecuted him through court now. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the sur-rounding facts and the laws cited, it is our ruling that since a writ of prohibition is to restrain the respondents from exercising jurisdiction but the respondents had proceeded contrary to rules which ought to be observed at (all) times, none of which exists in the instant case the petition is hereby denied, the alternative writ quashed, the peremptory writ denied.”
From this ruling, we take it that the petition for the writ of prohibition was denied, the alternative writ quashed and the peremptory writ denied because the respondent Minister of Justice had jurisdiction over both the person of the petitioner and the subject matter; that he had jurisdiction to evict the petitioner from the premises and that he, the Minister of Jus-tice, by virtue of the power vested in him as Justice Minister, and by the directive received from the Head of State, had not proceeded contrary to rules which ought to be observed at all times when he arrested and jailed the petitioner.
We give hereunder the letter of directive of the Head of State dated January 10, 1985, the headings of which we have omitted:
“Mr. Minister:

The Head of State and President of the Interim National Assembly, CIC Dr. Samuel K. Doe, has received a letter from Mr. Abraham Trawally informing him of a property dispute which has been investigated under the Liberian Law and Islamic Laws, in which matter he was found to be the rightful owner of the property under both judicial systems.

According to the documents presented, the Ministry of Justice has adjudged that he is the rightful owner of the land and house occupied by Mr. Larminie Trawally, who has refused to vacate the premises even though requested to do so. Therefore, if your Ministry that has investigated the matter, evict Mr. Larminie Trawally and have Mr. Abraham Trawally his house turned over to him without delay.

In the cause of the people, the struggle continues.

Very truly yours,

Signed: J. B. Blamo

Major J. Bernard Blamo

Minister of State.”
We shall say more about this letter in another place.
This ruling, of course, is in line with the argument ad-vanced before the full bench by counsels for respondents when they pointed out that the Minister of Justice has the authority to, and that by the directive of the Head of State, can arrest and commit anyone suspected of the commission of a given crime. Under that authority, they said, the petitioner was committed to jail under a commitment duly signed by the Assistant Minister of Justice for Litigation.
We were not, and we are not convinced by this argument, for, except in cases of treason or when the existence of the State is at stake—in which case, the suspect is kept at the post stockade, not in the central prison yard—the Minister of Justice cannot himself arrest and jail a person who is a suspect, as he did in this case. The law relied on by the respondents vests in the police and members of the Criminal Investigation Bureau the power to temporarily arrest and detain suspects, and to keep them in police custody within a specified period of time, pending the conclusion of an investigation. Thereafter, within the specified period of time, the matter must be forwarded to the court or a justice of the peace or magistrate where a proper writ of arrest is issued and the defendant is then bailed or committed to jail under commitment of the court.

Reverting to the January 10, 1985 letter, christened by counsel for respondents as the “directive”, anyone reading the letter in point cannot but conclude that it could not have influenced the arrest and incarceration of the petitioner in November, 1984, six weeks before it was written and received. We therefore deprecate the act of counsel for respondents in leading the Justice in Chambers to believe that the “directive” had direct connection with the arrest and jailing of the petitioner. Acts like this certainly defeat the oath subscribed to by lawyers not to intentionally and knowingly mislead the court, as misleading the court frequently causes the court to arrive at regrettable conclusions. Lawyers must refrain from such surreptitious acts.
We would like to observe here that the Minister of Justice, being a strong pillar of the laws of the land and the chief legal advisor to the government of Liberia, must be very candid for candidness is the first and foremost quality of a lawyer with the Chief Executive who, to a greater degree, depends on his advice.
When the Minister received the directive requesting, not ordering, him to evict Larminie Trawally from and put Abraham Trawally in possession of the disputed premises, the Minister should have at once informed the Chief Executive that his Ministry could not dispossess a person of his property and place another in possession of said property, as this could only be done by a writ of possession, the issuance of which is a judicial function. More than this, his information could have included the fact that Abraham Trawally had instituted an action of summary proceedings to recover real property against Larminie Trawally for the same property; and that said case was still pending before the People’s Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County; that the Ministry was preparing criminal prosecution against Larminie Trawally for criminal trespass; and that the eviction therefrom could be stayed until the criminal prosecution against Larmine Trawally ended. Of course the question yet remains whether or not an indictment for criminal trespass can serve as a possessory writ.
We have seen that the letter of “directive”, dated January 10, 1985, addressed to the Honourable Minister of Justice could not have influenced the arrest and incarceration of the petitioner in November 1984. Indeed, that directive only re-quested the Honourable Minister of Justice to evict petitioner, Larminie Trawally, and place co-respondent Abraham Trawally in possession of the premises in point. But that was a task assigned to the Ministry which it could not legally perform as, we repeat, to dispossess one of and place another in possession of a given property, is a judicial function which no other agency of government can legally perform.

We therefore hold that the Honourable Minister of Justice, in arresting and committing petitioner to prison, exceeded his sphere of duty, and that in so acting he proceeded contrary to rules which must be followed by Ministers of Justice at all times. For, to commit to jail can only be done legally by commitment, and the issuance of a commitment is exclusively a judicial function which cannot legally be assumed by anyone outside the judicial branch of government. There was, there-fore, no commitment under which petitioner was admitted to Monrovia Central Prison Yard, as the document issued by the Assistant Minister of Justice for Litigation was a legal nullity ab initio.
With the above holding, we cannot but reverse the ruling appealed from and grant the petitioner’s petition. And we so hold.

Petition granted.