J. LAFAYETTE TOLES, Appellant, v. C. L. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued April 1, 1963. Decided May 9, 1963. 1. If a plaintiff is absent from Liberia when or after a cause of action accrues, calculation of the time within which the statute of limitations requires that action must be commenced should exclude time during which the plaintiff was absent ; but the statute of limitations begins to run again whenever he returns to Liberia. 2. The fact that a plaintiff in an ejectment action, who interrupted a protracted absence from the country by a short visit, did not visit the particular county where his property was located does not excuse his failure to take proper steps to protect his property rights. On appeal in an ejectment action, judgment reversed. C. L. Simpson and Tellman Dunbar for appellant. William N. Witherspoon for appellee. MR. JUSTICE PIERRE delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1959, C. L. Williams brought an action of ejectment against J. Lafayette Toles, alleging that Toles was withholding from him a portion of Lot Number 349 in the City of Monrovia, which land was lawfully his. Defendant Toles appeared and filed answer in which he pleaded the statute of limitations. He alleged that he had purchased the whole of Lot Number 349 from Simpson in 1929; and he set forth his chain of title by annexing to his answer the deeds under which he claimed said title. He contended that from 1929, when he acquired his title to the property, up to August, 1959, when plaintiff brought his suit, he had been in continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the said lot of land. Toles argued 357 358 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS that, tacking to the 3o years during which he himself had possessed the lot, the time which his privies before him had had possession of it, there were 43 unbroken years up to the time that plaintiff filed his complaint; therefore he relied exclusively upon the statute of limitations as defense against the plaintiff’s case. From the record before us, Williams purchased onehalf of Lot Number 349 in Monrovia from Gabriel D. Potter in October, 1904, and retained possession and ownership of it until the year 1915, when he left Liberia and went abroad. He returned to Liberia in 1947 and has not left this country since. It was alleged that he made several visits to Liberia before 1947, when he finally returned to stay; but although he might not have come back till 1947, and must have noticed his property being occupied by the appellant, he did not bring action to evict him until August, 1959. When the case came on for trial before a jury in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, several witnesses testified that Williams had been seen in Monrovia at one time or another between his departure and return dates, that is to say, between 1915 and 1947. In no instance of such alleged return is there any corroboration to establish the truthfulness of the allegation. However, of the several witnesses who testified in the case, we are most concerned with the testimony of the plaintiff himself; and for the benefit of this opinion we quote the following portion thereof : “I left Monrovia in 1915. I came back to Monrovia in 1947. I visited Cape Palmas in 1927 on special business for my company, which took me up the Cavalla River in the interior for about eight to nine days. I returned to Cape Palmas and waited a few days for a boat to take me back to the coast. I might point out that, at that time, I was not in touch with Monrovia, and I did not know that Mr. Toles was claiming my property.” LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 359 It is an elementary principle of the law of statutes of limitations that absence from the realm, and sojourn beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the country in which the action, is sought to be brought, tolls the statute of limitations in favor of the absent party. In some jurisdictions, it tolls local absences as well as those occasioned by stay abroad in a foreign country. In some countries, there is much controversy as to who should benefit from such absences, the plaintiff or the defendant; and in some states of the United States of America, there is also a difference of opinion as to whether such benefits should be extended to absences from a particular state of the union, or confined to absences beyond the territorial limits of the United States. But the language of our statute of limitations dispels all doubt as to what is meant by absence from the Country: “If any party to an action is absent from the Republic of Liberia . . . when or after a cause of action accrues, the calculation of the time within which the action must be commenced shall exclude the period when the party is absent from the Republic. . .” 1956 Code, tit. 6, � 51. In the instant case, Williams has made record that he left Liberia in 1915, and was away from that time until 1947 when he returned to stay permanently; but in 1927, he concededly visited Cape Palmas on business. Cape Palmas being a part of the Republic of Liberia, we hold that his return there terminated any prior tolling of the statute in his favor, since he was again within the jurisdiction of the courts of Liberia. According to our statute quoted supra, all of the period when a party is away from Liberia must be excluded from the time within which he could bring action against a defendant; but the statute begins to run again as soon as he sets foot on Liberian soil. The fact that he did not visit the particular county where the property was located, as Williams contended, would not justify his failure to 360 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS take proper steps to protect his property rights in any part of Liberia once he was in the country. This view is supported by the following authorities : “The moment plaintiff comes or returns into the jurisdiction, the operation of the saving clause ceases and that of limitation begins and continues irrespective of subsequent absences, if the debtor also is present at the time, and if the statutory [sic] disability is absence from the United States, a return to any part of the United States removes the disability and puts the limitation in operation. It does not lie in plaintiff’s mouth to say that he did not remain in the jurisdiction long enough to sue, for that was his own choice.” 25 CYC. 1 23 1- 1 23 2 Limitations of Actions. “Under some statutes if a person be out of a state when a cause of action accrues to him, the limitation does not begin to run until he comes into the state, at which time it immediately attaches. And, generally, a disability is removed within the purview of the statute when it no longer exists and that of absence from the state ends when the personal presence of the person whom it affects begins therein.” 17 R.C.L. 844.-845 Limitation of Actions � 205. If the property in question had descended, or had been willed to Williams during his absence from the country, and if he did not know that he owned it when he came to Cape Palmas in 1927, we might have been minded to accept some argument which would give him credit up to the time that he admits permanent return in 1947. Under such circumstances, his ignorance might have cured any failure on his part to have acted within statutory time. But such is not the case. Williams admits having bought the property, and having owned it for i r years prior to his departure from Liberia. What legal excuse could he have, then, for failing to protect his rights to the property when he returned to Liberia in 1927, at which time someone was trespassing on and had taken possession of his half lot, and was in occupation thereon? LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 361 Under the circumstances, and in keeping with the law cited and quoted, supra, we are unable to agree that appellee could legally recover in face of the appellant’s plea of the statute of limitations which began to run in his favor with his departure in 1915, and continued to run against him on his return in 1927. It is therefore our opinion that the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and appellant be allowed to continue to enjoy undisturbed possession of the lot in question. Reversed.