The National Elections Commission (NEC) v The Management of M Tosh Prints Media, Inc (2026)
The National Elections Commission (NEC) of Liberia, represented by Mrs. Davidetta Browne Lansanah, Executive Chairperson and the Board of Commissioners of the City of Monrovia, Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia Movant Versus The Management of M-Tosh Prints Media, Inc. represented by Mr. Varney A. Fahnbulleh of the City of Monrovia, Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia Respondent
Motion to Dismiss
Appeal
Action of Debt
Heard: March 19, 2026 Delivered: May 21, 2026
MADAM JUSTICE WOLOKOLIE DELIVERED THE OPINION
This motion to dismiss grows out of an action ofdebt instituted by the Media Print Inc., represented by Mr. Varney A. Fahnbulleh, the the National Elections Commission (NEC) of Liberia represented
Lansanah, the Executive Chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, the movant, bef re the
Commercial Court of Liberia. A final ruling was entered by the Chief Judge of the Com ercial Court, Her Honor Eva Mappy Morgan, against the respondent, on December 31, 202 , from which ruling the respondent announced its appeal to the Honorable Supreme Cou , and subsequently proceeded to perfect its appeal consistent with the appeal statute.
The undisputed facts culled from the records reveal that on March 31, 2025, the resp ndent filed its complaint in the Court below and alleged therein that the movant was indebt d to it based on a contract for the production and delivery of specific election materials to b used by the movant for electioneering purposes. The respondent alleged that consistent w th the stated agreement which required it to produce and supply One Thousand Nine Hundr d and Seventy (1 ,970) prepackaged election kits to the movant NEC for the conduct f the Montserrado County Senatorial and District #13 Representative By-Elections in 2019, it had same produced and imported by chattered flight; that in addition to the agreed 1,970 prepackaged election kits delivered, it delivered an excess of Four Hundred and Fiftee (415) election kits and Two Hundred and Eighty-seven (2.87) packages of bulk materials com rising of election stationary; that upon the arrival of these items at the Roberts International irport (RIA), they were received by the movant’s Logistics Manager, Mr. J. Wert Saah, and tored directly in the movant’s warehouse; that the movant subsequently used a total f Two
Hundred (200) of the Four Hundred and Fifteen ( 415) excess kits for the conduct oft e ByElection in Grand Cape Mount County, and that although the movant made full paym nts in the amount of United States Five Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Sixty Dollars (US$ 589,000.00) for the initial contracted 1,970 prepackaged election kits, as well as fort e two hundred (200) of the 415 excess kits used in the Grand Cape Mount By-Elections, the ovant has since refused to make payments for the remaining 215 kits and 287 bulk material which it subsequently used to assemble One Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-eight 1,898) election kits valued at United States Eight Hundred Seventy-seven Thousand dollar (US$ 877,060.00) and which constitutes the indebted amount sued for.
The rnovant in response to the respondent’s claim contended that it was not indebted in the
value of the amount sued for by the respondent; that the existent contract between th movant and the respondent did not provide for the delivery of any excess or surplus materia as was produced by the respondent; that although the movant had previously received two nvoices for the remaining 415 excess kits stored in the movant’s warehouse, the movant EC only made payment of United States Ninety Four Thousand Dollars (US$ 94,000.00) fo the two hundred (200) of the 415 kits used by NEC on October 15, 2019, and that the only a ount it owed the respondent is United States Ninety Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Doll rs (US$ 96,750.00 ) for the remaining 215 kits for which it is yet to make payment although it eceived a debt invoice to said effect from the respondent on October 29, 2020.
Upon the conduct of the trial, the debt court entered ruling on the central issue of wh ther the respondent met the burden of proof required to establish that the movant was inde ted to it in the amount of US$877,OOO?
The Debt Court held that considering that the Cargo Manifest and Payment Recei t dated July 18, 2019, were the only documents confirming the quantity of materials brought into the country and that said documents did not support the existence of the additional aterials which the respondent claimed were used to assemble 1,898 kits, the respondent f iled the litmus test regarding the burden of proof, as it (lid not produce any evidence sho ng that they brought more materials into the country other than what was already paid fo by the movant. Moreso, the Court continued that because respondent’s demand letter dated August and September 2020 only requested US$96,750.00 for the remaining 215 lection kits coupled with the fact that the respondent admitted to receiving US$ 589,06 .00 as payment for its supply of the 1,970 prepackaged election materials, the respondent’s laim of US$877,000.00 in the lawsuit lacked supporting evidence; that because the movant p yment of US$ 94,000.00 for the use of 200 out of the excess 415 election kits used by the ovant in conducting the By-Elections in Grand Cape Mount County is an admissio of its indebtedness on the remaining 215 kits, the movant NEC was therefore only liabl to the respondent in the amount of US$ 96,750.00 for the remaining 215 election kits me tioned. The Court thereafter entered final ruling in the matter holding the movant NEC li ble for US$96,750.00 plus 6% interest. The respondent noted exceptions to this ruling, ann unced its appeal and took statutory steps to perfect same consistent with the applicable pr isions of the Civil Procedure Law.
On March 5, 2026, the movant filed this motion before this Honorable Court praying th Court to dismiss the respondent’s appeal for the following reasons: (1). That the Cou lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal on grounds that the respondent’s bill of exceptions w s filed
beyond the statutory ten (10) days period after the final judgment was rendered on Dec mber 31, 2025; (2). That the respondent’s appeal bond was defective as it was signed y an unnamed person other than the Chief Judge of the Commercial Court, Her Honor Eva appy Morgan, who presided over the case and entered final ruling on December 31, 2025, co trary to section 51.8 of the Civil Procedure Law and said bond was filed without any evi ence proving that its surety, Secured Risk Insurance Company, was duly authorized to do bu iness in Liberia when it executed the appeal bond, and neither did it present a valid tax cle ance from the Liberian Revenue Authority (LRA) to establish that it had fully settled all i s tax obligations covering the period under which the bond was issued; (3) That the resp ndent appeal bond and notice of completion of appeal was filed on March 2, 2026, same being sixty. one days after the final judgment, contrary to the statutory requirement that mandates same to be filed within sixty days commencing at the time the final judgment of the cou was rendered and delivered.
The respondent countering the assertions in the movant’s motion to dismiss the respon ent’s appeal asserted that the respondent appeal was perfected in strict compliance wi h the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law, in that it completed all the necessary steps wit in the stipulated sixty-day window for appeal required for a party seeking appellate review of the final ruling of the lower court before the Supreme Court. The respondent states that it re eived a copy of the lower court’s final ruling on January 6, 2026, and filed its bill of exceptio s nine days later on January 15, 2025, rendering its bill of exceptions filed within the statuto y tenday period; that contrary to the movant’s claim that respondent appeal bond is defecti e, the respondent’s appeal bond filed was supported by the appropriate documents inclu ing its valid tax clearance, insurance lincense, business registration documentation and the udited financial statements of its surety indicating total assets and equity in the amount of One Billion One Hundred Twenty One Million One Hundred Forty Six Thousand and Two Liberian ollars (L$ 1,121,146,002) which amount is more than sufficient to satisfy the bond amount of nited States Five Thousand Dollars (US$ 5,000.00); that the respondent’s appeal bond as not signed and approved by any unknown or unnamed person as stated by the movant a same was signed by His Honor Chan-Chan A. Paegar, a sitting Associate Judge of the Com ercial Court of Liberia who is duly authorized to approve bonds, especially in view of the f ct that Judge Eva Mappy Morgan was unavailable and had authorized him to approve s me as evidenced by the issuance of the Clerk’s certificate. Besides, the Supreme Co rt has recognized that any judge presiding in the court from which an appeal is taken may erform administrative judicial function such as approving appeal bonds when the judge who p esided over the case is unavailable.
Our Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:54.1 provides the grounds for which parties seeking an appeal must comply and based on which appellate jurisdiction is rightly conferre on this Honorable Supreme Court, and that failure to comply with any of these requireme s within the time allowed by statute shall be ground for dismissal of the appeal.
The movant raises three contentions in its motion seeking to dismiss the respondent appeal filed before this Court. Firstly, the movant contends that the lower court having ren ered its ruling on December 31 , 2025, the respondent announced its appeal thereto, received its copy of the final ruling on the same day but proceeded to file its bill of exceptions on Jan ary 15, 2026, in violation of the appeal statute which mandates the party seeking an appeal o file its bill of exceptions within ten (10) days after the rendition of the lower court’s final rul ng, that is, the bill of exceptions should have been filed no later than the January 10, 2026, nd that the filing of said bill of exceptions on January 15, 2026 rendered the appeal dismissi le.
The respondent however countered that the movant had misinformed the Court as to he date of the respondent’s receipt of the lower court’s final ruling, in that the final ruling altho h read and rendered in open court on December 31, 2025, the trial Judge, Her Honor Ev Mappy Morgan, informed the parties that copies of the ruling would be made available to th parties at a later date; that respondent’s copy of the ruling was received and signed fo by its supervisor, Gardea Jackson, on January 6, 2026, and its bill of exceptions filed on anuary 15, 2025 which made its filing compliant with the statutory provision offiling a bill ofex ptions within ten(10) days. The records in the court’s file shows a clerk certificate issued o March 17, 2026, under the signature of the Clerk of the Commercial Court, it confirmed that efinal ruling of the Judge was entered on December 31, 2025, but it was not delivered on th same day; that the respondent’s representative, Gardea Jackson, did receive the responden ‘s copy of the final ruling on January 6, 2026, and its bill of exception was filed on January 1 , 2026, in compliance with the appeal statute. Given this fact, that the last day for filing th bill of exceptions was January 16, 2026, the respondent did file its bill of exceptions within t e time prescribed by the statute.
The movant’s second contention js that the respondent’s appeal should be dis issed because the appeal bond filed by the respondent was not approved by Her Honor Eva appy Morgan who presided over the case and entered the final ruling, but was “PP” by an un nown person. This Court says same is untenable since like the respondent countered, the ppeal bond having been signed by His Honor Judge Chan-Chan A. Paegar who is an As ociate Judge of the Commercial Court where the trial Judge, Her Honor Eva Mappy Morgan is the
Chief Judge, is an acceptable practice in this Jurisdiction where any judge of the circui court
can perform judicial administrative function, like the approval of a bond in the absenc of the trial Judge who heard and rendered ruling in the case; especially, in this case where Judge Mappy Morgan who heard the case and was not present had authorized Judge Cha -Chan
- Paegar to approve the bond on her behalf.
The appeal statute imposes the statutory obligation for the approval of the appeal bo d filed by the appellant on the trial Judge. This Court has however held that although the ap ellant is under normal circumstances statutorily required to secure the approval of an appe I bond by the judge who tried the case, in extraordinary unforeseen circumstances a other judge regularly sitting or assigned to the court from which the appeal was taken may a prove the bond. See Citibank v Hansen & Soehne 35 LLR 69, 78 (1988); Sillah et al v Sher an 36 LLR 918, 923 (1990). It therefore goes without saying therefore that the approval of the appellant’s appeal bond by another Judge other than the trial Judge who heard the ca e and entered final ruling. Furthermore, the Court having reviewed the bond, finds that it m ets all the requirement to serve as a valid surety to indemnify the movant as required by the ppeal statute.
The final contention of the movant in its motion to dismiss the respondent’s appeal, is t at the respondent completed the appeal process beyond sixty days as allowed by the appeal tatute in that the respondent’s notice of completion of appeal was filed on March 2, 2026 ins ad of March 1, 2026, as required by the appeal statute.
The Court considering that the trial judge did not give the parties copies of her final ruling when she read same on December 31, 2025, and that the respondent received a copy fsaid ruling on January 6, 2026, as confirmed by the clerk’s certificate in the court’s recor s, the respondent’s service of the bond and notice of completion of appeal on March 2, 202 , was indeed within the statutory period since same constituted fifty-five days after the resp ndent had received its copy of the court’s final ruling and well into the statutory period.
The Court therefore having heard the parties’ arguments and reviewed the recordsfo arded to it, the movant’s prayer to dismiss the respondent’s appeal on the grounds cited is unt nable and dismissible.
WHEREFORE AND INVIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the movant’s motion to dismi s the respondent’s appeal is hereby denied and dismissed, and the appeal ordered proceed d with on its merits. Costs are to abide final determination of the appeal. AND IT IS HERE Y SO
ORDERED.
WHEiN THIS CASE WAS CALLED FOR HEARING, COUNSELLOR ALVIN EAGE JALI-OH APPEARED FOR THE MOVANT. COUNSELLOR ARTHUR T. JO NSON APPEARED FOR THE RESPONDENT.