CHARLES F. TAYLOR, JR., Appellant, v. DENCO SHIPPING LINES, Appellee.
AN APPEAL FROM THE NATIONAL LABOUR COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: June 25, 1992. Decided: September 4, 1992.
1. The hearing officer is required to calculate the amount of damages awarded with certainty and specificity.
2. Section 1508(5)(6)(c) of the Liberian Labor Law state: Notwithstanding the provision of Section 1508 of this chapter an employer may dismiss an employee engaged for an indefinite period without notice, subject to payment only of wages due, where it is shown that the employee has been guilty of a serious breach of duty. The following acts and violations shall be deemed to be serious breaches of duty within the meaning of the preceding section entitling the employer to terminate without notice or pay in lieu of notice contracts of employment for an indefinite period.
a. Any of the acts or violations specifically set in subsection of this section;
b. Lack of skill or manifest inefficiency of the employee which makes impossible the fulfilment of his duties under the contract; and
c. If the employee commits any other serious offense against his obligation under
Appellant, an employee of Denco Shipping Lines, was accused by his employer of releasing bills of lading documents on more than one occasion without requiring any guarantee for payment. The appellant was confronted by his employer in a letter written on May 8, 1984. Appellant responded to his employer in a letter written on May 14, 1984 and apologized for his action, essentially admitting to wrongdoing. On May 15, 1984, appellee/employer again wrote to appellant demanding an explanation by May 31, 1984 as to why appellant had not acted in keeping with company’s policies when he issued the bills of lading. Appellant did not respond to the latter letter, and on June 4, 1984 he was dismissed by appellee for “administrative reasons”.
On January 11, 1986 appellant filed a complaint for wrongful dismissal, asserting that under Liberian Labor Laws, “administrative reasons” is no grounds for dismissal. Appellant therefore prayed for reinstatement and compensation in the amount of $L23,400. The hearing officer ruled that appellant had been dismissed in keeping with Liberian Law, Section 1508 (5) and (6), for gross breach of duty, and was therefore entitled to leave pay and unpaid wages at the time of dismissal. Appellant appealed to the National Labor Court where the ruling of the hearing officer was confirmed “in toto”.
Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court modified the ruling and remanded the case on the grounds that the said ruling was very vague and uncertain as to the award the appellant should receive upon termination of his services. Accordingly, the National Labor Court was ordered to determine wages due appellant up to June 4, 1984, the date of his termination, as well as leave pay due the appellant.
James K Kumeh of the Philip J. L. Brumskine Law Chambers appeared for the appellant. Henry Reed Cooper of the Cooper and Togbah Law Firm appeared for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE BULL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1976, the appellee, Denco Shipping Lines, a company engaged in the business of shipping and stevedoring, employed Charles F. Taylor, Jr., appellant. During the period of his employment with Denco Shipping Lines, appellant, Charles F. Taylor, Jr., served in many positions such as Feeder Vessel Traffic Manager, Traffic Manager for Main Line Vessel, and Acting Owner Representative and Outward Traffic Manager, the position which he held up to the time of his dismissal by appellee.
In the certified records before us is a document entitled “notice of removal from payroll”. This is the document which informed appellant that his services with appellee were terminated. The document which summed up the reason for appellant’s dismissal in two words namely: “administrative reasons”, was approved by Denco’s manager on June 4, 1984.
On January 11, 1986, being dissatisfied with his dismissal, appellant addressed a letter of complaint to the Minister of Labour. The substance of appellant’s letter of complaint is that:
1. “Administrative reasons” is no ground for dismissal under the law of Liberia, the reason for which appellant was dismissed;
2. “Since appellant’s employment with Denco, he had received no official warning with respect to the discharge of duty besides the time he threatened to take Denco’s Management to the Labour Ministry for unfair labour practices”.
Appellant concluded in his letter of complaint that his dismissal was wrongful and he prayed to be compensated in the total sum of L$23,400.00 together with reinstatement.
We however deem it necessary to quote below the letter from appellee to appellant dated May 8, 1984 which was attached to appellant’s letter of complaint to the Labour Ministry.
“May 8, 1984
Mr. Charles F. Taylor, Jr.
Traffic Manager
Denco Shipping Lines
Monrovia, Liberia
Dear Mr. Taylor:
While preparing our records for the auditors, we noticed several unorthodox discrepancies and we would like your explanation so as to clarify certain unresolved issues.
1. On bill of lading number 00059MR, loaded aboard the export commerce voyage 106, Monrovia/Tema, cargo was shipped as per Farrell instructions. Up to today’s date, you still have the original bills of lading in your possession. We are wondering “why would a shipper elect to ship to Tema, Ghana such valuable cargo and never try to retrieve or clear same?” Why was no telex sent to Tema to stop delivery of the goods since February of this year, in as much as you are aware that you still had the originals within your possession? We have also noted that in the freight column of the freighted manifest, you originally quoted invoice number 18609, which invoice is now reported missing. It is not a practice that all original bills of lading should be accompanied by the relevant invoices? Why now is original bill of lading number 000859 in your possession without the necessary invoices? Was the duplicated invoice 18609 actually issued, and if so, where are the copies?
2. On bill of lading 00079MR loaded on export Challenger 97-Home Monrovia Norfolk Road “Shipper” Voice of America, do American Embassy, Monrovia, Liberia”. We believe you are aware or should be aware that the American Embassy sub-contracts all shipment to clearing and forwarding companies in and around Monrovia. Did an American Embassy employee expedite the documentation? Why then did you send invoices to the Voice of America, whereas the shipment was sub-contracted to Export Packers?
The same explanation should also go for B/L NR000740MR on the Export Champion 94-Home. All three bills of lading are for the same shipper, the same clearing and forwarding company, with no payment made against any of those shipments since 1983.
This is a grave, serious and embarrassing matter and we would appreciate your response in similar manner. Very truly yours, s/ James D. Gibson, Jr. t/ James D. Gibson, Jr. Personnel Manager”
On May 14, 1984, the appellant addressed a letter in reply to appellee’s letter of May 8, 1984, quoted above. We also herewith quote the letter or response:
“Mr. James D. Gibson,
Jr. Personnel Manager
Denco Shipping Lines Monrovia,
Liberia
Dear Mr. Gibson:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated May 8, 1984. All facts were well noted.
1. For your information, on bill of lading numbers 00085MR and 0086MR loaded on the Export Commerce voyage MR. 106 Monrovia/Tema; the above bills of lading were shipped freight prepaid. Originals were released on good will basis that shippers were going to come back April/May to pay freight. However, one shipper has been located and promised to pay freight by 16-21 May 1984.
2. No American Embassy employee expedited documents. Documents were expedited by Export Packers who requested that invoices/bill of lading be made out directly to VOA c/o American Embassy. Export Packers being account customer, documents were released to them, as in most cases with Denco’s account customers.
Mr. Gibson, I am appealing for mercy in the whole matter and regret embarrassing the company. Please consider me but most of all my six children and my wife. Also please look back over the passed years about all the good work. I am begging for mercy, please help and forgive me in the whole issue.
Very truly yours, s/ Charles F. Taylor, Jr. s/ Charles F. Taylor, Jr.”
We have taken time to quote those two letters as we believe they are indispensable to the determination of this matter. The hearing officer who first heard this matter, after hearing all of the evidence both oral and written, ruled that appellant had been dismissed in accordance with the Labour Laws of Liberia for gross breach of duty and therefore was only entitled to his annual leave and wages due prior to the filing of his complaint. Appellant, being dissatisfied with the ruling, petitioned the National Labour Court for a judicial review of this administrative proceeding.
His Honour, Judge Arthur K. Williams of the National Labour Court after listening to arguments from both appellee and appellant’s counsels confirmed the ruling of the hearing officer in toto. Hence, this case has come before us on appeal.
The determination of this case primarily rests upon our interpretation of Section 1508 of the Labour Law which relates to the dismissal of employees. This section of the Labor Laws of Liberia classifies employees into two categories:
1. Those employed under a contract for a definite period; and,
2. Those employed under a contract for an indefinite period.
We shall concern ourselves with that portion of Section 1508 which applies to employees who are regarded as being employed for an indefinite period since the records before us do not show that appellant was bound by a contract of employment for a definite period. 1508(5) & (6) reads thus:
5. “Notwithstanding the provision of Section 1508 of this chapter an employer may dismiss an employee engaged for an indefinite period without notice, subject to payment only of wages due, where it is shown that the employee has been guilty of a serious breach of duty” (Emphasis ours).
6. “The following acts and violations shall be deemed to be serious breaches of duty within the meaning of the preceding section entitling the employer to terminate without notice or pay in lieu of notice contracts of employment for an indefinite period”.
a. Any of the acts or violations specifically set in subsection of this section;
2. Lack of skill or manifest inefficiency of the employee which makes impossible the fulfillment of his duties under the contract; and
3. If the employee commits any other serious offense against his obligation under the contract.
Sub-section (c) of Section 1508 entitles an employer to terminate an employee without notice or pay in lieu of notice engaged under contracts of employment for an indefinite period if the employee commits any other serious offense against his obligation under the contracts and such dismissed employee shall only be entitled to wages due. (Emphasis ours).
Let us now examine the letters which we have quoted above. In the letter of May 8, appellee through its personnel manager, Mr. James D. Gibson, Jr., called appellant’s attention to certain discrepancies regarding three bills of lading which deprived appellee of income. Appellee ended this letter in the last paragraph by saying that “this is a grave serious and embarrassing matter and we would appreciate your response in a similar manner.” (Emphasis ours). Appellant responded to appellee’s letter of May 8, by his letter of May 14, which is also quoted in this opinion. Appellant’s letter of May 14 contained his apology for embarrassing the company and asked for forgiveness not only for himself but for his six children and his wife.
Appellant’s letter of May 8, 1984 clearly pointed out, in our opinion, appellant’s obligation under his contract of employment with appellee for an indefinite period and that the offense which the appellant had committed against that obligation as being grave and serious. Appellant’s letter of May 14, 1984 admitted the commission of the offense and asked for forgiveness. Such admission must operate against appellant. Any voluntary admission made by a party himself is evidence against such party making same. Dennis v. Republic, [1928] LRSC 12; 3 LLR 45(1928).
Appellant’s counsel in his argument before the Court strongly contended that there is no ground for dismissal of an employee called “administrative reasons”. Nonetheless, the grounds stated in the statute which we have quoted above particularly subsection 6(c) provides that if an employee who is employed for an indefinite period commits any other serious offense against his obligation, such employee may be dismissed without notice subject to payment only for wages due. (Emphasis ours). For an act to be classified as a serious offense under this statute, evidence must be taken to determine whether such act falls within the meaning of sub-section 5 of section 1508. It is our opinion that both letters, appellee’s letter of May 8, 1984 and appellant’s letter of May 14, 1984 sufficiently established that the acts committed are serious offense against appellant’s obligations under his contract of employment for an indefinite period.
Furthermore, after the appellee received appellant’s letter dated May 14, 1984, appellee addressed another letter to appellant Charles F. Taylor, Jr., dated May 15, 1984 which letter we also deem necessary to quote below:
“May 15, 1984
Mr. Charles F. Taylor, Jr.
Traffic Manager
Denco Shipping Lines
Monrovia, Liberia
Dear Mr. Taylor:
With reference to our letter of May 8, 1984, and your subsequent reply of 14th May, 1984, you stated “originals were released on good will basis that the shippers were going to come back April/May to pay the freight. However, one shipper has been located and promised to pay freight by 16-21 May, 1984”. Up to today’s date, we have not received any payment. Also please note that it is not within the scope of your authority to release original bills of lading to customers without proof of official receipts from Denco showing payment for freight if freight is to be prepaid. We also wish to note here, that the explanation in question “bills of lading 00085MR” were shipped by shippers with whom we have never dealt with commercially.
We wonder as to why would you release the originals on goodwill to two different shippers without any guarantee whatsoever for the collection of the freight charges.
You are required to respond to this letter by 31′ of May, 1984, as your failure will lead us with no other alternative but to dispense your services for “administrative reasons”.
Very truly yours,
s/James D. Gibson, Jr.
t/James D. Gibson, Jr.
cc: James Heyburn Joseph F. Brent, Jr., File”
The letter just quoted shows without any doubt the reason why appellant was dismissed. In appellant’s letter of May 8, 1984, it was stated that the acts which appellant committed were grave and serious. In appellee’s letter of May 15, 1984, appellee requested appellant to give further explanation for those acts and upon his failure to do so, his services would be terminated for “administrative reasons”. Appellant according to the records did not reply this letter.
Clearly, sub-section six (c) of section 1508 has enlarged the definition of acts and violations which may be regarded as serious breaches of duty within the meaning of 1508 (5) of the Labour Law when it states broadly that any serious offense against an employee’s obligation under his contract may be regarded as a serious breach of duty. The important words here are “any other serious offense”.
In the instant case, it was therefore necessary for the hearing officer to determine what was the serious offense which was a serious breach of duty committed against appellant’s obligation under the contract for an indefinite period to warrant his dismissal. Sub-section six (c) of Section 1508 compels the taking of testimonies to determine what acts constituted “any other serious offense”. We therefore hold that the hearing officer correctly permitted evidence to be adduced at the hearing which would show what serious offense the appellant had committed which appellee termed “administrative reasons”.
Administrative proceedings do not require the technical rules which are followed by trials held in the courts. In order to make a fair determination of the validity or invalidity of any action which an employer takes against his employee, it is necessary for the hearing officer to exploit every reason why such action is taken. In the instant case, we are satisfied that the testimony shows that the hearing officer did receive every relevant evidence which enabled him to make the determination which he made in this case. See Doe v. Sinkor Bakery, [1976] LRSC 65; 25 LLR 292(1976).
When this case came before the National Labor Court for judicial review, this Court was obliged to review the determination of the hearing officer upon the copies of the records and the other evidence filed with it by the Minister of Labour and thereafter to make its decision based upon these records, the evidence therein, and apply properly the relevant law.
We have observed from the ruling of the hearing officer dated July 21, 1987, that he based his said ruling on Section 1508 6 (c) of the Labor Law and therefore sustained the dismissal of appellant by appellee. Section 1508 (5) states that an employer may dismiss an employee engaged for an indefinite period subject to payment for only wages due where it is shown that the employee has been guilty of “serious breach of duty”.
The hearing officer made an award to appellant of wages and leave pay due prior to filing of his complaint. Appellant was dismissed on June 4, 1984 and filed his complaint on January 11, 1986, a period of one year and seven months after his dismissal. The award made to appellant by the hearing officer in his ruling is vague and uncertain. In other words, no figure was stated in the ruling of the hearing officer in terms of dollars and cents that appellant should be paid. Judge Arthur K. Williams of the National Labor Court confirmed said ruling in toto. This shows careless handling of the petition for judicial review by Judge Williams who should have modified the ruling of the hearing officer in keeping with the records before him and the law relied upon by both the hearing officer and the judge. We have also searched the records, including the petition for judicial review and the briefs filed by both counsels and no where have we been able to discover the wages which was due to appellant at the time of his dismissal. The records show that appellant received a salary of L$1,170.00 per month. However, there is nothing in the records from which we may determine what wages and leave pay the appellant should have received at the time he was dismissed in 1984.
We hold that the ruling of the hearing officer and Judge Arthur K. Williams are incomplete, vague and inadequate and we therefore give no credence to these two rulings. We agree that appellant’s dismissal was in keeping with Section 1508 of the Labor Law relating to the dismissal of employees who are employed for an indefinite period.
We are of the further opinion that appellant is entitled to receive from appellee his wages and leave pay due up to the date of his dismissal, that is to say up to June 4, 1984.
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, this case is remanded to the National Labour Court to determine the wages and leave pay due appellant up to June 4, 1984, the date he was dismissed by appellee, and that upon such determination, appellee shall immediately pay to appellant the amount so determined.
The Clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate to the court below commanding it to enforce this judgment. Costs are disallowed.
Judgment reversed; case remanded