Sherman v Slawon (2017)
Dahn Shenman of District #9, Nimba County, Liberia MOVANT Versus Dr. Michael P. Slawon, Aspirant, Liberty Party, District # 9, Nimba County, Republic of Liberia RESPONDENT
Motion to Dismiss Appeal
Appeal
HEARD: September 5, 2017 Decided: September 12, 2017
MADAM JUSTICE YUOII DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT
On July 2, 2017, the National Elections Commission (NEC) commenced the nomination process for prospective candidates desirous of contesting the General and Presidential Elections for October 10, 2017. Pursuant thereto, on July 3, 2017, the Liberty Party, submitted the name of the respondent/appellant, Dr. _Michael P. Slawon to the National Elections Commission as its representative candidate to contest the Elections in District 9, Nimba County.
On July 6, 2017, the movant/appellee, Mr. G. Dan Sherman, filed a complaint before the Chairman of National Elections Commission, Counsellor Jerome G. Korkoya stating that the respondent/appellant is a presidential appointee currently holding appointments as Director General, Commission of Higher Education, Republic of Liberia and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Grand Bassa Community College; that given his current appointments the respondent/appellant is in violation of the Code of Conduct; and that the National Elections Commission (NEC) should reject the respondent/appellant’s nomination and disallow him from contesting in District # 9, Nimba County. The movant/appellee’s letter réads thus:
“CONCERNED CITIZEN OF DOE
TAPPITA STA TUTOR Y DISTRICT
LOWER NIMBA COUNTY
July 6, 2017
Honorable Jerome Korkoya
Chairman
National Elections Conunission (NEC.)
Republic Q/Liberia
Dear Honorable Chairman:
It has been intimated 10 me as a citizen Q/’ Lower Nimba County, especially Doe Chiefdom in Electoral District #9, Nimba County, thal Dr. Michael P. Slawon with cell# 0886-660067, Director of Higher Education d the Republic of Liberia and Chairman Q/ the Board Q/ Directors Q/’ the Grand Bassa (Community College, is intending 10 contest in the 2017 election on the Liberty Party ticket by subli171ting application to NEC to contest as Representative Candidate of District in Nimba County, even though he did not resign from his appointed position qforementioned. This act by Dr. Slawon is a complete violation Qflhe code Q/’conduct.
I lhergföre wish 10 call on the National Elections Commission to do justice by denying Dr. Slawon based on the Code Q/ Conduct and ask him to produce his letter of resignation from his Presidential Appointment. Further, Dr. Slawon is a member on the Board of ahnosl all of the Community Colleges in the Republic Q/’ Liberia appointed by the President.
I am ofthe highest conviction thatjustice will prevail in this case and that the National Election Commission will protect and defend the Constitution and all laws of the Republic ofLiberia to the letter.
Kind regards.
Sincerely yours,
- Dan Sherman
CELIß.• 0770375057/0886-499247 ”
Our review of the above quoted complaint shows that besides the mere assertion by the movant/appellee that he is a citizen of lower Nimba County, the movant/appellee gives no futther identification of himself as a registered voter of District 9 Nimba County, by proffering his voter identification card or number; that he is an agent of a political party or a candidate or a political aspirant contesting the representative seat in the said district # 9, Nimba County; or a political party, coalition or alliance that would have evidenced his eligibility to file a complaint regarding alleged elections offences or violations. Pursuant to Chapter 5, section 5.9 of the New Elections Law and the NEC’s Compilation of Regulations at Article 3, a registered voter, a candidate, a political party, coalition or alliance, or an agent of a political party or candidate is qualified to file an election complaint at any stage of the election. In fact, Article 3 section 3.2 of the Regulations is specific in its mandate that “a challenge or a complaim must nol be based on hearsay and must be made by an individual who has personal knowledge or was a witness to (he matters that are the basis QT the challenge or the complaint.” The very first sentence of the movant/appellee’s complaint is clearly in violation of this provision of the law, when it states that, “it has been intimated 10 me… ” Regrettably however, this issue which borders on standing having not been challenged by the respondent/appellant, this Court is precluded from making comments regarding the matter.
The records show that attached to the complaint was a facsimile of an appointment letter dated March 20, 20 12, under what appears to be the signature of the President, Her Excellency Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, re-appointing the respondent/appellant as Director General for Higher Education, Republic of Liberia. We herein quote the President’s Letter of re-appointment to wit:
“EJS MOSRL/0459/’2012
March 20, 2012
Hon. Dr. Michael Slewon
Director (jeneral
National Commission on Higher Education
Monrovia, Liberia
Dear Hon. Slewion,
I am pleased 10 re-appoint you 10 [he position Q/’ Director (;enera/, National Conunission on Higher Education, Republic Q/Liberia.
Il is expected that you will take office immediately and (f not already submitted, you are required to file by April 3. 2011 with the AmiCorruption Conunission the Declaration Q/ Income, Assets and Liabilities.
I trust thal you will justify the confidence I have reposed in you and that you will execute your responsibilities to the credit (Ifyourself and our country.
Sincerely,
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf”
The complaint was forwarded to Hearing Officer, Counsellor P. Teplah Reeves, who cited the parties to a hearing on August 3, 2017. At the hearing, the respondent/appellant stated that he was hired as a Civil Servant and therefore not a presidential appointee; that he went through a vetting process headed by the Minister of Education; that the appointment letter of March 20, 2012, was not delivered to him; and that he had never seen the letter until it was presented to the investigation by the movant/appellee.
On the same day, that is, August 3, 2017, the Hearing Officer, Counsellor P. Teplah Reeves, rendered her ruling holding that the appointment letter of March 20, 2012, was not sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent/appellant is a presidential appointee; and hence, the complaint was denied. The movant/appellee excepted to the ruling, announced an appeal to the Board of Commissioners of the NEC and subsequently filed his bill of exceptions, thus perfecting the appeal process from the hearing officer to the Board of Commissioners of the NEC
On August 17, 2017, the Board of Commissioners of the NEC entertained arguments from both parties and thereafter, on the same date, rendered its final ruling wherein it reversed the decision of the hearing officer on grounds that the respondent/appellant was a presidential appointee; that he was in violation of the Code of Conduct; and that he committed perjury when he swore under oath that he was not a presidential appointee. Relevant portion of the Boards’ ruling of August 17, 201 7, denying the respondent/appellant’s application for certification to contest the October 2017 elections are quoted as follows:
“During argument before us, counsel for the Appellee admitted-thal the Appellee, Dr. Slawon, presently serves as Director General o/’ (he National Commission on Higher Education and also on the Board Q/ several conununily colleges in lhe Republic. We also observed Troll? (he record a letter dated March 20, 2012, wherein Her Excellency, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleq/ appointed the Appellee Dr. Michael P. Slawon to the position of _Director General of the National Commission on Higher Education, Republic ofLiberia.
We note that the Honorable Supreme Court in the case: Selena Mappy-PoIson v. Republic Q/ Liberia (March 2017) upheld the constitutionality Q/ the appointee fi•om engaging in political activities, canvassing or contesting for elected public offices. Section 5.2 of• the Code of Conduct requires that a presidential appointee wishing to engage in political activities, canvass or contest for an elected public Qffice must resign his her position two or three years prior to the said election.
Based on the evidence produced al the trial, coupled with Appellee ‘s admission that he is currently holding the position(s) to which he was appointed by the President, Appellant Slawon was required to resign as a condition to contest the 2017 representative election in District #9, Nimba County. Because Appellant Slawon failed to resign•as required by law beföre applying to the NEC to contest the ensuing elections, we hold that he is in egregious violation of Section 5.1 Q/ the (Code ofConducl. See Kamara v. NEC, decided by the Honorable Supreme Court, July 2017. Accordingly, we are duty bound to reject and revoke his letter Q/’ acceptance to contest the 2017 General Elections.
We nole./iwlher that in his notarized answers to questions 7 Ihru 9 of the aspirant “questionnaire to establish residency, domicile and compliance with Code Q/ Conduct for public Qfficials “, such as l)r. Slawon, Appellee untruthfully answered “no ” to the question as to whether he has been appointed to a government position during the past three years…. We hold that Dr. Slawon ‘s fålse answer to the questions r€/&renced herein constitute sufficient legal grounds 10 revoke and nullifj his acceptance letter issued by the NEC.
WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is the Final Ruling Q/’ this Board that the August 3, 2017 final nding Q/’ the Hearing ()fjicer in these proceedings, is hereby reversed; the
Nomination Conunittee ‘s recommendation Jör Appellee Dr. Michael P. Slawon to contest as a representative candidate in District 119, Nimba County is hereby rejected and overruled; and the acceptance letter issued based on Jålse representation by Appellee Dr. Slawon is hereby ordered revoked, and Dr. Slawon ‘s naille is ordered renwved from the final listing of accepted candidates for the 2017 General
Elections. AND IT 1S HEREBY SO ORDERED. ‘
The respondent/appellant excepted to this final ruling of the Board, announced an appeal to the Supreme Court, and filed his bill of exceptions on August 21, 2017.
On August 22, 20 17, the movant/appellee filed a four (4) count motion to dismiss the respondent/appellant’s appeal before the Board of Commissioners of the NEC, alleging that the respondent/appellant neglected to file his bill of exceptions on August 19, 2017, and thus, was in violation of Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law which prescribe a 48- hour period to complete an appeal from the NEC to the Supreme Court. As proof of this averment, the movant/appellee attached a certificate dated August 21, 2017, issued by the clerk of the NEC’s Board, authenticating the absence of the respondent/appellant’s bill of exceptions from the records as at August 21, 2017.
On August 23, 201 7, the respondent/appellant filed an eleven (l l) count resistance to the motion stating that due to the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)’s official campaign launching on Saturday, August 19, 2017, the respondent/appellant was unable to file his bill of exceptions and that as the next day, August 20, 2017 was a Sunday, a non-working day, he had no alternative but to file same on the next working day, that is, Monday, August 21, 2017; that Chapter 5 section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law, upon which the movant/appellee was relying to have his appeal dismissed and which provides for a 48-hour period to perfect an appeal from the NEC to the Supreme Court, was inapplicable to the respondent/appellant as same contravenes Article 83 of the Constitution which provides for a period of 7 (seven) days to appeal an adverse ruling from the NEC to the Supreme Court. As we have determinedÄhat counts four (4) and seven (7) of the resistance which speak to this issue are germane to these proceedings, we quote same herein below, to wit:
4) That as to count three (3) of lhe motion to dismiss the appeal, respondent says that section 5.12, subsection 6 says that a declaration Q/’ lhe (l’.cnnmission on an appeal from the decision of a magistrate or chic/’ hearing officer, may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
Jörly-eight hours qfler the posting of the decision. This provision of the Elections Law violates Article 83 of the 1986 Constitution Q/’ Liberia which stales in part that the Elections Commission shall within seven (7) days of receipt o/• lhe Notice Q/ Appeal, /örward al/ [he records in the case to the Supreme Court, which no/ later than seven days thereqfter, shall hear and make its determination. In lhe instant case, the respondentjiled its bill Q/ exceptions on Monday, the 21 St and accordingly paid the requiredJ&e of US $2, 000.00 to have [he matter tran,yferred to the Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia för final determination.
7) And also, respondent submits and says that assuming, without adlilitting, that section 5.12 subsection six (6), relied upon by the movant 10 file the motion 10 dismiss the appeal, which is not the case, respondent says that the ruling was delivered in the evening hours Q/’ the 17th instant and [hat i/ could not have filed its hill Q/’ excep/ions particularly on Saturday, August 19, 2()17, due to the Irq//ic congestion caused by the launch of CDC.’ ‘s campaign which Illacle i/ difficult for the respondent to have reach the C.cnnmission in time to file. With Sunday being a holiday, its bill exceptions was filed on Monday, the 21 st instant. Accordingly, count three (3) Q/ the movan/ Is motion is ajit subject for dismissal.
On the same day, August 23, 2017, the Board of Commissioners of the NEC listened to arguments on the motion and the resistance thereto, and on August 25, 2017, rendered its final ruling stating, among other things, that the seven (7) days’ time frame for an appeal from the NEC’s Board to the Supreme Court provided for in Article 83(c) of the Constitution was applicable only to post elections challenges; that the 48-hour period stipulated in Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law was the applicable law to the respondent/appellant’s appeal and that the respondent/appellant should have filed a motion for enlargement of time if he was unable to file his bill of exceptions within the prescribed time frame. We qt.10te herein below the relevant portion of the Board’s final ruling of August 25, 201 7, as follows:
‘The record shows that the Board renderedfinal judgment on August 17, 2017 ordering that the name Q/’ Respondent Dr. Michael P. Slawon he stricken the final list candidates based on Respondent Is false representation to the Candidate Nomination C’.cnnmittee, and based on Respondent ‘s violation ofSections 5.1 & 5.2 oflhe National Code Q/’ Conduct. Respondent was present along Wilh his Counsels. Not satiéfied with the said ruling Q/ the Board, Respondent excepted and announced an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court.
Counting 48 (/örty eight) hours the posting Q/’ the said final decision, Respondent had up 10 Saturday, the day Q/’August,d4.D. 2017 to present his Bill ofExceptions to the Boardfor approval along with proe/’ ofpaying the requiredfees for Recognizance as provided for under Section 6.8 of the New Elections Law. The Head Office of the NEC was opened on Saturday, August 19, 2017 for business. Respondent does not dispute this fact. He argued however that he could not Ina/ce it to the office of the NEC’ due to the traffic congestion cause by the CDC campaign launch. He ./iwlher argued that Section 5.12 subsection 6 of the New Elections _Law violates Arlicles and 83(c) Q/’the Liberian Constitution.
With respect to Respondent Counsel’s argument concerning CDC’s canipaign launch, the Board asked Respondent why he did not take advamage Q/’ lhe statute providing a party with the option offiling for enlargement oftilne. Counsel replied that Respondent did not dean it necessary to Jile Jör enlargement of lime because they were in lhe process of preparing their Bill of Exceptions. The Board is nol persuaded by this argument.
7he record b€fore us shows that on August 17, 2017, the Board Q/ Conunissioners Q/ the National Elections Commission handed down its l”ina/ Ruling in (he case concerning the Code Q/’Conduc/ violation involving Mm G. Dahn Sherman and Dr. Michael P. Slawon. 7’he Board’s Final Ruling was in favor Q/ Mr. G. Dahn Sherman thereby reversing the Hearing ()fficer ‘s Ruling. 7’he Respondent, Dr. Michael P. S/awon, nol satiåfiecl with the ruling, took exception and announced appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court Qflhe Republic Q/’Liberia.
Article 20(b) Q/’ the 1986 Constitution provides Ihat “the right Q/’ an appeal fhom a judgnenl, decree, decision or ruling Q/ any court or acbninistrative board or agency, except the Supreme Court, shall be inviolable. The Legislature shall prescribe rules and procedures for
the easy, expeditious and inexpensive filing and hearing Q/’ an
Ihat right Q/’ an appeal from a decision of the Board challenging an Aspirant ‘s candidature is provided för and regulated under Section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law Q/’ 1986.
We ./iw(her note Iha/ Article 83(c) (2/ the Liberian Constitution provides that “the returns of the elections shall he declared by the National Elections Commission not later than fifteen days qfler the casting of ballots. Any party or candidate who complains about the )nanner in which the elections were conducted or who challenges the results there” shall have the right to file a convlaint with the National Elections Conunission. Such complaint must he filed no/ later Ihan seven days q/ier the announcement of/he elections ‘
We note that the seven day period in Article 83(c) only applies to challenges to the results of an election. Because the language Q/’ Section 5.12, subsection 6 Q/ the New Elections Law is mandatory, and because Respondent /åi/ed 10 comply with said statute, we hold thal his appeal is hereby dismissed.
WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the./ina/ ruling Qf/he Board Q/’ Commissioners Q/ August 17, is confirmed and g[/irmed; the Movant’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal is herchy granted and appeal announced by Respondent in this matter is hereby dismissed AND IT IS HEREBY SO ORDER.
The respondent/appellant excepted to the above final ruling by NEC’s Board on the motion dismissing his appeal, and announced an appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court. On August 26, 2017, the respondent/appellant submitted his bill of exceptions to the Board for approval and filed same with the Clerk of this Court on August 28, 2017. On August 31, 2017, the movant/appellee filed another motion to dismiss the appeal, this time before the Supreme Court, stating that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, in that the respondent/appellant neglected to timely file his bill of exceptions from the Board’s final ruling of August 17, 201 7, and that the appeal had already been dismissed by the Board of Commissioners of the NEC.
At the call of the case for arguments on September 4, 2017, this Coun observed from the records and the Ininutes that the respondent/appellant’s lawyers neglected to file resistance to the motion to dismiss the appeal and also did not make any request to spread their resistance on the records of the Supreme Court. But be that as it may, the Supreme Court however consolidated the motion to dismiss and the appeal, given the fact that this Court is obligated by law to hear and determine elections cases expeditiously and without any delay. Pursuant thereto, Iqyvyers from both sides argued thei.r theory of the case and the laws they believed to be supportive of their respective positions.
This Court having carefully examined the records and the contentions of the parties determined that there are two salient issues dispositive of this case. The issues are:
- l) Whether or not the Suprelne Court has jurisdiction to hear and deteril)ine this appeal? and
2) Whether or not the Board of Commissioners of the NEC erred in reversing the ruling of the Hearing Officer, thus denying the respondent/appellant’s application to contest the ensuing October 10, 2017 elections?
This Court shall proceed to dispose of the first issue given the fact that the said issue mandatorily compels us to determine whether the Court is seized with the requisite jurisdiction to answer the second issue which delves into the merits of the appeal. The Supreme Court has consistently held as follows:
“whenever the issue of a court’s jurisdiction is raised, every other thing in the case becomes subordinated until the court has determined its jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the panicular matter. This is true because if a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a matter, whatever decision or judgment is rendered by it is a legal nullity. Therefore, it is necessary that the court should determine its jurisdiction over the question which its judgment assumes to answer or give relief.” MIM Liberia Corporation v. Toweh, 30LLR 611(1983); Kamara v. Chea & Saito, 31LLR 511(1983); Scans/up (LIB) Inc., v. 1710/110, 41 LLR 181, 186 (2002); The Intestate Estate of the late ChigfMurphey-Vey John el. al. v. The Intestate Estate of the late Bendu Kaidii el. al., 41 LLR 277, 282 (2002); The Management of Paynesville •Cily Corporation v. The Aggrieved Workers of Paynesville City Corporation, Supreme Court Opinion, March Term A.D. 2013; Loiuse Clarke-Tarr v. Daniel K. Wright, Supreme Court Opinion, March Term A.D. 2015; The National Elections Conunission (NEC) v. Siebo, Jr., Supreme Court Opinion, March Term A.D. 2017.
The principle of law on jurisdiction, contained in the above quoted cases, mandates us to determine whether the respondent/appellant did file his bill of exceptions within the time prescribed by law as would confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to hear the case on its merits and to make a final determination thereon.
In answering this query, we must state at the onset that the movant/appellee’s reliance on Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law as a basis to dismiss the appeal for failure to complete the process within a 48-hour period is misapplied and inapplicable given the fact that the entire Chapter 5 which this provision is a part off, speaks only to voting and noting more. We take judicial cognizance that the Supreme Court, in recent times has recognized and acknowledged that Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law relating to appeals is not applicable to the candidates’ nomination process or period, but rather, is concerned with only the voting process and irregularities arising therefrom. In the case, National Elections Commission (NEC’.) v. Siebo, .Jr., Supreme Court Opinion, March Term, A.D. 2017, the Court, in atticulating its position on this provision of the New Elections Law, opined thus:
‘We cannot accept Chapter 5 Sections 5.12(6) which the movant seeks 10 use as authority for asserting that the appellant had violated the appeal time frame requirement within which to file his hill of exceptions as the Chap/er under which the provision Jå/ls, being. Chapter 5 of the Elections Law, does not deal with candidates or aspirants registration or the registration process, bul rather deals exclusively with voting. Accordingly, we hold that the procedures Jör the filing Q/’ ccnnp/ain/s ar/icula/ed in C.’hapter 5, and e.specia//y a/ subsection 5.9 through 5.12(6), apply squarely to lhe li/ne of ‘voting ‘ and nol ‘nomination of candidates Hence, the section relied upon by
the movant:appellee is not applicable to the instant case which involves candidates ‘ nomination or the nonlination process, but rather that the section applies instead to challenges emanating from complaints on irregularities noticed during voting or connected to the voting process. We take note, and impress on counsel./ör to do [he same, Iha[ each chapler Q/’ the Elections Law deals with separate and distinct topics or aspects Q/ the elections and that unlike Chapter 4 which deals with the general conduct Q/’ the elections ranging the setting up of voting precincts(4. l), polling places (4.2), Elections Writs (4.3), duty of [he Inagistrale (4.4) through N0111ination Q/ Candidates (4.5) to the close d the polls (4. 12), Chapter 5 only deals exclusively with ‘voting ‘ and nothing more
We confirm and affirm the holding of the Supreme Coutt immediately cited herein above and hold that Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law is not applicable to this present case since the said provision of the law squarely applies to voting and voting alone.
Notwithstanding our holding, stated supra, this Court on the other hand, will also not give credence to or endorse the respondent/appellant’s argument that Article 83(c) of the Constitution is the applicable law to this case and that pursuant thereto, the respondent/appellant had seven (7) days to complete the appeal process. A review of Article 83 (c) of the Constitution provides thus:
“The returns of the elections shall be declared by the Elections Commission not later than 15 days after the casting of ballots. /()ur Emphasis] Any party or candidate who conlplains about the manner in which the elections were conducted or who challenges the result thereof shall have the right to file a complaint to the elections commission. Such complaint shall be file not later than seven days dier the announcement of/he elections.
The Elections Commission shall, within thirty days of the receipt Q/ the ccnnplaint, conduct an impartial investigation and render a decision which may involve a dismissal Q/’ the complainl or nullification of lhe election Q/ a candidate. Any such political party or independent candidate affected by such decision shall not later than seven days appeal against it to the Supreme Court. ” [our emphasis]
The reading of the above constitutional provision leaves no doubt that the said provision unambiguously speaks to post-elections challenges and complaints and not pre-elections complaints. And we place great emphasis on the phrase: “the returns of the elections shall be declared by the Elections Conunission not later than 15 days after the casting of ballots” in order to show that during the preelections period there is neither electoral returns nor are ballots cast. Hence, we hold that Article 83(c) of the Constitution is inapplicable to this case.
Given the fact that this Court has rejected the legal reliances, theories and principles of law advanced by the respective parties as they relate to tinne for the filing of an appeal from the final decision of the NEC to the Supreme Court with respect to pre-elections complaint such as the one before us, the question that we must now endeavor to answer is, what is the governing applicable law regarding this issue?
We diligently perused the provisions of the New Elections Law and the attendant
Compilation Regulations promulgated by the NEC. Our perusal thereof reveal that
the applicable provisions relating to pre-elections complaints, challenges and appeals are found in Articles 5 and 9 of the Regulations on Complaints and Appeals. Article 5, which is entitled ‘Candidate Nomination Challenges, reads th us:
“Candidate Nomination Challenges
Article 5. Challenges to Candidates
5.1. A candidate rejected by the NEC during the candidate nomination period may appeal the NEC’s decision to the Supreme Court within 48-hours period after the NEC’s determination.
5.2 A challenge to the eligibility of a candidate on the preliminary list of candidate must be in writing and signed by the challenger and presented to (he NEC within 48 hours after publication of the provisional list Q/’ candidates, with al/ evidence available to support lhe challenge.
5.3 The NEC shall investigate and determine the challenges presented 10 it and (flit decides that the candidate is not qualified, shall remove the candidate from the provisional list Q/ candidates.
5.4 A candidate removed fronz the provisional list may appeal the decision to the Suprune Court within 48 hours after it is issued.
5.5. A challenger may appeal NEC’s decision on rejection of the challenge wit/lin 48 hours after NEC determination. ”
Article 9, which is entitled ‘Due Process, reads as follow:
“9. l. the hearing process, investigation and determination Q/’ challenges and complaints by the NEC shall he organized according 10 rules Qfprocedures issued by the NEC
9.2. A decision by the NEC or a Magistrate shall be published on the prenüses Qfthe NEC or the Magistrate ‘s Office.
9.3. A Magistrate Is decision can be appealed to the NEC within 48 hours qfter determination by the Magistrate.
9.4. Determination Q/’ Hearing Officer shall be appealed 10 the Board Q/’Commissioners no later [han 48 hours qfter the determination.
9.5. Determination of NEC Board on the complaint can be appealed to the Supreme Court ofLiberia no later than 48 hours after the determination is issued. ”
The letter and spirit of the above quoted provisions from the Regulations clearly dictate a 48-hour period to coinplete an appeal from the NEC to the Supreme Court in matters of pre-elections. This Court, being a constitutional Court must zealously apply the Constitution, Statutes, and Regulations promulgated by authority of the law. Hence, we hold that the applicable law in this case is the Regulations on Complaints and Appeals and that pursuant thereto, the respondent/appellant had a 48-hoår period to complete his appeal to the Supreme Cotilt.
In ascribing to our holding stated supra, this Court takes judicial cognizance of the Candidate Nomination Regulations promulgated by the NEC; that the said regulations constituted the Nomination Committee to vet candidates nominations and that appeals emanating from the said Committee to the Board of Commissioners of the NEC and subsequently to the Suprelne Court is three (3) days. We also take judicial notice that of recent, the Supreme Court in the case, National Elections Conamission (NEC’) v. Siebo, Jr. recognized and acknowledged that appeals arising from the Nomination Committee is three (3) days.
The facts in the Siebo, Jr., case reveal that Amos Siebo Jr., submitted his application as an independent candidate to the Nomination Committee of the NEC to contest the elections in District l, Montserrado County. Upon receipt of the application, the Nomination Committee scrutinized the application and informed Mr. Siebo, Jr., that his application indicated that he did not have a headquarters in the district he intended to contest in. A hearing was duly conducted by the Nomination Committee on the application and thereafter the Committee rejected Mr. Siebo’s application and denied him from contesting the elections. On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of the NEC the ruling of the Committee was affirmed. Mr. Siebo’s lawyer excepted to the Board’s ruling, announced an appeal, complied with the recognizance requirement, but completed his appeal five (5) days after the decision of the Board.
The NEC moved to dismiss Mr. Siebo, Jr.’s appeal on grounds that the Supreme Coult lacked jurisdiction over the merits of the case since the appeal was completed outside of the 48-hour period stipulated in Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law. Mr. Siebo resisted the motion on grounds that the 48-hour period was not applicable since the case emanated from the Nomination Committee which the Elections Law does not recognize as compared to an election magistrate or hearing officer.
This Court in passing on this issue, rejected the arguments advanced by both parties holding that Chapter 5, section 5.12(6) of the New Elections Law is inapplicable since the said provision deals with voting and that the Nomination Committee is recognized by the regulations promulgated by the NEC and as such the Committee was clothed with the authority to make a determination on Mr. Siebo’s application. .1n view of this, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Candidate Nomination Regulations at section 11.4 the time frame to complete an appeal that originated from the Nomination Committee is three (3) days and not 48 hours.
In the present case the facts reveal that the Nomination Committee of the NEC did not initiate the investigation against the respondent/appellant; rather, a coinplaint was filed against the respondent/appellant before the NEC; that the said complaint was heard and determined by a Hearing Officer, Counsellor P. Teplah Reeves, not the Nomination Committee; and that pursuant to the decision of the hearing officer this appeal was birthed.
As stated earlier, this Court says that the above quoted provision of Article 9 of the Regulations on Complaints and Appeals clearly speaks to the conduct of hearing and appeals emanating from hearing ofTicers and elections magistrates and that the said provision provides a 48-hour period to complete an appeal. Therefore, we hold that given the fact that this appeal emanated from a hearing officer and not the Nomination Committee, this case is distinguishable from the Siebo, Jr,. case and that the principle of law stated in the Siebo, Jr., case is not applicable to the present case; that Article 5, sections 5.1 and 5.5 and Article 9, sections 9.1 tlmrough 9.5 of the Regulations on Complaints and Appeals are the laws applicable to the instant case and as such, the respondent/appellant’s appeal having been filed beyond the 48-hour period, divests the Supreme Court of the authority to hear this case on its merits.
Our holding, stated supra, should not be misconstrued that this Court is insensitive to the plight of the respondent/appellant’s contention regarding the overwhelming traffic congestion caused by the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)’s official campaign launched on August 19, 2017. In fact, we take judicial notice of the said event and acknowledge all the attending undisputed circumstances surrounding the said launching. But what this Court will not accept is the fact that the respondent/appellant’s lawyers have decided to use this occasion as an excuse to shield their negligence in that the said lawyers submitted an affidavit stating that Counsellor Onesimus Banwon was seen in his car enroute to the NEC on August 19, 2017; and that Counsellor Banwon was held in a traffic jam as a result of the CDC’s campaign. It is disheartening to note that during the hearing of this case, Counsellor Onesimus Banwon presented a completely different version of the assertions made in the affidavit, stating instead that he was never in his car on that day out of fear that his car would have been damaged by the overwhelming crowd participating in the CDC’s campaign. This statement of Counsellor Onesimus Banwon shows that the deponent of the affidavit, Mr. Spencer M. Koroma, of the Sherman & Sherman Law Firill, committed perjury by giving false statement under
oath and that the respondent/appellant’s lawyers connived with Mr. Spencer M Korolna to mislead this Court. These unethical conducts by the respondent/appellant’s lawyers clearly demonstrate that they were indeed derelict in their professional duties.
This Coutt says that in as much as we are eager to attend to the merits of this case and make a determination thereon, we are precluded from going any further because of want of jurisdiction. This Court acknowledges that the taking of an appeal is a journey to the Supreme Court wherein the appellant is required to complete the process step by step and that when one of the mandatory steps is missing or defective, the journey cannot be completed. The Supreme Court, in numerous Opinions, has opined as follows:
‘in as much as the Court has repeatedly expressed its strong /ör deciding cases on its merit and, consequently, is hesitant to dismiss a case by reason of a mere technicality it is very important that an appellant, in pursuing an appeal takes the outinosl care 10 ensure (hat the statute is strictly complied with; (ha/ the Counsel ./ör [he appellant must continuously and meticulously examine the appeal statute and make sure (hat it is complied Wilh 10 the leller and 10 the full intent oflhe Legislature as the Court is nol prepared to sacrifice the appeal statute or turn a blind eye to accommodate the errors Q/’ the appellant in pecfecting his appeal. T’o the converse, the position Q/ the Suprune (.’ourl has been strict ccnnpliance; and any omission in./i/(/il/ing the requirements enounced in the appeal statute is deemed fatal and a warranlyför lhe dismissal Q/ [he appeal as the Supreme Court has been un-wavering and uncomprolllising in its position that non-compliance Wilh the mandatory statutory requirejnenls• for appeal cannol he deemed as /llere technicality and that a case will in fact he dismissed where lhere are violations o/’ lhe substantive statutory requirements by the appellant. ” Manakeh v. Toweh, 32LLR 2()7 (1984); Ezzedine v. Sat/ 33LLR 21 (1985); Blanl() et al., v. The Managenzent ofCalholic Relic/ Services, Supreme Court Opinion, March Term 2006; Hussenni v.
Bnunskine, Supreme Court Opinion, March Term, A.D. 20 13; National Eleclions C.onunission (NEC) v. Sieho, .Jr., Supreme Court Opinion, March Term A.D. 2017
With regards to election cases, this Court has made no differentiation in the application of the principle of law quoted supra. In fact the Court has articulated and espoused that:
has in place a qualified legal teal)? so that in the event he believes that an election violation has occurred, he would he in the position to adequately take advantage Q/ the law, especially with the tilng/i•cvne prescribed hy lhe law ./ör asserting a challenge and timely appealing Ji*0111 any decision related to the challenge since electoral challenges are special proceeding which must be heard expeditiously. Jonathon Boye Charles Soghie v. NEC, Suprme Coutt Opinion, October Term A.D. 2016; Kumara v. NEC, Supreme Court Opinion March Term, A.D. 2017; National Elections (NEC,) v. Siebo, Jr., Supreme Court Opinion, March Term A.D. 2017.
In view of the facts articulated herein and the principle of laws applicable thereto we hold that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and make a determination on the merits of this case and, as such, the motion to dismiss the appeal is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Given the fact that the appeal is dismissed, the Supreme Court is precluded from delving into the second issue concerning whether the Board of Commissioners erred in confirming the rulingß0f the hearing, officer which disqualified the respondent/appellant from contesting the October 2017 Elections.
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, it is the holding of this Court that the motion to dismiss the appeal should be and same is hereby granted, and the appeal is dismissed as a matter of law.
The Clerk of this Coun is ordered to send a mandate to the National Elections Commission to resume jurisdiction over this case and enforce this judgment. Costs ruled against the respondent/appellant. And it is so ordered.
Motion 10 IDismiss Appeal C;ranled.
Counsellor Joseph P. Gibson Q/’lhe Wright and Associates Law Firm appeared /ör
(he movant appellee. Counsellors James G. Innis, Jr., Albert S. Sims, and D.
Onesimus Banwon appearedJör the respondent: appellanL