MAMADEE SANDO, Appellant, v. AFRICAN TRADING COMPANY, by and thru its Managing Director, ALI M. H. ALI, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Heard: December 6, 1988. Decided: December 30, 1988.

1. A party is barred by the doctrine of estoppel from repudiating his own voluntary act.

2. Where a party has already benefitted from a judgment in a case, that party cannot legally seek further benefit or relief by another judgment in the same case.

3. Satisfaction of a judgment refers to compliance with or fulfillment of the mandate contained in the judgment.

4. Generally, there is one satisfaction of a judgment in an action.

5. Public policy dictates that there be an end to litigation.

6. Parties who have contested any issue shall be bound by the result of the contest.

7. Matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the same parties.

8. In the absence of fraud, a party is not entitled to two judgments over the same subject matter.

Appellant’s building was destroyed in a fire which started in an adjacent building owned by appellee. When appellee refused to accept liability, appellant sought the intervention of the office of the President of Liberia. Appellant was compensated for the loss, following an investigation by the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, whereupon appellant issued a release to appellee. Later appellant instituted an action of damages in court for the same loss. After a number of procedural actions, including withdrawals of the complaint and answer by both parties, and refiling the action and an amended answer, the trial court ruled that the appellant was acting in bad faith to institute an action for damages after he had received compensation for his loss as a result of the investigation conducted by the Minister of State. The trial judge further ruled there was no action pending before the court for disposition. Thereafter appellant filed a motion to dismiss the amended answer, which was denied by the trial court.
Consequently, appellant appealed. In reviewing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that appellant was estopped from disavowing his voluntary act of submitting his claim to the president. The Court further found that appellant, having received compensation for his loss in that forum, could not now seek satisfaction of judgment from the court for the same kiss. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Johnnie N Lewis for appellant. P. Amos George Firm and E. Winfred Smallwood for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE KPOMAKPOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mamadee Sando, plaintiff/appellant herein alleged in his complaint that he owned a building situated on Water Street in the City of Monrovia, adjacent to the appellee’s building which burned down on the 5th of February, 1982. Although appellant averred in his complaint that defendant, now appellee “caused plaintiffs building aforesaid to be destroyed by fire,” the complaint is silent as to the wanton act, or any act, for that matter, perpetrated by the appellee which caused the destruction of the building. Appellant’s only rationale for holding appellee liable is that due to the proximity of the premises, appellant’s building was destroyed. Plaintiff therefore sought compensation from appellee for the injury done to his premises. According to the records certified to us, when appellee refused to accept liability, appellant directly sought the intervention of the then Head of State, now President Samuel K. Doe, who sent a directive to his then Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, John G. Rancy, who expeditiously disposed of the matter, awarding appellant the sum of $100,000.00, evidenced by a receipt and a general release signed by appellant and approved by Honourable Rancy.

Thereafter, on February 17, 1984, plaintiff resurrected his case by instituting this action of damages against the appellee. In count five (5) of the complaint, plaintiff demanded that appellee pays an initial compensation for the damages appellant sustained as a result of the fire. The rest of the complaint, besides making mention of the $100,000.00, is void of any reference to the hearing of the case as concluded at the Executive Mansion. After receiving the answer, plaintiff unmindfully withdrew his complaint against appellee without reservation. Subsequently, appellant filed a new complaint against appellee, alleging therein, essentially, the same facts and circumstances. To this new complaint appellee filed an amended answer, after he withdrew the previous one. For the purpose of this opinion, we quote counts 7 and 8 of appellee’s amended answer which we deem relevant:

7. And also because defendant avers as to count 3 of the said complaint that same should be overruled and dismissed in that, the plaintiff took this matter, the same facts and circumstances and the same parties, to the Executive Mansion where defendant’s representative was incarcerated and forced to pay an amount of $100,000.00 to plaintiff as total compensation for damages suffered by the plaintiff during the fire incident of February 8, 1982, and which amount plaintiff accepted as full compensation for damages done to his house as will more fully appear by decision, general release and receipts.

8. And also because defendant avers as to the said complaint with particular reference to counts 3 and 4 thereof that same is unmeritorious, baseless and without legal foundation as defendant is not in anyway obligated to plaintiff for the destruction of his building which position defendant has always held and because of his refusal to assume any liability plaintiff, instead of coming to the Court, then referred the matter to the Head of State and Chairman of the People’s Redemption Council who instructed Honourable John G. Rancy, the then Minister of State for Presidential Affairs to investigate the matter. In execution of the directives of the Head of State, Minister Rancy arrested and imprisoned Mr. Khalil Bourgi, the acting manager of the defendant’s corporation, African Trading Corporation and rendered a decision that the defendant pays the plaintiff $100,000.00 Dollars, and that the acting manager, Mr. Khalil Bourgi should be incarcerated until the said amount is paid. To secure the release of Mr. Bourgi, defendant was forced to pay $100,000.00 dollars in full settlement of Minister Rancy’s decision and receipt and a general release executed by Minister Rancy.

Although clear and cogent were counts 7 and 8 of the amended answer just recited, the amended reply did not traverse them, at least not in specific terms. We will set out counts 8 and 9 of the amended reply which attempted to address the issues raised in counts 7 and 8 of the amended answer:

8. Traversing count seven of the answer of Ali M . H. Ali, defendant, plaintiff says that the allegations therein contained are false, misleading and a distortion of the facts; for, while plaintiff did receive $100,000.00 through the office of the then Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, Major John G. Rancy, plaintiff was never furnished a copy of any decision, allegedly rendered on 7th June, 1983, by Major John G. Rancy, to the effect that $100,000.00 was being awarded as full compensation for the loss sustained, especially in face of the estimate presented and the loss of rental income.

9. Traversing counts eight and nine of the answer of Ali M. H. Ali, defendant, plaintiff submits that the allegations therein contained are false and misleading for, the defendant, African Trading Company, by and thru Mr. Ali M. H. Ali, admitted liability for the damages inflicted upon, and sustained by the plaintiff, and promised to make compensation as soon as the company has been compensated by the insurance company, with which it was insured, following the fire. Further, it would seem, but unreasonable, that plaintiff would issue a release in favor of the defendant, African Trading Company, for $100,000.00, when the estimate for repairs alone, excluding loss of rental intake, was not only so much more than the $100,000.00, but in face of the fact that the defendant, African Trading Company, was fully informed of the total loss sustained by the plaintiff.

Despite the fact that appellant claimed in his reply that the allegations as contained in counts 7 and 8 of the amended answer were false, misleading, and a distortion of the facts, what is of utmost concern to us is the fact that plaintiff, now appellant, admitted receiving the $100,000.00 from the appellee through the office of the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, where he voluntarily took his grievance for redress. According to the record certified to us, when the case was called after the pleadings had rested, plaintiffs counsel made application in which he requested that the case be ruled to trial on the complaint and reply since the defendant had withdrawn his answer as evidenced by defendant’s own notice.

For his part, the defendant, through his counsel, made a counter submission in which he informed the court that since both parties had withdrawn their pleadings there was therefore no action before the court for disposition. In disposing of the two submissions, His Honour Judge Tulay observed, among other things:

“We are not convinced by counsel’s argument that plaintiff did not receive the money, ($25,000.00) paid under the directive of the First Lady of the Republic of Liberia. Additionally, we hold that plaintiff being the one who carried his complaint to the Minister of (sic) Presidential Affairs, cannot complain of not receiving the money from the defendant as the decision could not legally be satisfied anywhere else outside of the office of the Minister of (sic) Presidential Affairs. There is no showing that plaintiff was forced to sign the notice of withdrawal of his action. But granted that this averment is true, could it be considered amiss when the defendant was forced to (sic) $100,000.00? And our answer is no; for the power that forced the defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of $100,000.00 to (sic) would force him to withdraw his action since it was fine (sic) after the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs had examined the whole matter.

On the whole we pronounce (sic) it here that the trial of the action of damages for $28,000.00 after plaintiff has been awarded and have received the amount of $100,000.00 was done in bad faith, and for this court the action could have been abated, (sic) even if it had not (sic) withdrawn. But not that the action had been withdrawn, which we considered was proper, we cannot rule the case to trial as counsel for plaintiff would have us to do.

There being no action in the court, it follows that there can be no case against Khalil Bourgi of the African Trading Company. He is thereby discharged from further answering to the action of damages. And it is so ordered.

Given under our hand in open court this 31′
day of May, A .D. 1985.
Frederick K. Tulay
RESIDENT/ASSIGNED CIRCUIT JUDGE,
MONTSERRADO COUNTY, R. L ”

On October 25, 1985, the plaintiff, now appellant, filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s amended answer. The said motion was resisted by the defendant, now appellee. His Honour Jesse Banks, Jr , presiding by assignment over the Civil Law Court, denied the motion. Plaintiff/appellant excepted to Judge Bank’s ruling and gave notice that he would take advantage of the statute in such cases, which was noted by the court.

Next, Judge Banks ruled on the law issues in the cause. He, in a nutshell, refused to review or amend the ruling of Judge Tulay, his predecessor and a judge of concurrent jurisdiction. In confirming the ruling of his colleague, Judge Banks held:

“According to the ruling of His Honour, Circuit Judge Frederick K. Tulay, given on May 31, 1985, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted and announced an appeal to the June Term of the Honourable Supreme Court, A.D. 1985 the same parties are involved and the same subject matter. It is the contention of counsel for plaintiff that the case before us is different from the case between Mamadee Sando and Ali Abdullah. But recourse again to exhibit “B” of defend-ant’s amended answer, the court observes that it is the same African Trading Company, which plaintiff admits he has sued, which through its managing director, Ali Abdullah, has moved the Honourable Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal. In so far as we know this motion has not been disposed of by the Honourable Supreme Court, and we have not been presented with any evidence to the contrary. We are bound by the ruling of our colleague, His Honour Frederick K. Tulay, right or wrong and we would not attempt to make a distinction between the two cases which the plaintiff maintains are different but which Judge Tulay said are the same.”

Judge Banks concluded his ruling thus: “Wherefore and in view of the foregoing, and with particular reference to count 2 of these issues of law, this court is of the opinion that it cannot review, amend nor reverse the ruling of His Honour Judge Frederick K. Tulay. Consequently, we affirm that ruling and order the dismissal of this case for the reason that the case is still pending before the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia. And it is hereby so ordered.”

To this ruling, counsel for plaintiff excepted and prayed for an appeal to this Court, which was granted. The appellant filed a six-count bill of exceptions, but neglected, perhaps deliberately, to mention therein that previous to his fleeing to the civil law court, his client had earlier sought and received adequate relief from the Executive Mansion for the same injury and had also executed a release therefor.

In appellant’s brief, highly technical and procedural issues are raised. However, as it is true with the bill of exceptions, all of the issues are completely silent with respect to what transpired at the Executive Mansion. Indeed, counsel for appellant put together a brief that can, for all practical purposes, be characterized as a work of a legal scholar. Needless to say that appellant’s counsel was superb in his presentation of his argument; but, unfortunately, these are the only marks he deserved on the plus side. On the other hand, we find the following important issues in the brief of the appellee:

1. Although the Head of State and/or President, for that matter, is not a tribunal for the adjudication of such matters, but where a party elects to take his cause before him, and having enjoyed the benefit of his decision to which that party has contributed by signing a receipt/ release, can he in the premises repudiate his own acts in abrogation to the document signed by him?

2. Does the doctrine of estoppel operate against such a party?

3. Is it legal for an action involving the same parties and the same cause of action, after having been dismissed and an appeal announced, granted and pending, to again be filed in the trial court while the first appeal is still pending?

In essence, the contention of the appellee is that by turning his back on the court in preference to the other forum for the purpose of redressing his grievance and receiving full and complete satisfaction and executing a release therefor, he is and should be forever barred from repudiating his voluntary act. During the arguments of the parties before us, the question as to whether the parties were represented at the Executive Mansion by legal counsel was put to the counsel for the appellee. His answer was: “Yes ,Your Honours, both sides were represented.” For the benefit of this opinion, we hereby quote verbatim, the decision rendered in favor of appellant and the corresponding release executed in favor of appellant, evidencing a complete discharge of appellant from all other demands and causes of action for and by reason of the loss or injury sustained by appellant as a consequence of the fire of February 8, 1982:

EXHIBIT “E” THE EXECUTIVE MANSION
MINISTRY OF STATE FOR PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

DECISION
Predicated upon a complaint from Mamadee Sando, Mr. Khalil Bourgi of African Trading Company was summoned by us to appear on the 24 th day of May 1983 for an investigation, and based upon the statement of Dr. A. Kassas, it is hereby decided that except Mr. Khalil Bourgi pays to the Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), Mr. Bourgi should be incarcerated and remain incarcerated until the said amount is paid.

African Trading Company is being asked to pay this amount of money because the building leased by Mamadee Sando was damaged in the fire of February 8, 1982, and the manager of ATC, also a victim, made a commitment in the presence of Dr. Kassas that, for humanitarian reason, he would pay Mamadee Sando for the loss he sustained, provided the insurance company paid his claim, which the company did.

Accordingly, it is decided that Mr. Mamadee Sando be compensated in the said amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). However, this does not necessarily make ATC liable to the tenants who were living in the building leased by Mamadee Sando. Should they have any claim against ATC, same should be processed through a court of competent jurisdiction. And it is so decided.

SIGNED:
John G. Rancy
Major John G. Yancy
MINISTER OF STATE AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET.

DATED THIS 7TH DAY
OF JUNE, A. D. 1983

GENERAL RELEASE
EXHIBIT “F”
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I, Major John G. Rancy, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, R.L., in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) paid to Mamadee Sando of the City of Monrovia, Liberia, by Khalil Bourgi, representing African Trading Company, (the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged) upon my directive and in accordance with a decision rendered by me on the 7 th day of June, A. D. 1983, which payment has been made, through me to Mamadee Sando in full satisfaction of my said decision.

In consequence of the foregoing, I, Major John G. Yancy, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, do hereby release and forever discharge the said Khalil Bourgi of African Trading Company, his heirs, executors, administrators, assigns and/or successors in business of and from any and all manner of actions and cause of action, suits and demands as Mamadee Sando has been fully compensated by the payment of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), with the expressed understanding that the amount paid to him will be used for the renovation of his said building, to compensate his tenants for any loss sustained by them, and to restore his said tenants to the premises previously occupied by them, thus hereby forever releasing and discharging the said African Trading Company from any and all claims and demands whatsoever.

Given under my hand in the city of Monrovia, Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia, this 22k” day of December, A. D. 1983.
John G. Rancy
MAJOR JOHN G. RANCY
MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS, R. L.

We are in agreement with the contention of appellee that we affirm the decision of the trial court on the ground that appellant is barred by the doctrine of estoppel from repudiating his own voluntary act. In the case of Tanios Abi-Rached v. Gemayel et al.[1965] LRSC 25; , 17 LLR 14 (undated), this Court decided that the “participation in the execution of a decree constitutes a basis of estoppel against subsequent action under the same decree.”

A case in which the facts and circumstances are similar to that of the case at bar is Wahab v. Helou Brothers, [1975] LRSC 20; 24 LLR 250 (1975) In the Wahab case, supra, an action of ejectment was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, in which plaintiff was awarded $150,000.00. Helou Brothers came to the Chambers Justice on error, praying for a review of the $150,000.00 judgment. The Chambers Justice dismissed the petition, denied the issuance of the peremptory writ and ordered the court below to enforce the judgment. An appeal was announced to the bench en banc, but subsequently withdrawn. Later, however, through some unexplained circumstances, the case found its way back to this Court, and by judgment of the Chambers Justice, the judgment of the trial court was modified, in that it was reduced from $150,000.00 to $20,000.00. This modified judgment was enforced by a mandate sent to the trial court. The plaintiff was paid in keeping with the modified judgment. Not only was she paid the $20,000.00, but she was put in possession of the premises, in keeping with the judgment.

About nine years later Wahab, the plaintiff, moved the trial court to resume jurisdiction over the cause and enforce the original judgment of $150,000.00. After resisting the motion, the court said that since the plaintiff had already benefitted from a judgment in the same case she could not legally seek further benefit or relief by another judgment in the same case. The Court held, citing 31 AM JUR., Judgment, § 862 (1940): “[t]he satisfaction of a judgment refers to compliance with or fulfillment of the mandate thereof; ordinarily it means the payment of the mandate due thereunder. . . . Sometimes it is declared that the jurisdiction continues until satisfaction of the judgment. It is a general rule that there can be but one satisfaction of a judgment.”

The principle in the Wahab case, where all the transactions were commenced and ended in the same court, is also applicable in the case at bar, despite the fact there were two fora, instead of one: the Executive Mansion and the civil law court. The principle words are “two judgments for the same offense after complete satisfaction has been obtained in the first judgment.” The appellant in the case at bar is completely estopped from seeking another judgment in his favor from the same defendant and for the same wrong and damage done to his premises by fire. The plaintiff/appellant desires what is often referred to as a windfall or unjust enrichment.

Incidentally, the instant case is not one of first impression. In 1982, Alhaji Salihou Sirleaf and John Tamba filed an action of damages in the civil law court against Firestone Plantations Company, praying for special damages of $6,975.00, representing the value of plaintiffs’ pickup, damaged by defendant’s truck. In that suit the plaintiff also demanded general damages. After the pleadings had rested, law issues disposed of and the case ruled to trial, but before the trial, plaintiffs rushed to the Executive Mansion and prayed for quick and speedy relief, of course, thereby abandoning the civil law court in preference to the Mansion which paid him off quickly. Plaintiffs received $14,000.00 and promptly executed a complete and absolute release. Although it was stated in the release that the matter would be withdrawn from the civil law court, plaintiffs reneged on this promise and instead, returned to that court for further compensation for the same wrong from the same defendant. The two cases, the Firestone case and the case at bar are similar in many respects. The only marked difference being that, whereas in the earlier case the plaintiffs sued in the court first and later abandoned the court for the Mansion, in the instant case the plaintiff rushed to the Mansion first, obtained satisfaction and then came to the court for his windfall. Courts of law should never lend aid to this kind of practice.

Ironically and incidentally, Judge Tulay ruled in both the Firestone case and the case at bar. As can be clearly seen, his rulings in both cases are not consistent. In the Firestone case, for example, Judge Tulay ruled as follows:

“Informant has brought this information asking the court to strike the case out of the docket as settlement has been made in it. Respondent holds a contrary view.

Except for the receipt given respondent for the $14,000.00 made proffer of in the information, this court has no record whatsoever touching the Mansion transaction and since in the circuit court we are governed by records, we cannot order the withdrawal of a case regularly entered on a docket before this court. The transaction at the Mansion being outside the walls of the courtroom, it does not and cannot affect us and we therefore rule that the trial of this case be had on a day to be set. And it is so ordered.

“Given under our hand in open court this 29th day of April, A. D. 1985.
“Frederick K. Tulay ASSIGNED CIRCUIT JUDGE”

In reversing Judge Tulay in the Firestone case, Mr. Chief Justice Nagbe, speaking for the Court, concluded:

“Consequently, to uphold the ruling of the Chambers Justice and confirm the position of the trial court will surely open a floodgate, or a pandora’s box, for which there might be no way to stop. Claims that were settled administratively from April 1980 to January 5, 1986, will be re-opened by many on the grounds that they were settled administratively, outside of the court, and that notices of settlements were not brought to the court’s attention in keeping with law and procedure, and that since that was not done it became necessary to have the claims settled again in keeping with the correct procedure in the courts.”
Surely, if the ruling were to be confirmed, many unscrupulous persons who had removed their cases from the courts and obtained full settlements of their claims by duress and coercion would use such a decision as precedent to go back to the courts and pursue the same claims. This would be a strange development in our judicial system and would create a serious situation.

Therefore, appellees Alhaji Salihou Sirleaf and John Tamba having already received from the appellant, Firestone Plantations Company, more than full settlement of their claim and executed a release therefor, they cannot go back to the court and pursue the same claim for further payment.”

Public policy dictates that there be an end to litigation; that those who have contested any issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the same parties. We see no reason why this policy should not apply in every case where one who voluntarily appears, presents his case and is fully heard, should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his case. This is also the rationale behind the doctrine of estoppel. We have avoided passing upon other issues raised by the pleadings and briefs of the parties because of our holding that appellant, in the absence of fraud, is not entitled to two judgments. We cannot overemphasize the need for clients to be meticulous and scrupulous in their selection of lawyers to represent them in securing their rights. In the instant case, we are of the opinion, backed by the law and other authorities cited, that we are without power to grant the relief sought by the appellant, even if we are in agreement that the appellant has raised highly technical and procedural issues. We are therefore left with no alternative but to affirm the judgment of the trial court with costs against the appellant. To do otherwise would be lending aid to claimants who believe not in justice and fair play, but that “the end justifies the means.” And it is so ordered.

Judgment affirmed.