ROBERTS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, by and thru its General Manager, Appellant, v. JEROME TAYLOR et al., Appellees.
MOTION TO DISMISS AN APPEAL FROM THE PEOPLE’S DEBT COURT FOR MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: June 17, 1982. Decided: July 9, 1982.
- Notice of the completion of the appeal must be issued and served within sixty (60) days after rendition of judgement. Failure to comply with this requirement shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
This motion to dismiss grows out of an appeal announced and perfected from a final judgment of the People’s Debt Court for Montserrado County, in a petition for judicial review of a ruling in favour of the appellees by the Board of General Appeals in an action of unfair labor practice. Appellees contend in their motion to dismiss that the notice of the completion of the appeal was served on him six-three (63) days after the final judgment, contrary to the statute. The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
Julius Adighibe appeared for appellant. James D. Gordon and David Kpomakpor appeared for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court
There is only one issue presented by counsel for the parties in their argument for our determination. That issue revolves around the time limit within which the appealing party is to serve and file notice of the completion of an appeal, one of the jurisdictional steps for the completion of an appeal.
The appeal, which is sought to be dismissed, is from a decision of the judge of the People’s Debt Court for Montserrado County, rendered on the 23rd day of November, 1981, in the above entitled case. How the case of unfair labor practices traveled to the People’s Debt Court for review of the administrative decision of the Board of General Appeals of the Ministry of Labor, is beyond our understanding. However, we have no legal authority to raise issues for the parties; we are only authorized to decide issues presented to us by the parties. More than this, our jurisdiction to open the records, hear, and discuss the merits and demerits of these proceedings has been challenged by the motion filed to dismiss appellant’s appeal. Therefore, we shall confine ourselves to the issues presented by the parties; and that is, the time limit within which the appealing party is required to serve and file the notice of the completion of the appeal.
Counsels for appellees contended in their motion to dismiss the appeal, that the judgment from which appellant appealed was rendered on November 23, 1981, and appellant did not serve on appellee, a notice of the completion of the appeal until January 28, 1982, that is, quite 63 days from the date of rendition of judgment. Counsel for appellee argued that it is the service of the notice of the completion of the appeal by the appellant that places the appellee under the jurisdiction of the appellate court. He also argued that although the untimely service of the notice of the completion of the appeal did not cause any legal injury or prejudice to the appellees, it has nonetheless done injury to the legal system and violated a long line of judicial precedence, which will seriously affect our judicial system.
Counsel for appellant, on the other hand, has argued that there is no time limit set by our statute within which the appealing party is required to serve and file notice of the completion of the appeal. The learned counsel for appellant strongly argued that the statute provides only 10 days within which a bill of except-ions is required to be filed, and 60 days for the filing of the appeal bond, and that, in fact, the notice of completion of an appeal is the sole responsibility of the clerk of court; that said notice, upon application of the appellant, was issued and served on the appellees; and that one or three days late service was a reasonable time which caused no injury to the appellees. Appellant’s counsel further argued that the 60th day fell on Saturday which, according to him, was not a working day for the clerk of the court and, hence, said notice of the completion of the appeal was issued by the clerk on the following Monday and served on the appellees on Tuesday.
Although there are numerous opinions of this Court which hold, in the interpretation of our appeal statute, that the notice of the completion of the appeal must be served within 60 days after rendition of final judgment, the learned counsel for appellant in answering a question from the Bench, stated that the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court are not mandatory. This was the utterance of a counsellor of the Supreme Court Bar who was seeking by his appeal the judgment of this Court. It is regrettable that the learned counsel for appellant has permitted himself to go on record by such statement which tends to discredit the long line of opinions handed down by this Court on the point and which, in his opinion as counselor of this bar, have no binding effect. It would seem to us that the learned counsel is misled by his thinking, but this Court cannot permit itself to be misled and depart from the several judicial precedents which will no doubt affect our judicial system. If the opinions of this Court have no mandatory effect, it is beyond our understanding why the learned counsel has elected to cite the same opinions in establishing his side of the case; this is just in passing.
Our statute on appeal is very clear, and any appealing party who negligently violates any provision thereof, as to give this Court jurisdiction to hear the merits of his case, will not benefit from such negligence. In taking and perfecting appeals at law, time is an essential element. It is an indispensable requisite that warrants its taking and perfection. Negligence to take and complete an appeal within the statutory period makes void the right of appeal.
Counsel for appellant in his argument relied on the Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code, 1: 51.9 which in his understanding, states no specified time within which the notice of completion of the appeal should be served and filed. This section reads as follows:
“Notice of Completion of Appeal. After the filing of the bill of exceptions and the filing of the appeal bond as required by section 51.7 and 51.8, the clerk of the trial court on application of the appellant shall issue a notice of the completion of the appeal, a copy of which shall be served by the appellant on the appellee. The original of such notice shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court.”
The service and filing of the notice of the completion of the appeal is one of the necessary and mandatory steps to be taken to complete an appeal according to the Revised Civil Procedure Statute, which reads as follows:
“Requirement for Completion of Appeal. The following acts shall be necessary for the completion of an appeal:
Announcement of the taking of the appeal.
Filing of the bill of exceptions.
Filing of an appeal bond.
Service and filing of notice of completion of the appeal.
(Emphasis ours). Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code, 1: 51.4.
If the service and filing of the notice of the completion of the appeal is one of the necessary acts for the completion of an ap-peal in keeping with the provision of the section quoted herein- above, can it be construed to mean that there is no time set to complete the appeal, since according to counsel for appellant, the Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.9, makes no mention of any time limit? This court in several of its opinions has made the statute clear, the latest of which is reported in Bility v. Sirleaf, [1976] LRSC 68; 25 LLR 319 (1976). In that case, judgment was entered by the court below on the 2nd of April, 1975, and on March 16, 1976, notice of the completion of the appeal was served, quite 332 days after rendition of judgment. This Court, therefore, held that notice of completion of appeal should be issued and served within 60 days after rendition of judgment, and that except in admiralty cases, every appeal must be taken and perfected within 60 days. The appeal was dismissed.
As to what constitutes the completion of an appeal, as contemplated by Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1: 51.4, quoted supra, Mr. Justice Dossen speaking for this Court several years ago in McAuley v. Laland, [1894] LRSC 1; 1 LLR 254, 255 (1894), said, and it is upheld in Yengbe v. Porte, [1964] LRSC 7; 15 LLR 537 (1964) that:
“It is needless to enter into extensive arguments to establish the well known requirements of the law, as it should be obvious to every reflecting mind that an appeal is not complete until the appellee is duly summoned, which summons places him under the jurisdiction of the court to which the appeal is taken; therefore, the summons or notice forms a very integral part in an appeal and should be served within the time allowed for the completion of the appeal.”
Also in a recent opinion of this Court, based on our current appeal statute which the learned counsel for appellant argued provides no time limit within which to complete an appeal, this Court settled the issue of time limit when it decided, and we quote:
“Ordinarily, the notice of completion of appeal must not only be issued by the clerk of the court within sixty days after judgment, but must also be served within such time.” Gallina Blanca S. A. v. Nestle Products, Ltd., [1975] LRSC 14; 24 LLR 203 (1975).
What is important here and needs to be strictly adhered to, is the completion of the appeal. Can it be said that an appeal is complete upon the filing of an appeal bond within sixty days, without the service on appellee of the notice of the completion of the appeal? It is legally untenable to hold that the statute provides no time limit, but rather leaves it with the discretion of appellant to serve and file the notice of the completion of the appeal at any time he wishes after the filing of appeal bond.
What is surprising and most disgusting is that, despite the long line of opinions of this Court on the service of the notice of the completion of the appeal, some lawyers of this Bar continue to be negligent and careless in the handling of their clients’ appeals, believing that the statute sets no time limit for the service of the notice of the completion of an appeal, as argued by counsel for appellant in this case. Several cases on appeal before this Court have been dismissed because the statutory requirements were not observed by the appealing counsel. As a result, their clients were victimized while the counsel have already received his retainer long in advance. We observe further that this Court has on many instances sounded warnings to members of this Bar to the effect that, any counsel found to be careless and negligent in the handling of his client’s case, leading to this Court dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, would be penalized. In Taylor v. Pasi, [1977] LRSC 9; 25 LLR 453 (1977), one of the grounds for dismissing the appeal was the failure on the part of appellant to serve on appellee, a notice of the completion of the appeal, and Mr. Justice Horace speaking for the Court in said case warned members of this Bar in the following words:
“We have observed that fifty percent of the cases coming before us on appeal are decided on motions to dis-miss rather than on the merits of the case. What concerns us is that most times the motions to dismiss carry one or more of the grounds laid in the statute for dismissal of an appeal, particularly mis-issuance or non-service of notice of completion of appeal and defective appeal bonds because of lack of sufficient description of the property offered to establish a lien of the bond. In spite of our many decisions on these points, counsel practicing before us continue to make the same errors. In the circumstances, it is not un-reasonable to conclude that lawyers do not read the opinions of the Supreme Court, or that they are totally indifferent to the pronouncements of this Court. What is more important, however, is the fact that when these lawyers carelessly handle cases before this Court, or any other court for that matter, the interest of their clients suffer and some person is deprived of rights which they can ill afford to lose.
Because of the alarming rate of recurrence of the same conditions which cause so many appeals to be dismissed, we have decided not to sound a further warning against such practices – that has been often done – but to take a definite position because of gross carelessness or neglect of a lawyer handling a litigant’s interest, or where it appears in the appeal record that the case was carelessly and inefficiently handled in the trial court, we will severely discipline such lawyer either by fine, suspension, or disbarment. No exception will be made to this decision. Let all lawyers practicing before the courts of Liberia take note.”
Despite the long line of opinions of this Court with respect to the statutory requirements necessary to complete an appeal, and regardless of the threats of punishment against those lawyers who elect to jeopardize their clients’ causes at the last stage for no cause on part of their clients, but on account of their own carelessness, and especially despite the warning of the Court in recent years as quoted supra, the rate of careless handling of appeals coming to this Court has tripled. Perhaps, one of the contributing factors is the leniency which this Court has exercised in the past. Since it is the unanimous decision of the present Bench to rigidly enforce Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, as it relates to the negligent and careless handling of appeals by the appealing counsel, we have thought it necessary to re-enforce our position by reiterating the warning of the Court just quoted in this Opinion. We would like to further advise lawyers who have appeal cases before this Court, to carefully examine the records and their positions now as of the adjournment of this term of Court, because effective as of the ensuing October Term of this Court, 1982, lawyers whose negligent and careless acts necessitate the dismissal of their clients’ cases, will definitely not go unpunished.
In view of the fact that the notice of completion of appeal in this case was not served on the appellees within the statutory time of 60 days allowed for the completion of an appeal, we have no other alternative but to grant the motion to dismiss the appeal; the motion to dismiss is, therefore, granted and the appeal dismissed with costs against the appellant.
Mr. Justice Mabande disagrees with the majority holding and has therefore dissented.
Motion to dismiss granted.
Note: Mr. Justice Mabande dissented but did not file a dissenting opinion.