JOHN H. RICHARDS, Appellant, v. MONROVIA BREWERY, of Bushrod Island, Monrovia, by and through its manager, R. J. WALSOR, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued November 4, 1968. Decided January 7, 1969. 1. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to it by the appellate court and the meaning and intention of the Legislature not determined by resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. 2. The division of the court in which an action is brought must be specifically set forth and not merely indicated by implication. 3. Where a plea in bar effectively disposes of an action, the lower court is not required to also consider other issues of law and the issues of fact, although, generally, the Supreme Court does not favor having a subordinate court decide a matter on a single issue. An action in replevin was brought, and the plaintiff failed to set forth the division of the circuit court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit having jurisdiction of the matter. Defendant raised the issue in his pleadings and the action was dismissed. An appeal was taken from the judgment of the court. Judgment affirmed. John Stewart for appellant. Albert D. Peabody and Philip Brumskine for appellee. MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the opinion of the court. One John H. Richards brought an action of replevin against the Monrovia Brewery, of Bushrod Island, by and through its manager, R. J. Walsor. This action was commenced in the December 1966 Term of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County. The complaint in the action was brought to replevy one Henschel truck, 1962 model, purchased from the Monrovia Auto Service in 1962 for the sum of $7,000.00. 241 242 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS The defendant appeared, filed his answer, and pleadings rested at the surrejoinder. At the December Term of the circuit court, the issues of law involved in the pleadings were heard and disposed of when the court entertained defendant’s answer and rejoinder and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. To this ruling of the court below defendant excepted and brought his case up for review on a bill of exceptions consisting of one count. “I. Because the court, in spite of the several cogent issues raised by plaintiff in the pleadings, and without hearing evidence on the issues of fact, rendered final ruling on the loth day of February, 1967, dismissing plaintiff’s action, to which final ruling plaintiff then and there excepted, and prayed for an appeal to the Supreme Court sitting in its ensuing March 1967 Term.” The salient point involved, and for which this case was dismissed, verified by the record before us, is that plaintiff failed to set out in the venue of his complaint the division of the court in which the case was filed. When this case was called for hearing plaintiff’s counsel exercised all of his legal skill in an effort to convince the court that the law does not make it mandatory for the division of the court to be mentioned in the venue set forth, especially when the court is already a court sitting in law and not equity nor admiralty. Hence, it could be assumed that, being a cause in law, it was intended to be filed in the Law Division. On this point of argument he relied upon our Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code, tit. 6, � 254, which reads : “Every pleading in an action shall contain a caption setting forth the name and term of the court, the name of the judge before whom the case is filed, the title of the action, and a designation of the type of pleading as defined in section 250 above. All pleadings in matters of admiralty law shall be entitled ‘in Admiralty LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 243 Division’; and all pleadings in equity cases shall be entitled ‘in Equity Division. . . ” And he also made reference to Koff ah v. Republic of Liberia, 13 L.L.R. 232 (1958), where the Court said, at P. 245 “The intention and meaning of the legislature must primarily be determined from the language of the statute itself, and not from conjectures aliunde. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction ; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Counsel for appellant offered no legal theory but sought to sustain his argument by saying that since Section 254 made no positive reference to the Law Division of the Court, it was implied that the court otherwise sat in its Law Division. The interpretation of a statute cannot be capricious nor is it to be done on inferences or presumption, as it would seem counsel for appellant has urged. Rather, the construction and interpretation of the statutes must be based exclusively upon words employed and the intent of the law makers. It is a requirement of the law that in all cases the division of the court in which jurisdiction can be legally exercised must be set forth and the absence thereof from any pleading, renders the pleading vague and a subject for dismissal. In Moddermann v. Roberts, i L.L.R. 218 (1888), at p. 219, the court stated : “The Court of Quarter Sessions is a court of common pleas with admiralty and equity jurisdiction; these jurisdictions are absolutely separate in themselves and must be so understood and regarded. We have made the declaration before in the cases Erskine vs. Smith, in an action of injunction, and Lee vs. Republic of Liberia, in an action in admiralty (see judg- 244 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ments of this Court) ; and now we further assert, that for the intelligence with which the law means that all actions must be set forth for the information of litigant parties, it is the opinion of this Court that all the papers in every action should and must be addressed to the proper division of the court in which relief is sought.” The main question involved is the omission of the plaintiff now appellant to designate the division of the court in which his action was brought. The next point raised in the bill of exceptions relates to the failure of the judge to consider in his ruling the many issues raised by the plaintiff below in his pleadings, without hearing testimony on the many issues of fact. On this point, we would like to make it emphatically known to all concerned that whereas this Court does discourage matters being disposed of by a subordinate court on a single issue, without considering all of the legal issues involved, yet, the Supreme Court has not required this to be done when the pleadings present pleas raised in bar. A challenge to jurisdiction is a plea in bar and the respondent, therefore, had no legal right to have all of the issues raised in the pleading considered. The jurisdictional attack made it necessary to consider the plea in preference to all other issues raised. Because of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the ruling of the court below should not be disturbed, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. And it is hereby so ordered. Afflrmed.