OSWALD NYEPON, Informant, v. THOMAS REEVES, JAMES N. DOE, and JAMES M. T. KANDAKAI,

Circuit Court Judge presiding over the March 1972 Term of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, Respondents. BILL OF INFORMATION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. Argued November 30, 1972. Decided February 1, 1973. 1. Withdrawal of an appeal implies acceptance by appellant of the judgment he had protested against by the announcement of an appeal therefrom. 2. Except when the Republic of Liberia is a party, no official of the Ministry of Justice has legal authority to take part in, or interfere with, a civil matter, whether the matter be pending before the courts or not, in order to preserve the constitutionally prescribed principle of the separation of powers in the governmental structure. 3. Any court, acting within its proper jurisdiction and the limits of its authority, must be obeyed, not only by parties but by all in contact with the court, especially the lawyers. 4. The Supreme Court shall enforce obedience to orders of all the courts, and most especially its own orders, without regard to whether the enforcement is against parties, lawyers, or judges. An appeal was announced from a judgment entered in ejectment proceedings, but the appeal subsequently was withdrawn. The appellant conveyed the property at issue to another during the pendency of the appeal. After the appeal had been withdrawn the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to enforce its judgment, but the sheriff was unable to remove the occupant, who was supported by the respondent judge when he ordered the occupant not to be removed, in spite of the writ of possession issued by the lower court pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate. Subsequently, after the Justice in chambers had referred to the full bench the bill of information presented to him, a letter was received by the informant requesting him to appear at the Ministry of Justice for a conference concerning the property which had been at issue in the ejectment proceedings. The unsuccessful 406 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 407 litigant, the purchaser of the property who had refused to vacate the premises and the circuit court judge who had apparently countermanded the Supreme Court’s mandate and the writ of possession duly issued by the circuit court, were charged by the informant with contempt of court. The Supreme Court adjudged the respondents and their counsel to be in contempt of court and they were fined accordingly. M. Kron Yangbe for informant. A. Lorenzo Weeks for respondents. M. M. Perry and MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PIERRE delivered the opinion of the Court. These proceedings were filed in the Supreme Court and argued before the Court sitting en banco, on November 30, 1972. Information for contempt had originally been filed in the chambers of Mr. Justice Horace, the Justice now presiding in chambers, and he had heard and ruled to effectuate enforcement of the Supreme Court’s mandate in the ejectment suit, out of which these information proceedings have grown. But because of defiance shown to the Court’s mandate, as well as to the ruling in chambers ordering enforcement thereof, and also because of the attempt on the part of appellant James N. Doe to circumvent the enforcement of the aforesaid mandate, the Justice rescinded his ruling and sent the matter foreward to be handled by the Court en banco. The bill of information, in its fifteen counts, alleged that respondent Doe has by devious means sought to circumvent a final judgment in ejectment entered against him on March I I, 1966, from which he appealed. The appeal, however, was withdrawn by him in the March 1972 Term, at which time the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to enforce its judgment. The bill alleges that said respondent sought to frustrate the judgment by 408 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS a sale of the land during pendency of the appeal and by the judicial intervention of the respondent judge on May 20, 1972. Justice Horace’s part in the judicial proceedings has been set forth in the first paragraph of this opinion. The facts set forth in this bill of information show that co-respondent James N. Doe appealed from the judgment of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in an ejectment action to the Supreme Court. For reasons not stated he voluntarily withdrew his appeal before the appeal could be heard. This act of withdrawal on his part prevented the Supreme Court from hearing the case and perhaps determining rightful ownership of the property. He is, therefore, bound by the judgment of the trial court in respect to that court’s finding as to who was the rightful owner of the property at issue. In a similar case decided November 24, during the present term of Court, it was held that “withdrawal of appeal deprives the withdrawing party from raising any issues in respect to the judgment from which he has appealed. By his voluntary withdrawal he waived all rights which he might have gained by the appeal, and he thereby accepts the judgment which by announcement of appeal he had rejected.” Cooper v. Dunbar, [1972] LRSC 43; 21 LLR 295. Before withdrawing his appeal and thereby waiving all rights to challenge the judgment in the ejectment action with respect to ownership of Lot No. 7, respondent James N. Doe had already sold the lot to co-respondent Thomas Reeves, while the appealed case was still pending before the Supreme Court. Thomas Reeves had thus been drawn into the maelstrom of irregularity and contempt of court, perhaps unwittingly, but under the principle of caveat emptor this would be no excuse, since it was his duty to have investigated the title before he sought to acquire ownership. But we shall say more about Thomas Reeves later. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 409 As muddled as the circumstances were at that point, James N. Doe and Thomas Reeves sought to further complicate the matter by appealing to the Ministry of Justice in the Executive branch for relief against enforcement of the judgment of the trial court, as well as against the Supreme Court mandate. Count 15 of the bill of information states that on November 14, 1972, Mr. Justice Horace rescinded his ruling in chambers and sent the matter to be heard by the bench en banco. So even though the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, yet the next day, November 15, 1972, the Solicitor General wrote to Mr. Nyepan, the informant. “Dear Mr. Nyepan : “Please call at the Ministry of Justice on Friday, the 17th instant at the hour of 10:30 A.M. I would like to have an interview with you. This is in connection with the land matter between you and Mr. Thomas Reeves. “Please be kind enough to be present. “Very truly yours, ROLAND BARNES, Solicitor General.” The implication of the Ministry of Justice attempting to officially interview one of the parties in connection with a civil matter pending before the Supreme Court not only infringes upon the text, the spirit, and the intent of the Constitution, Article I, Section i4th, but it also violates the statute in respect to the duties of the Solicitor General or, for that matter, any other official in the Ministry of Justice. See the Judiciary Law, 1956 Code 13 :151, 152, 154. Except where the Republic of Liberia is a party, no official of the Ministry of Justice has legal authority to take part in, or interfere with a civil matter, whether the matter be pending before the courts or not. Normally, one would have attributed such an act to ignorance, but James N. Doe is a practicing counsellor of the Supreme Court bar, and he cannot claim ignorance 410 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS of the division of powers of our Government under the Constitution as contained in Article I, Section r4th. We must, therefore, have to interpret this act of referring the matter to the Solicitor General, while it was still pending in the Supreme Court, as a deliberate attempt to perpetuuate the contempt he had already committed by his sale of the lot while the matter was still pending before the courts. Perhaps Mr. Thomas Reeves might have been excused for what he had done up to the point where he purchased the lot from James Doe. One could easily excuse him for not having known any better. But when the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, upon authority of a mandate from the Supreme Court, sought to enforce the judgment of the trial court, Thomas Reeves not only refused to vacate the premises as the writ of possession commanded, but he threatened to resist the court’s order to remove him. Indeed, his appeal to the Ministry of Justice is an indication of the extent to which he was prepared to go to defy the court’s order. Perhaps it might be relevant to this opinion to quote a portion of the certificate of the surveyor who was ordered by the court to locate Lot No. 7. “This is to certify that on the 27th day of May, 1972, the undersigned surveyed for Oswald M. Nyepan Lot No. M19-7 in keeping with the Sinkor layout as per deed from Angela Dennis Brown to said Oswald Nyepan. . . . One Thomas Reeves is presently occupying the said Lot No. 7. “Dated this 29th day of May, 1972. “LAWRENCE K. GBUIE, Government Surveyor, Ministry of Lands and Mines.” There seems to be no doubt, therefore, that the lot now occupied by Mr. Thomas Reeves is indeed Lot No. 7, the subject of the ejectment suit pending in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court and which, according to the judgment of LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 411 that court ordered by the Supreme Court to be enforced, is the lawful property of informant. The return of the sheriff inscribed on the back of the writ of possession issued out of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court is also set forth. “On the loth day of May, 1972, the deputy sheriff, Samuel E. Moore, served the within writ of possession on the within named defendant, and reports that the defendant refused to receive a copy of the writ, and that the defendant says that he has sold the property herein described to someone else, and has nothing to do with it. And those on the land refuse to move. And I now make this as my official return to the office of the clerk of court. “Dated this 3oth day of May, 1972. “P. Edward Nelson, II, Sheriff for Montserrado County.” The return shows that Thomas Reeves did indeed refuse to obey the order for him to remove himself from the property. The Justice in chambers had been lenient with his previous disobedience when on November 3, 1972, he heard the contempt proceedings referred to in count to of the bill of information. It must be remembered that the defendant referred to in the return of the sheriff is James N. Doe who sold to Thomas Reeves. Thus, it can be seen that there must have been some understanding between James Doe and Thomas Reeves, not only to perpetrate the sale of the lot while the case was pending, but also to defy and threaten the rightful owner and to disregard the orders of the court. The ethics of the profession require that a lawyer should “maintain toward the courts a respectful attitude, not only toward the judge temporarily presiding, but for the purpose of maintaining the supreme importance of this judicial office.” Rule 1, Code of Moral and Professional Ethics. The Justice in chambers, in the proper discharge of his duties, ordered that the trial court en- 412 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS force the mandate of the Supreme Court, concluding the litigation involving the property. To this end Judge Walser summoned the parties and their counsel to appear before her. Counts I 1 and 12 of the bill of information recite the contemptuous disregard with which these orders were attended by counsellors Alfred Weeks and M. M. Perry, for not only did they fail and refuse to attend themselves, but they also failed to have their clients obey the court’s call. How can a lawyer in response to a court summons, while in his law office, “send word by a court Bailiff to a Judge that he is ill and therefore could not come,” as alleged in count 12 of the bill? If he was well enough to be in his office, then certainly it would seem that he was also well enough to have attended upon the court’s call, if he had any intention of obeying the command of Rule i of the Code, supra. We would like to emphasize that these allegations against the two counsellors have not been denied by them. Perhaps it might be necessary that we here again emphasize the importance of obeying a court order. Any court acting within proper jurisdiction and within the limits of its authority, must be obeyed not only by the parties concerned in litigation, but by all who come in contact with the particular court. But over and above what the parties and/or the public may do, lawyers should never allow themselves to be accused of refusing, disobeying, or disregarding a court order of summons, because of their special relationship to the courts. In In Re Simpson, [1961] LRSC 23; 14 LLR 429 (1961), this Court laid down this rule in the most definite terms. A lawyer who defies or disobeys a court order not only displays contempt for the court issuing the order, but shows contempt for the judicial system of which the particular court is a part. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court cannot ignore the affront, and in order to preserve the dignity and authority of the courts of the country must punish for contempt in every such case. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 413 Co-respondent Judge Kandakai, in his effort to excuse himself from blame and from the several charges made against him in the bill of information, filed returns. He has denied therein the several charges made against him in the bill of information. He admitted, however, that he did preside over the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s mandate, and he sought to justify himself in count four of his returns. “We did not, as we do not now regard the execution of the order of the Supreme Court as a judicial act. Rather, in our opinion it is a ministerial duty, and as a ministerial duty it falls under the category of mandatory duty required of an inferior court judge, in the performance of which is no room left for the discretion, hence the charge of recusation does not and should not lie. On the basis of this belief, we feel the need to recuse ourselves did not arise.” It is unfortunate that the learned judge did not see fit to go further in his explanation, and explain his reason for refusing to carry out the provisions of the Supreme Court’s mandate ordering that Thomas Reeves should be evicted from the property, which allegation against the Judge is contained in count five of the bill of information. “Every disobedience of a court’s order constitutes contempt; and it is as much the duty of the inferior courts to demand and compel obedience of their orders as a first step to upholding the dignity of the judiciary and the authority of the courts of Liberia, as it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court to see that said dignity and authority are preserved.” Int. Trust Co. v. W eah[1964] LRSC 13; , 15 LLR 568, 575 (1964). Such was the pronouncement of this Court in respect to disobedience of orders issued out of the Probate Court for Montserrado County. The Court still holds itself responsible to enforce obedience to orders of all courts within the Republic, and most especially will we enforce obedience of our own orders; and it makes no difference 414 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS whether such obedience is enforced against parties, lawyers, or judges. Judges who flagrantly and intentionally disobey orders of superior courts thereby render themselves not only, censurable for such disobedience, but by such disobedience raise doubt as to their fitness to continue as judges of courts in Liberia. We regard the acts of the respondents in this case as highly contemptuous, and to purge them of contempt, we have taken the following action: I. Counsellors and co-respondents M. M. Perry and A. Lorenzo Weeks are each fined in the sum of One Hundred dollars; 2. Judge and co-respondent James M. Kandakai is also fined in the sum of Two Hundred dollars; 3. Co-respondents James N. Doe and Thomas Reeves are fined in the sum of Five Hundred dollars each. These several amounts are to be paid into the Bureau of Revenues, and official revenue receipts exhibited by the Marshal in our Chambers on or before February 28, 1973, as evidence that our orders have been obeyed. Failing which, they are all and severally to be committed to jail until the said amounts are paid. It is also our order that the Supreme Court’s mandate handed down on May 19, 1972, commanding the enforcement of the circuit court’s judgment, should again be sent to the judge now presiding in the Sixth Judicial Circuit for immediate enforcement. Costs of these proceedings are ruled against the respondents. It is so ordered. Contempt adjudged.