NATIONAL MILLING COMPANY, by and thru its General Manager, Mr. GORDON HARRIS, Appellant, v. ADAM WEAH and WILLIAM KPANGBAI, Trade Union Representatives of 54 (Fifty-Four) Redundant Employees of the NATIONAL MILLING COMPANY, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DEBT COURT FOR MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: December 7 & 8, 1988. Decided: December 30, 1988.
1. A party who submits himself to the jurisdiction of a tribunal by appearing before the tribunal and contesting issues cannot thereafter properly object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal over his person with respect to any issue contested.
2. A money judgment that does not award a sum certain is void for indefiniteness.
3. For good cause, an appellate court can modify a judgment.
Appellant declared 54 of its workers redundant in 1983. Later that year, on August 1st, the workers filed a complaint for compensation through their trade union. While the complaint was pending, appellant rehired 18 of the redundant workers. In August 1984, appellees filed a new complaint (referred to as the August 6′ complaint). When the August 6th complaint was called for hearing, appellant insisted that it would participate in hearing the August 6th compliant only if the previous complaint filed August 1, 1983 was withdrawn. Appellees then withdrew the August 1st complaint. Appellant thereupon took the position that with the withdrawal of the August 1st complaint, there was no complaint before the ministry, since the withdrawn August 1st complaint took into account the August 6th complaint. The hearing officer sustained the position of appellant and dismissed the August 6th complaint. Appellees appealed to the Board of General Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the National Labour Court/debt court, as the case might be, replaced the Board of General Appeals. Appellees filed a petition for judicial review in the debt court. The petition was heard. The it’s ruling on the petition, the court ordered the appellant to re-hire the remaining 36 workers and compensate them at least 50% of their pay for the time they were laid off because appellant had violated article 26 of the collective bargain agreement. Appellant excepted to the ruling and perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court contending, inter alia, that the debt court did not have jurisdiction over it, since withdrawal of the complaint of August 1, 1983 effectively withdrew the complaint of August 6, 1984 and, that consequently, there was no complaint before the court. Appellant also contended that at the time the debt court heard the matter, it lacked jurisdiction since a writ of summons was not issued and served. The Supreme Court held that appellant could not raise the jurisdictional issue, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It also held that the inferior appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction by passing on the entire case, rather than the issue raised in the appeal; however, the court also held that it was erroneous for the hearing officer to dismiss the August 6th complaint because the August 1 s t complaint was withdrawn, when they were entirely different complaints. The Court therefore reversed the ruling of the debt court and remanded the case to the hearing officer for a regular trial.
Victoria Sherman-Lang for appellant. Henrietta Koenig for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE JUNIUS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Milling Company, appellant, declared redundant 54 workers in 1983. The 54 redundant workers, appellees, through their trade union, represented by Adam Weah and William Kpangbai, filed a complaint on August 1, 1983, against appellant requesting payment for days-off, job classification, two weeks of notice and one month in lieu of notice with pay for both salaries, as well as vacation pay. Thereafter, on August 6, 1984, while the complaint of August 1st, 1983 was still pending for hearing by the local Ministry of Labour, Grand Bassa County, appellant re-employed 18 of the redundant workers. Subsequently, the remaining workers filed another complaint against management, appellant, alleging wrongful redundancy and also alleging appellant’s violation of article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement.
On August 6, 1984 when the complaint of August 1, 1983 was called for hearing, counsel for appellant contended that management would participate in the August 6, 1984 complaint only if the August 1, 1983 complaint was finalized. As a result, the August 1, 1983 complaint was withdrawn by appellees with the intention of going into the August 6, 1984 complaint. However, at this point, appellant contended that the withdrawal of the August 1, 1983 complaint took into account the August 6, 1984 complaint and, as such, there was no complaint on behalf of appellees before the local Ministry of Labour, Buchanan. The labor commissioner sustained appellant’s application, thereby, dismissing the August 6, 1984 complaint. Appellees excepted to the ruling and announced an appeal to the Board of General Appeals, Ministry of Labour, Monrovia. While the appeal was pending, the Board of General Appeals was dissolved and replaced by the National Labour Court (Debt Court in Buchanan). Subsequently, appellees filed a petition for judicial review before the debt court. Appellant filed its returns. The debt court heard the case and ruled that appellant should re-employ the remaining 36 workers and pay them 50% of their pay for the period they were laid off, because it (meaning appellant) had violated article 26 of the collective bargaining agreement. Appellant excepted to this ruling and announced an appeal to this Honourable Court.
When this case was called for hearing before us, appellant presented the below issues for our consideration. They are:
1. Whether the judge of the debt court erred in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, basing his judgment on appellees’ complaint of August 6, 1984, and ruling thereon holding appellant liable to pay 50% of the wages of 36 redundant workers which had not been investigated by the labor commissioner, but rather the said complaint was dismissed in the labor commissioner’s ruling of June 30, 1986?
2. Whether the judge of the debt court erred when he sua sponte ruled that the 36 redundant workers were entitled to 50% of their pay, re-employment, and that the appellant violated of article 26 of a collective bargaining agreement of 1979?
3. Whether the judgment of the debt court ordering reemployment of 36 redundant workers and 50% pay without any fixed sum of money being awarded is void for indefiniteness and therefore unenforceable?
4. Whether the debt court judge erred in not dismissing appellees’ petition for judicial review filed subsequent to the dissolution of the Board of General Appeals because of appellees’ failure to follow-up and complete the appeal to the Board of General Appeals from the labor commissioner’s said ruling within the 30-day statutory period which rendered the labor commissioner’s ruling final and conclusive?
5. Whether the judge of the debt court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the case and not dismissing appellees’ petition for judicial review because of lack of jurisdiction on the face of the record?
6. Whether the debt court judge erred in reversing the ruling of the labor commissioner because section 9 of the Labor Practices Law on wrongful dismissal applied to this case?”
Also, appellees presented for our consideration the below issues:
1. Whether or not the court obtained jurisdiction over the appellant?
2. Whether or not the trial judge made reversible error in reversing the ruling of the labor commissioner?”
It is now our duty to consider the issues presented by both parties and come out with a conclusion that is legal and just. But for our consideration, the pertinent issue which concerns us most and, when adequately answered, would cover the other issues is: issue one in appellant’s brief.
The records revealed that on July 1, 1986, the appellees announced an appeal to the Board of General Appeals, but up to the dissolution of the Board of General Appeals, the records were never transmitted and the request to the Board to have the labor commissioner transmit the records proved futile.
The records further revealed that after the Board of General Appeals was dissolved on October 22, 1987, they requested the labor commissioner to have their file transferred to the Debt Court, Grand Bassa County, in keeping with the statute controlling, since the debt court now stood in place of the Board of General Appeals. When the file was not forwarded, appellees petitioned the debt court for judicial review. Appellant contends that appellees were legally barred from filing the petition because the debt court lacked jurisdiction by virtue of the filing and service of the petition without writ of summons. To this point, this Court has held in Coleman et al. v. Cooper et al.[1955] LRSC 7; , 12 LLR 226 (1955), that a “party who submits himself to the jurisdiction of a tribunal by appearing before the tribunal and contesting issues cannot properly thereafter object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal over his person with respect to any issue so contested.” Even though appellant did submit to the jurisdiction of the court and is barred from raising issue as to summons not being served along with petition, does the debt court have jurisdiction over this matter?
We say that under the Act Amending INA Decree No. 21 of October 20, 1986, § 23.16, a debt court is limited to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in labor cases on appeal from the ruling of a hearing officer or a labor commissioner. The debt court, thus, has statutory jurisdiction over this case. But when the debt court attempted to render a decision in the original complaint that was filed before the labor commissioner and made a ruling that appellant is liable to pay 50% of the wages of 36 redundant workers and/or to re-employ them, the debt court attempted to assume original jurisdiction over the case. Further, we do not know how the debt court reached such a conclusion, because the records forwarded to us only showed that an appeal was announced from the labor commissioner to the Board of General Appeals, (now dissolved) when the complaint was dismissed without a hearing. This Court has held that a “money judgment which does not award a sum certain is void for indefiniteness and is unenforceable.” National Iron Ore Company v. Gibson, [1978] LRSC 2; 26 LLR 365 (1978)
We do not agree with appellant’s contention that the debt court should have dismissed appellees’ petition for judicial review because the ruling of the labor commissioner of June 30, 1986, was not final and conclusive, since appellees announced an appeal to the Board of General Appeals, and did not perfect same. What we do see is that the trial judge introduced a novelty when he went beyond his limit by passing upon the entire case. We do admit that an appellate court, for good cause, can modify a judgment. We do not, however, see how an appellate court can make an award when the case was dismissed without hearing. The trial judge should have remanded the case to the labor commissioner for a hearing because it was erroneous for the him to have dismissed the August 6 m complaint of appellees when it is entirely different from the August 1st complaint that was withdrawn.
Having discovered reversible errors were committed both by the labor commissioner of the Ministry of Labour and by the trial court, we cannot but reverse the judgment and remand the case to the labor commissioner for regular trial.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to send a mandate to the trial court accordingly. Costs to abide final determination. And it is so ordered.
Judgment reversed; case remanded.