LIBERIA MINING COMPANY, LTD., by and thru its President and General Manager or Representatives, Appellant, v. KEILEE LEBBI, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Heard: May 20, 1981. Decided: June 30, 1981.

1. A person relying upon the doctrine of res judicata, as to a particular issue involved in the pending case, bears the burden of introducing evidence to prove that such issue was involved and actually determined by the prior action and that the matter as to which the rule of res judicata is involved as bar, was in fact necessarily adjudicated in the former action.

2. The doctrine of res judicata is defined as a matter adjudicated, a thing judicially acted upon or decided..

3. The doctrine of res judicata is a principle of universal jurisprudence, forming a part of the legal systems of all civilized nations.

4. Whilst the principle of estoppel is raised against the assertion of a right unreasonably slept on by a party, when in such lapse of time another has unalterably changed his position in good faith. In other words, estoppel will prevent a party from denying his own acts if well founded.

5. Issues of law must be disposed of before issues of fact and trial court is required to decide all issues of law raised by the pleadings before dealing with the facts.

6. The admissibility of evidence is the sole prerogative of the trial judge, while the weight and credibility to be attached to such evidence on the other hand, lies solely in the province of the jury. The Appellate court will not normally question this discretion unless gross abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial judge.

7. The purpose of the direct examination is to put the witness back on the track so as to make a continuous journey to the intended destination. In other words, in a direct examination, the counsel seeks to introduce into evidence those important issues, which the witness may have forgotten to mention in his general statement in chief, for the benefit of the court and the jury.

8. The burden of proof rests upon him who alleges a fact and that such burden of proof shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

9. Proof is the perfection of evidence; for without proof there is no evidence.

10. A stipulation entered into between parties before a court , agreeing to the manner in which payment is to be made by the debtor, does not per se make such stipulation a judgment of the court; nor does the judge’s signature thereon, indicating his approval ipso facto make such stipulation a judgment. To constitute such stipulation a judgment by consent, the document should be acknowledged as such in court and entered in the records by order of the judge.

11. Our statutes require that all stipulations be approved of and attested to by counsel by affixing his signature thereto.

Appellee, an employee of the appellant company, sustained physical injuries while on duty. When he requested for work-men’s compensation, appellant gave him the sum of $5,000.00. Appellee did not consider the cash payment of $5,000.00 made to him as an adequate compensation within the meaning of Workmen’s Compensation laws of Liberia. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor. The hearing officer dismissed the complaint on the grounds that appellee had been adequately compensated and that he had executed a release to that effect. On appeal, the Board of General Appeals reversed the hearing officer and ordered that the appellee be paid $14,016.00, less the $5,000.00, that he had already received, thus, leaving appellee with a sum of $9,016.00 as his balance. On judicial review, the Civil Law Court confirmed and affirmed the decision of the Board of General Appeals, from which judgment appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Prior to the hearing of the appeal by the Supreme Court, appellant and appellee entered into a stipulation, under which appellant agreed to fully compensate appellee as ordered by the Civil Law Court, and to withdraw the appeal.

Consequently, the appellee was subjected to a series of prolonged medical treatment involving several drugs administered by appellant’s medical doctors as a result of which appellee’s previous black skin turned to white, a medical condition referred to as “vitilge”. Appellee continued to receive treatment for over twenty five years, as he was assured by appellant’s doctors that his white skin would return to its normal pigmentation, black. However, appellee failed to realize this; instead his condition deteriorated. Hence, appellee wrote the appellant company claiming $50,000.00. The claim was submitted to the Ministry of Labour, only to remain there unattended. Consequently, appellee instituted an action of damages against appellant in the Civil Law Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County.

After a regular trial, the jury awarded appellee the sum of $40,000.00 in general damages. The trial judge affirmed the verdict and accordingly entered final judgment against the appellant company, from which it announced an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Appellant contended, among other issues, that: (1) appellee was estopped under the doctrines res judicata and estoppel from further instituting an action against the appellant, in that he had been fully compensated by the judgment of the Civil Law Court; (2) that the trial judge by his charge to the jury touching upon the stipulation committed a reversible error; (3) that the trial judge committed a reversible error by denying appellant’s motion for a new trial on the contention that the verdict of the empanelled jury was manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence ?

The Supreme Court held that the plea of res judicata and estoppel are untenable, in that the appellee’s suit at the Civil Law Court was a different cause of action as opposed to that which he had filed at the Ministry of Labour, which was basically an industrial dispute. The Court also held that the release alleged to have been executed by appellee in favour of appellant did not constitute a legal bar to appellee against further prosecution of his case before a court of law, and that it is not only contrary to public policy to grant a release as to the consequences of future negligence, but it is also a violation of the labor law for any employee to waive his right under the provisions of the Labor Practices Law. Finally the Court held that the release relied upon by appellant was inoperative, in that it was signed in relation to an industrial dispute and not to the action of damages which was later filed in the Civil Law Court by the appellee.

In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Philip A. Z. Banks, III appeared for appellant. John A. Dennis appeared for appellee.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GBALAZEH delivered the opinion of the Court.

On March 9, 1951, the Appellee Keilee Lebbi, an employee of the appellant company, sustained physical injuries as a result of a fall he had from a three storey building while constructing a rock crusher for the appellant.

Predicated upon the occupational injuries so sustained, the appellee made representations to the appellant company for workmen’s compensation benefits. Pursuant to the appellee’s demands and in deference to the Labour Law of Liberia, the appellant company tendered to the appellee, the sum of $5,000.00 as compensation and discharge of the appellee’s demands.

It is observed, however, from the records certified to this Tribunal that the cash payment of $5,000.00 made to the appellee was not an adequate compensation within the meaning of Workmen’s Compensation Laws of Liberia, since appellee’s daily rate was $1.20 and that the Ministry of Labour should thus review the matter. The appellee’s demand, notwithstanding, was dismissed by the hearing officer on the ground that the appellee had been adequately compensated and that a release to that effect had been duly executed by the appellee in the presence of officials of the Ministry of Labour. The records before us show that the appellee was not satisfied with this ruling and, hence, further filed an appeal to the Board of General Appeals of the Ministry of Labour. The Board allowed the appeal, but limited appellee’s claim to $14,016.00 and ordered that the appellee be paid $14,016.00, less of course $5,000.00, thus, leaving the appellee with only a sum of $9,016.00 as his balance.

The appellant excepted to the ruling of the Board of General Appeals and appealed its case to the People’s Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County. The case was heard by His Honour E. S. Koroma, assigned circuit judge, in the March Term, A. D. 1978, who gave the final judgment confirming and affirming the decision of the Board of General Appeals.

The appellant again being dissatisfied with the judgment of the People’s Civil Law Court, registered its appeal with the then Supreme Court of Liberia. The records further reveal, that prior to an assignment of the case for hearing by the then Supreme Court, a stipulation had been entered into on the 9th day of October, 1978, by and between the appellant company and the appellee, by which the appellant company had agreed to withdraw the appeal then pending in the Supreme Court and to compensate the appellee the full sum laid down by the Board of General Appeals and the trial court. In pursuance of the said stipulation, the appeal was withdrawn and the Supreme Court rendered judgment without opinion, affirming the judgment of the trial court and ordered the trial court to resume jurisdiction over the cause and enforce its judgment.

Consequently, the appellee was subjected to a series of prolonged medical treatment involving several drugs administered by appellant’s medical consultant, Dr. Ross, as well as one Dr. Robert Patton, appellant’s dermatologist at its medical department, a third party. These treatments resulted into a pigmentation of appellee’s previously black skin to white, technically called by medical experts as “vitilge”, in 1951 during which time, appellee was assured that his white skin would turn to black. However, appellee failed to realize this; instead his health condition deteriorated. Hence, on March 25, 1976 after 25 years of the bodily injuries, appellee wrote the appellant company claiming $50,000.00. The claim was submitted to the Ministry of Labour, but only to remain there unattended. The said letter is herein quoted as follows, to wit:

“No. 587 Ware House L. M. C. LTD. Tubmanburg City Bomi Territory, R .L. March 25, 1976 “Mr. J. L. Pevola, President & General Manager

L. M. C. LTD. Tubmanburg City Bomi Territory, R. L. Sir:

Due to your being in doubt of complying to my demand until you find out from a dermatologist doctor (skin doctor), if I am telling the truth about my body being over dosed of drugs through injection during the deadly accident that I had in May 9, 1951, that caused my whole body almost becoming white.

Now the doctor of your own choice, whom you sent me for approval, has proven beyond all doubts or has stated exactly as Dr. Ross who treated me in 1951 stated to me. So for me to be satisfied until the end of my life for this type of experiment that your English Doctor made on me, you have to compensate me with the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00).

This will keep me up until the end of my life, as it is the first of its kind within the Republic of Liberia, made known yet. So the above demanded amount is needed to keep me up because this experiment, I say, your L. M. C. Doctor made on me, will remain with me until the end of my life. Awaiting to hear from you concerning needed demand as compensation.

Sadly yours,

K. Lebbi.”

1. Appellee sustained both occupational and personal injuries, redress for the former being limited to the Ministry of Labour, an administrative agency, whilst the latter cognizable before the People’s Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. On the 18th day of February, A.D. 1980, appellee instituted an action of damages for personal injuries against appellant in said judicial forum, and for the purpose of this opinion, we quote verbatim counts 2, 3, 4 and the prayer for relief of appellee’s complaint against appellant.

2. That the plaintiff was sent to the hospital by the defendant, and thereat treated by one Dr. Ross, M.D., who because of the seriousness of the illness of the plaintiff, and in order to save his life, administered several drugs to plaintiff which resulted in a change of patient’s physical appearance from black to white as per plaintiff’s photo hereto attached, and marked Exhibit “A”.

3. And also because after the said incident plaintiff sent a letter to then President and General Manager of Liberia Mining Company Limited, calling his attention to this incident as per Exhibit ‘B’ hereto attached to the plaintiffs complaint, and forming a part thereof.

4. And also because plaintiff entered the John F. Kennedy Medical Center as a result of this serious condition (pigmentation) as per Exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’ hereto attached to this complaint and forming a part thereof.

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, plaintiff claims general damages because of this permanent change of his physical appearance from black to white, attributed to the conduct of the defendant, in an amount which cannot be estimated in a sum certain, but the jury may award him an amount sufficient for this disgraceful, uncomfortable, bothersome and injurious conditions, due to the defendant’s failure to provide the same amicably, so as to enable him to go to foreign parts and obtain expert medical attention and the cost of this litigation; and to grant unto the plaintiff such further and other relief as the nature of the case provides and the end of justice demands and requires and affords relief therefor.” Appended to appellee’s complaint were also the below listed documents, quoted word for word: “JOHN F. KENNEDY MEDICAL CENTER MONROVIA, LIBERIA CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL CARE TO: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN DATE: March 5, 1976 The following summary is taken from the patient’s medical records. THIS MEDICAL REPORT IS CONFIDENTIAL. IT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS. NAME OF PATIENT: Lebbi HOSPITAL NUMBER: 14-88-92 ADMISSION DATE: March 1, 1976 (Out-Patient Clinic) DISCHARGE DATE:

FINAL DISCHARGE: OPERATION(S) REMARKS : With reference to Mr. Lebbi’s case, it is to be informed that there is no doubt left regarding the vitilge diagnosis.

I’m at the opinion as well that the present patient’s condition may relate to the accident sustained in the past, and thus belief is not baseless.

It is known that vitilge is connected with disturbance of nervous system and spears as the consequence at psychiatric stress.

(Signature) Szroder I.M.D.

TITLE Dermatologist/JFKMH

NOTE: This report is not valid unless stamped by the Medical Record

Department STAMP NRD\73-26 (revised 5/28/73.”

The trial court entertained appellee’s case and at the end of the hearing the jury awarded appellee the sum of $40,000.00 as general damages. The trial judge affirmed the verdict and accordingly entered final judgment against the appellant company, having failed in its motion to secure a new trial, the appellant company noted exceptions to the judgment of the trial court and consequently announced and perfected its appeal to this Honourable Court for review. Hence, is the appeal now before US.

In order to arrive at an impartial conclusion in this case, we shall proceed to pass upon the principle issues so raised in appellant’s bill of exceptions and they are:

(1) Whether the appellee was estopped under the doctrines res judicata and estoppel from further instituting an action against the appellant ?

(2) Whether or not the trial judge committed a gross error when he overruled appellant’s objections to the questions put by appellee’s counsel to the witness, viz: ‘Mr witness, for the benefit of the court and jury, the document you are referring to, that is to say, your picture and the letter written to LMC, as well as the medical report, if you see them, say whether or not, you will be able to identify them?’

(3) Whether or not the trial judge committed a serious error when he denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the action on the contention that appellee had failed to sustain the burden of proof?

(4) Whether or not the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter?

(5) Whether or not the trial judge committed a reversible error when over the objections of appellant he (the trial judge) admitted into evidence documents offered by the appellee’s counsel?

(6) Whether or not the trial judge by his charge to the jury touching upon the stipulation committed a reversible error? and

(7) Whether or not the trial judge committed a reversible error by denying appellant’s motion for a new trial on the contention that the verdict of the empanelled jury was manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence? For the sake of clarity, these issues will be discussed in their serial sequence.

The general rule of law is that a person relying upon the doctrine of res judicata as to a particular issue involved in the pending case bears the burden of introducing evidence to prove that such issue was involved and actually determined by the prior action and that the matter as to which the rule of res judicata is involved as a bar was, in fact, necessarily adjudicated in the former action: Karpeh and Nagbe v. Fisher, [1974] LRSC 28; 23 LLR 91, 95 (1974); and 30 AM. JUR., Judgments, §283.

The doctrine of res judicata is defined by BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1174 (5′ ed.), as “A matter adjudicated; a thing judicially acted upon or decided.” The doctrine of res judicatais a principle of universal jurisprudence, forming a part of the legal system of all civilized nations. Whilst the principle of estoppel is raised against the assertion of a right unreasonably slept on by a party when in such lapse of time another has unalterably changed his position in good faith. In other words, estoppel will prevent a party from denying his own acts if well founded; neither law or equity will permit a party to disclaim his acts, Cooper and Cooper v. C.F.A.O., [1972] LRSC 68; 20 LLR 554 (1972).

The position of this Court is that the doctrine of res judicataor estoppel is to be applied in particular situations as fairness and justice require, and that it is not applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice. In this respect, application of the doctrines were not applicable to the particular facts involved and where the circumstances present a unique and non-current situation.

Now applying these principles of law to the facts of the case at bar, it is difficult to see how the principle of res judicata or estoppel could apply as contended by appellant. The records before us clearly show that the suit that was first instituted by appellee against the appellant company was an industrial one to recover compensation for the injury sustained as laid down by the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of Liberia. This suit had gone naturally before the Ministry of Labour since the appellee sustained injuries while in the scope of his employment. The sum of $5,000.00 appellee is alleged to have received as full compensation, for which he executed a release in favour of the appellant, was adequate only in so far as the sum was intended to cover the extent of the injuries as recommended by the medical officer employed by the appellant company. The subsequent appeal filed by appellee to the Board of General Appeals was occasioned by adverse physical conditions as recommended by a government physician at the John F. Kennedy Medical Center. This explains why the Board of General Appeals entertained the appeal and consequently awarded appellee an additional sum of $9,016.00 in conformity with the Labour Laws of Liberia. Of course, it must be remembered, at this juncture, that the additional sum, of $9,016.00, awarded to appellee by the Board of General Appeals, was also based on the fact that appellee’s daily rate as applied by the hearing officer, was not correct; since the previous one was based on a lower rate.

What is most important to remember at this juncture is that throughout the prosecution of his case from the hearing officer to the Board of General Appeals, the appellee was basing his claim on workmen’s compensation. This also explains why the appellee in neither instance did mention anything concerning action for damages as he did later in the Civil Law Court. It is also important to note here in passing that in neither instance did appellee impute negligence on the part of appellant for the accidental fall that occasioned the subsequent injuries sustained. The appellee was only questioning the quantum (amount) of the compensation accorded him as not being commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained in keeping with his daily rate.

On the other hand, in his suit filed before the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, the appellee was petitioning the court to award him general damages for the physical disability that appellee sustained as a result of the gross negligence in the treatment of appellee by Dr. Ross, an employee of appellant. In this connection, it is most helpful to remember that as a result of the series of wrong medications administered by Dr. Ross, the appellee’s pigmentation changed from black to white, a state of affairs that has regrettably been certified to be a permanent disability. It is on account of this incident that appellee filed an action of damages to hold appellant liable in legal negligence for the wrong medication he (appellee) received from appellant’s agent, which treatment resulted in appellee losing his natural skin colour (black), besides the untold mental and psychological sufferings and distress. Levin v. Juvico Supermarket, [1975] LRSC 12; 24 LLR 187 (1975).

It is, therefore, clear that the action filed by appellee at the Civil Law Court was substantially different in nature and scope from that filed earlier at the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry of Labour has no jurisdiction over actions of damages; hence, the Ministry cannot hear cases of that nature a fortiori, the trial judge did not commit any reversible error by denying appellant’s motion to dismiss as the facts of the case already displayed that this action was not cognizable before the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports as it was not of an industrial nature; and that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, Labour Practices Law, 18-A:3660.

Before leaving issue number one, we would also like to point out that it is a general rule that issues of law must be disposed of before issues of fact and that trial court is required to decide all issues of law raised by the pleadings before dealing with the facts. Thompson v. Faraj, [1976] LRSC 26; 25 LLR 34 (1976). The trial court did not err in failing to rule on the issue of “whether or not the appellee was barred and estopped under the principle of res judicata from further instituting an action based on the same subject claim, incident, parties and the like, which had previously been disposed of by the courts on the merits,” because, the court observed, all of the issues raised in the complaint, the answer, as well as the reply were mixed issues of law and facts, and thus were to be decided upon by the trial jury under the supervision of the court, which was done in the case at bar.

For the purpose of this opinion, we set forth below excerpts of appellee’s relevant testimony as well as counsel for appellant’s testimony:

Q. Mr. witness, you stated in your testimony in chief that you were taken to the office of Counsellor Toye C. Barnard where you signed a stipulation releasing LMC from all further claims in return for LMC’s compliance with the judgment of the trial court. Is it not a fact that you indeed signed the said stipulation before any withdrawal of the appeal of the case from the Supreme Court was made?

A. All the transaction that Counsellor Toye C. Barnard made were never made known to me, but he only told me of them afterwards and he invited me to his office to sign a paper and got my money, which paper copy was not given me.

A. I preferred for my lawyer to know; but Counsellors Toye C. Barnard and Tuan Wreh did everything under hand, because they did not want for my lawyer to know. They called me in their office to sign the paper and to receive my money unknowing to my lawyer, this is why they did not give me a copy. While in the employment of the Liberia Mining Company, LMC, I had an accident, that is, I fell from a three storey building. After this accident, all of my teeth were replaced, and at the same time when I was discharged from the hospital, I came to find out that my whole body turned white, as can be seen today. I went back to the doctor and asked him what was becoming of my body, why I was getting white. He performed a blood test on me as well as x-ray. After a while, he told me that he was sorry; then I started to cry. He said after some years, I would again recover my black skin, and this is what has kept me waiting because it is not good for a man to kick against a doctor. With my present condition after two or three hours without eating, I would drop. Secondly, I cannot function properly and I cannot stand the heat from the sun. . . . ”

A. All what I know about this case are, as follows: Counsellor Toye C. Barnard, one day, informed me that he had taken an appeal from the decision of the circuit court relating to the case of Lebbi v. Liberia Mining company to the Supreme Court of Liberia, and he sought for my opinion based upon a stipulation that Mr. Lebbi has earlier issued and signed, amounting to $5,000.00 as full settlement for his original claim for the injury sustained by him. Subsequently, Counsellor Barnard later informed me that Mr. Lebbi had been pestering him that the award of $9,016.00 given him by the Board of General Appeals of the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports, which serves as additional compensation for his claim, should be paid. Counsellor Barnard then said to me that he was disposed of withdrawing the said appeal and let Mr. Lebbi obtain the $9,016.00 award on humanitarian grounds, and because he was a black man like ourselves. After that, I used to see Mr. Lebbi frequently near the office of Counsellor Barnard, on the University Campus where I teach and at the Henries Law Firm on Benson Street, where Counsellor Bernard had his office. Then one day, whilst I was in the classroom, Counsellor Barnard called me to his office and there I met Mr. Lebbi. Counsellor Barnard himself and another gentlemen then placed on whose name I cannot recall, Counsellor Bernard placed on the table the document entitled “stipulation”. During my presence, the said stipulation was read to Mr. Lebbi and he was asked whether he understood it and he said “yes” and thereupon he signed the document and I was asked by Counsellor Barnard to witness Mr. Lebbi’s signature, which I did.

Touching upon the second and fourth issues, we rule that admissibility of evidence, is the sole prerogative of the trial judge and that the weight and credibility to be attached to such evidence, on the other hand, lies solely in the province of the jury; and the appellate court will not normally question this discretion unless gross abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial judge,Beysolow v. Coleman, [1946] LRSC 4; 9 LLR 156 (1946). A fortiori, the trial judge committed no error, when he overruled appellant’s objections to the question put by counsel for appellee to the witness, to wit: “Mr. witness, for the benefit of the court and jury, the documents you are referring to, that is to say, your picture and letter written to LMC, as well as the medical report, if you see them, say whether or not you will be able to identify them?” Objection: grounds: (1) Injecting the records, not made mention by the plaintiff; (2) misinterpretations. We wish to state here that the purpose of the direct examination is to put the witness back on the track so as to make a continuous journey to the intended destination. In other words, in a direct examination, the counsel seeks to introduce into evidence those important issues which the witness may have forgotten to mention in his statement in chief, for the benefit of the court and the jury; Cummings v. Republic, [1934] LRSC 2; 4 LLR 16 (1934). In this regard, the appellee’s counsel was right in putting the subject question to his client, the appellee, because the documents alluded to by counsel concerned a subject matter, personal injuries, which had already been mentioned by appellee in his pleadings.

It is thus surprising that counsel for appellant should have raised an objection when the documents sought to be introduced into evidence by appellee were vital in the determination of the nature and extent of injuries sustained by appellee. The trial judge was thus right in overruling appellant’s objection to the question put to appellee and the subsequent introduction into evidence of the documents alluded to by appellee’s counsel in his question. Walker v. Morris, [1963] LRSC 42; 15 LLR 424 (1963).

Now coming to the third issue, which concerns appellant’s motion to dismiss the action for want of proof, we find ourselves again unable to agree with the appellant on this issue. The Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code, 1:25.5 provides that “the burden of proof rests on him who alleges a fact and that such burden of proof shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” The evidence adduced by appellee in support of his complaint clearly meets this statutory requirement. This point is easily recognized by the fact that throughout the prosecution this case, appellant has not accepted the fact that appellee was injured in the prosecution of his duties as appellant’s employee and that there was no negligence, contributory or otherwise, imputable to appellee. This, therefore, explains why appellee’s complaint was easily accepted by the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports. Besides, appellee had produced oral, written, and demonstrative evidence, the latter being his photograph indicating that he sustained personal injuries arising out of drugs administered to him by third parties – Dr. Ross and Dr. Patton, to substantiate his claim. It is, therefore, our opinion that appellee sustained the burden of proof as laid down by statute. The trial judge was thus right in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss in this regard. Besides, the said motion was violative of the mandatory provisions of our statute on pleadings, in that the said motion to dismiss had not been filed along with appellant’s answer. Failure on the part of appellant to adhere to the statutory requirement, made the motion thus null and void. Ibid.,1:11.2. The trial judge thus did not commit any error in denying appellant’s motion. In the same manner, we rule, with reference to the sixth issue, that the trial judge committed no error in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial, in that the verdict of the jury was not manifestly against the weight of the evidence; and that the appellee did not fail to sustain the burden of proof as alleged by appellant. It is well to point out that proof is the perfection of evidence; for without proof there is no evidence. There was, in our opinion, ample evidence on the part of the appellee to sustain his claim.

Lastly, we come now to the seventh issue, which concerns a stipulation alleged to have been made by appellee. We would like to begin by reiterating the common law principle, that a stipulation entered into between parties before a court, stipulating to the manner in which payment is to be made by the debtor, does not per se make the stipulation a judgment of the court; nor does the judge’s signature thereon, indicating his approval thereof, ipso facto, make such stipulation a judgment. To constitute such stipulation as a judgment by consent, the document should be acknowledged as such in court and entered in the records by order of the judge. Acolatse v. Chase Manhattan Bank, [1974] LRSC 18; 23 LLR 14 (1974). Above all, our statutes require that all stipulations be approved of and attested to by counsel by affixing his signature thereto. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code, 1:11.6(b).

A close look at the testimony adduced for appellee, and the stipulation in question, readily reveal that the stipulation in question was not signed by appellee’s counsel as required by the statute; nor was the stipulation entered on the records of the court as a judgment by the order of the judge. This being the case, the stipulation was thus null and void ab initio, since what is not legally done is not done at all. There is no record either showing that the stipulation was passed upon by the Supreme Court, a fact that appellant also tends to admit by implication.

It should also be observed that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the stipulation by the appellee, appear to be quite suspicious as it is not easy to see and understand the motives that could have prompted appellee to enter into such an agreement while his interests were going to be grossly prejudiced. Could one really believe that appellee signed the stipulation under favourable conditions, viz: intelligently, knowingly and willingly? A study of appellee’s testimony on this topic, vide his testimony in chief, makes interesting reading. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge committed no reversible error in his charge over appellant’s objections to the jury touching upon the authenticity of the alleged stipulation.

In view of the above, we come to the conclusion that the appellee had a cause of action against the appellant company for general damages for the acute physical injuries he sustained while in the employ of appellant. We hold that the plea of res judicata and estoppel are untenable, in that the appellee’s suit at the Civil Law Court was a different cause of action as opposed to that which he had filed at the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports which was basically an industrial dispute. The Ministry of Labour has no jurisdiction over actions of damages such as the one filed by appellee, to hold otherwise would create a great injustice to the appellee and therefore set up a dangerous precedent in our jurisdiction.

We also hold that the release alleged to have been executed by appellee in favour of appellant did not constitute a legal bar to appellee against further prosecution of his case before a court of law. As a matter of fact the release in question was signed purely as a mutual concession before a legal suit had been instituted by appellee against appellant at the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports; not to mention the spurious circumstances under which the appellee executed the release. 66 AM. JUR. 2d., Releases, §33, provides that: “at common law a mere possibility was not a subject of release and a release was held to operate only on a present interest to show the relationship. In addition, it may be contrary to public policy to grant a release as to the consequences of future negligence.” Also the Liberian Labour Law provides that “any agreement by the employee to waive his right under this chapter shall be void”; Labour Practices Law, 18-A:2660; that is to say, all agreements by employee to waive compensation are void. It is observed from the legal authority cited herein that the release relied upon by appellant was inoperative, especially so when it was signed in relation to an industrial dispute and not the action of damages filed later on by the appellee at the Civil Law Court.

We further rule, that the stipulation alleged to have been signed by appellee was illegal in that it did not meet the requirements of our statutory laws, not to mention the attending suspicious circumstances under which it was executed, as evidenced from the testimony of appellee and counsel for appellant. It is not thus useful to spend any more time on the merits of the instrument as it was null and void ab initio, except perhaps, only to mention in passing that the conduct of the counsel for appellant in this regard leaves much to be desired.

We therefore conclude that because of the foregoing legal and factual grounds, the appeal of appellant cannot be maintained and the judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed with cost against the appellant. And it is so ordered.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MABANDE dissents.

As I understand the facts and the law of this case, judgment should be reversed. I therefore dissent.

In deciding this case, after a similarly previous case had been decided by this Court between the same parties, the Court should firstly determine the theories of the cases, the subjects of the claims, the parties involved, and a combination of two or all of these, in order to hold whether or not res judicata is applicable to the present cause.

I consider it necessary therefore to briefly state the causes of actions that were before the Labour Ministry which ended in the Supreme Court and those here before us.

The first complaint by Keilee Lebbi was filed for workmen’s compensation in the Workmen’s Compensation and Industrial Safety Section of the Labour Ministry. He complained that on May 9, 1951 he fell from a three storey building while working on a rock crusher for his employer, the Liberia Mining Company; that he was hospitalized by the Liberia Mining Company at the clinic of Dr. Ross and was discharged after his recovery; that thereafter he gradually began to lose the pigmentation of his skin, which he reported to the Liberia Mining Company; and that a medical diagnosis was made by the John F. Kennedy Medical Center which confirmed Dr. Ross’ findings that he was suffering from “vitilge” a disease connected with disturbances of the nervous system resulting from his fall. The complaint was heard and after the Supreme Court’s judgment, he was paid.

For the present case before us, the same plaintiff, Keilee Lebbi, sued the same Liberia Mining Company in 1979 after the termination of the labour case. His complaint substantially stated: (1) that he fell from a three storey building on May 9, 1951, when he was constructing a rock crusher for the defendant, and he sustained injuries; (2) that Dr. Ross treated him, but that because of the seriousness of his illness and in order to save his life, several drugs were administered to him which resulted into the change of his physical appearance; and (3) that he was sent to the John F. Kennedy Medical Center for diagnosis of the change of his pigmentation and he obtained a medical certificate. The medical certificate proferted by plaintiff was the same certificate used at the labour trial. It did not charge Liberia Mining Company’s doctor with malpractice.

From even the history of the former case as given by the briefs of counsel and the majority, one may easily conceive that both subject matters arose out of the same accident and injuries to the same employee of the same employer. It is the mere distinction between the Labour Ministry being the initial quasi judicial forum created solely to handle grievances arising out of disputes between employers and employees, and the circuit court, that has deterred this court from piercing the veil of appellation, in order to comprehend more clearly the facts and identity of both cases.

In the Labour Ministry, a cause of action that could have been venued in the Civil Law Court as damages for personal injury or as a civil action may be referred to as occupational injuries or unfair labour practices. Both titles of the same cause of action are for compensation claimed from the employer by an employee on account of any damage suffered by the employee in connection with or in relation to his employment.

The personal injury case now instituted by and between the same parties is for all injuries, physical, mental or otherwise suffered by the employee/appellee as a result of a fall he had while constructing a rock crusher for appellant. This was the same cause of action filed by appellee before Labour Ministry for which he was awarded compensation and fully paid.

The medical certificates exhibited at the Labour Ministry for the occupational injury case are the same used in the Civil Law Court for the present suit.

The facts and evidence, both oral and documentary, and all other circumstances, are the same except that the caption of the cases in the two different forums are different in words but same in meaning. Other than the designation of the present suit as damages for personal injury and venuing it before the Civil Law Court which is an appellate court for labour cases, appellee’s theories of the actions and subjects of the claims are identical.

In the Labour Ministry, he sued for compensation while in the civil court, he claimed damages. Both claims are for the same injuries he suffered as a result of his said accidental fall on May 9, A. D., 1951, from a building while constructing a rock crusher for appellant. The records reveal annexation of the Board of General Appeals’ ruling on the previous case a portion of which reads thus:

“According to the records in this case, appellant, Liberia Mining Company Badge #587, was employed by Liberia Mining Company as a Carpenter Helper. Appellant had an accident on May 9, 1951 in which he fell from a building during the course of his employment. Appellant was hospitalized and he received medication at the clinic of Dr. Ross who was then physician for Liberia Mining Company. He was later discharged from the hospital and upon recovery, appellant gradually began to lose the pigmentation of his skin over the years.

“In 1957, he reported the matter to appellee and a medical diagnosis of his case was made by a dermatologist, at the John F. Kennedy Medical Center. Appellant was given a medical certificate in which his case was diagnosed as vitilge, a disease connected with disturbance of the nervous system as a consequence of psychiatric stress. The medical report confirmed that the appellant’s present condition may relate to the accident sustained in the past.” In ruling on the law issues of the pending case, the Civil Law Court ruled thus:

“This case travelled as far as the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia and the same was remanded with instruction that the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court should resume jurisdiction and give effect to the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia.”

From the documentary evidence of both the labour case and the civil case now before us, appellee knew and complained of the loss of pigmentation of the skin due to the said accident before he sued in the Labour Ministry. This was proved by the two medical certificates and the physical appearance of appellee at the previous and now pending trial.

I am convinced therefore that were these facts apply to the same parties in the same case previously decided, the doctrine of res judicata must apply to the second or any identical future cause of action between the same parties.

I therefore hold that in any subsequent case, no matter in which court, where the first case was originally filed and that matter was finally decided by that court of competent jurisdiction, to any subsequent case the doctrine of res judicata is applicable if there exists, in the future case, identity of parties to the suit, identity of the thing sued for, and identity of the cause or reason for the action. Such previous judgment is always conclusive on all of the parties thereto.

The majority holds that res judicata must be pleaded and proved at the trial, but it was properly pleaded according to Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code, 1:9.3(2), which requires pleadings to be simple and concise without any special technical form.

I am of the firm opinion that where the original suit was determined by the same court, it is bound to take judicial notice of its own records when a subsequent case comes before it. The judgment need not be pleaded and proof of such judgment is not required and need not be made. The court’s own records of which it takes judicial notice is a more reliable evidence. The trial judge was fully cognizant of this Court’s opinion and mandate to which he referred in his ruling on the law issues. Being aware of the binding force of a mandate and judgment of this Court, he elected to disregard same. This is contemptuous for which he should be punished. The decisions of this Court should be and are binding upon itself and all courts of this land. Phelps v. Williams, [1928] LRSC 14; 3 LLR 54 (1928); Alpha v. Tucker [1964] LRSC 12; 15 LLR 561 (1964). Res judicata is and should be pleaded and proved only when different courts determine the suits, but here it is, the same court that tried the previous controversy and now hears the present case. Thomas et al. v. Dayrell[1966] LRSC 21; , 17 LLR 284 (1966); Cooper v. Dunbar [1972] LRSC 43; 21 LLR 295(1972). The complaint, answer or the reply did not raise any issue of illegality, nullity or voidness of any stipulation which the majority has undertaken to consider in their opinion. Their conclusion that the stipulation is “null and void ab initio, since what is not legally done is not done at all”, is unsupported by the records. It is a review of an enforceable final judgment of the Supreme Court which is not and cannot be in issue. Tucker v. Brownell [1975] LRSC 28; 24 LLR 333 (1975); Jackson et al. v. Mason et al.[1975] LRSC 7; , 24 LLR 97 (1975). The judgment without opinion dated 19th November, A. D. 1979 reads thus: “When this case was called, The Henries Law Firm appeared for the appellant, and the appellees appeared for themselves. In view of the withdrawal of appeal filed by the Liberia Mining Company, appellants in the above entitled cause, and the stipulation entered into by and between the parties, it is adjudged that the notice of withdrawal should be and the same is hereby granted. The Clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate down to the court below, commanding the judge presiding therein to resume jurisdiction over the cause and give effect to this judgment. Costs are disallowed. And it is hereby so ordered.” Legally and logically, the Supreme Court earlier considered and determined the stipulation which finally relieved the appellant from any liability or cause of action. The relevant clause of the stipulation reads: “That the said Mr. Keilee Lebbi hereby releases the said Liberia Mining Company from any further claims, demands, actions, causes of action and suits, both in law and equity whatsoever relating directly or indirectly to the said industrial injury sustained while in the employ of the Liberia Mining Company, which results to his skin pigmentation.”

The case now pending before us is a cause of action that seeks to impose liability on appellant. The binding force of the prior judgment prohibits us from reopening the entire issue.

The Workmen’s Compensation Law, Labor Practices Law, 18A:3660, is specifically intended to protect the employee by entitling him to compensation for occupational injuries arising out of the act of a third party but, the present case is not based on malpractice which, if assorted, was absolved by the occupational injury case that has been finally terminated. Splitting the same causes of action is contrary to public policy and law. Appellee Lebbi’s complaint credited the treatment given him as having resulted in the change of the pigmentation of his skin, the intention of said treatment being to save his own life. Hence, the Labor Practices Law, 18-A:3660 is inapplicable to the case.

On account of these facts and supporting laws, I respectfully decline to concur. Therefore, I must file this dissenting opinion.