THE MANAGEMENT OF LAMCO J. V. OPERATING COMPANY, Appellant, v. IDEL ICASHANI and HARPER S. BAILEY, Assigned Judge, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE NATIONAL LABOR COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Argued: October 27, 1988. Decided: December 29, 1988.
1. When a ruling, decision, or judgment is reversed, it means that the prior ruling, decision of judgment is set aside or overruled.
2. When an appellate court reverses and remands to the lower court with instructions that the court below decides certain inconsistences in its prior ruling, decision of judgment, in keeping with law, a new trial has been ordered.
The Supreme Court had earlier heard an appeal in this labor case. It had reversed the ruling of the lower court and remanded the case to the hearing officer with instructions to determine in keeping with law whether the compensation he had awarded was for wrongful dismissal or to avoid payment of pension. On remand, the hearing officer, without holding any further hearings, restated the award, this time on the ground of wrongful dismissal. The hearing officer’s ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court held that its mandate had not been followed, either by the administrative agency or the lower court, because of the failure of the hearing officer to try the case de novo. The Court therefore reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for a new hearing.
Toye C. Barnard for the appellant. Elijah Gannett, Sr. for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE KPOMAKPOR delivered the opinion of the court.
Once again this matter is before us the second time for review and determination. In Lamco J. V. Operating Company v. Kashani, [1988] LRSC 48; 35 LLR 181 (1988), heard during the March A. D. 1988 Term, three issues were raised by the parties, but we found two relevant to arriving at a decision in the case:
1) Whether His Honour Arthur Williams committed a reversible error when he confirmed the decision of the Board of General Appeals, since Mr. Donald George, a member of the said Board signed said decision even though he took no part in the hearing of the matter.
2) Whether the trial judge erred in confirming the award of 24 months in favor of the appellee when the ruling of the hearing officer and the Board of General Appeals was so ambiguous on its face that it could not be determined for certain whether the said award was made because appellee was illegal dismissed or whether it was made only because appellant attempted to avoid the payment of pension to appellee.
In disposing of the first issue, we held, relying upon 46 AM JUR. 2d., Judges, §34 and Morgan v. United States, [1936] USSC 108; 298 U.S. 468 (1936), that the duty to decide cannot be performed by one who has not considered the evidence or the argument because the obligation is not an impersonal one, but rather one akin to that of a judge. “‘The one who decides must hear.” We therefore answered this question in the affirmative. In other words, it was our holding that the act of Member Donald George in signing the judgment of the board in which he took no part in the hearing was a dereliction of law.
Regarding the second issue, we also decided that the trial judge erred in confirming the decision of the board. On page seven of our opinion we decided that: “one cannot be certain, from reading the ruling of the hearing officer, the Board of General Appeals and, unfortunately, that of the judge of the National Labor Court, that the $10,257.40 awarded appellee was compensation for wrongful dismissal as provided for under the first part of (ii), section 9, or as compensation in favor of appellee for appellant’s attempting to avoid paying pension, in keeping with the latter portion of the same. . . .”
We had no choice, because of the errors adverted to, but to answer the second question in the affirmative also and reverse the ruling of the trial judge and remand the cause, in doing, so we specifically said: “In view of the foregoing, the ruling of the National Labour Court appealed from is reversed with instructions to the hearing officer of the Ministry of Labour that he resumes jurisdiction and decide in keeping with law whether the award of $10,257.40 was compensation for wrongful dismissal, or whether it represents compensation for management’s attempt to avoid payment of pension.”
The case is before us again and LAMCO, as petitioner/ appellant, is now contending mainly, that the judge committed several reversible errors:
2. And also because petitioner says that it was prejudicial to the interest of petitioner when your Honour affirmed the ruling of the labor inspector without first conducting a hearing.
3. [T]he Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the National Labour Court, which had ruled in favor of the Corespondent Idel Kashani in the above mentioned case with instruction to the hearing officer of the Ministry of Labour to resume jurisdiction and decided in keeping with law whether the award of $10,257.40 was compensation for wrongful dismissal, or whether it represents compensation for attempting, on the part of management to avoid payment of pension.
4. The labor inspector, instead of conducting a hearing and taking in evidence, arbitrarily decided that the award was compensation for wrongful dismissal.
5. [T]he award of $10,257.40 cannot be compensation for wrongful dismissal because the co-respondent worked for only eight years at a salary of $384.80 per month, which means that even if she were illegally dismissed, which Petitioner says it is not so, she would be entitled to only $3,078.40; that is to say one month for each year of service. See appellant’s bill of exceptions filed in the trial court.
A recourse to the records certified to this Court show that in reversing the ruling of the trial court in our opinion in the March A.D. 1988 Term, we did so with the instructions that the case be remanded to the hearing officer, who would resume jurisdiction and decide in keeping with law whether the $10.257.40 award was made in favor of appellee because she had been wrongfully dismissed or whether her dismissal was motivated by a desire on the part of appellant to avoid paying her pension. Despite this clear and unequivocal mandate to the lower tribunals, both the hearing officer and the trial judge ignored it; instead they ruled summarily and arbitrarily.
As to the hearing officer, although it was brought to his attention in a submission by appellant that by this Court reversing the previous ruling and remanding the case with the instructions that he decide in keeping with law why he had awarded appellee $10,257.40, that a de novo trial was intended, the hearing officer nevertheless made the following ruling:
“In keeping with the Supreme Court’s opinion delivered July 29, 1988, that we decide in keeping with law whether the award of $10,257.40 (TEN THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN DOLLARS & FORTY CENTS) was compensation for wrongful dismissal or whether it represents compensation for attempting, on the part of Management, to avoid the payment of pension, from evidences adduced at the hearing and the law controlling, we are convinced that Complainant, Idel Kashani was wrongfully dismissed….” (Emphasis ours).
As can be seen from the ruling of the hearing officer, he failed to carry out the mandate of this Court. Apparently, when he writes, “from the evidences adduced at the hearing and the law controlling,” he is referring to the hearing he conducted. when he first heard the case. Obviously, this was not the intention of this Court when it reversed and remanded the case with the instructions that a decision be made as to the ground or grounds for the award.
In the first place, the judgment appealed from had been reversed by this Court and the case remanded with instructions that a decision be made in keeping with law as to why an ambiguous award has been made. It should have been obvious to both the trial judge and the hearing officer that in order to decide “in keeping with law” whether the award is for wrongful dismissal or for attempting to avoid the payment of pension, a de novo hearing was contemplated, especially when the appellee served appellant for only eight years and when we had earlier held that it was a reversible error for two members of the Board of General Appeals to hear a cause while three rendered and sign the decision. Had we not reversed. the judgment, but rather had only issued an interlocutory order, that is, requiring the court below to resume jurisdiction and perform certain acts and report to us, cur present position and task would be different. While we have another judgment before us, the one originally rendered having been, as aforesaid, reversed, since the case was not heard at all after its remand, the judgment before us now is actually, for all intents and purposes, the same one which we had in our earlier opinion rejected for ambiguity and because the procedure adopted by the Board in rendering it was contrary to law.
The National Labor Court Judge, unfortunately, adopted the same procedure as did the hearing officer, even though the former claimed that he was acting in obedience to the Supreme Court of Liberia. After quoting at length the from ruling of the hearing officer, Judge Harper S. Bailey concluded:
“Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, this court is convinced that the hearing officer has given sufficient clarification as to the doubts that will arise at the time (sic) and the said ruling is hereby affirm (sic) and confirm (sic) and it is the final Judgment of this court that the petitioner/appellant, Lamco J. V. Operating Company (sic) is hereby adjudge (sic) liable yo (sic) respondent/appellee Idel Kashani in the total of $10,257.40 as an award for wrongful dismissal….”
The only decisive issue now before us for determination is: whether the mandate of this Court was adhered to, or properly executed by the hearing officer and whether the trial court was warranted in affirming this second ruling of the hearing officer. We answer this question in the negative. The instruction of this Court to the hearing officer was not that he clarifies his earlier ruling. Definitely he could not have understood our instruction as stated, supra, to mean “clarify and transmit to us,” since before we remanded, we reversed. When a ruling, decision, or judgment is reversed, it has always meant, and still means, that the prior ruling or decision is vacated, set aside or overruled. When an appellate court reverses and remands to the lower court with instruction that the court below decides in keeping with law certain inconsistencies in the prior ruling or decision, a new trial has been ordered; this is usually the case, especially where, as in the case at bar, when one who took no part in the hearing participated in making the decision.
During the argument before us, the learned counsel for the appellee eloquently argued that the mandate of this Court to the lower court did not by its language envisage a de novo trial. Of course, his adversary held the opposite view. However, in answer to a question put to appellee’s counsel as to whether his position would have been the same if another hearing officer had presided over the case when it was remanded, instead of C. Wadah Mangou, the previous hearing officer, he promptly replied that in that case it might have made a difference. In other words, the learned counsel is saying that a de novo hearing would have been mandatory in such a case. We disagree and hold that it makes no difference, not when the case is reversed.
In the case of Wright v. Wright, [1936] LRSC 27; 5 LLR 288 (1936), the issue therein, as in the instant case, centered around the effect of a decision of this Court where the judgment of the lower court has been reversed, and the case remanded with instructions. In the Wright case, this Court reversed the judgment of the court below and remanded the case to the trial court, with instructions that the trial court takes certain additional evidence, and upon doing so have the widow’s dower properly assigned. Id. at 289.
When the trial judge received the above quoted mandate, he caused the parties to appear; heard additional testimony and evidence offered by the parties, and ordered the clerk of his court to transmit to the Supreme Court the supplementary records.
In remanding the Wright case for the second time, this Court held that it should have been obvious to the trial judge that after hearing the evidence, he should have given a judgment, settling the issue in accordance with that he considered just, in view of the additional evidence obtained.
The Court continued: “As the case now stands the judgment given by His Honor Judge Brownell, on the 16th of September, 1935, has been reversed; no other judgment has been given, and were we to assume jurisdiction now we would be compelled to give an original judgment, instead of reviewing an original judgment, which constitutionally we cannot do.”
The facts and circumstances of the instant case present the same issue. Had we not reversed the judgment of the trial court which was rendered earlier, when the case was first heard, we would have still retained the appellate jurisdiction which we had already acquired when appeal to this Court was announced and perfected during our sitting in the A. D. 1988 March Term, by virtue of which we had the power to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment originally given. After we reversed the original judgment of the trial court in the present case, we do not now have any decision to review. It is our opinion, therefore, that the hearing officer of the Ministry of Labour be ordered to resume jurisdiction, and decide this cause de novo, and after he shall have given a decision, should either party be dissatisfied, such a party may be allowed to bring the case for review, through the procedure required by law.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby mandated to send an order to the court below to this effect. Costs are to abide final determination. And it is so ordered.
Judgment reversed; case remanded.
CHIEF JUSTICE GBALAZEH dissents.
This matter started before a hearing officer of the Ministry of Labour in Yekepa, Nimba County, where appellee had entered an action of wrongful dismissal against her former employer, the appellant, LAMCO. After hearing evidence on both sides, the hearing officer ruled for appellee and awarded her compensation of $10,257.40. However, the hearing officer, in his ruling cited two (2) laws: one relating to wrongful dismissal simply, and the other to dismissal to avoid payment of pension, without indicating, definitely for which of the two reason he had made the awarded for appellee. The corporation announced an appeal to the National Labor Court, which affirmed the decision in toto. There also, management announced another appeal, this time to this Court, which heard the appeal and reversed the ruling during its March A . D.1988 Term. Lamco J. V Operating Company v. Kashani, [1988] LRSC 48; 35 LLR 181 (1988). Despite the reversal on July 29, 1988, this Court in addition, gave instructions to the hearing officer to go and decide the case in keeping with law, and indicate whether the award made to appellee was for wrongful dismissal simply, or for dismissal in order to avoid the payment of pension.
When the matter again returned to the hearing officer, he made the determination in the presence of the parties, that in fact the award he earlier made was for wrongful dismissal and not compensation for dismissal in order to avoid the payment of pension benefits. There, once more, the management excepted and appealed against the said decision contending among other things that the hearing officer had not fully carried out the mandate of this Court, since he had made this second determination without first of all hearing evidence from the parties. The determination of the hearing officer was again confirmed by the National Labour Court, and the matter has come up here on yet another appeal.
On this second coming, my colleagues have again reversed the ruling of the hearing officer, and are at this time remanding the case to the hearing officer for hearing anew, but I have refused to join them in their pursuit because I hold the view that it will not only bring the standard of consistency of the holdings of this Court into disrepute, but also if will be quite inequitable and against the interest of justice. And the appellee will thereby suffer for what I consider should be our own blame and for the mistake of this Court itself for the following reasons: firstly, this Court had earlier committed the error of first reversing the judgment, and yet went ahead to instruct the hearing officer to give an explanation of the very ruling we had reversed; and secondly, the explanation we sought was on law, nevertheless, we had the records of the case before us, and the hearing officer is a layman, while we clothed with legal authority to render such judgment as should have been rendered by the hearing officer.
Black’s Law Dictionary defined the word “reverse” as “to overthrow, vacate, set aside, make void, as to reverse a judgment, sentence or decree, or to change to the contrary. To reverse a judgment means to overthrow it by contrary decision, make it void, undo or annul it for error.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1185 (5th ed.).
We had reversed the ruling of the hearing officer, yet we had also ordered the said hearing officer to give legal reasons for that ruling, which we had already reversed. According to the definition given, supra, when a court reverses a judgment, it throws it away and declares same to be null and void. What the court has to do thereafter, is to give its own ruling in place of that which has been declared void; but it is not to ask for reasons or explanations for the decision which was reversed, as was done by us in the instant case. I am of the considered opinion that we were in error for doing what we did, since indeed under our practice and procedure a reversal never gives instructions like a remand.
In our instructions to the hearing officer, we had specifically ordered him to decide in keeping with law, whether or not the award given to a appellee was for wrongful dismissal, or for avoiding the payment of pension. This was a question of law which we had sent down to a layman, the hearing officer, to decide. And upon receipt of our said instructions, he went ahead to give us the needed answer, specifying that the award was in an actual fact one made for a wrongful dismissal simply.
This was a question we were competent to decide earlier on without instructing the hearing officer, who happens to be a layman, to do so. The Supreme Court can render such judgment as would have been rendered below; and therefore, with the file of the case before us, we ought to have decided that the award was for wrongful dismissal, especially when we know that an employee who had worked for barely eight (8) years could not have been dismissed to avoid the payment of pension. Wahab v. Helou Brothers, [1975] LRSC 20; 24 LLR 250 (1975).
Having concluded earlier that this Court was in error when it reversed and yet instructed the hearing officer to decide the legal issues, I therefore hold the view that the appellee should not be made to suffer as a consequence of our own wrongful act. This Court has held in several cases that the error of the court should not prejudice any party litigant.
Despite the foregoing facts and the law cited, my colleagues are remanding this case for a hearing de novo, which I consider will not only expose us, the members of this bench to public ridicule for contradiction and inconsistency in our own opinions, but what is more, the retrial will not properly achieve its intended purpose because this matter has been pending before the courts for several years. Many changes have taken place in the position of the parties involved since 1984; evidences might have been destroyed, witnesses gone out of the jurisdiction, and indeed the expense of going to and from, between Monrovia and Yekepa will be considerable and obviously against the interest of the appellee who is a private individual and for which the ruling should be affirmed instead of remanding it for retrial.
Hence, I decided to dissent from my colleagues and to file this opinion.