MUSA KANNEH, Informant, v. MANSTON J. MANLEY of the LAW OFFICES OF WHITE AND ASSOCIATES, ABRAHAM SAYSAY, JAMES DESHIELD, et al., Respondents.

INFORMATION PROCEEDINGS.

Heard: April 29, 2002. Decided: June 14, 2002.

1. If an appeal is taken from a judgment of a court not of record in favor of a plaintiff in a proceeding to recover possession of real property, the issuance and execution of a writ of possession shall be stayed pending the rendition of final judgment.
2. Under Liberian jurisprudence, the justice of the peace court is classified and categorized as a court not of record; therefore an appeal taken from that court in a proceeding to recover real property shall stay issuance and execution of writ of possession, the appeal serving as a supersedeas pending the rendition of a final judgment.
3. The eviction of a defendant from the subject property in an action to recover possession of real property pending a hearing of his appeal constitutes a reversible error.
4. The following acts are necessary for the completion of an appeal: (a) announcement of the taking of the appeal; (b) filing of the bill of exceptions; (c) filing of an appeal bond; and (d) service and filing of the notice of completion of the appeal, all of the foregoing within the time allowed by statute.
5. A failure to comply with the any of the requirements for the perfecting of an appeal within the time allowed by statute shall be ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
6. An appellant must present his bill of exceptions for approval of the trial judge within ten days after the rendition of the judgment.
7. An appeal may be dismissed by the trial judge on motion for failure of the appellant to file a bill of exceptions within the time allowed by statute.
8. The statutory law on appeal in the Liberian jurisdiction is mandatory and should be strictly adhered to and a failure to do so renders the appeal dismissible.
9. An inferior court’s disregard of the Supreme Court’s mandate is contumacious.
10. If a judge or any judicial officer attempts to execute the mandate of the Supreme Court in an improper manner, the correct remedy is to proceed by a bill of information.

Informant filed a bill of information before the Supreme Court alleging that upon information filed in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, the judge of the lower court had suspended the enforcement of the mandate issued by the Supreme Court Justice in Chambers. In the case, the co-respondent, James DeShield, had instituted in a justice of the peace court an action of summary proceeding to recover possession of real property from the informant because of the latter’s failure to pay the rental for said property. In that action, in which Co-respondent DeShield had obtained a judgment in his favour, the informant had appealed to the circuit court. Notwithstanding the appeal, the justice of the peace had proceeded to dispossess the informant of possession of the property. Whereupon the informant filed a bill of information before the circuit court. From a decision of the circuit court ordering that the informant be repossessed of the property, co-respondent DeShield announced an appeal, which was never perfected. Whereupon the circuit court ordered the justice of the peace to enforce of its ruling and to place the informant in possession of the premises.
From the decision of the circuit court, Co-respondent DeShield sought prohibition from the Chambers Justice of the Supreme Court. The Chambers Justice denied the writ and or-dered enforcement of the ruling of the circuit court. However, upon the circuit court assuming jurisdiction over the case, the Co-respondent Abraham Saysay, who was a tenant of Co-respondent DeShield filed a bill of information praying the court to stay the enforcement of the proceedings until the informant produced evidence that he had title to the property in question. It was from the granting of the information and the stay of the enforcement of the Supreme Court Justice’s mandate that the informant filed the bill of information.

The Supreme Court granted the information, stating several grounds for its decision. The Court reasoned that, firstly, a justice of the peace court, being a court not of record, cannot enforce a decision made by it in an action to recover the possession of real property where an appeal had been announced by the defendant in such proceeding. The action of the justice of the peace in dispossessing the informant of the property after an appeal had been announced and while the same was still pending before the circuit court, was a reversi-ble error. The Court said that the circuit court judge acted properly in ordering that the informant be repossessed of the property and that the respondents had forfeited their right to prevent such repossession or enforcement of the circuit court’s ruling since they had failed to perfect the appeal announced by them from the said ruling.
With regard to the suspension of the service of the writ of repossession by the succeeding circuit court judge, the Court opined that not only was the action an affront to the Supreme Court, a disobedience of its mandate by the trial judge, and hence, contemptuous, but that the action also amounted to the succeeding trial judge reviewing and reversing the ruling of his predecessor. The Supreme Court noted that the succeeding trial judge had no authority to review or reverse the ruling of his predecessor and that his action was therefore illegal and reversible. The Court reasoned that under the circumstances, information was the proper course available to the informant and the fact that the trial judge, who committed the error, was no longer in office did not preclude the informant from bringing to the attention of the Court the violation committed by the judge in enforcing the Court’s mandate. The Court, in granting the information, and noting that the case was not one involving a dispute as to title, ordered the trial court to resume jurisdiction of the same, conduct a trial de novo, and render an appropriate decision.

J. Emmanuel R. Berry appeared for the respondents/ appellants. Joseph H. Constance appeared for the informant/ appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MORRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Culled from the certified records transmitted to this Court, the facts revealed that James DeShield et al., respondents, rented a zinc shack to one Jusufu, the alleged brother of the informant. After the death of Jusufu, the informant, Musa Kanneh, informed Co-respondent James DeShield that the late Jusufu was his brother and that he was therefore requesting the co-respondent’s permission to continue renting the said zinc shack. The informant than moved into the zinc shack with Co-respondent DeShield’s approval. Subsequently, the infor-mant, Musa Kanneh, defaulted on several occasions in his rental payment. As a result, Co-respondent DeShield, in 1982, instituted an action of summary proceeding to recover posses-sion of real property against Mr. Kanneh in the justice of the peace court of His Honour B. S. Tamba, where he obtained a judgment against the informant. Informant Kanneh, being dis-satisfied with said judgment, excepted thereto and announced an appeal therefrom to the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia. The records revealed that Informant Kanneh alleged that he was evicted from the subject property pending his appeal to the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. Hence, Informant Kanneh filed a bill of information before the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, conten-ding therein, amongst other things, that his eviction from the subject premises by Justice of the Peace Tamba, whose court was a court not of records, and in favor of the co-respondent, notwithstanding the pendency of his appeal before the circuit court, was illegal and not in keeping with the statutory laws of this land. The certified records before this Honourable Court further revealed that the information was resisted by the Co-respondent DeShield, and was heard and granted on Sep-tember 27, 1994 by His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., who at the time was presiding over the September Term, A. D.1994, of the circuit court by assignment. The co-respondents excepted to Judge Cooper’s ruling of September 27, 1994, and announced an appeal therefrom, which was granted.

However, Co-respondent DeShield failed to file a bill of exceptions within ten days (10), as required by statute. There-fore, the trial court, on November 22, 1994, upon a motion filed, dismissed the co-respondent’s appeal. On November 23, 1994 the trial court judge, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, ordered the justice of the peace, His Honour B. S. Tamba, to resume jurisdiction over the case and to place the informant in possession of the premises. The co-respondents then sought the aid of the alternative writ of prohibition with the filing of a petition in the chambers of the Associate Justice. The petition was heard and denied, and the justice of the peace, His Ho-nour B. S. Tamba, was mandated directly by Mr. Justice Smith to place informant in possession of the subject property rather than having the said act done through the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court.
The certified records also revealed that one Abraham Saysay, a lessee of the DeShield Family, filed a bill of information on February 23, 1995, in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, during its December Term, A. D. 1994, before His Honour C. Alexander B. Zoe, presiding by assignment. Informant Saysay requested the trial court to temporarily suspend the service of the writ of possession until the informant produced his title deed or squatters right from the Liberian Government showing his entitlement to remain on the land and in the zinc shack.
On February 24, 1995, the assistant clerk of court upon orders of His Honour Judge Zoe, issued a writ of summons commanding the then justice of the peace, His Honour B. S. Tamba, to suspend the writ of possession until hearing shall have been held on Saturday, February 25, 1995, at 10:00 o’clock a. m. The justice of the peace acknowledged receipt of the writ of summons, on February 25, 1995, at 12:25 p. m.
On December 23, 1998, Musa Kanneh, informant herein, filed a seven-count bill of information before this Court alleging, amongst other things that, the enforcement of the Chambers Justice’s mandate had been suspended by His Honour Judge C. Alexander B. Zoe based upon a bill of information filed by Abraham Saysay, by and through the Law Offices of White and Associates. Consequently, he said, the mandate to repossess Musa Kanneh of the subject property had still not been enforced and that he was therefore still dispossessed of the premises. The informant therefore prayed this Court to grant the information and to order that Mr. Justice Smith’s mandate be enforced.

On May 4, 1999, the respondents filed a seven-count returns to the information, contending that the informant should have brought his information to the immediate atten-tion of the Supreme Court, if indeed Judge Zoe had suspended its mandate, and not to wait until Mr. Justice Smith had died and Judge Zoe had been relieved of his judgeship. The respondents therefore prayed this Court to deny and dismiss the information proceeding and sustain the returns.
After a careful perusal of the certified records transmitted to us, we have concluded that the below points constitute the germane issues for the determination of this case.

1. Whether or not a judge of a court not of records, who has rendered a judgment in an action of summary proceeding to recover possession of real property, from which an appeal has been announced and granted, can, during the pendency of the appeal, evict the defendant from the premises in question and issue a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff, and does such action constitute a reversible error?
2. Whether or not the trial court judge committed a reversi-ble error when he dismissed the respondents’ appeal because of the respondents failure to file their bill of exceptions within statutory time of (l0) ten days? and
3. Whether or not a trial court judge of a subordinate court may suspend a mandate or order of the Supreme Court or its Justice presiding in Chambers?

With regard to the first issue, i.e., whether or not a judge of a court not of records, who has rendered a judgment in an action of summary proceeding to recover possession of real property, from which an appeal has been announced and granted can, during the pendency of the appeal evict the defendant from the premises and issue a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff, and whether such action constitutes a reversible error, we observe from the certified records before us that James DeShield, for the DeShield family, instituted an action of summary proceedings to recover possession of real property against Informant Musa Kanneh before Justice of the Peace B. S. Tamba; that a judgment was rendered against Informant Kanneh who, being dissatisfied with said judgment, excepted to the same and announced an appeal to the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County, which appeal was granted; and that Justice of the Peace B. S. Tamba pro-ceeded to evict Informant Kanneh from the subject property notwithstanding the pendency of the hearing of his appeal before the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County.
The statutory law of this country provides, amongst other things, that “if an appeal is taken from a judgment of a court not of record in favor of the plaintiff in a proceeding under this sub-chapter, the issuance and execution of a writ of possession shall be stayed pending the rendition of final judgment…” For reliance, see Civil Procedure Law, Rev, Code 1:62.24. It is the considered of opinion of this Honourable Court that under Liberian jurisprudence, the justice of the peace court is classified and categorized as a court not of record. Therefore, where an appeal is taken from a judgment of the said court not of record, in favor of the plaintiff, the issuance and execution of a writ of possession shall be stayed, the said appeal serving as a supersedeas pending the rendition of a final judgment. Accordingly, it is the holding of this Court that the eviction of the informant from the subject pro-perty by Justice of the Peace B. S. Tamba while the hearing of the informant’s appeal was still pending before the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, constituted a reversible error.
With respect to the second issue, which is whether or not the trial judge committed a reversible error when he dismissed Co-respondent DeShield’s appeal because of the co-respon-dent’s failure to file a bill of exceptions within the statutory time of ten (10) days, we observe from the certified records that the informant filed a bill of information before the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court alleging that he was evicted from the premises despite the pendency of his appeal taken from the said court. The information was resisted, heard, and granted by the court on September 27, 1994, then presided over by His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., at its September, A. D. 1994 Term.

The records further showed that Co-respondent DeShield excepted to the trial judge’s ruling and announced an appeal therefrom to this Court, which was duly granted. However, he failed to file a bill of exceptions within (10) ten days, as required by law. The trial judge, on November 22, 1994, and upon a motion duly filed, dismissed the appeal because of the failure of the co-respondent to file the statutorily required bill of exceptions within (10) ten days. The trial court further ordered the justice of the peace court to resume jurisdiction over the case and place the informant in possession of the property. Could we assign error to the trial court judge’s actions in granting the informant’s motion and in dismissing the co-respondent’s appeal because of his failure to file a bill of exceptions within the time prescribed by statute? We think not. The law on appeal is mandatory, both by dictates of the statute and the opinions of this Honourable Supreme Court. The statute states that a failure to comply with any one of the requirements is ground for dismissal of such appeal. For reliance see Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.4 The statute specifically provides, as follows:

“The following acts shall be necessary for completion of an appeal: (Emphasis supplied).”

(a) Announcement of taking of the appeal;

(b) Filing of the bill of exceptions

(c) Filing of an appeal bond; and,

(d) Service and filing of notice of completion of the appeal.

Failure to comply with any of these requirements with-in the time allow by statue shall be ground for dismissed of the appeal” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.4.
The Civil Procedure Law also provides that “the appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within (10) ten days after rendition of the judgment”. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.7, I LCLR 250. And further, that “an appeal may be dismissed by the trial court on motion for failure of the appellant to file a bill of exceptions within the time allowed by statute…” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:5 1.16.

From the certified records before us, we observed that the final judgment in this case was rendered and an appeal an-nounced therefrom on September 27, 1994. Under the appeal statute, Co-respondent DeShield should have filed his bill of exceptions on October 7, 1994, which was (10) ten days after rendition of the judgment. However, this was not done. More than that, the co-respondent could have filed a motion for enlargement of time with justification; but on the contrary, he did nothing. See Civil Procedure Law, 1.7(2). Rather, the co-respondents resisted the motion by raising issues not res-ponsive to the motion’s central theme, that the co-respondent had failed to file his bill of exceptions to the final judgment within the time allowed by law. The issue raised in the motion being one of law, the court obviously passed on it, granted it, and dismissed the appeal, The granting of the informant’s motion is part of the subject of this information proceeding.
As stated supra, the statutory law in our jurisdiction on appeal is mandatory and should be strictly adhered to, and that a failure to do so renders the appeal dismissible. For reliance, see Bility v. Sirleaf, [1976] LRSC 68; 25 LLR 319 (1976); Delaney v. Republic, [1935] LRSC 3; 4 LLR 251(1935); and Saudi v. Gebara, [1964] LRSC 18; 15 LLR 598 (1960). However, we note that when the respondents sought the aid of prohibition, which was denied, Mr. Justice Smith’s mandate was sent directly to Justice of the Peace B. S. Tamba, instead of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, for execution, as the law of this land directs. In doing so, the Chambers Justice committed a reversible error.
Traversing the third and last issue, which is whether or not a trial court judge or a subordinate court judge may suspend a mandate or order of the Supreme Court or that of its Justice Presiding in Chambers, we observe from the certified records that Abraham Saysay, a lessee of the DeShield Family, filed a bill of information on February 23, 1995, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, during its December Term, A. D. 1994, presided over by His Honour C. Alexander B. Zoe, assigned judge. In the bill of information, Mr. Saysay requested the trial court to temporarily suspend the service of the writ of possession until Informant Kanneh shall have produced his title deed or squatter’s right from the government for the land claimed by him instead of the zinc shack.
On February 24, 1995, the assistant clerk of court, upon the orders of Judge Zoe, issued a writ of summons commanding Justice of the Peace B. S. Tamba to suspend the writ of pos-session until hearing of the information filed by Mr. Saysay on Saturday, February 25, 1995, at the hour of 10 o’clock a. m. The justice of the peace acknowledged receipt of the writ of summons on February 25, 1995, at the hour 12:25 p. m.

On December 23, 1998, Co-respondent Musa Kanneh filed a seven-count bill of information contending that the enforce-ment of the Chambers Justice’s mandate had been suspended by Judge Zoe, upon a bill of information filed by Abraham Saysay, by and through the Law Offices of White and Asso-ciates. As such, the mandate to repossess Musa Kanneh of the subject property was still not enforced and Musa Kanneh was therefore still dispossessed of the premises. Informant Kanneh, therefore, prayed this Court to grant the information and order that Mr. Justice Smith’s mandate be enforced.
On May 4, 1999, the respondents filed a seven-count returns to the information. This Court considers count 7 of the returns relevant for the determination of this case. The respon-dents contended in count 7 of the returns that the informant should have brought his information to the immediate attention of the Supreme Court if he felt that Judge Zoe had suspended the Supreme Court’s mandate, and not to wait until Mr. Justice Smith’s had died and/or Judge Zoe had been relieved of his judgeship. The respondents therefore prayed this Court to deny the bill of information and dismiss the information proceedings.
A careful recourse to the certified records in this case evidently shows that the then circuit court judge, His Honour C. Alexander Zoe, did, on February 24, 1995, issue a precept temporarily suspending the mandate emanating from the Chambers Justice of this Honourable Court. Thus, the said mandate is still unenforced and Informant Kanneh is yet to be repossessed of the subject property. From all legal intents and purposes, there is a clear defiance of this Honourable Court’s authority and dignity by the respondents, which is highly contemptuous. This Court has held that “an inferior court’s disregard of the Supreme Court’s mandate is contumacious.” For reliance, see The National Industrial Forest Corporation v. Baysah, [1976] LRSC 30; 25 LLR 74 (1976).
Further to the above, this Court, in the case Raymond International (Liberia) Ltd. v. Dennis, [1976] LRSC 35; 25 LLR 131, Syl. 6, (1976), held that: “If a judge or any judicial officer attempts to execute the mandate of the Supreme Court in an improper manner, the correct remedy is by bill of information”.

The informant, Musa Kanneh, therefore has every right under the laws of this land to bring to this Court’s attention the fact that its mandate has been disregarded as long as said mandate is unenforced. The fact that Mr. Justice Smith has died and Judge Zoe has been relieved of his judgeship do not preclude the informant from informing this Honourable Court of the disobedience and obstruction of its mandate as in the instant case. Hence, this Honourable Court shall entertain this information in preserving its authority and dignity, despite the relieving of His Honour Judge Zoe from his judgeship and the death of Mr. Justice Smith.
The Supreme Court strenuously frowns on the behavior of a circuit court judge in impeding and obstructing the execution of this Court’s mandate. Henceforth, we shall not hesitate to discipline any practicing lawyer or judge of a subordinate court who disobeys or frustrates the enforcement of the mandate of this Court or its Justice presiding in Chambers.
From the certified records in this case and also during oral arguments made by counsels for both parties, they agreed and identified the below listed facts as follows to wit:

(1) That this case does not involve the issue of title as in an action of ejectment; and,

(2) That the appellee was only a tenant of the DeShield family who occupied a zinc shack, and that on several occasions he had defaulted in his rental payments. Consequently, the respondents had instituted an action of summary proceeding to recover possession of real property against him in 1982.
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing facts, circum-stances and laws controlling, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the information should be and the same is hereby granted, and the peremptory writ ordered issued. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the trial court to resume jurisdiction over this matter, with instructions that the said court conducts a de novo trial of the case on its merits. Costs are to abide final determination. And it is hereby so ordered.

Information granted.