BALLAH KAMARA, Appellant, v. VARLEE KAMARA, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GRAND GEDEH COUNTY. Argued April 2, 1970. Decided June 11, 1970. 1. The writ of summons commencing the action must contain the place of residence of the person summoned and be served at least 15 days before the term of court the action was brought in commences. After judgment for the petitioner in an action for cancellation of a deed, the respondent appealed and contended that, aside from the merits of the case, the trial court should not have entertained jurisdiction over the matter because of defects in the summons, which omitted the residence of the respondent and which was served less than 1 5 days before the commencement of the term of court in which venue had been laid. The judgment was reversed on these grounds. A. Gargar Richardson for appellant. No appearance for appellee. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WILSON delivered the opinion of the Court. During the August Term, 1965, of the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court, Varlee Kamara, the appellee in these proceedings, filed as petitioner a bill in equity for the cancellation of a deed alleging fraud. Respondent in his answer contended that : (a) The writ of summons by which petitioner-appellee brought respondent-appellant before the trial court, was defective and rendered the action dismissible in its entirety, for the said writ was not served upon the respon114 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 115 dent Is days before the opening day of the term of the court in which the case had been venued. (b) That the written directions were defective in that they did not state the place of residence of the respondent as is required by law. The documents referred to by the answer show that the writ of summons required the respondent to appear in the August Term, 1965, and was dated August 9, 1965. From all calculations, it is not possible that August 9, 1965, could be is days before the znd Monday in August, the day on which the Circuit Court from which these proceedings emanate was required to convene. This Court has held that where statutory regulations governing service of summons are not substantially complied with, the court has no jurisdiction over the person improperly served and, in furtherance thereof, a defendant who has not been summoned at least 15 days prior to the first day of the term of court to which the writ of summons is made returnable, has not been legally summoned and is not required to answer the complaint. Hangah v. Melton, [1954] LRSC 25; 12 LLR 128 (1954). Because, as aforesaid, it is patently clear that the respondent was required by writ of summons to appear and answer less than 15 days before the opening day of the term of court in which the case had been venued, hence, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of the respondent and should not have entertained the action. Count one of the answer is, therefore, sustained. Count two prays the dismissal of the action on the ground that the written directions did not state the address of the respondent. An inspection of the documents indicates this is so. The Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code, 6 :167 (c), requires the name of the defendent to be stated and the place of residence as well. Because of the conclusive nature of the foregoing, the merits of the appeal become irrelevant to the decision