AMELIA JOHNSON, Appellant, v. SARAH CARR and ANDREW CARR, Administratrix and Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late SARAH CARR-TUBMAN, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE MONTHLY AND PROBATE COURT FOR
MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: March 19, 2001. Decided: July 5, 2001.
1. Letters of administration must be granted to persons who are distributees of an intestate estate and who are eligible and qualified in the following order: (a) a surviving spouse; (b) the children; (c) the grandchildren; (d) the father or mother; (e) the brother or sister; (f) any other person who are distributees, preference, however, being given to the person entitled to the largest share in the estate.
2. Any person who has an interest in an estate may present a petition for the revocation or modification of letters of administration, and the fiduciary may be cited to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
3. Persons who are listed in the line of preference for letters of administration have standing to challenge the issuance of letters of administration to any persons over whom the challengers may have preference.
4. Probate courts should exercise extreme care and diligence to follow prescribed procedures in supervising the administration of estates.
The appellant appealed from a decision of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County revoking her letters of administration to administer the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman. The suspension grew out of a petition filed by the appellees for revocation of the appellant’s letters of administration. In their petition, the appellees claimed that the appellant had committed fraud in persuading the probate court to grant her letters of administration, in that she had represented that she was a close relation of the decedent. The appellees also alleged that the appellant had failed to inform them, the true relatives of the decedent, of the filing of a petition for letters of administration of the decedent estate.
Following its review of the contentions raised by the parties, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court, holding: (a) that the appellees, being the brother, sister, and nephew of the decedent, had, by statute, interest in the estate and preference over the appellant in the granting of letters of administration. As such, they had standing to challenge the letters of administration issued in favour of the appellant; (b) that in the order specified by the statute, the appellant, who was only allegedly a cousin of the decedent, was not legally qualified to be appointed administratrix of the estate; (c) that the trial court had found the testimony of the appellant’s witnesses not to be sufficiently corroborative of her allegation that she was a cousin of the decedent; (d) that the appellant had perpetrated fraud, in that she had misrepresented herself to be the next of kin of the decedent when in fact she was not legally qualified to be appointed administratrix of the decedent’s estate, since the decedent had died leaving a brother, sister, and nephew, all of whom, by statute, had preference over the appellant who was only a cousin; (e) that the appellant had further committed fraud in her concealment or silence when she was approached by the appellees as to the whereabouts of certain documents relating to the property of the estate; and (f) that the appellant had concealed her appointment from the appellees who found out that fact only after they also had been granted letters of administration. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the probate court ruled properly in revoking the letters of administration of the appellant. The Court however modified the trial judge’s ruling by rejecting the court’s appointment of the appellees as administrators and administratrix of the decedent estate since the appellees had already been appointed in a previous ruling on their petition for letters of administration.
Joseph H. Constance of the Law Offices of Greene and Associates, Inc. appeared for the appellant. Cooper W. Kruah of the Henries Law Firm appeared for the appellees.
MR. JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is on appeal from a judgment of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County revoking the letters of administration issued to the appellant, Amelia Johnson, growing out of an action filed by Sarah Carr and Andrew Carr. The method and motive of how and why Appellant Amelia Johnson entered upon the property in question are a subject of dispute and debate between the parties. Also, the relationships between the respective parties, on the one hand, and the deceased property owner, on the other hand, are also a subject of debate and dispute between them, to the extent that the appellees claim they are the sister and uncle of the deceased and that the appellant is just a stranger and tenant of the deceased, and hence, not entitled to inherit from her. On the other hand, the appellant claims to be a second cousin of the deceased by virtue of her grandmother, one Sayble, being the aunt of the deceased, and that the appellees are in-laws and a ward of the deceased, in that Co-Appellee Sarah Carr was only a girlfriend to the deceased’s uncle named Weyan Carr, that she had only assumed the Carr name for purposes of inheritance in this case, and that her real name was Kpana, while Co-appellee Andrew Carr was just a boy merely reared by the deceased; and hence, that both of them did not bear any blood relation to the deceased.
The pertinent facts which are not disputed by the parties are that prior to her marriage to James Hilton Tubman, Madam Sarah Carr (Tubman) acquired the subject property of this suit, situated and lying in the Township of Gardnersville Iron Factory, Monrovia, in her own name. Thereafter, she and her husband resided therein. At some point in time, the appellant, Amelia Johnson, also took up residence in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Tubman, and lived there with them until the wife (the property owner) traveled to the United States, leaving her husband and the appellant in the house. Then the husband died in 1997, leaving only appellant, along with renters, in the house, from whom she collected rents. Mrs. Tubman authorized Mr. James Doe Gibson Jr. to supervise the arrangement for the burial of her husband, since she herself could not come to Liberia. This was done as she had instructed. Later, on July 3, 1998, the wife died and was buried in the United States. Mrs. Sarah Carr-Tubman bore no natural issues of her own body. Appellant Amelia Johnson thereafter, on November 12, 1998, filed a petition for letters of administration, dated October 15, 1998, and was granted the said letters of administration by the Monthly arid Probate Court for Montserrado County on January 22, 1999, vesting in her the legal power to administer the Intestate Estate of the late Mrs. Sarah Carr-Tubman.
On August 20, 1999, the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County also granted the appellees’ petition for letters of administration, dated and filed the same August 20, 1999, and accordingly issued the appellees letters of administration to administer the same Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman. Thereafter, on September 9, 1999, the appellees (the second set of administrator and administra-trix) filed a four-count petition praying the probate court to revoke the letters of administration earlier issued to the appellant on January 22, 1999, contending that the appellant had misrepresented herself to be a blood relative of the deceased when in fact she was merely a tenant. They maintained that it was based on such fraudulent misrepresentation that the court had issued the said letters of administration to the appellant.
The appellant filed returns on September 20, 1999, containing seven counts. In her returns, the appellant also challenged the petitioners, now appellees, as bearing no blood relation to the deceased, stating that they were only an in-law and a ward of the decedent and that she, the appellant, being a next of kin, was qualified and best suited to administer the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman. The appellant also denied that she had clandestinely obtained her letters of administration from the probate court without the knowledge of the rest of the family.
The law issues were disposed of on October 25, 1999, and thereafter the court conducted a trial which commenced on November 15, 1999 and ended on June 5, 2000 with the grant-ing the appellees’ petition for revocation, thereby revoking the appellant’s letters of administration and appointing the appellees as administrators (to include Saturday Carr, brother of the deceased) and administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman. The appellant, respondent in the lower court, excepted to and appealed from that ruling of the probate court. All of the jurisdictional steps for perfecting her appeal having been completed, the appellant’s appeal is properly before this Court for review.
The general question this Court is now called upon to decide is whether or not the probate court was justified in revoking the appellant’s letters of administration? To answer this question, we must first decide whether or not the appellees had standing to sue out their petition for revocation. Also to be decided is whether or not the appellant was legally qualified to have been appointed administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman?
As noted above, this appeal is from the ruling of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County granting the petition for revocation filed by the appellees, as administrator and administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman. The appellees had sought the removal of the appellant who had, prior to their own appointment, also been appointed as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman. The issue to be decided, therefore, is whether or not the appellant proved that she was legally qualified to be appointed administratrix and whether she perpetrated fraud against the rest of the family members in securing the said letters of administration?
In the appellant’s petition for letters of administration, dated October 15, 1998 and filed November 12, 1998, and which was granted January 22, 1999, she represented herself to be a close relative of the deceased. Also, in her returns to the petition for revocation, she again reasserted her relationship to the deceased based on the fact that her grandmother, Sayble Carr, was an aunt of the Late Sarah Carr-Tubman who had died leaving no children, and that therefore she was qualified as next of kin to be an administratrix of the decedent’s estate.
Further, in her returns abovementioned, the appellant alleged that the appellees bore no blood relation to the deceased, in that, firstly, Co-appellee Andrew Carr was merely a boy reared by the deceased. This fact was partly conceded by Co-appellee Andrew Carr when he stated that he was the nephew of the deceased and that he was reared by her. Secondly, as to Co-appellee Sarah Carr, the appellant said that she was merely a girlfriend of the deceased’s uncle, named Weyan Carr, and that her real name was Kpana, but that she had taken on the Carr name simply for purposes of inheritance in this case.
Also, during the trial from which this appeal emanated, the trial court found that the appellant testified to the allegations stated above but did not bring any witness, family members or otherwise, to confirm and corroborate her claim to be a cousin of the deceased. In fact, on cross-examination, she was asked as to the basis for her claim; that is, whether her claim to being legally qualified to serve as administratrix was based on her blood relationship to the deceased or based on the authority she claimed to have been given by the deceased in a telephone call from the United States upon the death of Mr. Hilton Tubman, the deceased’s husband, to the effect that she, the appellant, should take control and manage the deceased’s property. Her witness, James Doe Gibson, Jr., whom both parties recognized and referred to, testified and confirmed that in a telephone conversation the deceased had asked him to manage her house along with the appellant, Amelia Johnson. He also testified that when the decedent husband died, she (the deceased) called him (Gibson) from the United States and sent US$650.00 to him, with instructions that he, along with Amelia Johnson, should bury her husband. He also testified that during all this time he never saw the appellees, and that the man was buried without their participation.
The court found, however, that the answer was not adequately responsive to these questions and that the appellant’s witnesses did not corroborate each other. As a result the court held that the appellant had obtained her letters of administration through false suggestion of a material fact, and therefore, relying on chapter 107, section 107.10(d) of the Decedents Estates Law, under the caption Suspension, Modifi-cation, or Revocation, the court revoked the appellant’s letters of administration.
On the other hand, also during the trial, the appellees testified and brought witnesses to show that the deceased did not have a child and that her husband predeceased her, leaving as heirs her brother, Saturday Carr, her sister, Sarah Carr, and her Nephew, Andrew Carr, whom she had reared from one year old. The court noted that “letters of administration must be granted to the persons who are distributees of an intestate estate and who are eligible and qualified in the following order; (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the children; (c) the grandchildren; (d) the father or mother; (e) the brother or sister; (f) any other persons who are distributees, preference however being given to the person entitled to the largest share in the estate.” Decedents Estates Law, Rev. Code 8:111.1. Accordingly, the court, being satisfied with the evidence produced by the appellees, held that the appellees were indeed the brother, sister, and nephew of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman, and that as such, they were legally qualified to administer her Intestate Estate. In its ruling, the court took the further action in revoking the appellant’s letters of administration and at the same time appointed the appellees as administrators and administratrix.
This brings us to the question earlier posed, which is whether or not the appellees had standing to sue out their petition for the revocation of the letters of administration issued to the appellant? The law provides that any person who has an interest may present a petition for the revocation or modification of letters of administration and the fiduciary may be cited to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Section 107.10(d), supra. The lower court, having reviewed the evidence presented by the appellees and determined that their petition was justifiable, granted the said petition, and thereby determined that they had standing by virtue of their being the brother, sister, and nephew of the deceased. We wish to observe that even if it were true that the appellant, Amelia Johnson, was found to be a cousin of the deceased, she still would not have enjoyed preference over the brother, sister, and/or uncle of the decedent. See Decedents Estates Law, Rev. Code 8:11l.1,supra.
We have thus determined that the appellees had legal standing to sue, and that the appellant was not legally qualified to be appointed administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman because the appellees had preference as per the order of priority in the Decedents Estates Law, supra, and also because she did perpetrate fraud in obtaining the said appointment. Moreover, the trial court found that she had misrepresented herself to be a next of kin to the decedent, and that in so doing, she had committed fraud. We find that the fraud perpetrated was in her concealment or silence when she was approached by the appellees as to the whereabouts of the property document of the deceased. The appellees did not know of the appellant’s appointment until they (the appellees) had filed their petition for letters of administration, which was granted. We hold that the appellant ought to have been more forthright with the appellees.
In Woodson v. Heuston and Solomon, [1954] LRSC 26; 12 LLR 133 (1954), text at 134, we held that “probate courts should exercise extreme care and diligence to follow prescribed procedures in supervising the administration of estates.” This Court has also held that “an administrator of an estate may only be removed for cause after he has been confronted with the evidence establishing his misconduct in office.” [1971] LRSC 41; 20 LLR 339 (1971), text at 341; Dennis v. Weeks, 11 LLR317 (1952), text at 319.
We find also that the judge exercised all due diligence and did what he was supposed to have done by conducting a full, regular, and open trial in which all of the parties had the opportunity to defend their respective positions, and that after hearing the evidence, he determined that fraud and misrepresentation had been committed by the appellant, for which he properly corrected himself by revoking her letters of administration.
At this point, this Court is of the opinion that the proper thing to do is for the probate court to remain seized of the subject matter and expeditiously dispose of the same by having the Estate closed.
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this Court that in the actual conduct of the trial, the judge did not commit any error for which his judgment or ruling should be reversed. But we find that the trial court committed an error by inadvertence when it issued a second letters of administration on August 20, 1999 when disposing of the appellees’ petition to revoke the first letters issued on January 22, 1999 to the appellant without the know-ledge of the appellees. This was especially an error since the probate court had previously issued letters of administration to the appellees. We, however, reemphasize that since the falsehood and misrepresentation by the appellant had been alleged by the appellees and given that the appellees were not notified of the appellant’s application for appointment as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Sarah Carr-Tubman, the court could not ignore same, for which the trial judge properly corrected himself by conducting a hearing, after which he revoked his earlier orders of January 22, 1999. See Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:41.6. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for the estate to be closed.
Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County commanding the judge therein presiding to resume jurisdiction over the case and have the estate closed in keeping with law, giving this case preference on its trial docket. Costs are disallowed. And it is hereby so ordered.
Judgment affirmed.