Jeda Tor Estate v Monrovia Breweries, Inc. (2026)
Jeda Tor Estate, by and thru its heirs, Oldman Gbekar Davis, Ma. Pandora Brown, Mme. Jartu Massaquoi, Mme. Marcia Swen, Oldman D. Tweh, and their appointed Administrators, Daniel K.Tor and Natt Wayne, all of Monrovia, Liberia Appellant Versus Monrovia Breweries, Inc. , represented by its Acting Managing Director, Christopher Jud & all persons acting under his authority, also of Monrovia, Liberia Appellee
APPEAL
PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF LEASE AGREEMENT
HEARD: April 2, 2026 DECIDED: May 21, 2026
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GBEISAY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COU
This case is on appeal from the Final Judgment of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Civil Law Court
Annex for Montserrado County sitting in its June Term 2026 presided over by His Ho Sheaplor R. Dunbar. The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of the Respondent, Monro
Breweries, Inc. (MBI) denying and dismissing the Petition for Cancellation of Le Agreement filed by the Petitioner, the Jeda Tor Estate.
The Petitioner, being dissatisfied with this Final Judgment, perfected its appeal to
Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia within statutory time and the case was docketed
accordingly heard. Both parties filed their respective Legal Briefs raising varies issues a d presented oral argument to the Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia en banc.
Before going further, we deem it necessary to recite the salient facts in order to properly le d support to our conclusion.
The facts as certified from the records show that the appellant by and thru its heirs a d administrators. filed a petition for the cancellation of a 2006 Addendum to a lease agreem t allegedly executed by petitioner and the appellee. The appellant fifed a petition for t e cancellation of lease alleging that it is the owner of a parcel of land on which the appellee h s it factory and offices and that the lease agreement was entered into on May 23, 2002, fo a period of twenty (20) years to end on May 22, 2022; that the lease agreement between t e parties expired on May 22, 2022 but the appellee has since failed to evacuate the land a d when approached by the appellant to leave the property, the appellee refused on groun s that the lease agreement was renewed or extendecl for a further period of twenty-one ( ) years, that is from 2022-2043, by Oldman Gbekar Davis and Mrs. Elizabeth Jappah Tor n behalf of the appellant; that this is untrue as Oldman Gbekar Davis denied ever renewing r extending the said lease agreement as that what appears to be his signature on the purport d lease agreement is a misrepresentation of the truth: as he did not sign any extended lea e agreement or amendment to any lease agreement; moreover, Mrs. Elizabeth Jappah passed away on September 21, 2006, and prior to her passing, she was very ill and b ridden and therefore, she could not have signed the purported new or extended lea e agreement; that to his (Oldman Gbekar Davis) greatest amazement, he later realized that t e estate’s lawyer at the time, Cllr. Snonsio Nigba, who was recommended to him by C Ir. Augustine Chea, was a friend of Cllr. Augustine C:hea; that his signature was fictitiou ly inserted in a purported lease agreement that runs up •.•0 2043; that he (Oldman Gbekar Davi ), signed receipts to collect annual rent under the guidance of his then lawyer, Cllr. Snon io Nigba, who was recommended to him by Cllr. Augustine Chea, the then general counsel f the appellee; that Cllr. Chea did not disclose to him that Cllr. Nigba was a former employ e of Sherman & Sherman Inc., who is the legal representative of the appellee and that whate r signature on the purported extended lease agreement was not his signature and neither t e signature of Mrs. Elizabeth Jappa Tor and the said extension is fraudulent and must e stricken.
The appellee filed its response basically denying the appellant’s allegation that the addend to the lease was a product of fraud as the addendum to the lease was negotiated by t e parties and executed on July 28, 2006, extending the lease period for an additional twen one years, that is from May 22, 2022 to May 21, 2043, and this addendum was execut d validly by Mr. Weah Gbekar Davis and Mrs. Elizabeth Jappah Tor on July 28, 2006 a d witnessed by the legal counsel of the estate; moreover, the appellant is estopped legally fr m questioning the validity of the 2006 addendum as the appellant has received benefits un r the very addendum to the agreement it is seeking to cancel.
The appellant filed its reply basically reiterating the same counts in its petition. Thereaft r, pleadings rested and the disposition of law issues was held and the matter was ruled to t al on its merits.
During the trial, appellant produced three general witnesses and two rebuttal witnesses, w le the appellee produced four general witnesses. After the production of oral and document ry evidence by both parties, the court rendered a final ruling on September 5, 2025, in favor of the appellee, thereby denying the petition for cancellation as filed by the appellant. T e appellant excepted to this ruling and announced an appeal to this Court. Thereafter, t e appellant tendered a Bill of Exceptions consisting of eighteen (18) counts and thereaf r presented in its Legal Brief three issues for our determination.
The first question submitted by the Appellant to be decided by this Court is whether or not t e Appellant proyed its case by a preponderance of the evidence to warrant the entry of judgment in favor of the Appellant?
Whether or not Cancellation will lie where the validity of the lease agreement relied on byt e Respondent has been successfully challenged by the appellant and where the validity ofs id lease rest on the alleged signatures of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Toh and Oldman Gbe r Davies who has denied ever signing the purported extension or renewal of said Lea Agreement on, behalf of the deda Tor Estate?
Whether or not the trial judge committed reversible error when he ruled denying cancellati n of the addendum to the lease agreement of July 28, 2006?
We have determined that the first issue will be answered as we discuss the second and thi d issues. Further, we shall address the second issue before reaching the third and final iss In order to answer the two questions presented to us by the appellant we shall take recour e to the evidence adduced at the trial.
First of all, the appellant has asked us to determine whether or not cancellation will lie whe e the validity of the lease agreement relied on by the appellee has been successfully challeng d by the Petitioner and where the validity of said lease rest on the alleged signatures of Mad m Elizabeth Jappah Toh and Oldman Gbekar Davies who has denied ever signing the purpo d extension or renewal of said Lease Agreement on behalf of the Jeda Tor Estate?
The subject matter of the case concerns itself with the validity of a certain Lease Agreem nt alleged to have been signed and entered into on July 28th, 2006, to take effect on May 2, 2022, and due to expire on May 22, 2043.
The crux of the dispute between the parties is that the appellant is contending that the subj ct Lease Agreement is not valid and is fraudulent because it was not signed by the pers s whose names appear as Administrators for the appellant. On the other hand, the appelle is contending that the subject Lease Agreement is valid because the two Administrators wh names appear as signatories actually signed the said Agreement.
It is noteworthy that at the time this subject agreement is alleged to have been signed on J ly 28, 2006, the’ parties had earlier signed and entered into a new Lease Agreement da d September 18, 2000, as a replacement or extension of a previous Lease Agreement da d June 7, 1980, which was due to expire in 2001. In other words, when the Lease Agreem now subject of this case, was said to have been executed on July 28, 2006, there was a v id Lease Agreement already in existence dated September 18, 2000, which took effect May 2001, extending into May 22,2022.
The decision ih this case is to determine whether or not Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor a Mr. Weah Gbekar Davies actually signed the disputed Lease Agreement of July 28, 2006 If our determination finds that these two Administrators did sign the said agreement, th n cancellation will not lie; if, on the other hand, it is our determination that the said administrators did not sign the alleged Agreement, then cancellation witl lie.
On the part of the appellant, its witnesses testified that Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor to sick in June of 2006 and died in September 2006 and during that period she too sick a d helpless and even bed-ridden that it was not possible for her to even sit up for her to ha e been able to sign the subject Lease Agreement. The star witness on this issue was Mad m
Ernestine Fahhbulleh, who identified herself as a grand-daughter of Madam Elizabeth Japp h Tor. This witness testified that she had to stop going to school in order to take care of r grandmother; she stated that her grandmother was bed-ridden and helpless during the peri d of her illness, June to September 2006 and her grandmother could not have signed and, in fact, did not sign the purported Lease Agreement in July 2006.
In contrast, the appellee produced two witnesses, in persons of Cllr. Augustine Chie and C Ir. Snonsio E. Nigba, both of whom testified that Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor was never s k during that period and did indeed sign the said Lease. Agreement personally in their presen e.
The appellant produced two rebuttal witnesses in persons Ms. Ernestine Fahnbulleh and r. Waka Davis, both of whom reaffirmed that Madam Elizabeth Jappah Toh was actually s k and did not sign the subject Lease Agreement. The Court takes note of the testimony of witness Waka Davis who further testified that a close look at the signatures attributed to Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor on the two Lease Agreement, the first dated September 8, 2000 and the second July 28,2006,it will be observed that the two thumb prints said to e those of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor are markedly different, in that, one thumb print is sh rt, thick and round why the other thumb print is long and slender. This witness said that person cannot have two different thumb prints on the same finger.
As to Administrator Weah Gbekar Davies, he appeared in court in person and testified on is own behalf for the appellant. He told the Court that he did not at any time or at any place si n the subject Lease Agreement. This witness testified that what he remembered is that on occasion when he went to the appellee’s office to sign for and receive the lease rental un er the Lease Agreement of September 18, 2000 which took effect on May 22, 2001 ending n May 22, 2022, a person he called a WHITE MAN asked hiri to help him, the WHITE MAN extending the Lease Agreement for another period and he told the WHITE MAN he need d to consult with other family members to get their consent and that he would come back to WHITE MAN but he never did.
This witness also testified, ‘in support of his denial that he had signed the subject Le Agreement of July 28, 2006, that the hand writing on the subject Lease Agreement is not is handwriting because he usually starts writing his name using manuscript with the first le of his name and the other letters in his name are written in cursive.
On the other hand, the appellee produced the same two witnesses, in persons of
Augustine Chie and Clir. Snonsio E. Nigba, again who testified that in their presence r. Weah Gbekar Davies signed the Lease Agreement in the office of the Respondent’s Gene al Manager.
Again, the appellant brought Mr. Weah Gbekar Davies back to the stand as a rebuttal witne s.
On rebuttal, witness Weah Gbekar Davies denied ever signing the subject Lease Agreem and repeated his method or manner of writing his name, which is completely different fr the handwriting on the subject Lease Agreement.
On the issue of the signatures appearing on the subject Lease Agreement to be those f Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor and Mr. Weah Gbekar Davies, the Court says it is inclined o agree with the appellant that the signatures appearing on the subject Lease Agreement e not those of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor and Mr. Weah Gbekar Davies. The Court observ s that Ms. Ernestine Fahnbulleh testified from personel experience and told the court that if Grandmother were to have signed the said Lease Agreement at the time appellee claims t at the said Agreement was signed, then she, Ms. Ernestine Fahnbulleh would have known ab ut it and would have been present to see it take place bæause at all material times she always with her grandmother. This testimony, both on the direct examination and on rebu l, was corroborated by witness Waka Davies and was not overcome by the evidence of t e appellee.
Still on the signature of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor, the Court takes note of the testim y of witness Waka Davies in which he describes the thumb prints alleged to be those of Mad m Elizabeth Jappah Toh on two different Lease Agreements, both of which signatures/thu b prints are completely different from each other. The Court observes that the appellee did ot comment on and seek to refute or rebut or disprove the description of the two signatu s being different from one another. Our Law provides that failure to deny is an admission a d that such admission will operate against the party so admitting. Civil Procedure Law Chap er Rev. Code 1:9.8.
Also, the testimony of witness Weah Gbekar Davies on his own behalf, again on the dir ct examination and also on rebuttal, was not overcome by evidence produced by the appell
The Court therefore is satisfied that the appellant sufficiently met its burden of proof denyi g that signatures appearing on the subject Lease Agreement were the genuine signatures of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor and Mr. Weah Gbekar Davies. The Court therefore •holds t at cancellation will lie in the instant case.
We now turn our attention to the next issue presented to the Court to be considered, whi h is, whether or not tne Trial Judge His Honor Scheaplor R. Dunbar committed reversible er or when he ruled denying Cancellation of the fraudulent Lease Agreement of July 28, 20 6, notwithstanding that appellant proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence a d thereby justifying why the said Lease Agreement should be cancelled, and in the ruling t e trial judge relied on facts not presented by the appellee?
The court, from this question observes two subjects, namely, (a.) that the petitioner h d
proven its case by sufficient evidence and (b.) that the judde in ruling relied on facts not rais d by the parties.
On the first part of the above question relating to the petitioner having proved its case, e have already ih the earlier portion in this Opinion found and held that the appellant did pro e its case by sufficient evidence in denial of the genuineness of the signatures attributed to t e appellant’s two administrators.
As to the second portion of the question relating to the judge basing his ruling on fact ot raised by the parties, the Court observes that the judge held that he could not cancel t e agreement because the appellant had received benefit under the lease agreement subjec of the cancellation proceedings.
We note that the payments referred to by the judge as benefits received by the appellant re said to be lease rentals due and payable under the $ubject Lease Agreement dated July 8, 2006. This Court also notes that the subject lease agreement should have taken effect n May 22, 2022, and would expire in the year 2043. We also note that during the pendenc of this future Agreement ending 2043, there is a present agreement already in force and runn g from May 22, 2001, due to end on May 22, 2022. It is to be noted also that the curr nt agreement of 2001 to 2022 being current for which lease rental are due and payable, e question is, why would payments be made under a future agreement while there is a pres nt Agreement currently in force? Further to this, another question is whether or not e respondent/appellee was paying rentals under both the current and the future le e agreement and if so, under what parity af reasoning’?
The evidence is not clear to establish that the appellee was paying both lease rentals at e same time under both the current and the future lease agreement. The evidence did not st te that the future .lease agreement of July 28, 2006, ending May 22, 2043, took immediate eff ct and served as a replacement of the current agreement of September 18, 2001 , ending 22) 2022. The evidence also does not establish that the two agreements, the current future agreements, ran side by side or cc-existed. The doubts resulting from th uncertainties must operate for the benefit of the appellant, especially considering that all th lease agreements were drafted by the appellee and presented to the appellant a d supposedly signed by the appellant.
It is the Law of Contracts that where doubts, uncertainties or ambiguities exist in, or re It from interpretation of written contracts, such doubts, uncertainties or ambiguities will e interpreted against the party that’drew up or drafted the contract and for the benefit of e other party tot whom it was presented for signature. In this instant case both the Le e Agreement of September 18, 2000, ending May 22, 202, and the future Lease Agreem nt dated July 28, 2006 ending May 22, 2043,were both drafted and drawn up by the appell e, and so if there is any doubt, uncertainty or ambiguity, the same must operate in favor of e appellant and against the appellee.
Still on the issue of payment of lease rental by the appellee to the appellant, it is obse d that the appellee produced one witness in person of Madam Helena Tweh, who as introduced as a grandchild of Jeda Tor and a niece to Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor and r. Daniel Tor, Sr. This witness was said to be an Administrator of the Estate under the subj ct Lease Agreement which was alleged to have been signed on July 28, 2006, while the curr nt agreement signed by the appellant on September 18, 2000, which ended on May 22, 2 2 was still valid and the Administrators who signed the current Agreement ending 2022 w re still alive and were still Administrators. The same two Administrators are alleged to have a so signed the future Lease Agreement ending 2043 still as Administrators.
According to appellant’s witnesses, the present Adrninistrators who filed this suit, in pers ns of Mr. Natt Waye and Mr. Daniel K. Tor Jr., became Administrators in 2019 when Mr. W ah Gbekar Davies retired or was replaced.
However, while on the direct examination, appellee’s witness Madam Helena Tweh testif d that upon the death of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor, Ms. Bendu Johnson was appoin d Administrator to replace Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor. This witness also testified that s e, Samie Toe and Denise Tor were appointed Administrators in 2017 and remained in of ce until 2020, and that during this period they received rents from the Respondent for the Est é.
We note that this witness, Helena Tweh did not state the period for which she received e rent and under which Lease Agreement, that is to say, whether the current Agreement end g 2022 or the future Agreement ending 2043. However, the Court notes that witness Hel
Tweh testified that she and other people became Administrators in 2017 and left offic in 2020, while appellants witness Mr. Natt Waye testified that he became Administrator in 20 9.
The appellee also failed to proffer any evidence to show that Helena was ever appointed s administrator of the estate in question at any time. Whichever way it goes, that is, whet r under the current Agreement ending 2022 or the future Agreement ending 2043, the eviden e does not establish that the appellee has paid or did pay..any rent to the Estate since Hele a Tweh left office as an Administrator allegedly in 2020 or since 2019 when Natt Waye beca e administrator.
In either or both scenarios, the appellee is still indebted to the appellant for the period M y 22, 2022, up to and including May 22 ,2026, a period of four (4) years since the curr nt agreement expired.
Having exhausted the discussion of the issues raised by the appellant in its appeal to t is Honorable Court, it is therefore the holding of this court that the appellant provided suffici nt evidence to support its claim that the Lease Agreement of July 28, 2006 ending May 22, 20 3 is illegal as the signatures allegedto be those of Madam Elizabeth Jappah Tor and Mr. W h Gbekar Davies was falsified thereby rendering tne said Lease Agreement subject to cancellation. This court also holds that the failure of the appellee to pay rent when due to e appellant constitutes a violation or a material breach of the said Lease Agreement. Furth r, considering that the current Lease of September 18, 2000, ending May 22, 2022, has en d and was not renewed, it means that the occupancy of appellant’s property by the appelle is illegal.
This Court further finds that even assuming that the July 28, 2006, lease agreement s lawfully executed, which is not the case, yet the appellee would be in violation of said le e agreement, having paid the said lease rentals to the wrong person or persons who were ot administratorst or authorized, which therefore con#titutes a violation of the Lease Agreem t.
For all the reasons stated herein, it is the holding of this court that cancellation will lie and t at the said Lease Agreement of July 28, 2006, ending, May 22, 2043, is hereby orde d cancelled, set aside, nullified and declared invalid and of no legal force and effect. appellee is hereby ordered to pay to the appellant the amount of Forty-Four Thousand Uni d States Dollars (US$44,000.00) which is the equivalent of four (4) years Lease rental at e rate of Eleven Thousand United States Dollars (US$11 ,000.00) per annum, calculated un er the current Lease Agreement of September 18, 2000, which expired on May 22, 2022.
Further to this, the appellant has argued that it is entitled general damages from the appel e for the wrongful withholding its land and employing tricks and deception to cheat it out of ts
lawful property and not pay for the usethereof, under the preterse of a purported adden um to the lease agreement without paying any rent under the alleged extended lease agree ent.
Generally, damages attached as pecuniary cornpensation or indemnity which ma be recovered in the courts by persons who have suffered loss, detriment or injury, whether t his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of ano er. General damages are those which are the natural and necessary result of the wrongful a t or omission asserted as the foundation of liability. Firestone Liberia, Inc. v. G. Garlimah K Ilie, Supreme Court Opinion, March Term 2012; Lonestar Cell Corp. v. Wright, Supreme urt Opinion, March Term 2014; Air Maroc, Inc., v. Cllr. Finley Y. Karnga, Supreme Court Opi ion, March Term 2022.
The act of depriving a person of his or her property by means of illegal occupancy nd wrongful withholding, entitles the affected party to recovery of general damages as a m tter of law; notwithstanding, it is a legal requirement that a plaintiff presents proof to warran the scale of the award of damages. The appellant has proven that its land was illegally occu ied during the said period by the appellee under an addendum to the lease agreement whic we have found to be fraudulent and that during •this period, the appellant was denied of usi g it property or benefitting from it thereof, and this caused the appellant inconveniences, ang ish and humiliation that is impracticable to measure in tangible terms, therefore general, puni ive and compensatory damages will lie.
Based upon our findings herein, it is our considered opinion that the appellee is liable to ay the appellant general, punitive and compensatory damages in the amount of Five Hun ed Thousand United States Dollars (US$500,000.00, for the wrongful withholding of appella t’s property for years.
It is that the original lease ending May 22, 2022, has already expired and that the future le se ending 2043 has herein been declared invalid and ordered cancelled and nullified. This c urt cites for reliance the case: Boima Laney et al, purported surviving heirs and descendant of the late Chief Murphy, v. Alhaji Vamuvah Corneh, et al, 36 LLR 255, 257 (1989).
Applying this holding in the cited case to the facts in this instant case, this court says t at since the Lease Agreement of July 28, 2006, ending 2043 has been cancelled and nullifi d and also since the erstwhile valid Lease Agreement of September 18, 2000, ending May 2, 2022, has already expired, this leaves the appellee without any legal basis for remaining n the appellant’s property and that the appellant, being the Title Holder of the subject prop
and its deed remaining the only valid title instrument of the subject property, the appellant the right to determine the present and future occupancy of its property, as there cannot b a vacuum created in the right of possession and occupancy of the appellant’s property.
In the cited case, fre Supreme Court held that possession and occupancy cannot be hel in a vacuum, therefore, where a deed had been cancelled, the existing deed is the d controlling.
The court says this is a petition for cancellation of a lease agreement and not an actio of ejectment andt the court says vhere cancellation of lease is ordered, the judgment will applicable only to the land covered by the lease thus cancelled and will not extend to prop (ies) not covered by the said lease agreement.
Accordingly, it is the holding of this court that this judgment will not touch the merits of claim of the appellant in respect of appellant’s extra land, but the court hereby declares t at the appellant has adequate remedy at law to pursue its rights regarding its extra I d wrongfully occupied by the appellee and not covered by the lease agreement.
WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the ruling of the trial court is her by reversed, the lease agreement subject of the dispute is hereby cancelled, nullified and m e null and void to all legal intents and purposes. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordere to send a Mandate to the court below commanding the judge presiding therein to resu e Jurisdiction and give effect to this Judgment. Costs are ruled against the appellee. IT IS HEREBY SO ORDERED.
WHEN THIS CASE WAS CALLED FOR HEARING, COUNSELLOR M. WILKINS WRIG T APPEARED FOR THE APPELLANT. COUNSELLOR ALBERT S. SIMS APPEARED FOR
APPELLEE.
Revers d.