INTERCON SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., by and thru its Acting Project Manager, Appellant, v. HIS HONOUR ARTHUR K. WILLIAMS, Assigned Judge, National Labour Court, and PERU M. K. KERKULA et al., Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONAL LABOUR COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Heard: April 24, 2002. Decided: June 14, 2002.

1. A release is a liberation from an obligation, duty, or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced; a discharge, a surrender.
2. A release is the relinquishment or concession of a right, title, or claim.
3. The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances.
4. The voluntary signing of a release by a party terminates his suit brought against the party released in the document of release.
5. The consent of a number of co-party litigants, expressed individually in the form of a release, does not extinguish the right of other co-party litigants who together jointly instituted the suit but were not parties to the release.

The appellant, Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. appealed from a ruling of the National Labour Court, Montserrado County, reversing the ruling of the hearing officer who dismissed the appellees claims against the appellant and awarding the appellees US$155,776.32 for the determination of unfair labour practice. The appellant contended that the appellees could not maintain the action against it because the period for which they were claiming compensation was the pre-employment training period, that the training was a prerequisite to their employment, that its obligations commenced only when the appellees signed the standard of employment document, that they had agreed to this condition of employment, that in any event they had been compensated following the termination of their services, and that they had executed individual releases in its favour. The appellees had contended that the appellant had failed to pay them for the period they spent in their pre-employment training.
The Supreme Court agreed with the contention of the appellant, noting that with the receipt of compensation and the execution of individual releases by some of the appellees in favour of the appellant, the signers of the releases had waived all rights to sue the appellant and had, by signing the release, terminated their suit and waived all future claims and demand against the appellant, and rendering the action dismissible as to those appellees. In that respect, the Court affirmed the ruling of the hearing officer and reversed the ruling of the National Labour Court Judge. The Court observed, however, that the execution of releases by some of the appellees did not affect the rights of those appellees who did not accept compensation and execute releases, and therefore as to the non-signing appellees their claims continued to exist.
The Court agreed with the appellant that the Labor Laws of Liberian granted to the employer the right to hire, set conditions, standards, rules, and regulations of employment, as well as the right to promote or not to promote, to retire, and to dismiss employees. But it noted that the contention in that respect was secondary and therefore did not affect the claim of the non-signing appellees. The Court accordingly reversed the portion of the hearing officer’s ruling which dismissed the claims of the non-signing appellees, and remanded the case to the Ministry of Labour for a proper determination of the claims of the non-signing appellees by the hearing officer.

David A. B. Jallah represented the appellant. Emmanuel S. Koroma and Cooper Kruah represented the appellees.

MADAM CHIEF JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is the third time that this matter has been brought before this Honourable Supreme Court for consideration. The first time was on an appeal to this Court to review the decision of the National Labour Judge dismissing the summary proceedings against Hearing Officer G. Rudolphus Brown. At that time, we ordered that the case be remanded to the Ministry of Labour for hearing on its merits. When the case next came before us this Court confirmed the ruling of the National Labour Court Judge in an opinion rendered on January 25, 1996.
In compliance with the decision of this Court, the hearing of the appellees’ complaint of unfair labour practices was held and the hearing officer, G. Rudolphus Brown, dismissed the appellees’ complaint. The appellees duly appealed from that decision and filed a petition for judicial review before the National Labour Court. The judge of the National Labour Court reversed the ruling of the hearing officer and granted an award of US$155,776.32 (One Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars and Thirty Two Cents) in favour of the appellees. Not being satisfied with the ruling of the National Labour Court on the petition for judicial review, the appellant announced an appeal therefrom. The National Labour Court judge denied the appeal announced by the appellant. Whereupon, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Assigned Chambers Justice of the Honourable Supreme Court. The writ was ordered issued and eventually the matter traveled to this Honourable Court en banc for consideration.
In its decision this Court ordered and mandated the National Labour Court judge to grant the appeal. The judge of the National Labour Court complied with this Court’s mandate and granted the appellant’s appeal nunc pro tunc. The appellant completed the statutory appeal procedure which squarely placed this matter before this Honourable Court for appellate review of the law, facts, circumstances relied on by the National Labour Court judge in deciding the case. These now form the substance of this third review.
The certified records before this Court reveal that the appellees herein filed a complaint of unfair labour practices before the Ministry of Labour in January of 1995. The appellees complained that they were not paid for the pre-employment training period, the in-service training period, the muster roll call, and payment or compensation of daily wages for being ordered to return home after muster or roll call.
The appellant, for its part, basically contended that the period spent in pre-employment training was a condition precedent to employing the appellees, and that this was acknowledged and consented to by the appellees, and hence, the appellant’s obligations to the appellees commenced only when the appellees signed the standard of performance document, which created the employer-employee relationship between the appellees and the appellant. The appellant also argued that the other acts complained of by the appellees were all included in the standard of performance document, which the appellees consented to when they voluntarily affixed their signatures thereto. The appellant further contended that under the Labour Practices Laws of Liberia it had the right to exercise and did exercise its right to terminate the services of the appellees. It argued also that it had informed and brought to the attention of the hearing officer and presented documentary evidence showing that the matter which was being investigated had been settled and that the appellees had signed releases relinquishing all claims against it, resulting from the appellees tenure of service or employment with it.
The issue which this Court finds decisive of this controversy is whether or not a release agreed to and signed by the parties during the pendency of a suit terminates the action? To answer this question we shall firstly take recourse to the records certified to this Court for appellate review. The records reveal that the allegations of unfair labour practices complained of were not denied by the appellant during the investigation conducted by the hearing officer at the Ministry of Labour. All of the witnesses for the appellant informed the hearing officer that the policies executed and enforced by the appellant, Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. were inclusive in the standard of performance and conduct agreement signed voluntarily and individually by the appellees. The acts complained of having been denied by the appellant, this Court shall repeat the relevant portion of its decision handed down previously in the case Inter-Con Security System, Inc. v. Nuahn et al. and Williams, which established the following broad guideline to govern employment contract:

“The lawmakers must have had a reason to require that rules and regulations made by employers to govern the conditions of employment of employees must be approved by the Ministry of Labour. The rationale for this was to ensure conformity with not only the letter but also the spirit and intent of the Labour Practices Laws of Liberia. The second rationale was that the fear of loss of employment by employees was deemed so great that discussions of rules and regulations could not be left solely between the employer and the employees. This Court upholds and reaffirms the employers right to hire, set conditions, rules, standards, and regulations of employment, promote, not to promote, retire, dismiss, etc., with the provision that all acts of an employer must be within the spirit and intent of the Constitution and relevant statute laws of this Republic.”

“…Before concluding, this Court holds and confirms the principles of good management to motivate and improve the skills and output of its employees and the organization. We reiterate that we confirm and affirm the right of the employer to hire, fire, transfer, promote, and take other administrative actions as long as the actions are within the pale of the law.”
The foregoing is a secondary issue, the importance of which shall become apparent after we determine the issue of the releases signed by several of the appellees herein.
The appellant’s contention that several of the appellees had signed a release relinquishing any claim whatsoever against the appellant that might arise from the appellees’ tenure of service with the appellant. The appellees, in response to the revelation made by counsel for the appellant and the presenta-tion of documentary evidence, told the administrative or investigative hearing that the release was a special release and not a general release and, hence, that the appellant was still answerable to the appellees who had consented to a settlement during the pendency of this action. The appellees further contended that the intent of the special release signed by them was to effect a compromise of the benefits they were entitled to upon their summary dismissal by the appellant after all of the appellees had instituted the complaint of unfair labour practices. We shall examine the content of the release in controversy to determine what was the intent of the parties thereto and consequently what rights and obligations flowed therefrom. We now quote verbatim the said release:

“REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA )

MONTSERRADO COUNTY)

INTER-CON SECURITY SYSTEM, INC.
SPECIAL RELEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, PERO M. KERKULA, the undersigned, of the City of Monrovia do hereby accept the amount of Five Hundred United States Dollars (US$500.00), as being final pay of my TERMINATION which was in keeping with the Labour Law. Therefore, having received the above mentioned sum, I do hereby voluntarily discharge forever Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc., its owners, affiliate or associate companies, of any suit, actions, claims and demands in connection with my termination whatsoever, both in law and equity.

And I undertake and promise never to institute any other claim, suit, action or demand before any court of law or administrative agency or public authority in regards with my termination claim during or after my entire tenure of employment with the management of Inter-Con Security System, Inc.

In view of the foregoing, I hereby declare that I have no further claim or claims against the management of Inter-Con Security System, Inc. whatsoever, growing out of my termination.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE

ON THIS 1ST DAY OF MAY, A.D.

1995, EXECUTED THIS SPECIAL

RELEASE.

SIGNED:

PERO M. KERKULA

WITNESS:
Black Law Dictionary defines release as follow:

1. Liberation from an obligation, duty or demand; the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced … Also termed discharge; surrender.
2. The relinquishment or concession of a right, title, or claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (7th ed.)

At section 30, in 66 AM JUR2d., release is stated thus:

Intention of the parties.

“The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the entire instrument where that is possible. In interpreting a release to determine whether a particular claim has been discharged, the primary rule of construction is that the intention of the parties shall govern, and this intention is to be determined with a consideration of what was within the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed, which in turn is to be resolved in the light of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted.”
Our application of the above quoted rule of construction of a release to the entire instrument in controversy has enable this Court to determine that the intent of the parties thereto is clear and unambiguous. It is the finding of this Court that for the consideration of US$500.00 each appellee who affixed his/her signature to the said document under review consented to “voluntarily discharge forever Inter-Con Security Systems Inc., its owners, affiliated or associated companies, of any suit, actions, claims and demands in connection with my termination whatsoever both in law and equity…”
The import of the foregoing words are very clear. It is the view of this Court that the above quoted relevant portion of the release addressed the relinquishment by the appellees of any present rights, claims and demands whatsoever that had accrued under the Labor Law and were being asserted in the appropriate quasi-judicial forum. The first paragraph releases the appellant, its owners, affiliates, or associate companies from answering to the pending suit and any and all claims and demands flowing therefrom. The second paragraph of the release confirms this Court’s construction of the intent of the parties therein to terminate this action and settle the controversy. The second paragraph continues:

“AND I undertake and promise never to institute any other claim…” (Emphasis ours).
It is therefore our view that the subject and intent of the parties herein is that the appellees concerned, in addition to relinquishing their rights in the pending action before the Ministry of Labour, also relinquished any right to commence a future or another action or claim or demand.
The closing paragraph encompasses and totally extinguish-es the claims or demands, whether currently being asserted in an action or suit, or any claim or demand whatsoever which may vest or accrue in the future. The paragraph succinctly states the appellees voluntary consent, as follows:

“In view of the foregoing, I hereby declare that I have no further claim or claims against the management of Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc….”
Again, this Court concludes that the clear, unambiguous and expressed intent of each appellee who affixed his/her signature to the release under review is that he/she relinquished all rights whatsoever to continue the prosecution of the action pending and the right to bring a suit or action in the future, thereby absolving the appellant of any current or future liability to the appellees which has or may accrue as a result of the appellees tenure of service with the appellant, as well as the subsequent summary termination of appellees’ services by appellant.
In view of the foregoing, this Court confirms and affirms the ruling of the hearing officer in part, as far as it affects all of the appellees who signed the release under review. This Court finds that the hearing officer was correct in part and acted within the pale of the law in handing down a ruling, after an investigation, which dismissed the complaint of unfair labor practice on the ground that the appellees had terminated the suit when they voluntarily signed the release. This Court therefore finds that those appellees who voluntarily signed the release consented to terminate this action and to extinguish all future claims and demands against appellant. Accordingly, the complaint and the entire action of unfair labor practice are or-dered dismissed with respect to all former employees or their representative who affixed their signatures to the said release.
This Court also finds that those appellees who did not sign the release under review continue to have all their rights and privileges as provided for by the Labor Laws, the statute, and the Constitution of this Republic. Hence, it was erroneous for the hearing to make a ruling which extinguished the rights of those appellees who did not sign the release. The said release was not executed jointly. Rather, it was prepared and executed individually by the appellees who consented. The consent of a number of co-party litigants, expressed individually, does not extinguish the rights of other co-party litigants who together jointly instituted the action or claim.
Wherefore and in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby confirms each release signed by any of the appellees herein and orders that the appellant’s obligation and liability current-ly or in the future terminated on the day and date those appellees signed or affixed their signatures to the mentioned release.
This Court also declares that the rights of each employee who did not sign the release remain in full force and effect. Hence, the ruling of the hearing officer is reversed in part and the case is remanded to the hearing officer to determine the liability of the appellant to those appellees who did not sign the release, consistent with the Labor Laws, and other statutes controlling and decisions of this Honourable Court. We also order that the hearing officer be guided by the relevant laws and the relevant quoted portions of this Court’s decision in the case Inter-Con Security System, Inc. v. Nuahn et al. and Williams, decided at the March Term, A. D. 1999.
Wherefore and in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby states again that it affirms that part of the hearing officer’s decision dismissing the complaint and action against each of the appellees who signed the release and reverse that part of the said ruling of the hearing officer made against those appellees who did not sign the release. Hence, we remand the case with instructions that the hearing officer determine the amount of the appellant’s liability to each of the appellees who did not sign the release. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the Ministry of Labour ordering the hearing officer therein to give effect to this Court’s opinion. Costs are ruled against the appellant. And it is hereby so ordered.

Ruling confirmed in part and reversed in part.